From ef7af0acf2f6fb31289e66960a2eb7cd2cd37f47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2023 23:30:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 01/20] test: add space-separated test for LogFilterPatterns --- test/testsuite-04.units/logs-filtering.service | 2 +- test/units/testsuite-04.LogFilterPatterns.sh | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/test/testsuite-04.units/logs-filtering.service b/test/testsuite-04.units/logs-filtering.service index 06210868fd..6e2af9a2a1 100644 --- a/test/testsuite-04.units/logs-filtering.service +++ b/test/testsuite-04.units/logs-filtering.service @@ -2,5 +2,5 @@ Description=Log filtering unit [Service] -ExecStart=sh -c 'while true; do echo "Logging from the service, and ~more~"; sleep .25; done' +ExecStart=sh -c 'while true; do echo "Logging from the service, and ~more~ foo bar"; sleep .25; done' SyslogLevel=notice diff --git a/test/units/testsuite-04.LogFilterPatterns.sh b/test/units/testsuite-04.LogFilterPatterns.sh index 3f889d1294..41cf8a1fa1 100755 --- a/test/units/testsuite-04.LogFilterPatterns.sh +++ b/test/units/testsuite-04.LogFilterPatterns.sh @@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ if is_xattr_supported; then add_logs_filtering_override "logs-filtering.service" "10-allow-with-escape-char" "\\\\x7emore~" [[ -n $(run_service_and_fetch_logs "logs-filtering.service") ]] + add_logs_filtering_override "logs-filtering.service" "11-reset" "" + add_logs_filtering_override "logs-filtering.service" "12-allow-with-spaces" "foo bar" + [[ -n $(run_service_and_fetch_logs "logs-filtering.service") ]] + add_logs_filtering_override "delegated-cgroup-filtering.service" "00-allow-all" ".*" [[ -n $(run_service_and_fetch_logs "delegated-cgroup-filtering.service") ]] From 58cb36e56b15e14da23a507f337af6bd26503e2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 00:06:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 02/20] env-util: add helper to replace env block --- src/basic/env-util.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ src/basic/env-util.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/basic/env-util.c b/src/basic/env-util.c index 44772f778d..d3bf73385f 100644 --- a/src/basic/env-util.c +++ b/src/basic/env-util.c @@ -1074,3 +1074,22 @@ int getenv_steal_erase(const char *name, char **ret) { return 1; } + +int set_full_environment(char **env) { + int r; + + clearenv(); + + STRV_FOREACH(e, env) { + _cleanup_free_ char *k = NULL, *v = NULL; + + r = split_pair(*e, "=", &k, &v); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (setenv(k, v, /* overwrite= */ true) < 0) + return -errno; + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/basic/env-util.h b/src/basic/env-util.h index ec3ac199ef..f7fb1e9082 100644 --- a/src/basic/env-util.h +++ b/src/basic/env-util.h @@ -77,3 +77,5 @@ int setenv_systemd_exec_pid(bool update_only); int getenv_path_list(const char *name, char ***ret_paths); int getenv_steal_erase(const char *name, char **ret); + +int set_full_environment(char **env); From 6ecdfe7d1008964eed3f67b489cef8c65a218bf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2023 16:06:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 03/20] process-util: add posix_spawn helper This provides CLONE_VM + CLONE_VFORK semantics, so it is useful to avoid CoW traps and other issues around doing work between fork() and exec(). --- src/basic/process-util.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/basic/process-util.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/basic/process-util.c b/src/basic/process-util.c index 4928379bd7..d0ffb2d614 100644 --- a/src/basic/process-util.c +++ b/src/basic/process-util.c @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -1732,6 +1733,51 @@ int make_reaper_process(bool b) { return 0; } +int posix_spawn_wrapper(const char *path, char *const *argv, char *const *envp, pid_t *ret_pid) { + posix_spawnattr_t attr; + sigset_t mask; + pid_t pid; + int r; + + /* Forks and invokes 'path' with 'argv' and 'envp' using CLONE_VM and CLONE_VFORK, which means the + * caller will be blocked until the child either exits or exec's. The memory of the child will be + * fully shared with the memory of the parent, so that there are no copy-on-write or memory.max + * issues. */ + + assert(path); + assert(argv); + assert(ret_pid); + + assert_se(sigfillset(&mask) >= 0); + + r = posix_spawnattr_init(&attr); + if (r != 0) + return -r; /* These functions return a positive errno on failure */ + r = posix_spawnattr_setflags(&attr, POSIX_SPAWN_SETSIGMASK); + if (r != 0) + goto fail; + r = posix_spawnattr_setflags(&attr, POSIX_SPAWN_SETSIGDEF); /* Set all signals to SIG_DFL */ + if (r != 0) + goto fail; + r = posix_spawnattr_setsigmask(&attr, &mask); + if (r != 0) + goto fail; + + r = posix_spawn(&pid, path, NULL, &attr, argv, envp); + if (r != 0) + goto fail; + + *ret_pid = pid; + + posix_spawnattr_destroy(&attr); + return 0; + +fail: + assert(r > 0); + posix_spawnattr_destroy(&attr); + return -r; +} + static const char *const sigchld_code_table[] = { [CLD_EXITED] = "exited", [CLD_KILLED] = "killed", diff --git a/src/basic/process-util.h b/src/basic/process-util.h index 8f87fdc2ae..0d50e797e5 100644 --- a/src/basic/process-util.h +++ b/src/basic/process-util.h @@ -210,3 +210,5 @@ int get_process_threads(pid_t pid); int is_reaper_process(void); int make_reaper_process(bool b); + +int posix_spawn_wrapper(const char *path, char *const *argv, char *const *envp, pid_t *ret_pid); From 97f53fecd6a8fa4c9768a0cf84ec49710ba39b8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2023 19:16:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 04/20] core: add exec_params_dump helper --- src/core/execute.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/core/execute.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c index ffbe0832f4..a45da470bd 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.c +++ b/src/core/execute.c @@ -5699,6 +5699,48 @@ static void strv_dump(FILE* f, const char *prefix, const char *name, char **strv } } +void exec_params_dump(const ExecParameters *p, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { + assert(p); + assert(f); + + prefix = strempty(prefix); + + fprintf(f, + "%sRuntimeScope: %s\n" + "%sExecFlags: %u\n" + "%sSELinuxContextNetwork: %s\n" + "%sCgroupSupportedMask: %u\n" + "%sCgroupPath: %s\n" + "%sCrededentialsDirectory: %s\n" + "%sEncryptedCredentialsDirectory: %s\n" + "%sConfirmSpawn: %s\n" + "%sShallConfirmSpawn: %s\n" + "%sWatchdogUSec: " USEC_FMT "\n" + "%sNotifySocket: %s\n" + "%sFallbackSmackProcessLabel: %s\n", + prefix, runtime_scope_to_string(p->runtime_scope), + prefix, p->flags, + prefix, yes_no(p->selinux_context_net), + prefix, p->cgroup_supported, + prefix, p->cgroup_path, + prefix, strempty(p->received_credentials_directory), + prefix, strempty(p->received_encrypted_credentials_directory), + prefix, strempty(p->confirm_spawn), + prefix, yes_no(p->shall_confirm_spawn), + prefix, p->watchdog_usec, + prefix, strempty(p->notify_socket), + prefix, strempty(p->fallback_smack_process_label)); + + strv_dump(f, prefix, "FdNames", p->fd_names); + strv_dump(f, prefix, "Environment", p->environment); + strv_dump(f, prefix, "Prefix", p->prefix); + + LIST_FOREACH(open_files, file, p->open_files) + fprintf(f, "%sOpenFile: %s %s", prefix, file->path, open_file_flags_to_string(file->flags)); + + strv_dump(f, prefix, "FilesEnv", p->files_env); +} + void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { int r; diff --git a/src/core/execute.h b/src/core/execute.h index a68ea37d83..732d31969f 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.h +++ b/src/core/execute.h @@ -508,6 +508,7 @@ DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(ExecRuntime*, exec_runtime_free); ExecRuntime* exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime *rt); void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters *p); +void exec_params_dump(const ExecParameters *p, FILE* f, const char *prefix); bool exec_context_get_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext *c); From 154eb43f384be360a42db3c9190ee15ca38c51ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2023 21:08:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 05/20] core: ensure execute/spawn functions can work without manager object When switching to serialization later, the Manager object will not be serialized, move parameters around instead --- src/core/bpf-lsm.c | 16 ++-- src/core/bpf-lsm.h | 2 +- src/core/cgroup.c | 9 ++- src/core/dynamic-user.c | 71 +++++++++++------- src/core/dynamic-user.h | 5 +- src/core/execute.c | 141 ++++++++++++++++------------------- src/core/execute.h | 9 ++- src/core/manager-serialize.c | 2 +- src/core/mount.c | 12 +-- src/core/service.c | 12 +-- src/core/socket.c | 12 +-- src/core/swap.c | 12 +-- src/core/unit.c | 16 ++++ 13 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 132 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/bpf-lsm.c b/src/core/bpf-lsm.c index 22200bd939..300486597b 100644 --- a/src/core/bpf-lsm.c +++ b/src/core/bpf-lsm.c @@ -154,7 +154,8 @@ int lsm_bpf_setup(Manager *m) { return 0; } -int lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const Set *filesystems, bool allow_list) { +int lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const Set *filesystems, int outer_map_fd, bool allow_list) { + _cleanup_close_ int outer_map_fd_cleanup = -EBADF; uint32_t dummy_value = 1, zero = 0; const char *fs; const statfs_f_type_t *magic; @@ -162,8 +163,9 @@ int lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const Set *filesystems, bool allo assert(filesystems); assert(u); + assert(outer_map_fd >= 0 || u->manager); - if (!u->manager->restrict_fs) + if (u->manager && !u->manager->restrict_fs) /* Might be called in sd-executor with no manager object */ return log_unit_error_errno(u, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "bpf-lsm: BPF LSM object is not installed, has setup failed?"); @@ -177,9 +179,11 @@ int lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const Set *filesystems, bool allo if (inner_map_fd < 0) return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "bpf-lsm: Failed to create inner BPF map: %m"); - int outer_map_fd = sym_bpf_map__fd(u->manager->restrict_fs->maps.cgroup_hash); - if (outer_map_fd < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "bpf-lsm: Failed to get BPF map fd: %m"); + if (outer_map_fd < 0) { + outer_map_fd_cleanup = outer_map_fd = sym_bpf_map__fd(u->manager->restrict_fs->maps.cgroup_hash); + if (outer_map_fd < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "bpf-lsm: Failed to get BPF map fd: %m"); + } if (sym_bpf_map_update_elem(outer_map_fd, &u->cgroup_id, &inner_map_fd, BPF_ANY) != 0) return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "bpf-lsm: Error populating BPF map: %m"); @@ -263,7 +267,7 @@ int lsm_bpf_setup(Manager *m) { return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "bpf-lsm: Failed to set up LSM BPF: %m"); } -int lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const Set *filesystems, const bool allow_list) { +int lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const Set *filesystems, int outer_map_fd, const bool allow_list) { return log_unit_debug_errno(u, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "bpf-lsm: Failed to restrict filesystems using LSM BPF: %m"); } diff --git a/src/core/bpf-lsm.h b/src/core/bpf-lsm.h index dff581279d..5eb03ae7fb 100644 --- a/src/core/bpf-lsm.h +++ b/src/core/bpf-lsm.h @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ typedef struct restrict_fs_bpf restrict_fs_bpf; bool lsm_bpf_supported(bool initialize); int lsm_bpf_setup(Manager *m); -int lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const Set *filesystems, bool allow_list); +int lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const Set *filesystems, int outer_map_fd, bool allow_list); int lsm_bpf_cleanup(const Unit *u); int lsm_bpf_map_restrict_fs_fd(Unit *u); void lsm_bpf_destroy(struct restrict_fs_bpf *prog); diff --git a/src/core/cgroup.c b/src/core/cgroup.c index 47bab04f42..69c9d9a9bb 100644 --- a/src/core/cgroup.c +++ b/src/core/cgroup.c @@ -143,7 +143,14 @@ static void cgroup_compat_warn(void) { void cgroup_context_init(CGroupContext *c) { assert(c); - /* Initialize everything to the kernel defaults. */ + /* Initialize everything to the kernel defaults. When initializing a bool member to 'true', make + * sure to serialize in execute-serialize.c using serialize_bool() instead of + * serialize_bool_elide(), as sd-executor will initialize here to 'true', but serialize_bool_elide() + * skips serialization if the value is 'false' (as that's the common default), so if the value at + * runtime is zero it would be lost after deserialization. Same when initializing uint64_t and other + * values, update/add a conditional serialization check. This is to minimize the amount of + * serialized data that is sent to the sd-executor, so that there is less work to do on the default + * cases. */ *c = (CGroupContext) { .cpu_weight = CGROUP_WEIGHT_INVALID, diff --git a/src/core/dynamic-user.c b/src/core/dynamic-user.c index e99a6694f6..2cab0d44ac 100644 --- a/src/core/dynamic-user.c +++ b/src/core/dynamic-user.c @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ /* Takes a value generated randomly or by hashing and turns it into a UID in the right range */ #define UID_CLAMP_INTO_RANGE(rnd) (((uid_t) (rnd) % (DYNAMIC_UID_MAX - DYNAMIC_UID_MIN + 1)) + DYNAMIC_UID_MIN) -DEFINE_PRIVATE_TRIVIAL_REF_FUNC(DynamicUser, dynamic_user); +DEFINE_TRIVIAL_REF_FUNC(DynamicUser, dynamic_user); static DynamicUser* dynamic_user_free(DynamicUser *d) { if (!d) @@ -43,13 +43,15 @@ static int dynamic_user_add(Manager *m, const char *name, int storage_socket[sta DynamicUser *d; int r; - assert(m); + assert(m || ret); assert(name); assert(storage_socket); - r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&m->dynamic_users, &string_hash_ops); - if (r < 0) - return r; + if (m) { /* Might be called in sd-executor with no manager object */ + r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&m->dynamic_users, &string_hash_ops); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } d = malloc0(offsetof(DynamicUser, name) + strlen(name) + 1); if (!d) @@ -60,10 +62,12 @@ static int dynamic_user_add(Manager *m, const char *name, int storage_socket[sta d->storage_socket[0] = storage_socket[0]; d->storage_socket[1] = storage_socket[1]; - r = hashmap_put(m->dynamic_users, d->name, d); - if (r < 0) { - free(d); - return r; + if (m) { /* Might be called in sd-executor with no manager object */ + r = hashmap_put(m->dynamic_users, d->name, d); + if (r < 0) { + free(d); + return r; + } } d->manager = m; @@ -603,37 +607,49 @@ static DynamicUser* dynamic_user_destroy(DynamicUser *d) { return dynamic_user_free(d); } -int dynamic_user_serialize(Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { - DynamicUser *d; +int dynamic_user_serialize_one(DynamicUser *d, const char *key, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { + int copy0, copy1; - assert(m); + assert(key); assert(f); assert(fds); - /* Dump the dynamic user database into the manager serialization, to deal with daemon reloads. */ + if (!d) + return 0; - HASHMAP_FOREACH(d, m->dynamic_users) { - int copy0, copy1; + if (d->storage_socket[0] < 0 || d->storage_socket[1] < 0) + return 0; - copy0 = fdset_put_dup(fds, d->storage_socket[0]); - if (copy0 < 0) - return log_error_errno(copy0, "Failed to add dynamic user storage fd to serialization: %m"); + copy0 = fdset_put_dup(fds, d->storage_socket[0]); + if (copy0 < 0) + return log_error_errno(copy0, "Failed to add dynamic user storage fd to serialization: %m"); - copy1 = fdset_put_dup(fds, d->storage_socket[1]); - if (copy1 < 0) - return log_error_errno(copy1, "Failed to add dynamic user storage fd to serialization: %m"); + copy1 = fdset_put_dup(fds, d->storage_socket[1]); + if (copy1 < 0) + return log_error_errno(copy1, "Failed to add dynamic user storage fd to serialization: %m"); - (void) serialize_item_format(f, "dynamic-user", "%s %i %i", d->name, copy0, copy1); - } + (void) serialize_item_format(f, key, "%s %i %i", d->name, copy0, copy1); return 0; } -void dynamic_user_deserialize_one(Manager *m, const char *value, FDSet *fds) { +int dynamic_user_serialize(Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { + DynamicUser *d; + + assert(m); + + /* Dump the dynamic user database into the manager serialization, to deal with daemon reloads. */ + + HASHMAP_FOREACH(d, m->dynamic_users) + (void) dynamic_user_serialize_one(d, "dynamic-user", f, fds); + + return 0; +} + +void dynamic_user_deserialize_one(Manager *m, const char *value, FDSet *fds, DynamicUser **ret) { _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL, *s0 = NULL, *s1 = NULL; int r, fd0, fd1; - assert(m); assert(value); assert(fds); @@ -655,7 +671,7 @@ void dynamic_user_deserialize_one(Manager *m, const char *value, FDSet *fds) { return; } - r = dynamic_user_add(m, name, (int[]) { fd0, fd1 }, NULL); + r = dynamic_user_add(m, name, (int[]) { fd0, fd1 }, ret); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add dynamic user: %m"); return; @@ -663,6 +679,9 @@ void dynamic_user_deserialize_one(Manager *m, const char *value, FDSet *fds) { (void) fdset_remove(fds, fd0); (void) fdset_remove(fds, fd1); + + if (ret) /* If the caller uses it directly, increment the refcount */ + (*ret)->n_ref++; } void dynamic_user_vacuum(Manager *m, bool close_user) { diff --git a/src/core/dynamic-user.h b/src/core/dynamic-user.h index 6539d17571..679c588a76 100644 --- a/src/core/dynamic-user.h +++ b/src/core/dynamic-user.h @@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ struct DynamicUser { }; int dynamic_user_serialize(Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds); -void dynamic_user_deserialize_one(Manager *m, const char *value, FDSet *fds); +int dynamic_user_serialize_one(DynamicUser *d, const char *key, FILE *f, FDSet *fds); +void dynamic_user_deserialize_one(Manager *m, const char *value, FDSet *fds, DynamicUser **ret); void dynamic_user_vacuum(Manager *m, bool close_user); int dynamic_user_current(DynamicUser *d, uid_t *ret); @@ -41,3 +42,5 @@ DynamicCreds *dynamic_creds_destroy(DynamicCreds *creds); DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(DynamicCreds*, dynamic_creds_unref); DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(DynamicCreds*, dynamic_creds_destroy); + +DynamicUser *dynamic_user_ref(DynamicUser *user); diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c index a45da470bd..e305e7b8be 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.c +++ b/src/core/execute.c @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ #include "execute.h" #include "exit-status.h" #include "fd-util.h" +#include "fileio.h" #include "format-util.h" #include "glob-util.h" #include "hexdecoct.h" @@ -1770,20 +1771,21 @@ static int apply_lock_personality(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { #endif #if HAVE_LIBBPF -static int apply_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { +static int apply_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { assert(u); assert(c); + assert(p); if (!exec_context_restrict_filesystems_set(c)) return 0; - if (!u->manager->restrict_fs) { + if (p->bpf_outer_map_fd < 0) { /* LSM BPF is unsupported or lsm_bpf_setup failed */ log_unit_debug(u, "LSM BPF not supported, skipping RestrictFileSystems="); return 0; } - return lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(u, c->restrict_filesystems, c->restrict_filesystems_allow_list); + return lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(u, c->restrict_filesystems, p->bpf_outer_map_fd, c->restrict_filesystems_allow_list); } #endif @@ -2738,26 +2740,26 @@ fail: #if ENABLE_SMACK static int setup_smack( - const Manager *manager, + const ExecParameters *params, const ExecContext *context, int executable_fd) { int r; - assert(context); + assert(params); assert(executable_fd >= 0); if (context->smack_process_label) { r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label); if (r < 0) return r; - } else if (manager->defaults.smack_process_label) { + } else if (params->fallback_smack_process_label) { _cleanup_free_ char *exec_label = NULL; r = mac_smack_read_fd(executable_fd, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label); if (r < 0 && !ERRNO_IS_XATTR_ABSENT(r)) return r; - r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label ?: manager->defaults.smack_process_label); + r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label ?: params->fallback_smack_process_label); if (r < 0) return r; } @@ -3540,7 +3542,6 @@ static void append_socket_pair(int *array, size_t *n, const int pair[static 2]) static int close_remaining_fds( const ExecParameters *params, const ExecRuntime *runtime, - int user_lookup_fd, int socket_fd, const int *fds, size_t n_fds) { @@ -3578,8 +3579,8 @@ static int close_remaining_fds( append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->dynamic_creds->group->storage_socket); } - if (user_lookup_fd >= 0) - dont_close[n_dont_close++] = user_lookup_fd; + if (params->user_lookup_fd >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->user_lookup_fd; return close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close); } @@ -3950,20 +3951,16 @@ static bool exec_context_need_unprivileged_private_users( !strv_isempty(context->no_exec_paths); } +static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l); +static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, int named_iofds[static 3]); + static int exec_child( Unit *unit, const ExecCommand *command, const ExecContext *context, - const ExecParameters *params, + ExecParameters *params, ExecRuntime *runtime, const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, - int socket_fd, - const int named_iofds[static 3], - int *params_fds, - size_t n_socket_fds, - size_t n_storage_fds, - char **files_env, - int user_lookup_fd, int *exit_status) { _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pass_env = NULL, **joined_exec_search_path = NULL, **accum_env = NULL, **replaced_argv = NULL; @@ -3994,13 +3991,15 @@ static int exec_child( gid_t saved_gid = getgid(); uid_t uid = UID_INVALID; gid_t gid = GID_INVALID; - size_t n_fds = n_socket_fds + n_storage_fds, /* fds to pass to the child */ + size_t n_fds, /* fds to pass to the child */ n_keep_fds; /* total number of fds not to close */ int secure_bits; _cleanup_free_ gid_t *gids_after_pam = NULL; int ngids_after_pam = 0; _cleanup_free_ int *fds = NULL; _cleanup_strv_free_ char **fdnames = NULL; + int socket_fd = -EBADF, named_iofds[3] = { -EBADF, -EBADF, -EBADF }, *params_fds = NULL; + size_t n_storage_fds = 0, n_socket_fds = 0; assert(unit); assert(command); @@ -4012,6 +4011,28 @@ static int exec_child( assert(command->path); assert(!strv_isempty(command->argv)); + if (context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET || + context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET || + context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) { + + if (params->n_socket_fds > 1) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got more than one socket."); + + if (params->n_socket_fds == 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got no socket."); + + socket_fd = params->fds[0]; + } else { + params_fds = params->fds; + n_socket_fds = params->n_socket_fds; + n_storage_fds = params->n_storage_fds; + } + n_fds = n_socket_fds + n_storage_fds; + + r = exec_context_named_iofds(context, params, named_iofds); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m"); + rename_process_from_path(command->path); /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main @@ -4075,14 +4096,8 @@ static int exec_child( } #if HAVE_LIBBPF - if (unit->manager->restrict_fs) { - int bpf_map_fd = lsm_bpf_map_restrict_fs_fd(unit); - if (bpf_map_fd < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, bpf_map_fd, "Failed to get restrict filesystems BPF map fd: %m"); - } - - r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, bpf_map_fd, &bpf_map_fd); + if (params->bpf_outer_map_fd >= 0) { + r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, params->bpf_outer_map_fd, (int *)¶ms->bpf_outer_map_fd); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); @@ -4090,7 +4105,7 @@ static int exec_child( } #endif - r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, user_lookup_fd, socket_fd, keep_fds, n_keep_fds); + r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, socket_fd, keep_fds, n_keep_fds); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m"); @@ -4104,7 +4119,7 @@ static int exec_child( exec_context_tty_reset(context, params); - if (unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit)) { + if (params->shall_confirm_spawn && unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit)) { _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = NULL; cmdline = quote_command_line(command->argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY); @@ -4201,13 +4216,13 @@ static int exec_child( return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m"); } - r = send_user_lookup(unit, user_lookup_fd, uid, gid); + r = send_user_lookup(unit, params->user_lookup_fd, uid, gid); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_USER; return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m"); } - user_lookup_fd = safe_close(user_lookup_fd); + params->user_lookup_fd = safe_close(params->user_lookup_fd); r = acquire_home(context, uid, &home, &home_buffer); if (r < 0) { @@ -4513,7 +4528,7 @@ static int exec_child( joined_exec_search_path, pass_env, context->environment, - files_env); + params->files_env); if (!accum_env) { *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; return log_oom(); @@ -4830,7 +4845,7 @@ static int exec_child( /* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the * process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */ if (use_smack) { - r = setup_smack(unit->manager, context, executable_fd); + r = setup_smack(params, context, executable_fd); if (r < 0 && !context->smack_process_label_ignore) { *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL; return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m"); @@ -5060,7 +5075,7 @@ static int exec_child( #endif #if HAVE_LIBBPF - r = apply_restrict_filesystems(unit, context); + r = apply_restrict_filesystems(unit, context, params); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_BPF; return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to restrict filesystems: %m"); @@ -5135,24 +5150,21 @@ static int exec_child( return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to execute %s: %m", executable); } -static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l); -static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, int named_iofds[static 3]); int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, ExecCommand *command, const ExecContext *context, - const ExecParameters *params, + ExecParameters *params, ExecRuntime *runtime, const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, pid_t *ret) { - int socket_fd, r, named_iofds[3] = { -1, -1, -1 }, *fds = NULL; _cleanup_free_ char *subcgroup_path = NULL; - _cleanup_strv_free_ char **files_env = NULL; - size_t n_storage_fds = 0, n_socket_fds = 0; pid_t pid; + int r; assert(unit); + assert(unit->manager); assert(command); assert(context); assert(ret); @@ -5161,29 +5173,7 @@ int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_UNIT(unit); - if (context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET || - context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET || - context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) { - - if (params->n_socket_fds > 1) - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got more than one socket."); - - if (params->n_socket_fds == 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got no socket."); - - socket_fd = params->fds[0]; - } else { - socket_fd = -EBADF; - fds = params->fds; - n_socket_fds = params->n_socket_fds; - n_storage_fds = params->n_storage_fds; - } - - r = exec_context_named_iofds(context, params, named_iofds); - if (r < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m"); - - r = exec_context_load_environment(unit, context, &files_env); + r = exec_context_load_environment(unit, context, ¶ms->files_env); if (r < 0) return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load environment files: %m"); @@ -5222,13 +5212,6 @@ int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, params, runtime, cgroup_context, - socket_fd, - named_iofds, - fds, - n_socket_fds, - n_storage_fds, - files_env, - unit->manager->user_lookup_fds[1], &exit_status); if (r < 0) { @@ -5264,6 +5247,9 @@ int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, void exec_context_init(ExecContext *c) { assert(c); + /* When initializing a bool member to 'true', make sure to serialize in execute-serialize.c using + * serialize_bool() instead of serialize_bool_elide(). */ + *c = (ExecContext) { .umask = 0022, .ioprio = IOPRIO_DEFAULT_CLASS_AND_PRIO, @@ -6811,7 +6797,7 @@ int exec_shared_runtime_serialize(const Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { int exec_shared_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit *u, const char *key, const char *value, FDSet *fds) { _cleanup_(exec_shared_runtime_freep) ExecSharedRuntime *rt_create = NULL; - ExecSharedRuntime *rt; + ExecSharedRuntime *rt = NULL; int r; /* This is for the migration from old (v237 or earlier) deserialization text. @@ -6830,10 +6816,12 @@ int exec_shared_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit *u, const char *key, const char return 0; } - if (hashmap_ensure_allocated(&u->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, &string_hash_ops) < 0) - return log_oom(); + if (u->manager) { + if (hashmap_ensure_allocated(&u->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, &string_hash_ops) < 0) + return log_oom(); - rt = hashmap_get(u->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, u->id); + rt = hashmap_get(u->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, u->id); + } if (!rt) { if (exec_shared_runtime_allocate(&rt_create, u->id) < 0) return log_oom(); @@ -6875,7 +6863,7 @@ int exec_shared_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit *u, const char *key, const char return 0; /* If the object is newly created, then put it to the hashmap which manages ExecSharedRuntime objects. */ - if (rt_create) { + if (rt_create && u->manager) { r = hashmap_put(u->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, rt_create->id, rt_create); if (r < 0) { log_unit_debug_errno(u, r, "Failed to put runtime parameter to manager's storage: %m"); @@ -7101,8 +7089,11 @@ void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters *p) { p->environment = strv_free(p->environment); p->fd_names = strv_free(p->fd_names); + p->files_env = strv_free(p->files_env); p->fds = mfree(p->fds); p->exec_fd = safe_close(p->exec_fd); + p->user_lookup_fd = safe_close(p->user_lookup_fd); + p->bpf_outer_map_fd = -EBADF; } void exec_directory_done(ExecDirectory *d) { diff --git a/src/core/execute.h b/src/core/execute.h index 732d31969f..52940332f7 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.h +++ b/src/core/execute.h @@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ struct ExecParameters { const char *received_encrypted_credentials_directory; const char *confirm_spawn; + bool shall_confirm_spawn; usec_t watchdog_usec; @@ -442,6 +443,12 @@ struct ExecParameters { const char *notify_socket; LIST_HEAD(OpenFile, open_files); + + const char *fallback_smack_process_label; + + char **files_env; + int user_lookup_fd; + int bpf_outer_map_fd; }; #include "unit.h" @@ -450,7 +457,7 @@ struct ExecParameters { int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, ExecCommand *command, const ExecContext *context, - const ExecParameters *exec_params, + ExecParameters *exec_params, ExecRuntime *runtime, const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, pid_t *ret); diff --git a/src/core/manager-serialize.c b/src/core/manager-serialize.c index 76261a2d88..3d6af0d046 100644 --- a/src/core/manager-serialize.c +++ b/src/core/manager-serialize.c @@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ int manager_deserialize(Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { } } else if ((val = startswith(l, "dynamic-user="))) - dynamic_user_deserialize_one(m, val, fds); + dynamic_user_deserialize_one(m, val, fds, NULL); else if ((val = startswith(l, "destroy-ipc-uid="))) manager_deserialize_uid_refs_one(m, val); else if ((val = startswith(l, "destroy-ipc-gid="))) diff --git a/src/core/mount.c b/src/core/mount.c index 6424c56ed3..06a3b8a8c3 100644 --- a/src/core/mount.c +++ b/src/core/mount.c @@ -890,11 +890,13 @@ static void mount_dump(Unit *u, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { static int mount_spawn(Mount *m, ExecCommand *c, PidRef *ret_pid) { _cleanup_(exec_params_clear) ExecParameters exec_params = { - .flags = EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING|EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT|EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN, - .stdin_fd = -EBADF, - .stdout_fd = -EBADF, - .stderr_fd = -EBADF, - .exec_fd = -EBADF, + .flags = EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING|EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT|EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN, + .stdin_fd = -EBADF, + .stdout_fd = -EBADF, + .stderr_fd = -EBADF, + .exec_fd = -EBADF, + .bpf_outer_map_fd = -EBADF, + .user_lookup_fd = -EBADF, }; _cleanup_(pidref_done) PidRef pidref = PIDREF_NULL; pid_t pid; diff --git a/src/core/service.c b/src/core/service.c index 73a678b0cc..802b1728de 100644 --- a/src/core/service.c +++ b/src/core/service.c @@ -1603,11 +1603,13 @@ static int service_spawn_internal( PidRef *ret_pid) { _cleanup_(exec_params_clear) ExecParameters exec_params = { - .flags = flags, - .stdin_fd = -EBADF, - .stdout_fd = -EBADF, - .stderr_fd = -EBADF, - .exec_fd = -EBADF, + .flags = flags, + .stdin_fd = -EBADF, + .stdout_fd = -EBADF, + .stderr_fd = -EBADF, + .exec_fd = -EBADF, + .bpf_outer_map_fd = -EBADF, + .user_lookup_fd = -EBADF, }; _cleanup_(sd_event_source_unrefp) sd_event_source *exec_fd_source = NULL; _cleanup_strv_free_ char **final_env = NULL, **our_env = NULL; diff --git a/src/core/socket.c b/src/core/socket.c index 1bbcadc3ba..16faa256e2 100644 --- a/src/core/socket.c +++ b/src/core/socket.c @@ -1914,11 +1914,13 @@ static int socket_coldplug(Unit *u) { static int socket_spawn(Socket *s, ExecCommand *c, PidRef *ret_pid) { _cleanup_(exec_params_clear) ExecParameters exec_params = { - .flags = EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING|EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT|EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN, - .stdin_fd = -EBADF, - .stdout_fd = -EBADF, - .stderr_fd = -EBADF, - .exec_fd = -EBADF, + .flags = EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING|EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT|EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN, + .stdin_fd = -EBADF, + .stdout_fd = -EBADF, + .stderr_fd = -EBADF, + .exec_fd = -EBADF, + .bpf_outer_map_fd = -EBADF, + .user_lookup_fd = -EBADF, }; _cleanup_(pidref_done) PidRef pidref = PIDREF_NULL; pid_t pid; diff --git a/src/core/swap.c b/src/core/swap.c index 008c5bbc24..73db3fcb96 100644 --- a/src/core/swap.c +++ b/src/core/swap.c @@ -633,11 +633,13 @@ static void swap_dump(Unit *u, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { static int swap_spawn(Swap *s, ExecCommand *c, PidRef *ret_pid) { _cleanup_(exec_params_clear) ExecParameters exec_params = { - .flags = EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING|EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT|EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN, - .stdin_fd = -EBADF, - .stdout_fd = -EBADF, - .stderr_fd = -EBADF, - .exec_fd = -EBADF, + .flags = EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING|EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT|EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN, + .stdin_fd = -EBADF, + .stdout_fd = -EBADF, + .stderr_fd = -EBADF, + .exec_fd = -EBADF, + .bpf_outer_map_fd = -EBADF, + .user_lookup_fd = -EBADF, }; _cleanup_(pidref_done) PidRef pidref = PIDREF_NULL; pid_t pid; diff --git a/src/core/unit.c b/src/core/unit.c index 5623e94921..b028f8fda0 100644 --- a/src/core/unit.c +++ b/src/core/unit.c @@ -5393,6 +5393,22 @@ int unit_set_exec_params(Unit *u, ExecParameters *p) { p->received_credentials_directory = u->manager->received_credentials_directory; p->received_encrypted_credentials_directory = u->manager->received_encrypted_credentials_directory; + p->shall_confirm_spawn = !!u->manager->confirm_spawn; + + p->fallback_smack_process_label = u->manager->defaults.smack_process_label; + + if (u->manager->restrict_fs && p->bpf_outer_map_fd < 0) { + int fd = lsm_bpf_map_restrict_fs_fd(u); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + p->bpf_outer_map_fd = fd; + } + + p->user_lookup_fd = fcntl(u->manager->user_lookup_fds[1], F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, 3); + if (p->user_lookup_fd < 0) + return -errno; + return 0; } From b646fc324a83c9831fd3e3d356007ef3dfa3594c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2023 20:58:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 06/20] core: ensure execute/spawn functions can work without Unit object When switching to serialization later, the Unit object will not be serialized, move parameters around instead --- src/core/bpf-lsm.c | 38 +-- src/core/bpf-lsm.h | 2 +- src/core/execute.c | 724 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ src/core/execute.h | 117 ++++++++ src/core/manager.c | 16 +- src/core/manager.h | 1 - src/core/mount.c | 11 +- src/core/service.c | 10 +- src/core/socket.c | 11 +- src/core/swap.c | 11 +- src/core/unit.c | 23 +- src/core/unit.h | 2 - 12 files changed, 585 insertions(+), 381 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/bpf-lsm.c b/src/core/bpf-lsm.c index 300486597b..216fc341c1 100644 --- a/src/core/bpf-lsm.c +++ b/src/core/bpf-lsm.c @@ -154,20 +154,14 @@ int lsm_bpf_setup(Manager *m) { return 0; } -int lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const Set *filesystems, int outer_map_fd, bool allow_list) { - _cleanup_close_ int outer_map_fd_cleanup = -EBADF; +int lsm_bpf_restrict_filesystems(const Set *filesystems, uint64_t cgroup_id, int outer_map_fd, bool allow_list) { uint32_t dummy_value = 1, zero = 0; const char *fs; const statfs_f_type_t *magic; int r; assert(filesystems); - assert(u); - assert(outer_map_fd >= 0 || u->manager); - - if (u->manager && !u->manager->restrict_fs) /* Might be called in sd-executor with no manager object */ - return log_unit_error_errno(u, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), - "bpf-lsm: BPF LSM object is not installed, has setup failed?"); + assert(outer_map_fd >= 0); int inner_map_fd = compat_bpf_map_create( BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH, @@ -177,41 +171,35 @@ int lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const Set *filesystems, int outer 128U, /* Should be enough for all filesystem types */ NULL); if (inner_map_fd < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "bpf-lsm: Failed to create inner BPF map: %m"); + return log_error_errno(errno, "bpf-lsm: Failed to create inner BPF map: %m"); - if (outer_map_fd < 0) { - outer_map_fd_cleanup = outer_map_fd = sym_bpf_map__fd(u->manager->restrict_fs->maps.cgroup_hash); - if (outer_map_fd < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "bpf-lsm: Failed to get BPF map fd: %m"); - } - - if (sym_bpf_map_update_elem(outer_map_fd, &u->cgroup_id, &inner_map_fd, BPF_ANY) != 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "bpf-lsm: Error populating BPF map: %m"); + if (sym_bpf_map_update_elem(outer_map_fd, &cgroup_id, &inner_map_fd, BPF_ANY) != 0) + return log_error_errno(errno, "bpf-lsm: Error populating BPF map: %m"); uint32_t allow = allow_list; /* Use key 0 to store whether this is an allow list or a deny list */ if (sym_bpf_map_update_elem(inner_map_fd, &zero, &allow, BPF_ANY) != 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "bpf-lsm: Error initializing map: %m"); + return log_error_errno(errno, "bpf-lsm: Error initializing map: %m"); SET_FOREACH(fs, filesystems) { r = fs_type_from_string(fs, &magic); if (r < 0) { - log_unit_warning(u, "bpf-lsm: Invalid filesystem name '%s', ignoring.", fs); + log_warning("bpf-lsm: Invalid filesystem name '%s', ignoring.", fs); continue; } - log_unit_debug(u, "bpf-lsm: Restricting filesystem access to '%s'", fs); + log_debug("bpf-lsm: Restricting filesystem access to '%s'", fs); for (int i = 0; i < FILESYSTEM_MAGIC_MAX; i++) { if (magic[i] == 0) break; if (sym_bpf_map_update_elem(inner_map_fd, &magic[i], &dummy_value, BPF_ANY) != 0) { - r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "bpf-lsm: Failed to update BPF map: %m"); + r = log_error_errno(errno, "bpf-lsm: Failed to update BPF map: %m"); - if (sym_bpf_map_delete_elem(outer_map_fd, &u->cgroup_id) != 0) - log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "bpf-lsm: Failed to delete cgroup entry from BPF map: %m"); + if (sym_bpf_map_delete_elem(outer_map_fd, &cgroup_id) != 0) + log_debug_errno(errno, "bpf-lsm: Failed to delete cgroup entry from BPF map: %m"); return r; } @@ -267,8 +255,8 @@ int lsm_bpf_setup(Manager *m) { return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "bpf-lsm: Failed to set up LSM BPF: %m"); } -int lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const Set *filesystems, int outer_map_fd, const bool allow_list) { - return log_unit_debug_errno(u, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "bpf-lsm: Failed to restrict filesystems using LSM BPF: %m"); +int lsm_bpf_restrict_filesystems(const Set *filesystems, uint64_t cgroup_id, int outer_map_fd, const bool allow_list) { + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "bpf-lsm: Failed to restrict filesystems using LSM BPF: %m"); } int lsm_bpf_cleanup(const Unit *u) { diff --git a/src/core/bpf-lsm.h b/src/core/bpf-lsm.h index 5eb03ae7fb..a6eda193fe 100644 --- a/src/core/bpf-lsm.h +++ b/src/core/bpf-lsm.h @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ typedef struct restrict_fs_bpf restrict_fs_bpf; bool lsm_bpf_supported(bool initialize); int lsm_bpf_setup(Manager *m); -int lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const Set *filesystems, int outer_map_fd, bool allow_list); +int lsm_bpf_restrict_filesystems(const Set *filesystems, uint64_t cgroup_id, int outer_map_fd, bool allow_list); int lsm_bpf_cleanup(const Unit *u); int lsm_bpf_map_restrict_fs_fd(Unit *u); void lsm_bpf_destroy(struct restrict_fs_bpf *prog); diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c index e305e7b8be..c13024b1f8 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.c +++ b/src/core/execute.c @@ -353,7 +353,6 @@ static int connect_journal_socket( } static int connect_logger_as( - const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *params, ExecOutput output, @@ -393,7 +392,7 @@ static int connect_logger_as( "%i\n" "%i\n", context->syslog_identifier ?: ident, - params->flags & EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT ? unit->id : "", + params->flags & EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT ? params->unit_id : "", context->syslog_priority, !!context->syslog_level_prefix, false, @@ -619,7 +618,6 @@ static bool can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout( } static int setup_output( - const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *params, int fileno, @@ -635,7 +633,6 @@ static int setup_output( ExecInput i; int r; - assert(unit); assert(context); assert(params); assert(ident); @@ -714,9 +711,12 @@ static int setup_output( case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE: case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL: case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE: - r = connect_logger_as(unit, context, params, o, ident, fileno, uid, gid); + r = connect_logger_as(context, params, o, ident, fileno, uid, gid); if (r < 0) { - log_unit_warning_errno(unit, r, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", + log_exec_warning_errno(context, + params, + r, + "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "stdout" : "stderr"); r = open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); } else { @@ -852,18 +852,19 @@ static int setup_confirm_stdio( return 0; } -static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err, int fd, const Unit *u) { +static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err, int fd, const char *unit_id) { assert(err < 0); + assert(unit_id); if (err == -ETIMEDOUT) - dprintf(fd, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", u->id); + dprintf(fd, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", unit_id); else { errno = -err; - dprintf(fd, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", u->id); + dprintf(fd, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", unit_id); } } -static void write_confirm_error(int err, const char *vc, const Unit *u) { +static void write_confirm_error(int err, const char *vc, const char *unit_id) { _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; assert(vc); @@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ static void write_confirm_error(int err, const char *vc, const Unit *u) { if (fd < 0) return; - write_confirm_error_fd(err, fd, u); + write_confirm_error_fd(err, fd, unit_id); } static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin, int *saved_stdout) { @@ -903,20 +904,27 @@ enum { CONFIRM_EXECUTE = 1, }; -static int ask_for_confirmation(const ExecContext *context, const char *vc, Unit *u, const char *cmdline) { +static bool confirm_spawn_disabled(void) { + return access("/run/systemd/confirm_spawn_disabled", F_OK) >= 0; +} + +static int ask_for_confirmation(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *params, const char *cmdline) { int saved_stdout = -1, saved_stdin = -1, r; _cleanup_free_ char *e = NULL; char c; + assert(context); + assert(params); + /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */ - r = setup_confirm_stdio(context, vc, &saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); + r = setup_confirm_stdio(context, params->confirm_spawn, &saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); if (r < 0) { - write_confirm_error(r, vc, u); + write_confirm_error(r, params->confirm_spawn, params->unit_id); return CONFIRM_EXECUTE; } /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */ - if (manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(u->manager)) { + if (!params->confirm_spawn || confirm_spawn_disabled()) { r = 1; goto restore_stdio; } @@ -931,7 +939,7 @@ static int ask_for_confirmation(const ExecContext *context, const char *vc, Unit for (;;) { r = ask_char(&c, "yfshiDjcn", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e); if (r < 0) { - write_confirm_error_fd(r, STDOUT_FILENO, u); + write_confirm_error_fd(r, STDOUT_FILENO, params->unit_id); r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; goto restore_stdio; } @@ -943,7 +951,10 @@ static int ask_for_confirmation(const ExecContext *context, const char *vc, Unit r = 1; break; case 'D': - unit_dump(u, stdout, " "); + printf(" Unit: %s\n", + params->unit_id); + exec_context_dump(context, stdout, " "); + exec_params_dump(params, stdout, " "); continue; /* ask again */ case 'f': printf("Failing execution.\n"); @@ -960,13 +971,16 @@ static int ask_for_confirmation(const ExecContext *context, const char *vc, Unit " y - yes, execute the command\n"); continue; /* ask again */ case 'i': - printf(" Description: %s\n" - " Unit: %s\n" + printf(" Unit: %s\n" " Command: %s\n", - u->id, u->description, cmdline); + params->unit_id, cmdline); continue; /* ask again */ case 'j': - manager_dump_jobs(u->manager, stdout, /* patterns= */ NULL, " "); + if (sigqueue(getppid(), + SIGRTMIN+18, + (const union sigval) { .sival_int = MANAGER_SIGNAL_COMMAND_DUMP_JOBS }) < 0) + return -errno; + continue; /* ask again */ case 'n': /* 'n' was removed in favor of 'f'. */ @@ -1505,26 +1519,26 @@ static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext *c) { #if HAVE_SECCOMP -static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit* u, const char* msg) { +static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, const char* msg) { if (is_seccomp_available()) return false; - log_unit_debug(u, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg); + log_exec_debug(c, p, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg); return true; } -static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c, bool needs_ambient_hack) { +static int apply_syscall_filter(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, bool needs_ambient_hack) { uint32_t negative_action, default_action, action; int r; - assert(u); assert(c); + assert(p); if (!context_has_syscall_filters(c)) return 0; - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "SystemCallFilter=")) + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "SystemCallFilter=")) return 0; negative_action = c->syscall_errno == SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL ? scmp_act_kill_process() : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c->syscall_errno); @@ -1546,19 +1560,19 @@ static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c, bool needs_ return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action, c->syscall_filter, action, false); } -static int apply_syscall_log(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { +static int apply_syscall_log(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { #ifdef SCMP_ACT_LOG uint32_t default_action, action; #endif - assert(u); assert(c); + assert(p); if (!context_has_syscall_logs(c)) return 0; #ifdef SCMP_ACT_LOG - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "SystemCallLog=")) + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "SystemCallLog=")) return 0; if (c->syscall_log_allow_list) { @@ -1574,42 +1588,42 @@ static int apply_syscall_log(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action, c->syscall_log, action, false); #else /* old libseccomp */ - log_unit_debug(u, "SECCOMP feature SCMP_ACT_LOG not available, skipping SystemCallLog="); + log_exec_debug(c, p, "SECCOMP feature SCMP_ACT_LOG not available, skipping SystemCallLog="); return 0; #endif } -static int apply_syscall_archs(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { - assert(u); +static int apply_syscall_archs(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { assert(c); + assert(p); if (set_isempty(c->syscall_archs)) return 0; - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "SystemCallArchitectures=")) + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "SystemCallArchitectures=")) return 0; return seccomp_restrict_archs(c->syscall_archs); } -static int apply_address_families(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { - assert(u); +static int apply_address_families(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { