From ada6409d6acc41cd7b5071afc9786089335242f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lennart Poettering Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2026 09:54:34 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] vmspawn: bring external and internal enum value names back in sync We generally want that the exposed strings for enum values and the internal names for them stay in sync. Let's make sure this is the case for the ConfidentialComputing enum. This just changes the internal names, so that they match the external ones. No user visible change, just some search and replace. --- src/vmspawn/vmspawn-settings.c | 6 +++--- src/vmspawn/vmspawn-settings.h | 4 ++-- src/vmspawn/vmspawn.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmspawn/vmspawn-settings.c b/src/vmspawn/vmspawn-settings.c index 043920c36c..f3fdbd0001 100644 --- a/src/vmspawn/vmspawn-settings.c +++ b/src/vmspawn/vmspawn-settings.c @@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ static const char *const firmware_table[_FIRMWARE_MAX] = { DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(firmware, Firmware); static const char *const confidential_computing_table[_COCO_MAX] = { - [COCO_NO] = "no", - [COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP] = "sev-snp", - [COCO_INTEL_TDX] = "tdx", + [COCO_NO] = "no", + [COCO_SEV_SNP] = "sev-snp", + [COCO_TDX] = "tdx", }; DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(confidential_computing, ConfidentialComputing); diff --git a/src/vmspawn/vmspawn-settings.h b/src/vmspawn/vmspawn-settings.h index 68231b8120..65aae54894 100644 --- a/src/vmspawn/vmspawn-settings.h +++ b/src/vmspawn/vmspawn-settings.h @@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ typedef enum Firmware { typedef enum ConfidentialComputing { COCO_NO, - COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP, - COCO_INTEL_TDX, + COCO_SEV_SNP, + COCO_TDX, _COCO_MAX, _COCO_INVALID = -EINVAL, } ConfidentialComputing; diff --git a/src/vmspawn/vmspawn.c b/src/vmspawn/vmspawn.c index 8fb7e10492..b34f4daf84 100644 --- a/src/vmspawn/vmspawn.c +++ b/src/vmspawn/vmspawn.c @@ -2513,8 +2513,8 @@ static int prepare_device_info(const char *runtime_dir, MachineConfig *c) { * deviate slightly from our own names for the same modes (cf. confidential_computing_to_string()): * "sev-snp" vs. "amd-sev-snp", and "tdx" vs. "intel-tdx". */ static const char* const coco_firmware_feature_table[_COCO_MAX] = { - [COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP] = "amd-sev-snp", - [COCO_INTEL_TDX] = "intel-tdx", + [COCO_SEV_SNP] = "amd-sev-snp", + [COCO_TDX] = "intel-tdx", }; DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(coco_firmware_feature, ConfidentialComputing); @@ -2760,11 +2760,11 @@ static int run_virtual_machine(int kvm_device_fd, int vhost_device_fd) { return r; } - if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP) { + if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_SEV_SNP) { r = qemu_config_key(config_file, "confidential-guest-support", "snp0"); if (r < 0) return r; - } else if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_INTEL_TDX) { + } else if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_TDX) { r = qemu_config_key(config_file, "confidential-guest-support", "tdx0"); if (r < 0) return r; @@ -2962,7 +2962,7 @@ static int run_virtual_machine(int kvm_device_fd, int vhost_device_fd) { return r; } - if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP) { + if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_SEV_SNP) { /* SNP marks encrypted guest pages via the "C-bit" in the page table entry. On all * SNP-capable processors (Milan and later) the C-bit lives at bit 51, which reduces * the usable guest physical address space by one bit. @@ -2976,7 +2976,7 @@ static int run_virtual_machine(int kvm_device_fd, int vhost_device_fd) { "kernel-hashes", "on"); if (r < 0) return r; - } else if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_INTEL_TDX) { + } else if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_TDX) { r = qemu_config_section(config_file, "object", "tdx0", "qom-type", "tdx-guest"); if (r < 0) @@ -3036,9 +3036,9 @@ static int run_virtual_machine(int kvm_device_fd, int vhost_device_fd) { * CPU model. */ const char *cpu_model = #ifdef __x86_64__ - arg_confidential_computing == COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP ? "EPYC-v4" : - arg_confidential_computing == COCO_INTEL_TDX ? "host" : - "max,hv_relaxed,hv-vapic,hv-time"; + arg_confidential_computing == COCO_SEV_SNP ? "EPYC-v4" : + arg_confidential_computing == COCO_TDX ? "host" : + "max,hv_relaxed,hv-vapic,hv-time"; #else "max"; #endif @@ -3616,7 +3616,7 @@ static int run_virtual_machine(int kvm_device_fd, int vhost_device_fd) { * /.extra/system_credentials/, so we keep this scoped to SNP for now. Non-SNP guests * continue to use the SMBIOS path below, which works with older systemd versions too. * Must run after all credential-mutating calls above so the cpio captures the complete set. */ - bool use_initrd_cpio = arg_confidential_computing == COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP && + bool use_initrd_cpio = arg_confidential_computing == COCO_SEV_SNP && arg_credentials.n_credentials > 0; _cleanup_(unlink_and_freep) char *credentials_cpio_path = NULL; @@ -4225,7 +4225,7 @@ static int verify_arguments(void) { "confidential computing firmware is stateless. Use 'off' or 'auto'."); } - if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP) { + if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_SEV_SNP) { if (native_architecture() != ARCHITECTURE_X86_64) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "--coco=sev-snp is only supported on x86_64."); @@ -4248,7 +4248,7 @@ static int verify_arguments(void) { "so kernel, initrd and cmdline are covered by the launch measurement."); } - if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_INTEL_TDX) { + if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_TDX) { if (native_architecture() != ARCHITECTURE_X86_64) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "--coco=tdx is only supported on x86_64.");