man: document systemd.random-seed=

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Lennart Poettering
2020-06-24 15:33:48 +02:00
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<term><varname>systemd.clock-usec=</varname></term>
<listitem><para>Takes a decimal, numeric timestamp in µs since January 1st 1970, 00:00am, to set the
system clock to. The system time is set to the specified timestamp early during
boot. It is not propagated to the hardware clock (RTC).</para></listitem>
system clock to. The system time is set to the specified timestamp early during boot. It is not
propagated to the hardware clock (RTC).</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>systemd.random-seed=</varname></term>
<listitem><para>Takes a base64 encoded random seed value to credit with full entropy to the kernel's
random pool during early service manager initialization. This option is useful in testing
environments where delays due to random pool initialization in entropy starved virtual machines shall
be avoided.</para>
<para>Note that if this option is used the seed is accessible to unprivileged programs from
<filename>/proc/cmdline</filename>. This option is hence a security risk when used outside of test
systems, since the (possibly) only seed used for initialization of the kernel's entropy pool might be
easily acquired by unprivileged programs.</para>
<para>It is recommended to pass 512 bytes of randomized data (as that matches the Linux kernel pool
size), which may be generated with a command like the following:</para>
<programlisting>dd if=/dev/urandom bs=512 count=1 status=none | base64 -w 0</programlisting>
<para>Again: do not use this option outside of testing environments, it's a security risk elsewhere,
as secret key material derived from the entropy pool can possibly be reconstructed by unprivileged
programs.</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>