assert(c); + assert(p); if (!context_has_address_families(c)) return 0; - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictAddressFamilies=")) + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "RestrictAddressFamilies=")) return 0; return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c->address_families, c->address_families_allow_list); } -static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { +static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { int r; - assert(u); assert(c); + assert(p); if (!c->memory_deny_write_execute) return 0; @@ -1617,49 +1631,52 @@ static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) /* use prctl() if kernel supports it (6.3) */ r = prctl(PR_SET_MDWE, PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN, 0, 0, 0); if (r == 0) { - log_unit_debug(u, "Enabled MemoryDenyWriteExecute= with PR_SET_MDWE"); + log_exec_debug(c, p, "Enabled MemoryDenyWriteExecute= with PR_SET_MDWE"); return 0; } if (r < 0 && errno != EINVAL) - return log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Failed to enable MemoryDenyWriteExecute= with PR_SET_MDWE: %m"); + return log_exec_debug_errno(c, + p, + errno, + "Failed to enable MemoryDenyWriteExecute= with PR_SET_MDWE: %m"); /* else use seccomp */ - log_unit_debug(u, "Kernel doesn't support PR_SET_MDWE: falling back to seccomp"); + log_exec_debug(c, p, "Kernel doesn't support PR_SET_MDWE: falling back to seccomp"); - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute=")) + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute=")) return 0; return seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute(); } -static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { - assert(u); +static int apply_restrict_realtime(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { assert(c); + assert(p); if (!c->restrict_realtime) return 0; - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictRealtime=")) + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "RestrictRealtime=")) return 0; return seccomp_restrict_realtime(); } -static int apply_restrict_suid_sgid(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { - assert(u); +static int apply_restrict_suid_sgid(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { assert(c); + assert(p); if (!c->restrict_suid_sgid) return 0; - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictSUIDSGID=")) + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "RestrictSUIDSGID=")) return 0; return seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid(); } -static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { - assert(u); +static int apply_protect_sysctl(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { assert(c); + assert(p); /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */ @@ -1667,92 +1684,92 @@ static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { if (!c->protect_kernel_tunables) return 0; - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelTunables=")) + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "ProtectKernelTunables=")) return 0; return seccomp_protect_sysctl(); } -static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { - assert(u); +static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { assert(c); + assert(p); /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */ if (!c->protect_kernel_modules) return 0; - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelModules=")) + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "ProtectKernelModules=")) return 0; return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); } -static int apply_protect_kernel_logs(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { - assert(u); +static int apply_protect_kernel_logs(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { assert(c); + assert(p); if (!c->protect_kernel_logs) return 0; - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelLogs=")) + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "ProtectKernelLogs=")) return 0; return seccomp_protect_syslog(); } -static int apply_protect_clock(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { - assert(u); +static int apply_protect_clock(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { assert(c); + assert(p); if (!c->protect_clock) return 0; - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectClock=")) + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "ProtectClock=")) return 0; return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); } -static int apply_private_devices(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { - assert(u); +static int apply_private_devices(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { assert(c); + assert(p); /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */ if (!c->private_devices) return 0; - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "PrivateDevices=")) + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "PrivateDevices=")) return 0; return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); } -static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { - assert(u); +static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { assert(c); + assert(p); if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c)) return 0; - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictNamespaces=")) + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "RestrictNamespaces=")) return 0; return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c->restrict_namespaces); } -static int apply_lock_personality(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { +static int apply_lock_personality(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { unsigned long personality; int r; - assert(u); assert(c); + assert(p); if (!c->lock_personality) return 0; - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "LockPersonality=")) + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "LockPersonality=")) return 0; personality = c->personality; @@ -1771,8 +1788,7 @@ static int apply_lock_personality(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { #endif #if HAVE_LIBBPF -static int apply_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { - assert(u); +static int apply_restrict_filesystems(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { assert(c); assert(p); @@ -1781,17 +1797,17 @@ static int apply_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c, const ExecP if (p->bpf_outer_map_fd < 0) { /* LSM BPF is unsupported or lsm_bpf_setup failed */ - log_unit_debug(u, "LSM BPF not supported, skipping RestrictFileSystems="); + log_exec_debug(c, p, "LSM BPF not supported, skipping RestrictFileSystems="); return 0; } - return lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(u, c->restrict_filesystems, p->bpf_outer_map_fd, c->restrict_filesystems_allow_list); + return lsm_bpf_restrict_filesystems(c->restrict_filesystems, p->cgroup_id, p->bpf_outer_map_fd, c->restrict_filesystems_allow_list); } #endif -static int apply_protect_hostname(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c, int *ret_exit_status) { - assert(u); +static int apply_protect_hostname(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, int *ret_exit_status) { assert(c); + assert(p); if (!c->protect_hostname) return 0; @@ -1800,24 +1816,33 @@ static int apply_protect_hostname(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c, int *ret_ if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS) < 0) { if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno)) { *ret_exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; - return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(c, + p, + errno, + "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m"); } - log_unit_warning(u, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but UTS namespace setup is prohibited (container manager?), ignoring namespace setup."); + log_exec_warning(c, + p, + "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but UTS namespace setup is " + "prohibited (container manager?), ignoring namespace setup."); } } else - log_unit_warning(u, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup."); + log_exec_warning(c, + p, + "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not " + "support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup."); #if HAVE_SECCOMP int r; - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectHostname=")) + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "ProtectHostname=")) return 0; r = seccomp_protect_hostname(); if (r < 0) { *ret_exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_unit_error_errno(u, r, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, r, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m"); } #endif @@ -1855,7 +1880,6 @@ static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[static 4]) { static const char *exec_directory_env_name_to_string(ExecDirectoryType t); static int build_environment( - const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, @@ -1874,7 +1898,6 @@ static int build_environment( char *x; int r; - assert(u); assert(c); assert(p); assert(ret); @@ -1932,7 +1955,10 @@ static int build_environment( if (!c->user && !c->dynamic_user && p->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM) { r = get_fixed_user("root", &username, NULL, NULL, &home, &shell); if (r < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(u, r, "Failed to determine user credentials for root: %m"); + return log_exec_debug_errno(c, + p, + r, + "Failed to determine user credentials for root: %m"); } bool set_user_login_env = c->set_login_environment >= 0 ? c->set_login_environment : (c->user || c->dynamic_user); @@ -1969,8 +1995,11 @@ static int build_environment( our_env[n_env++] = x; } - if (!sd_id128_is_null(u->invocation_id)) { - if (asprintf(&x, "INVOCATION_ID=" SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(u->invocation_id)) < 0) + if (!sd_id128_is_null(p->invocation_id)) { + assert(p->invocation_id_string); + + x = strjoin("INVOCATION_ID=", p->invocation_id_string); + if (!x) return -ENOMEM; our_env[n_env++] = x; @@ -1997,7 +2026,11 @@ static int build_environment( r = proc_cmdline_get_key(key, 0, &cmdline); if (r < 0) - log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read %s from kernel cmdline, ignoring: %m", key); + log_exec_debug_errno(c, + p, + r, + "Failed to read %s from kernel cmdline, ignoring: %m", + key); else if (r > 0) term = cmdline; } @@ -2059,7 +2092,7 @@ static int build_environment( } _cleanup_free_ char *creds_dir = NULL; - r = exec_context_get_credential_directory(c, p, u->id, &creds_dir); + r = exec_context_get_credential_directory(c, p, p->unit_id, &creds_dir); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) { @@ -2435,7 +2468,6 @@ static int create_many_symlinks(const char *root, const char *source, char **sym } static int setup_exec_directory( - Unit *u, const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *params, uid_t uid, @@ -2527,13 +2559,13 @@ static int setup_exec_directory( if (r < 0) goto fail; - log_unit_notice(u, "Unit state directory %s missing but matching configuration directory %s exists, assuming update from systemd 253 or older, creating compatibility symlink.", p, q); + log_exec_notice(context, params, "Unit state directory %s missing but matching configuration directory %s exists, assuming update from systemd 253 or older, creating compatibility symlink.", p, q); continue; } else if (r != -ENOENT) - log_unit_warning_errno(u, r, "Unable to detect whether unit configuration directory '%s' exists, assuming not: %m", q); + log_exec_warning_errno(context, params, r, "Unable to detect whether unit configuration directory '%s' exists, assuming not: %m", q); } else if (r < 0) - log_unit_warning_errno(u, r, "Unable to detect whether unit state directory '%s' is missing, assuming it is: %m", p); + log_exec_warning_errno(context, params, r, "Unable to detect whether unit state directory '%s' is missing, assuming it is: %m", p); } if (exec_directory_is_private(context, type)) { @@ -2590,7 +2622,9 @@ static int setup_exec_directory( * it over. Most likely the service has been upgraded from one that didn't use * DynamicUser=1, to one that does. */ - log_unit_info(u, "Found pre-existing public %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n" + log_exec_info(context, + params, + "Found pre-existing public %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n" "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned off, and has now turned it on.", exec_directory_type_to_string(type), p, pp); @@ -2658,7 +2692,9 @@ static int setup_exec_directory( /* Hmm, apparently DynamicUser= was once turned on for this service, * but is no longer. Let's move the directory back up. */ - log_unit_info(u, "Found pre-existing private %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n" + log_exec_info(context, + params, + "Found pre-existing private %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n" "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned on, and has now turned it off.", exec_directory_type_to_string(type), q, p); @@ -2690,7 +2726,9 @@ static int setup_exec_directory( /* Still complain if the access mode doesn't match */ if (((st.st_mode ^ context->directories[type].mode) & 07777) != 0) - log_unit_warning(u, "%s \'%s\' already exists but the mode is different. " + log_exec_warning(context, + params, + "%s \'%s\' already exists but the mode is different. " "(File system: %o %sMode: %o)", exec_directory_type_to_string(type), context->directories[type].items[i].path, st.st_mode & 07777, exec_directory_type_to_string(type), context->directories[type].mode & 07777); @@ -3125,7 +3163,6 @@ static int verity_settings_prepare( } static int apply_mount_namespace( - const Unit *u, ExecCommandFlags command_flags, const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *params, @@ -3205,16 +3242,18 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace( return r; if (context->mount_propagation_flag == MS_SHARED) - log_unit_debug(u, "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring"); + log_exec_debug(context, + params, + "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring"); if (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_WRITE_CREDENTIALS)) { - r = exec_context_get_credential_directory(context, params, u->id, &creds_path); + r = exec_context_get_credential_directory(context, params, params->unit_id, &creds_path); if (r < 0) return r; } if (params->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM) { - propagate_dir = path_join("/run/systemd/propagate/", u->id); + propagate_dir = path_join("/run/systemd/propagate/", params->unit_id); if (!propagate_dir) return -ENOMEM; @@ -3343,7 +3382,8 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace( root_dir, root_image, bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts)) - return log_unit_debug_errno(u, + return log_exec_debug_errno(context, + params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Failed to set up namespace, and refusing to continue since " "the selected namespacing options alter mount environment non-trivially.