treewide: fix a few typos in NEWS, docs, comments, and log messages

This commit is contained in:
Dmitry V. Levin
2024-04-27 12:11:13 +02:00
committed by Luca Boccassi
parent ec361ea9ce
commit c309b9e9c3
24 changed files with 27 additions and 27 deletions
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@@ -2311,7 +2311,7 @@ static int setup_exec_directory(
* doesn't exist, then we likely are upgrading from an older systemd version that
* didn't know the more recent addition to the xdg-basedir spec: the $XDG_STATE_HOME
* directory. In older systemd versions EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE was aliased to
* EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION, with the advent of $XDG_STATE_HOME is is now
* EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION, with the advent of $XDG_STATE_HOME it is now
* separated. If a service has both dirs configured but only the configuration dir
* exists and the state dir does not, we assume we are looking at an update
* situation. Hence, create a compatibility symlink, so that all expectations are
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@@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ static int manager_setup_handoff_timestamp_fd(Manager *m) {
assert(m);
/* Set up the socket pair used for for passing timestamps back when the executor processes we fork
/* Set up the socket pair used for passing timestamps back when the executor processes we fork
* off invokes execve(), i.e. when we hand off control to our payload processes. */
if (m->handoff_timestamp_fds[0] < 0) {
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@@ -2007,7 +2007,7 @@ static void service_enter_dead(Service *s, ServiceResult f, bool allow_restart)
assert(restart_state >= 0 && restart_state < _SERVICE_STATE_MAX);
/* We make two state changes here: one that maps to the high-level UNIT_INACTIVE/UNIT_FAILED
* state (i.e. a state indicating deactivation), and then one that that maps to the
* state (i.e. a state indicating deactivation), and then one that maps to the
* high-level UNIT_STARTING state (i.e. a state indicating activation). We do this so that
* external software can watch the state changes and see all service failures, even if they
* are only transitionary and followed by an automatic restart. We have fine-grained
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@@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ static int acquire_home(
* LUKS image in case the image was used in a different system where the password was changed. In
* that case it will happen that the LUKS password and the host password are different, and we handle
* that by collecting and passing multiple passwords in that case. Hence we treat bad passwords as a
* request to collect one more password and pass the new all all previously used passwords again. */
* request to collect one more password and pass the new and all previously used passwords again. */
_cleanup_(sd_bus_unrefp) sd_bus *bus = NULL;
r = pam_acquire_bus_connection(handle, "pam-systemd-home", &bus, bus_data);
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@@ -3255,7 +3255,7 @@ static int generic_array_bisect_for_data(
} else {
/* If we are going upwards, then we need to return the last object that passes the test.
* When there is no object that passes the test, we need to return the the last object that
* When there is no object that passes the test, we need to return the last object that
* test_object() returns TEST_LEFT for. */
if (r == TEST_RIGHT)
return 0; /* Not only the 'extra' object, but also all objects in the chained arrays
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ typedef enum MountSettingsMask {
MOUNT_TOUCH = 1 << 9, /* if set, touch file to mount over first */
MOUNT_PREFIX_ROOT = 1 << 10,/* if set, prefix the source path with the container's root directory */
MOUNT_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS = 1 << 11,/* if set, we'll follow symlinks for the mount target */
MOUNT_PRIVILEGED = 1 << 12,/* if set, we'll only mount this in in the outer child if we are running in privileged mode */
MOUNT_PRIVILEGED = 1 << 12,/* if set, we'll only mount this in the outer child if we are running in privileged mode */
} MountSettingsMask;
typedef enum CustomMountType {
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@@ -4184,7 +4184,7 @@ static int outer_child(
* is then allocated for the container, the root mount and everything else will be out of reach for
* it. For unprivileged containers we cannot do that however, since we couldn't mount a sysfs and
* procfs then anymore, since that only works if there's an unobstructed instance currently
* visible. Hence there we do it the other way round: we first allocate a new set set of namespaces
* visible. Hence there we do it the other way round: we first allocate a new set of namespaces
* (and fork for it) for which we then mount sysfs/procfs, and only then switch root. */
if (arg_privileged) {
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@@ -2341,7 +2341,7 @@ static int event_determine_primary_algorithm(EventLog *el) {
}
FOREACH_ARRAY(alg, el->algorithms, el->n_algorithms) {
/* If we have SHA256, focus on that that */
/* If we have SHA256, focus on that */
if (*alg == TPM2_ALG_SHA256) {
el->primary_algorithm = *alg;
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@@ -2163,7 +2163,7 @@ int dissected_image_mount(
* If 'where' is not NULL then we'll either mount the partitions to the right places ourselves,
* or use DissectedPartition.fsmount_fd and bind it to the right places.
*
* This allows splitting the setting up up the superblocks and the binding to file systems paths into
* This allows splitting the setting up the superblocks and the binding to file systems paths into
* two distinct and differently privileged components: one that gets the fsmount fds, and the other
* that then applies them.
*
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@@ -1396,7 +1396,7 @@ int remount_idmap_fd(
assert(userns_fd >= 0);
/* This remounts all specified paths with the specified userns as idmap. It will do so in in the
/* This remounts all specified paths with the specified userns as idmap. It will do so in the
* order specified in the strv: the expectation is that the top-level directories are at the
* beginning, and nested directories in the right, so that the tree can be built correctly from left
* to right. */
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@@ -7205,7 +7205,7 @@ int tpm2_hmac_key_from_pin(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, const TPM2
/* Load the PIN (which we have stored in the "auth" TPM2B_AUTH) into the TPM as an HMAC key so that
* we can use it in a TPM2_PolicySigned() to write to the nvindex. For that we'll prep a pair of
* TPM2B_PUBLIC and TPM2B_SENSITIVE that defines an HMAC-SHA256 keyed hash function, and initialize
* it based on on the provided PIN data. */
* it based on the provided PIN data. */
TPM2B_PUBLIC auth_hmac_public = {
.publicArea = {
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@@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@ static int varlink_idl_field_consistent(
const VarlinkSymbol *found;
if (!field->symbol->name || !field->named_type || !streq(field->symbol->name, field->named_type))
return varlink_idl_log_full(level, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), "Resolved symbol name and named type of field '%s' in symbol '%s' do do not match, refusing.", field->name, symbol_name);
return varlink_idl_log_full(level, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), "Resolved symbol name and named type of field '%s' in symbol '%s' do not match, refusing.", field->name, symbol_name);
/* If this is a named type, then check if it's properly part of the interface */
found = varlink_idl_find_symbol(interface, _VARLINK_SYMBOL_TYPE_INVALID, field->symbol->name);
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@@ -1646,7 +1646,7 @@ def finalize_options(opts):
opts.verb = 'build'
# Check that --pcr-public-key=, --pcr-private-key=, and --phases=
# have either the same number of arguments are are not specified at all.
# have either the same number of arguments or are not specified at all.
n_pcr_pub = None if opts.pcr_public_keys is None else len(opts.pcr_public_keys)
n_pcr_priv = None if opts.pcr_private_keys is None else len(opts.pcr_private_keys)
n_phase_path_groups = None if opts.phase_path_groups is None else len(opts.phase_path_groups)