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cryptsetup: Add fixate-volume-key option to pin the expected volume key hash

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The expected hash (SHA265 HMAC signature) uses the exact same algorithm which
is used to calculate sha256 PCR bank digest when 'tpm2-measure-pcr=' is used.
This commit is contained in:
Vitaly Kuznetsov
2026-01-19 17:49:39 +01:00
parent f99f843f24
commit 69fab29ec4
4 changed files with 131 additions and 15 deletions
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src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c
+52 -15
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@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static char *arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr = NULL;
static char *arg_link_keyring = NULL;
static char *arg_link_key_type = NULL;
static char *arg_link_key_description = NULL;
static char *arg_fixate_volume_key = NULL;
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_cipher, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_hash, freep);
@@ -143,6 +144,7 @@ STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_pcrlock, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_link_keyring, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_link_key_type, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_link_key_description, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fixate_volume_key, freep);
static const char* const passphrase_type_table[_PASSPHRASE_TYPE_MAX] = {
[PASSPHRASE_REGULAR] = "passphrase",
@@ -651,6 +653,11 @@ static int parse_one_option(const char *option) {
#else
log_error("Build lacks libcryptsetup support for linking volume keys in user specified kernel keyrings upon device activation, ignoring: %s", option);
#endif
} else if ((val = startswith(option, "fixate-volume-key="))) {
r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fixate_volume_key, val);
if (r < 0)
return log_oom();
} else if (!streq(option, "x-initrd.attach"))
log_warning("Encountered unknown /etc/crypttab option '%s', ignoring.", option);
@@ -1050,24 +1057,29 @@ static int measure_volume_key(
* unprotected direct hash of the secret volume key over the wire to the TPM. Hence let's instead
* send a HMAC signature instead. */
_cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL;
escaped = xescape(name, ":"); /* avoid ambiguity around ":" once we join things below */
if (!escaped)
return log_oom();
_cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL;
s = strjoin("cryptsetup:", escaped, ":", strempty(crypt_get_uuid(cd)));
if (!s)
return log_oom();
/* Note: what is extended to the SHA256 bank here must match the expected hash of 'fixate-volume-key='
* calculated by cryptsetup_get_volume_key_id(). */
r = cryptsetup_get_volume_key_prefix(cd, name, &prefix);
if (r)
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not verify pcr banks: %m");
r = tpm2_pcr_extend_bytes(c, l ?: arg_tpm2_measure_banks, arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, &IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(s), &IOVEC_MAKE(volume_key, volume_key_size), TPM2_EVENT_VOLUME_KEY, s);
r = tpm2_pcr_extend_bytes(
c,
/* banks= */ l ?: arg_tpm2_measure_banks,
/* pcr_index = */ arg_tpm2_measure_pcr,
/* data = */ &IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(prefix),
/* secret = */ &IOVEC_MAKE(volume_key, volume_key_size),
/* event_type = */ TPM2_EVENT_VOLUME_KEY,
/* description = */ prefix);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not extend PCR: %m");
log_struct(LOG_INFO,
LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_TPM_PCR_EXTEND_STR),
LOG_MESSAGE("Successfully extended PCR index %u with '%s' and volume key (banks %s).", arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, s, joined),
LOG_ITEM("MEASURING=%s", s),
LOG_MESSAGE("Successfully extended PCR index %u with '%s' and volume key (banks %s).", arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, prefix, joined),
LOG_ITEM("MEASURING=%s", prefix),
LOG_ITEM("PCR=%u", arg_tpm2_measure_pcr),
LOG_ITEM("BANKS=%s", joined));
@@ -1173,12 +1185,36 @@ static int measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(
/* A wrapper around crypt_activate_by_volume_key() which also measures to a PCR if that's requested. */
/* First, check if volume key digest matches the expectation. */
if (arg_fixate_volume_key) {
_cleanup_free_ char *key_id = NULL;
r = cryptsetup_get_volume_key_id(
cd,
/* volume_name= */ name,
/* volume_key= */ volume_key,
/* volume_key_size= */ volume_key_size,
/* ret= */ &key_id);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to get volume key id.");
if (!streq(arg_fixate_volume_key, key_id))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Volume key id: '%s' does not match the expectation: '%s'.",
key_id, arg_fixate_volume_key);
}
r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size, flags);
if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */
return log_external_activation(r, name);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr == UINT_MAX) {
log_debug("Not measuring volume key, deactivated.");
return 0;
}
if (volume_key_size > 0)
(void) measure_volume_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size); /* OK if fails */
else
@@ -1204,14 +1240,12 @@ static int measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(
assert(cd);
/* A wrapper around crypt_activate_by_passphrase() which also measures to a PCR if that's
* requested. Note that we need the volume key for the measurement, and
* requested. Note that we may need the volume key for the measurement and/or for the comparison, and
* crypt_activate_by_passphrase() doesn't give us access to this. Hence, we operate indirectly, and
* retrieve the volume key first, and then activate through that. */
if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr == UINT_MAX) {
log_debug("Not measuring volume key, deactivated.");
if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr == UINT_MAX && !arg_fixate_volume_key)
goto shortcut;
}
r = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
if (r < 0)
@@ -1453,6 +1487,9 @@ static bool use_token_plugins(void) {
return false;
if (arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr)
return false;
/* Volume key is also needed if the expected key id is set */
if (arg_fixate_volume_key)
return false;
#endif
/* Disable tokens if we're in FIDO2 mode with manual parameters. */