\n" @@ -3354,7 +3394,7 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace( yes_no(root_image), yes_no(context->dynamic_user)); - log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring."); + log_exec_debug(context, params, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring."); return 0; } @@ -3419,7 +3459,6 @@ static int apply_root_directory( } static int setup_keyring( - const Unit *u, const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *p, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { @@ -3429,7 +3468,6 @@ static int setup_keyring( uid_t saved_uid; gid_t saved_gid; - assert(u); assert(context); assert(p); @@ -3453,12 +3491,18 @@ static int setup_keyring( if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) { if (setregid(gid, -1) < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m"); } if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) { if (setreuid(uid, -1) < 0) { - r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m"); + r = log_exec_error_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m"); goto out; } } @@ -3466,13 +3510,25 @@ static int setup_keyring( keyring = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0, 0, 0); if (keyring == -1) { if (errno == ENOSYS) - log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring."); + log_exec_debug_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring."); else if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno)) - log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring."); + log_exec_debug_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring."); else if (errno == EDQUOT) - log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring."); + log_exec_debug_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring."); else - r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m"); + r = log_exec_error_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m"); goto out; } @@ -3483,7 +3539,10 @@ static int setup_keyring( if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0) < 0) { - r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m"); + r = log_exec_error_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m"); goto out; } } @@ -3491,28 +3550,44 @@ static int setup_keyring( /* Restore uid/gid back */ if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) { if (setreuid(saved_uid, -1) < 0) { - r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m"); + r = log_exec_error_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m"); goto out; } } if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) { if (setregid(saved_gid, -1) < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m"); } /* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */ - if (!sd_id128_is_null(u->invocation_id)) { + if (!sd_id128_is_null(p->invocation_id)) { key_serial_t key; - key = add_key("user", "invocation_id", &u->invocation_id, sizeof(u->invocation_id), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING); + key = add_key("user", + "invocation_id", + &p->invocation_id, + sizeof(p->invocation_id), + KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING); if (key == -1) - log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m"); + log_exec_debug_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m"); else { if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, key, KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_READ|KEY_POS_SEARCH| KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_READ|KEY_USR_SEARCH, 0, 0) < 0) - r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m"); + r = log_exec_error_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m"); } } @@ -3586,12 +3661,12 @@ static int close_remaining_fds( } static int send_user_lookup( - Unit *unit, + const char *unit_id, int user_lookup_fd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { - assert(unit); + assert(unit_id); /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was @@ -3607,7 +3682,7 @@ static int send_user_lookup( (struct iovec[]) { IOVEC_MAKE(&uid, sizeof(uid)), IOVEC_MAKE(&gid, sizeof(gid)), - IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(unit->id) }, 3) < 0) + IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(unit_id) }, 3) < 0) return -errno; return 0; @@ -3775,7 +3850,7 @@ static int add_shifted_fd(int *fds, size_t fds_size, size_t *n_fds, int fd, int return 1; } -static int connect_unix_harder(Unit *u, const OpenFile *of, int ofd) { +static int connect_unix_harder(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, const OpenFile *of, int ofd) { union sockaddr_union addr = { .un.sun_family = AF_UNIX, }; @@ -3783,13 +3858,14 @@ static int connect_unix_harder(Unit *u, const OpenFile *of, int ofd) { static const int socket_types[] = { SOCK_DGRAM, SOCK_STREAM, SOCK_SEQPACKET }; int r; - assert(u); + assert(c); + assert(p); assert(of); assert(ofd >= 0); r = sockaddr_un_set_path(&addr.un, FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(ofd)); if (r < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(u, r, "Failed to set sockaddr for %s: %m", of->path); + return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, r, "Failed to set sockaddr for %s: %m", of->path); sa_len = r; @@ -3798,44 +3874,56 @@ static int connect_unix_harder(Unit *u, const OpenFile *of, int ofd) { fd = socket(AF_UNIX, socket_types[i] | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0); if (fd < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to create socket for %s: %m", of->path); + return log_exec_error_errno(c, + p, + errno, + "Failed to create socket for %s: %m", + of->path); r = RET_NERRNO(connect(fd, &addr.sa, sa_len)); if (r == -EPROTOTYPE) continue; if (r < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(u, r, "Failed to connect socket for %s: %m", of->path); + return log_exec_error_errno(c, + p, + r, + "Failed to connect socket for %s: %m", + of->path); return TAKE_FD(fd); } - return log_unit_error_errno(u, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPROTOTYPE), "Failed to connect socket for \"%s\".", of->path); + return log_exec_error_errno(c, + p, + SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPROTOTYPE), "Failed to connect socket for \"%s\".", + of->path); } -static int get_open_file_fd(Unit *u, const OpenFile *of) { +static int get_open_file_fd(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, const OpenFile *of) { struct stat st; _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF, ofd = -EBADF; - assert(u); + assert(c); + assert(p); assert(of); ofd = open(of->path, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); if (ofd < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Could not open \"%s\": %m", of->path); + return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, errno, "Could not open \"%s\": %m", of->path); if (fstat(ofd, &st) < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to stat %s: %m", of->path); + return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, errno, "Failed to stat %s: %m", of->path); if (S_ISSOCK(st.st_mode)) { - fd = connect_unix_harder(u, of, ofd); + fd = connect_unix_harder(c, p, of, ofd); if (fd < 0) return fd; if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_READ_ONLY) && shutdown(fd, SHUT_WR) < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to shutdown send for socket %s: %m", + return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, errno, "Failed to shutdown send for socket %s: %m", of->path); - log_unit_debug(u, "socket %s opened (fd=%d)", of->path, fd); + log_exec_debug(c, p, "socket %s opened (fd=%d)", of->path, fd); } else { int flags = FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR; if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_APPEND)) @@ -3845,34 +3933,35 @@ static int get_open_file_fd(Unit *u, const OpenFile *of) { fd = fd_reopen(ofd, flags | O_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(u, fd, "Failed to open file %s: %m", of->path); + return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, fd, "Failed to open file %s: %m", of->path); - log_unit_debug(u, "file %s opened (fd=%d)", of->path, fd); + log_exec_debug(c, p, "file %s opened (fd=%d)", of->path, fd); } return TAKE_FD(fd); } static int collect_open_file_fds( - Unit *u, - OpenFile* open_files, + const ExecContext *c, + const ExecParameters *p, int **fds, char ***fdnames, size_t *n_fds) { int r; - assert(u); + assert(c); + assert(p); assert(fds); assert(fdnames); assert(n_fds); - LIST_FOREACH(open_files, of, open_files) { + LIST_FOREACH(open_files, of, p->open_files) { _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; - fd = get_open_file_fd(u, of); + fd = get_open_file_fd(c, p, of); if (fd < 0) { if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_GRACEFUL)) { - log_unit_debug_errno(u, fd, "Failed to get OpenFile= file descriptor for %s, ignoring: %m", of->path); + log_exec_debug_errno(c, p, fd, "Failed to get OpenFile= file descriptor for %s, ignoring: %m", of->path); continue; } @@ -3894,8 +3983,15 @@ static int collect_open_file_fds( return 0; } -static void log_command_line(Unit *unit, const char *msg, const char *executable, char **argv) { - assert(unit); +static void log_command_line( + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + const char *msg, + const char *executable, + char **argv) { + + assert(context); + assert(params); assert(msg); assert(executable); @@ -3904,10 +4000,10 @@ static void log_command_line(Unit *unit, const char *msg, const char *executable _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = quote_command_line(argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY); - log_unit_struct(unit, LOG_DEBUG, + log_exec_struct(context, params, LOG_DEBUG, "EXECUTABLE=%s", executable, - LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "%s: %s", msg, strnull(cmdline)), - LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit)); + LOG_EXEC_MESSAGE(params, "%s: %s", msg, strnull(cmdline)), + LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID(params)); } static bool exec_context_need_unprivileged_private_users( @@ -3951,11 +4047,22 @@ static bool exec_context_need_unprivileged_private_users( !strv_isempty(context->no_exec_paths); } +static bool exec_context_shall_confirm_spawn(const ExecContext *context) { + assert(context); + + if (confirm_spawn_disabled()) + return false; + + /* For some reasons units remaining in the same process group + * as PID 1 fail to acquire the console even if it's not used + * by any process. So skip the confirmation question for them. */ + return !context->same_pgrp; +} + static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l); static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, int named_iofds[static 3]); static int exec_child( - Unit *unit, const ExecCommand *command, const ExecContext *context, ExecParameters *params, @@ -4001,7 +4108,6 @@ static int exec_child( int socket_fd = -EBADF, named_iofds[3] = { -EBADF, -EBADF, -EBADF }, *params_fds = NULL; size_t n_storage_fds = 0, n_socket_fds = 0; - assert(unit); assert(command); assert(context); assert(params); @@ -4016,10 +4122,10 @@ static int exec_child( context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) { if (params->n_socket_fds > 1) - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got more than one socket."); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got more than one socket."); if (params->n_socket_fds == 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got no socket."); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got no socket."); socket_fd = params->fds[0]; } else { @@ -4031,7 +4137,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = exec_context_named_iofds(context, params, named_iofds); if (r < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m"); rename_process_from_path(command->path); @@ -4047,7 +4153,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = reset_signal_mask(); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m"); } if (params->idle_pipe) @@ -4079,10 +4185,10 @@ static int exec_child( return log_oom(); } - r = collect_open_file_fds(unit, params->open_files, &fds, &fdnames, &n_fds); + r = collect_open_file_fds(context, params, &fds, &fdnames, &n_fds); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to get OpenFile= file descriptors: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to get OpenFile= file descriptors: %m"); } int keep_fds[n_fds + 3]; @@ -4092,7 +4198,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, params->exec_fd, &exec_fd); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); } #if HAVE_LIBBPF @@ -4100,7 +4206,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, params->bpf_outer_map_fd, (int *)¶ms->bpf_outer_map_fd); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); } } #endif @@ -4108,18 +4214,18 @@ static int exec_child( r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, socket_fd, keep_fds, n_keep_fds); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m"); } if (!context->same_pgrp && setsid() < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SETSID; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to create new process session: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to create new process session: %m"); } exec_context_tty_reset(context, params); - if (params->shall_confirm_spawn && unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit)) { + if (params->shall_confirm_spawn && exec_context_shall_confirm_spawn(context)) { _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = NULL; cmdline = quote_command_line(command->argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY); @@ -4128,7 +4234,7 @@ static int exec_child( return log_oom(); } - r = ask_for_confirmation(context, params->confirm_spawn, unit, cmdline); + r = ask_for_confirmation(context, params, cmdline); if (r != CONFIRM_EXECUTE) { if (r == CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS) { *exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS; @@ -4136,7 +4242,7 @@ static int exec_child( } *exit_status = EXIT_CONFIRM; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ECANCELED), + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ECANCELED), "Execution cancelled by the user"); } } @@ -4146,10 +4252,10 @@ static int exec_child( * that these env vars do not survive the execve(), which means they really only apply to the PAM and NSS * invocations themselves. Also note that while we'll only invoke NSS modules involved in user management they * might internally call into other NSS modules that are involved in hostname resolution, we never know. */ - if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", unit->id, true) != 0 || + if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", params->unit_id, true) != 0 || setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_SCOPE", runtime_scope_to_string(params->runtime_scope), true) != 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m"); } if (context->dynamic_user && runtime && runtime->dynamic_creds) { @@ -4159,7 +4265,7 @@ static int exec_child( * checks, if DynamicUser=1 is used, as we shouldn't create a feedback loop with ourselves here. */ if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m"); } r = compile_suggested_paths(context, params, &suggested_paths); @@ -4172,19 +4278,19 @@ static int exec_child( if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_USER; if (r == -EILSEQ) - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: User or group with specified name already exists."); - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m"); } if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) { *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH), "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT"\"", uid); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH), "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT"\"", uid); } if (!gid_is_valid(gid)) { *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH), "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT"\"", gid); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH), "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT"\"", gid); } if (runtime->dynamic_creds->user) @@ -4195,7 +4301,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = get_fixed_user(context->user, &username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m"); } } @@ -4203,7 +4309,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = get_fixed_group(context->group, &groupname, &gid); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m"); } } } @@ -4213,13 +4319,13 @@ static int exec_child( &supplementary_gids, &ngids); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m"); } - r = send_user_lookup(unit, params->user_lookup_fd, uid, gid); + r = send_user_lookup(params->unit_id, params->user_lookup_fd, uid, gid); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m"); } params->user_lookup_fd = safe_close(params->user_lookup_fd); @@ -4227,7 +4333,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = acquire_home(context, uid, &home, &home_buffer); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m"); } /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we must drop O_NONBLOCK */ @@ -4242,19 +4348,19 @@ static int exec_child( r = exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params, cgroup_context, &p); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m"); } r = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, p, 0, NULL, NULL); if (r == -EUCLEAN) { *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to attach process to cgroup %s " + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to attach process to cgroup %s " "because the cgroup or one of its parents or " "siblings is in the threaded mode: %m", p); } if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p); } } @@ -4262,7 +4368,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = open_shareable_ns_path(runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket, context->network_namespace_path, CLONE_NEWNET); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to open network namespace path %s: %m", context->network_namespace_path); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to open network namespace path %s: %m", context->network_namespace_path); } } @@ -4270,26 +4376,26 @@ static int exec_child( r = open_shareable_ns_path(runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket, context->ipc_namespace_path, CLONE_NEWIPC); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to open IPC namespace path %s: %m", context->ipc_namespace_path); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to open IPC namespace path %s: %m", context->ipc_namespace_path); } } r = setup_input(context, params, socket_fd, named_iofds); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up standard input: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up standard input: %m"); } - r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino); + r = setup_output(context, params, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_STDOUT; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up standard output: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up standard output: %m"); } - r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino); + r = setup_output(context, params, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_STDERR; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m"); } if (context->oom_score_adjust_set) { @@ -4297,21 +4403,21 @@ static int exec_child( * namespaces prohibit write access to this file, and we shouldn't trip up over that. */ r = set_oom_score_adjust(context->oom_score_adjust); if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) - log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, + log_exec_debug_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m"); else if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_OOM_ADJUST; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m"); } } if (context->coredump_filter_set) { r = set_coredump_filter(context->coredump_filter); if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) - log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter, ignoring: %m"); + log_exec_debug_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter, ignoring: %m"); else if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter: %m"); } } @@ -4319,7 +4425,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = setpriority_closest(context->nice); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_NICE; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m"); } } @@ -4335,7 +4441,7 @@ static int exec_child( ¶m); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SETSCHEDULER; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m"); } } @@ -4347,7 +4453,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(context, &converted_cpu_set); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask: %m"); } cpu_set = &converted_cpu_set; @@ -4356,37 +4462,37 @@ static int exec_child( if (sched_setaffinity(0, cpu_set->allocated, cpu_set->set) < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m"); } } if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&context->numa_policy))) { r = apply_numa_policy(&context->numa_policy); if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) - log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "NUMA support not available, ignoring."); + log_exec_debug_errno(context, params, r, "NUMA support not available, ignoring."); else if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_NUMA_POLICY; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set NUMA memory policy: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set NUMA memory policy: %m"); } } if (context->ioprio_set) if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, context->ioprio) < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_IOPRIO; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m"); } if (context->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, context->timer_slack_nsec) < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_TIMERSLACK; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m"); } if (context->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID) { r = safe_personality(context->personality); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_PERSONALITY; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m"); } } @@ -4406,7 +4512,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m"); } } @@ -4422,19 +4528,19 @@ static int exec_child( r = cg_set_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, uid, gid); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m"); } r = exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params, cgroup_context, &p); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m"); } if (r > 0) { r = cg_set_access_recursive(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, p, uid, gid); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust control subgroup access: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust control subgroup access: %m"); } } } @@ -4449,7 +4555,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = chmod_and_chown(memory_pressure_path, 0644, uid, gid); if (r < 0) { - log_unit_full_errno(unit, r == -ENOENT || ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r) ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, r, + log_exec_full_errno(context, params, r == -ENOENT || ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r) ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, r, "Failed to adjust ownership of '%s', ignoring: %m", memory_pressure_path); memory_pressure_path = mfree(memory_pressure_path); } @@ -4466,21 +4572,20 @@ static int exec_child( needs_mount_namespace = exec_needs_mount_namespace(context, params, runtime); for (ExecDirectoryType dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { - r = setup_exec_directory(unit, context, params, uid, gid, dt, needs_mount_namespace, exit_status); + r = setup_exec_directory(context, params, uid, gid, dt, needs_mount_namespace, exit_status); if (r < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params->prefix[dt]); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params->prefix[dt]); } if (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_WRITE_CREDENTIALS)) { - r = exec_setup_credentials(context, params, unit->id, uid, gid); + r = exec_setup_credentials(context, params, params->unit_id, uid, gid); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_CREDENTIALS; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up credentials: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up credentials: %m"); } } r = build_environment( - unit, context, params, cgroup_context, @@ -4537,10 +4642,10 @@ static int exec_child( (void) umask(context->umask); - r = setup_keyring(unit, context, params, uid, gid); + r = setup_keyring(context, params, uid, gid); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_KEYRING; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m"); } /* We need sandboxing if the caller asked us to apply it and the command isn't explicitly excepted @@ -4586,7 +4691,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit* const *) context->rlimit, &which_failed); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed)); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed)); } } @@ -4598,7 +4703,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, gid, context->tty_path, &accum_env, fds, n_fds); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_PAM; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m"); } if (ambient_capabilities_supported()) { @@ -4609,7 +4714,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = capability_get_ambient(&ambient_after_pam); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to query ambient caps: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to query ambient caps: %m"); } capability_ambient_set |= ambient_after_pam; @@ -4618,7 +4723,7 @@ static int exec_child( ngids_after_pam = getgroups_alloc(&gids_after_pam); if (ngids_after_pam < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, ngids_after_pam, "Failed to obtain groups after setting up PAM: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, ngids_after_pam, "Failed to obtain groups after setting up PAM: %m"); } } @@ -4632,10 +4737,10 @@ static int exec_child( * the actual requested operations fail (or silently continue). */ if (r < 0 && context->private_users) { *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user: %m"); } if (r < 0) - log_unit_info_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user, ignoring: %m"); + log_exec_info_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user, ignoring: %m"); else userns_set_up = true; } @@ -4649,18 +4754,18 @@ static int exec_child( if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_NET) && have_effective_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN) > 0) { r = setup_shareable_ns(runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket, CLONE_NEWNET); if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) - log_unit_notice_errno(unit, r, + log_exec_notice_errno(context, params, r, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but network namespace setup not permitted, proceeding without: %m"); else if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m"); } } else if (context->network_namespace_path) { *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "NetworkNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing."); } else - log_unit_notice(unit, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support or we lack privileges for network namespace, proceeding without."); + log_exec_notice(context, params, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support or we lack privileges for network namespace, proceeding without."); } if (exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context) && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { @@ -4668,33 +4773,33 @@ static int exec_child( if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_IPC)) { r = setup_shareable_ns(runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket, CLONE_NEWIPC); if (r == -EPERM) - log_unit_warning_errno(unit, r, + log_exec_warning_errno(context, params, r, "PrivateIPC=yes is configured, but IPC namespace setup failed, ignoring: %m"); else if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up IPC namespacing: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up IPC namespacing: %m"); } } else if (context->ipc_namespace_path) { *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "IPCNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing."); } else - log_unit_warning(unit, "PrivateIPC=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support IPC namespaces, ignoring."); + log_exec_warning(context, params, "PrivateIPC=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support IPC namespaces, ignoring."); } if (needs_mount_namespace) { _cleanup_free_ char *error_path = NULL; - r = apply_mount_namespace(unit, command->flags, context, params, runtime, memory_pressure_path, &error_path); + r = apply_mount_namespace(command->flags, context, params, runtime, memory_pressure_path, &error_path); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up mount namespacing%s%s: %m", + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up mount namespacing%s%s: %m", error_path ? ": " : "", strempty(error_path)); } } if (needs_sandboxing) { - r = apply_protect_hostname(unit, context, exit_status); + r = apply_protect_hostname(context, params, exit_status); if (r < 0) return r; } @@ -4702,10 +4807,13 @@ static int exec_child( if (context->memory_ksm >= 0) if (prctl(PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE, context->memory_ksm) < 0) { if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno)) - log_unit_debug_errno(unit, errno, "KSM support not available, ignoring."); + log_exec_debug_errno(context, + params, + errno, + "KSM support not available, ignoring."); else { *exit_status = EXIT_KSM; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set KSM: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set KSM: %m"); } } @@ -4723,7 +4831,7 @@ static int exec_child( &gids_to_enforce); if (ngids_to_enforce < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, ngids_to_enforce, "Failed to merge group lists. Group membership might be incorrect: %m"); } @@ -4731,7 +4839,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = enforce_groups(gid, gids_to_enforce, ngids_to_enforce); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Changing group credentials failed: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Changing group credentials failed: %m"); } } @@ -4745,7 +4853,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = setup_private_users(saved_uid, saved_gid, uid, gid); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m"); } } @@ -4757,10 +4865,11 @@ static int exec_child( r = find_executable_full(command->path, /* root= */ NULL, context->exec_search_path, false, &executable, &executable_fd); if (r < 0) { if (r != -ENOMEM && (command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE)) { - log_unit_struct_errno(unit, LOG_INFO, r, + log_exec_struct_errno(context, params, LOG_INFO, r, "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, - LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit), - LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m", + LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID(params), + LOG_EXEC_MESSAGE(params, + "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m", command->path), "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path); *exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS; @@ -4768,10 +4877,11 @@ static int exec_child( } *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; - return log_unit_struct_errno(unit, LOG_INFO, r, + return log_exec_struct_errno(context, params, LOG_INFO, r, "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, - LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit), - LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Failed to locate executable %s: %m", + LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID(params), + LOG_EXEC_MESSAGE(params, + "Failed to locate executable %s: %m", command->path), "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path); } @@ -4779,7 +4889,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, executable_fd, &executable_fd); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); } #if HAVE_SELINUX @@ -4798,9 +4908,15 @@ static int exec_child( if (r < 0) { if (!context->selinux_context_ignore) { *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, + params, + r, + "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m"); } - log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine SELinux context, ignoring: %m"); + log_exec_debug_errno(context, + params, + r, + "Failed to determine SELinux context, ignoring: %m"); } } } @@ -4818,7 +4934,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = flags_fds(fds, n_socket_fds, n_fds, context->non_blocking); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m"); } /* At this point, the fds we want to pass to the program are all ready and set up, with O_CLOEXEC turned off @@ -4837,7 +4953,7 @@ static int exec_child( if (context->restrict_realtime && !context->rlimit[RLIMIT_RTPRIO]) { if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m"); } } @@ -4848,7 +4964,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = setup_smack(params, context, executable_fd); if (r < 0 && !context->smack_process_label_ignore) { *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m"); } } #endif @@ -4866,7 +4982,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = capability_bounding_set_drop(bset, /* right_now= */ false); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m"); } } @@ -4885,7 +5001,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = capability_ambient_set_apply(capability_ambient_set, /* also_inherit= */ true); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m"); } } } @@ -4893,14 +5009,14 @@ static int exec_child( /* chroot to root directory first, before we lose the ability to chroot */ r = apply_root_directory(context, params, runtime, needs_mount_namespace, exit_status); if (r < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Chrooting to the requested root directory failed: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Chrooting to the requested root directory failed: %m"); if (needs_setuid) { if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { r = enforce_user(context, uid, capability_ambient_set); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT ": %m", uid); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT ": %m", uid); } if (!needs_ambient_hack && capability_ambient_set != 0) { @@ -4909,7 +5025,7 @@ static int exec_child( r = capability_ambient_set_apply(capability_ambient_set, /* also_inherit= */ false); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m"); } } } @@ -4919,7 +5035,7 @@ static int exec_child( * this service might have the correct privilege to change to the working directory */ r = apply_working_directory(context, params, runtime, home, exit_status); if (r < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m"); if (needs_sandboxing) { /* Apply other MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to @@ -4936,9 +5052,13 @@ static int exec_child( if (r < 0) { if (!context->selinux_context_ignore) { *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context); } - log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s, ignoring: %m", exec_context); + log_exec_debug_errno(context, + params, + r, + "Failed to change SELinux context to %s, ignoring: %m", + exec_context); } } } @@ -4949,7 +5069,11 @@ static int exec_child( r = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile); if (r < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) { *exit_status = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", context->apparmor_profile); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, + params, + errno, + "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", + context->apparmor_profile); } } #endif @@ -4972,113 +5096,113 @@ static int exec_child( r = capability_gain_cap_setpcap(/* return_caps= */ NULL); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to gain CAP_SETPCAP for setting secure bits"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to gain CAP_SETPCAP for setting secure bits"); } if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secure_bits) < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SECUREBITS; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m"); } } if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context)) if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m"); } #if HAVE_SECCOMP - r = apply_address_families(unit, context); + r = apply_address_families(context, params); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to restrict address families: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to restrict address families: %m"); } - r = apply_memory_deny_write_execute(unit, context); + r = apply_memory_deny_write_execute(context, params); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m"); } - r = apply_restrict_realtime(unit, context); + r = apply_restrict_realtime(context, params); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m"); } - r = apply_restrict_suid_sgid(unit, context); + r = apply_restrict_suid_sgid(context, params); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply SUID/SGID restrictions: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply SUID/SGID restrictions: %m"); } - r = apply_restrict_namespaces(unit, context); + r = apply_restrict_namespaces(context, params); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m"); } - r = apply_protect_sysctl(unit, context); + r = apply_protect_sysctl(context, params); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m"); } - r = apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit, context); + r = apply_protect_kernel_modules(context, params); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m"); } - r = apply_protect_kernel_logs(unit, context); + r = apply_protect_kernel_logs(context, params); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply kernel log restrictions: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply kernel log restrictions: %m"); } - r = apply_protect_clock(unit, context); + r = apply_protect_clock(context, params); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply clock restrictions: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply clock restrictions: %m"); } - r = apply_private_devices(unit, context); + r = apply_private_devices(context, params); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up private devices: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up private devices: %m"); } - r = apply_syscall_archs(unit, context); + r = apply_syscall_archs(context, params); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m"); } - r = apply_lock_personality(unit, context); + r = apply_lock_personality(context, params); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to lock personalities: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to lock personalities: %m"); } - r = apply_syscall_log(unit, context); + r = apply_syscall_log(context, params); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply system call log filters: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply system call log filters: %m"); } /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected * by the filter as little as possible. */ - r = apply_syscall_filter(unit, context, needs_ambient_hack); + r = apply_syscall_filter(context, params, needs_ambient_hack); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m"); } #endif #if HAVE_LIBBPF - r = apply_restrict_filesystems(unit, context, params); + r = apply_restrict_filesystems(context, params); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_BPF; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to restrict filesystems: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to restrict filesystems: %m"); } #endif @@ -5102,23 +5226,32 @@ static int exec_child( r = replace_env_argv(command->argv, accum_env, &replaced_argv, &unset_variables, &bad_variables); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to replace environment variables: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, + params, + r, + "Failed to replace environment variables: %m"); } final_argv = replaced_argv; if (!strv_isempty(unset_variables)) { _cleanup_free_ char *ju = strv_join(unset_variables, ", "); - log_unit_warning(unit, "Referenced but unset environment variable evaluates to an empty string: %s", strna(ju)); + log_exec_warning(context, + params, + "Referenced but unset environment variable evaluates to an empty string: %s", + strna(ju)); } if (!strv_isempty(bad_variables)) { _cleanup_free_ char *jb = strv_join(bad_variables, ", "); - log_unit_warning(unit, "Invalid environment variable name evaluates to an empty string: %s", strna(jb));; + log_exec_warning(context, + params, + "Invalid environment variable name evaluates to an empty string: %s", + strna(jb)); } } else final_argv = command->argv; - log_command_line(unit, "Executing", executable, final_argv); + log_command_line(context, params, "Executing", executable, final_argv); if (exec_fd >= 0) { uint8_t hot = 1; @@ -5128,7 +5261,7 @@ static int exec_child( if (write(exec_fd, &hot, sizeof(hot)) < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m"); } } @@ -5142,12 +5275,12 @@ static int exec_child( if (write(exec_fd, &hot, sizeof(hot)) < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m"); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m"); } } *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to execute %s: %m", executable); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to execute %s: %m", executable); } @@ -5170,6 +5303,7 @@ int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, assert(ret); assert(params); assert(params->fds || (params->n_socket_fds + params->n_storage_fds <= 0)); + assert(!params->files_env); /* We fill this field, ensure it comes NULL-initialized to us */ LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_UNIT(unit); @@ -5183,7 +5317,7 @@ int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, /* We won't know the real executable path until we create the mount namespace in the child, but we want to log from the parent, so we use the possibly inaccurate path here. */ - log_command_line(unit, "About to execute", command->path, command->argv); + log_command_line(context, params, "About to execute", command->path, command->argv); if (params->cgroup_path) { r = exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params, cgroup_context, &subcgroup_path); @@ -5206,8 +5340,7 @@ int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, if (pid == 0) { int exit_status; - r = exec_child(unit, - command, + r = exec_child(command, context, params, runtime, @@ -7092,8 +7225,11 @@ void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters *p) { p->files_env = strv_free(p->files_env); p->fds = mfree(p->fds); p->exec_fd = safe_close(p->exec_fd); - p->user_lookup_fd = safe_close(p->user_lookup_fd); + p->user_lookup_fd = -EBADF; p->bpf_outer_map_fd = -EBADF; + p->unit_id = mfree(p->unit_id); + p->invocation_id = SD_ID128_NULL; + p->invocation_id_string[0] = '\0'; } void exec_directory_done(ExecDirectory *d) { diff --git a/src/core/execute.h b/src/core/execute.h index 52940332f7..6f7d0686e8 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.h +++ b/src/core/execute.h @@ -421,6 +421,7 @@ struct ExecParameters { CGroupMask cgroup_supported; const char *cgroup_path; + uint64_t cgroup_id; char **prefix; const char *received_credentials_directory; @@ -449,8 +450,24 @@ struct ExecParameters { char **files_env; int user_lookup_fd; int bpf_outer_map_fd; + + /* Used for logging in the executor functions */ + char *unit_id; + sd_id128_t invocation_id; + char invocation_id_string[SD_ID128_STRING_MAX]; }; +#define EXEC_PARAMETERS_INIT(_flags) \ + (ExecParameters) { \ + .flags = (_flags), \ + .stdin_fd = -EBADF, \ + .stdout_fd = -EBADF, \ + .stderr_fd = -EBADF, \ + .exec_fd = -EBADF, \ + .bpf_outer_map_fd = -EBADF, \ + .user_lookup_fd = -EBADF, \ + }; + #include "unit.h" #include "dynamic-user.h" @@ -551,3 +568,103 @@ ExecDirectoryType exec_resource_type_from_string(const char *s) _pure_; bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *params, const ExecRuntime *runtime); bool exec_needs_network_namespace(const ExecContext *context); + +/* These logging macros do the same logging as those in unit.h, but using ExecContext and ExecParameters + * instead of the unit object, so that it can be used in the sd-executor context (where the unit object is + * not available). */ + +#define LOG_EXEC_ID_FIELD(ep) \ + ((ep)->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER ? "USER_UNIT=" : "UNIT=") +#define LOG_EXEC_ID_FIELD_FORMAT(ep) \ + ((ep)->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER ? "USER_UNIT=%s" : "UNIT=%s") +#define LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID_FIELD(ep) \ + ((ep)->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER ? "USER_INVOCATION_ID=" : "INVOCATION_ID=") +#define LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID_FIELD_FORMAT(ep) \ + ((ep)->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER ? "USER_INVOCATION_ID=%s" : "INVOCATION_ID=%s") + +#define log_exec_full_errno_zerook(ec, ep, level, error, ...) \ + ({ \ + const ExecContext *_c = (ec); \ + const ExecParameters *_p = (ep); \ + const int _l = (level); \ + bool _do_log = !(log_get_max_level() < LOG_PRI(_l) || \ + !(_c->log_level_max < 0 || \ + _c->log_level_max >= LOG_PRI(_l))); \ + LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_IOV(_c->log_extra_fields, \ + _c->n_log_extra_fields); \ + !_do_log ? -ERRNO_VALUE(error) : \ + log_object_internal(_l, error, PROJECT_FILE, \ + __LINE__, __func__, \ + LOG_EXEC_ID_FIELD(_p), \ + _p->unit_id, \ + LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID_FIELD(_p), \ + _p->invocation_id_string, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ + }) + +#define log_exec_full_errno(ec, ep, level, error, ...) \ + ({ \ + int _error = (error); \ + ASSERT_NON_ZERO(_error); \ + log_exec_full_errno_zerook(ec, ep, level, _error, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ + }) + +#define log_exec_full(ec, ep, level, ...) (void) log_exec_full_errno_zerook(ec, ep, level, 0, __VA_ARGS__) + +#define log_exec_debug(ec, ep, ...) log_exec_full(ec, ep, LOG_DEBUG, __VA_ARGS__) +#define log_exec_info(ec, ep, ...) log_exec_full(ec, ep, LOG_INFO, __VA_ARGS__) +#define log_exec_notice(ec, ep, ...) log_exec_full(ec, ep, LOG_NOTICE, __VA_ARGS__) +#define log_exec_warning(ec, ep, ...) log_exec_full(ec, ep, LOG_WARNING, __VA_ARGS__) +#define log_exec_error(ec, ep, ...) log_exec_full(ec, ep, LOG_ERR, __VA_ARGS__) + +#define log_exec_debug_errno(ec, ep, error, ...) log_exec_full_errno(ec, ep, LOG_DEBUG, error, __VA_ARGS__) +#define log_exec_info_errno(ec, ep, error, ...) log_exec_full_errno(ec, ep, LOG_INFO, error, __VA_ARGS__) +#define log_exec_notice_errno(ec, ep, error, ...) log_exec_full_errno(ec, ep, LOG_NOTICE, error, __VA_ARGS__) +#define log_exec_warning_errno(ec, ep, error, ...) log_exec_full_errno(ec, ep, LOG_WARNING, error, __VA_ARGS__) +#define log_exec_error_errno(ec, ep, error, ...) log_exec_full_errno(ec, ep, LOG_ERR, error, __VA_ARGS__) + +#define log_exec_struct_errno(ec, ep, level, error, ...) \ + ({ \ + const ExecContext *_c = (ec); \ + const ExecParameters *_p = (ep); \ + const int _l = (level); \ + bool _do_log = !(_c->log_level_max < 0 || \ + _c->log_level_max >= LOG_PRI(_l)); \ + LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_IOV(_c->log_extra_fields, \ + _c->n_log_extra_fields); \ + _do_log ? \ + log_struct_errno(_l, error, __VA_ARGS__, LOG_EXEC_ID_FIELD_FORMAT(_p), _p->unit_id) : \ + -ERRNO_VALUE(error); \ + }) + +#define log_exec_struct(ec, ep, level, ...) log_exec_struct_errno(ec, ep, level, 0, __VA_ARGS__) + +#define log_exec_struct_iovec_errno(ec, ep, level, error, iovec, n_iovec) \ + ({ \ + const ExecContext *_c = (ec); \ + const ExecParameters *_p = (ep); \ + const int _l = (level); \ + bool _do_log = !(_c->log_level_max < 0 || \ + _c->log_level_max >= LOG_PRI(_l)); \ + LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_IOV(_c->log_extra_fields, \ + _c->n_log_extra_fields); \ + _do_log ? \ + log_struct_iovec_errno(_l, error, iovec, n_iovec) : \ + -ERRNO_VALUE(error); \ + }) + +#define log_exec_struct_iovec(ec, ep, level, iovec, n_iovec) log_exec_struct_iovec_errno(ec, ep, level, 0, iovec, n_iovec) + +/* Like LOG_MESSAGE(), but with the unit name prefixed. */ +#define LOG_EXEC_MESSAGE(ep, fmt, ...) LOG_MESSAGE("%s: " fmt, (ep)->unit_id, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define LOG_EXEC_ID(ep) LOG_EXEC_ID_FIELD_FORMAT(ep), (ep)->unit_id +#define LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID(ep) LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID_FIELD_FORMAT(ep), (ep)->invocation_id_string + +#define _LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_EXEC(ec, ep, p, c) \ + const ExecContext *c = (ec); \ + const ExecParameters *p = (ep); \ + LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_KEY_VALUE(LOG_EXEC_ID_FIELD(p), p->unit_id); \ + LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_KEY_VALUE(LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID_FIELD(p), p->invocation_id_string); \ + LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_IOV(c->log_extra_fields, c->n_log_extra_fields) + +#define LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_EXEC(ec, ep) \ + _LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_EXEC(ec, ep, UNIQ_T(p, UNIQ), UNIQ_T(c, UNIQ)) diff --git a/src/core/manager.c b/src/core/manager.c index 9af6fd4184..6042bda239 100644 --- a/src/core/manager.c +++ b/src/core/manager.c @@ -144,6 +144,15 @@ static usec_t manager_watch_jobs_next_time(Manager *m) { return usec_add(now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC), timeout); } +static bool manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(Manager *m) { + assert(m); + + if (!m->confirm_spawn) + return true; + + return access("/run/systemd/confirm_spawn_disabled", F_OK) >= 0; +} + static void manager_watch_jobs_in_progress(Manager *m) { usec_t next; int r; @@ -4430,13 +4439,6 @@ void manager_disable_confirm_spawn(void) { (void) touch("/run/systemd/confirm_spawn_disabled"); } -bool manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(Manager *m) { - if (!m->confirm_spawn) - return true; - - return access("/run/systemd/confirm_spawn_disabled", F_OK) >= 0; -} - static bool manager_should_show_status(Manager *m, StatusType type) { assert(m); diff --git a/src/core/manager.h b/src/core/manager.h index 4fa54bb3c1..4595b1b686 100644 --- a/src/core/manager.h +++ b/src/core/manager.h @@ -616,7 +616,6 @@ const char *manager_state_to_string(ManagerState m) _const_; ManagerState manager_state_from_string(const char *s) _pure_; const char *manager_get_confirm_spawn(Manager *m); -bool manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(Manager *m); void manager_disable_confirm_spawn(void); const char *manager_timestamp_to_string(ManagerTimestamp m) _const_; diff --git a/src/core/mount.c b/src/core/mount.c index 06a3b8a8c3..fe04b3d74c 100644 --- a/src/core/mount.c +++ b/src/core/mount.c @@ -889,15 +889,8 @@ static void mount_dump(Unit *u, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { static int mount_spawn(Mount *m, ExecCommand *c, PidRef *ret_pid) { - _cleanup_(exec_params_clear) ExecParameters exec_params = { - .flags = EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING|EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT|EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN, - .stdin_fd = -EBADF, - .stdout_fd = -EBADF, - .stderr_fd = -EBADF, - .exec_fd = -EBADF, - .bpf_outer_map_fd = -EBADF, - .user_lookup_fd = -EBADF, - }; + _cleanup_(exec_params_clear) ExecParameters exec_params = EXEC_PARAMETERS_INIT( + EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING|EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT|EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN); _cleanup_(pidref_done) PidRef pidref = PIDREF_NULL; pid_t pid; int r; diff --git a/src/core/service.c b/src/core/service.c index 802b1728de..b4bd343bc9 100644 --- a/src/core/service.c +++ b/src/core/service.c @@ -1602,15 +1602,7 @@ static int service_spawn_internal( ExecFlags flags, PidRef *ret_pid) { - _cleanup_(exec_params_clear) ExecParameters exec_params = { - .flags = flags, - .stdin_fd = -EBADF, - .stdout_fd = -EBADF, - .stderr_fd = -EBADF, - .exec_fd = -EBADF, - .bpf_outer_map_fd = -EBADF, - .user_lookup_fd = -EBADF, - }; + _cleanup_(exec_params_clear) ExecParameters exec_params = EXEC_PARAMETERS_INIT(flags); _cleanup_(sd_event_source_unrefp) sd_event_source *exec_fd_source = NULL; _cleanup_strv_free_ char **final_env = NULL, **our_env = NULL; _cleanup_(pidref_done) PidRef pidref = PIDREF_NULL; diff --git a/src/core/socket.c b/src/core/socket.c index 16faa256e2..dff4bc42d7 100644 --- a/src/core/socket.c +++ b/src/core/socket.c @@ -1913,15 +1913,8 @@ static int socket_coldplug(Unit *u) { static int socket_spawn(Socket *s, ExecCommand *c, PidRef *ret_pid) { - _cleanup_(exec_params_clear) ExecParameters exec_params = { - .flags = EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING|EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT|EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN, - .stdin_fd = -EBADF, - .stdout_fd = -EBADF, - .stderr_fd = -EBADF, - .exec_fd = -EBADF, - .bpf_outer_map_fd = -EBADF, - .user_lookup_fd = -EBADF, - }; + _cleanup_(exec_params_clear) ExecParameters exec_params = EXEC_PARAMETERS_INIT( + EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING|EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT|EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN); _cleanup_(pidref_done) PidRef pidref = PIDREF_NULL; pid_t pid; int r; diff --git a/src/core/swap.c b/src/core/swap.c index 73db3fcb96..d0bce8c44b 100644 --- a/src/core/swap.c +++ b/src/core/swap.c @@ -632,15 +632,8 @@ static void swap_dump(Unit *u, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { static int swap_spawn(Swap *s, ExecCommand *c, PidRef *ret_pid) { - _cleanup_(exec_params_clear) ExecParameters exec_params = { - .flags = EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING|EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT|EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN, - .stdin_fd = -EBADF, - .stdout_fd = -EBADF, - .stderr_fd = -EBADF, - .exec_fd = -EBADF, - .bpf_outer_map_fd = -EBADF, - .user_lookup_fd = -EBADF, - }; + _cleanup_(exec_params_clear) ExecParameters exec_params = EXEC_PARAMETERS_INIT( + EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING|EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT|EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN); _cleanup_(pidref_done) PidRef pidref = PIDREF_NULL; pid_t pid; int r; diff --git a/src/core/unit.c b/src/core/unit.c index b028f8fda0..cd4282a26b 100644 --- a/src/core/unit.c +++ b/src/core/unit.c @@ -1854,18 +1854,6 @@ int unit_test_start_limit(Unit *u) { return -ECANCELED; } -bool unit_shall_confirm_spawn(Unit *u) { - assert(u); - - if (manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(u->manager)) - return false; - - /* For some reasons units remaining in the same process group - * as PID 1 fail to acquire the console even if it's not used - * by any process. So skip the confirmation question for them. */ - return !unit_get_exec_context(u)->same_pgrp; -} - static bool unit_verify_deps(Unit *u) { Unit *other; @@ -5405,9 +5393,14 @@ int unit_set_exec_params(Unit *u, ExecParameters *p) { p->bpf_outer_map_fd = fd; } - p->user_lookup_fd = fcntl(u->manager->user_lookup_fds[1], F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, 3); - if (p->user_lookup_fd < 0) - return -errno; + p->user_lookup_fd = u->manager->user_lookup_fds[1]; + + p->cgroup_id = u->cgroup_id; + p->invocation_id = u->invocation_id; + sd_id128_to_string(p->invocation_id, p->invocation_id_string); + p->unit_id = strdup(u->id); + if (!p->unit_id) + return -ENOMEM; return 0; } diff --git a/src/core/unit.h b/src/core/unit.h index 434981755a..b5d7eb5f26 100644 --- a/src/core/unit.h +++ b/src/core/unit.h @@ -1024,8 +1024,6 @@ void unit_notify_user_lookup(Unit *u, uid_t uid, gid_t gid); int unit_set_invocation_id(Unit *u, sd_id128_t id); int unit_acquire_invocation_id(Unit *u); -bool unit_shall_confirm_spawn(Unit *u); - int unit_set_exec_params(Unit *s, ExecParameters *p); int unit_fork_helper_process(Unit *u, const char *name, PidRef *ret); From 3f12c5ff2ee17df44926252809e882a811b20df2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2023 21:05:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 07/20] serialize: add serialize_item_hexmem() --- src/shared/serialize.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ src/shared/serialize.h | 1 + src/test/test-serialize.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/shared/serialize.c b/src/shared/serialize.c index 2ffc524f15..dc282e398e 100644 --- a/src/shared/serialize.c +++ b/src/shared/serialize.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include "escape.h" #include "fd-util.h" #include "fileio.h" +#include "hexdecoct.h" #include "memfd-util.h" #include "missing_mman.h" #include "missing_syscall.h" @@ -173,6 +174,28 @@ int serialize_pidref(FILE *f, FDSet *fds, const char *key, PidRef *pidref) { return serialize_item_format(f, key, "@%i", copy); } +int serialize_item_hexmem(FILE *f, const char *key, const void *p, size_t l) { + _cleanup_free_ char *encoded = NULL; + int r; + + assert(f); + assert(key); + assert(p || l == 0); + + if (l == 0) + return 0; + + encoded = hexmem(p, l); + if (!encoded) + return log_oom_debug(); + + r = serialize_item(f, key, encoded); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 1; +} + int deserialize_read_line(FILE *f, char **ret) { _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL; int r; diff --git a/src/shared/serialize.h b/src/shared/serialize.h index 9463d1127c..17bc968c04 100644 --- a/src/shared/serialize.h +++ b/src/shared/serialize.h @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ int serialize_item(FILE *f, const char *key, const char *value); int serialize_item_escaped(FILE *f, const char *key, const char *value); int serialize_item_format(FILE *f, const char *key, const char *value, ...) _printf_(3,4); +int serialize_item_hexmem(FILE *f, const char *key, const void *p, size_t l); int serialize_fd(FILE *f, FDSet *fds, const char *key, int fd); int serialize_usec(FILE *f, const char *key, usec_t usec); int serialize_dual_timestamp(FILE *f, const char *key, const dual_timestamp *t); diff --git a/src/test/test-serialize.c b/src/test/test-serialize.c index 36052b6485..501f5c6f2e 100644 --- a/src/test/test-serialize.c +++ b/src/test/test-serialize.c @@ -190,6 +190,24 @@ TEST(serialize_environment) { assert_se(strv_equal(env, env2)); } +TEST(serialize_item_hexmem) { + _cleanup_(unlink_tempfilep) char fn[] = "/tmp/test-serialize.XXXXXX"; + _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL; + + assert_se(fmkostemp_safe(fn, "r+", &f) == 0); + log_info("/* %s (%s) */", __func__, fn); + + assert_se(serialize_item_hexmem(f, "a", NULL, 0) == 0); + assert_se(serialize_item_hexmem(f, "a", (uint8_t []){0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, sizeof(uint8_t) * 3) == 1); + + rewind(f); + + _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL; + assert_se(read_line(f, LONG_LINE_MAX, &line) > 0); + assert_se(streq(line, "a=ffffff")); + +} + static int intro(void) { memset(long_string, 'x', sizeof(long_string)-1); char_array_0(long_string); From 6dae20ec412d5ca3de4a1def0abb5077ee7e2c43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2023 21:15:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 08/20] serialize: add serialize_item_base64mem() --- src/shared/serialize.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ src/shared/serialize.h | 1 + src/test/test-serialize.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/shared/serialize.c b/src/shared/serialize.c index dc282e398e..6133aeb575 100644 --- a/src/shared/serialize.c +++ b/src/shared/serialize.c @@ -196,6 +196,29 @@ int serialize_item_hexmem(FILE *f, const char *key, const void *p, size_t l) { return 1; } +int serialize_item_base64mem(FILE *f, const char *key, const void *p, size_t l) { + _cleanup_free_ char *encoded = NULL; + ssize_t len; + int r; + + assert(f); + assert(key); + assert(p || l == 0); + + if (l == 0) + return 0; + + len = base64mem(p, l, &encoded); + if (len <= 0) + return log_oom_debug(); + + r = serialize_item(f, key, encoded); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 1; +} + int deserialize_read_line(FILE *f, char **ret) { _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL; int r; diff --git a/src/shared/serialize.h b/src/shared/serialize.h index 17bc968c04..5eb9be2584 100644 --- a/src/shared/serialize.h +++ b/src/shared/serialize.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ int serialize_item(FILE *f, const char *key, const char *value); int serialize_item_escaped(FILE *f, const char *key, const char *value); int serialize_item_format(FILE *f, const char *key, const char *value, ...) _printf_(3,4); int serialize_item_hexmem(FILE *f, const char *key, const void *p, size_t l); +int serialize_item_base64mem(FILE *f, const char *key, const void *p, size_t l); int serialize_fd(FILE *f, FDSet *fds, const char *key, int fd); int serialize_usec(FILE *f, const char *key, usec_t usec); int serialize_dual_timestamp(FILE *f, const char *key, const dual_timestamp *t); diff --git a/src/test/test-serialize.c b/src/test/test-serialize.c index 501f5c6f2e..9e7047f4f0 100644 --- a/src/test/test-serialize.c +++ b/src/test/test-serialize.c @@ -208,6 +208,23 @@ TEST(serialize_item_hexmem) { } +TEST(serialize_item_base64mem) { + _cleanup_(unlink_tempfilep) char fn[] = "/tmp/test-serialize.XXXXXX"; + _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL; + + assert_se(fmkostemp_safe(fn, "r+", &f) == 0); + log_info("/* %s (%s) */", __func__, fn); + + assert_se(serialize_item_base64mem(f, "a", NULL, 0) == 0); + assert_se(serialize_item_base64mem(f, "a", (uint8_t []){0xff, 0xff, 0xff}, sizeof(uint8_t) * 3) == 1); + + rewind(f); + + _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL; + assert_se(read_line(f, LONG_LINE_MAX, &line) > 0); + assert_se(streq(line, "a=////")); +} + static int intro(void) { memset(long_string, 'x', sizeof(long_string)-1); char_array_0(long_string); From 5612426d7b827c1cfc12e1546c2e7eb256b06966 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2023 21:26:12 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 09/20] serialize: add serialize_item_tristate() --- src/shared/serialize.h | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/shared/serialize.h b/src/shared/serialize.h index 5eb9be2584..a4c67d8fb8 100644 --- a/src/shared/serialize.h +++ b/src/shared/serialize.h @@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ static inline int serialize_bool_elide(FILE *f, const char *key, bool b) { return b ? serialize_item(f, key, yes_no(b)) : 0; } +static inline int serialize_item_tristate(FILE *f, const char *key, int value) { + return value >= 0 ? serialize_item_format(f, key, "%i", value) : 0; +} + int deserialize_read_line(FILE *f, char **ret); int deserialize_usec(const char *value, usec_t *timestamp); From 1b30ccd81b333e7c027e730a643292e68d83d53a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2023 22:42:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 10/20] serialize: add serialize_string_set() --- src/shared/serialize.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ src/shared/serialize.h | 2 ++ src/test/test-serialize.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/shared/serialize.c b/src/shared/serialize.c index 6133aeb575..525adc73ed 100644 --- a/src/shared/serialize.c +++ b/src/shared/serialize.c @@ -219,6 +219,27 @@ int serialize_item_base64mem(FILE *f, const char *key, const void *p, size_t l) return 1; } +int serialize_string_set(FILE *f, const char *key, Set *s) { + const char *e; + int r; + + assert(f); + assert(key); + + if (set_isempty(s)) + return 0; + + /* Serialize as individual items, as each element might contain separators and escapes */ + + SET_FOREACH(e, s) { + r = serialize_item(f, key, e); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + return 1; +} + int deserialize_read_line(FILE *f, char **ret) { _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL; int r; diff --git a/src/shared/serialize.h b/src/shared/serialize.h index a4c67d8fb8..1b2c435f77 100644 --- a/src/shared/serialize.h +++ b/src/shared/serialize.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include "fdset.h" #include "macro.h" #include "pidref.h" +#include "set.h" #include "string-util.h" #include "time-util.h" @@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ int serialize_usec(FILE *f, const char *key, usec_t usec); int serialize_dual_timestamp(FILE *f, const char *key, const dual_timestamp *t); int serialize_strv(FILE *f, const char *key, char **l); int serialize_pidref(FILE *f, FDSet *fds, const char *key, PidRef *pidref); +int serialize_string_set(FILE *f, const char *key, Set *s); static inline int serialize_bool(FILE *f, const char *key, bool b) { return serialize_item(f, key, yes_no(b)); diff --git a/src/test/test-serialize.c b/src/test/test-serialize.c index 9e7047f4f0..9229e3f5c7 100644 --- a/src/test/test-serialize.c +++ b/src/test/test-serialize.c @@ -225,6 +225,37 @@ TEST(serialize_item_base64mem) { assert_se(streq(line, "a=////")); } +TEST(serialize_string_set) { + _cleanup_(unlink_tempfilep) char fn[] = "/tmp/test-serialize.XXXXXX"; + _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL; + _cleanup_set_free_free_ Set *s = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *line1 = NULL, *line2 = NULL; + char *p, *q; + + assert_se(fmkostemp_safe(fn, "r+", &f) == 0); + log_info("/* %s (%s) */", __func__, fn); + + assert_se(set_ensure_allocated(&s, &string_hash_ops) >= 0); + + assert_se(serialize_string_set(f, "a", s) == 0); + + assert_se(set_put_strsplit(s, "abc def,ghi jkl", ",", 0) >= 0); + + assert_se(serialize_string_set(f, "a", s) == 1); + + rewind(f); + + assert_se(read_line(f, LONG_LINE_MAX, &line1) > 0); + assert_se((p = startswith(line1, "a="))); + + assert_se(read_line(f, LONG_LINE_MAX, &line2) > 0); + assert_se((q = startswith(line2, "a="))); + + assert_se(!streq(p, q)); + assert_se(STR_IN_SET(p, "abc def", "ghi jkl")); + assert_se(STR_IN_SET(q, "abc def", "ghi jkl")); +} + static int intro(void) { memset(long_string, 'x', sizeof(long_string)-1); char_array_0(long_string); From 81b913f076348be53bf4292793896790265b48dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2023 01:19:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 11/20] serialize: add open_serialization_file() --- src/core/manager-serialize.c | 14 +------------- src/shared/serialize.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ src/shared/serialize.h | 1 + src/test/test-fd-util.c | 11 +++++++++++ 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/manager-serialize.c b/src/core/manager-serialize.c index 3d6af0d046..8be54c7ccc 100644 --- a/src/core/manager-serialize.c +++ b/src/core/manager-serialize.c @@ -18,21 +18,9 @@ #include "varlink-internal.h" int manager_open_serialization(Manager *m, FILE **ret_f) { - _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; - FILE *f; - assert(ret_f); - fd = open_serialization_fd("systemd-state"); - if (fd < 0) - return fd; - - f = take_fdopen(&fd, "w+"); - if (!f) - return -errno; - - *ret_f = f; - return 0; + return open_serialization_file("systemd-state", ret_f); } static bool manager_timestamp_shall_serialize(ManagerTimestamp t) { diff --git a/src/shared/serialize.c b/src/shared/serialize.c index 525adc73ed..3606390b99 100644 --- a/src/shared/serialize.c +++ b/src/shared/serialize.c @@ -400,3 +400,22 @@ int open_serialization_fd(const char *ident) { return fd; } + +int open_serialization_file(const char *ident, FILE **ret) { + _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL; + _cleanup_close_ int fd; + + assert(ret); + + fd = open_serialization_fd(ident); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + f = take_fdopen(&fd, "w+"); + if (!f) + return -errno; + + *ret = TAKE_PTR(f); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/shared/serialize.h b/src/shared/serialize.h index 1b2c435f77..82657bc873 100644 --- a/src/shared/serialize.h +++ b/src/shared/serialize.h @@ -42,3 +42,4 @@ int deserialize_strv(char ***l, const char *value); int deserialize_pidref(FDSet *fds, const char *value, PidRef *ret); int open_serialization_fd(const char *ident); +int open_serialization_file(const char *ident, FILE **ret); diff --git a/src/test/test-fd-util.c b/src/test/test-fd-util.c index 20d412f5c6..67ec3e59f1 100644 --- a/src/test/test-fd-util.c +++ b/src/test/test-fd-util.c @@ -100,6 +100,17 @@ TEST(open_serialization_fd) { assert_se(write(fd, "test\n", 5) == 5); } +TEST(open_serialization_file) { + _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL; + int r; + + r = open_serialization_file("test", &f); + assert_se(r >= 0); + assert_se(f); + + assert_se(fwrite("test\n", 1, 5, f) == 5); +} + TEST(fd_move_above_stdio) { int original_stdin, new_fd; From 665c6e46e38a3a8c7cb012f0b4e817e17fbe15fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2023 23:35:26 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 12/20] serialize: add serialize_image_policy() --- src/shared/serialize.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ src/shared/serialize.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/shared/serialize.c b/src/shared/serialize.c index 3606390b99..edb232e2ee 100644 --- a/src/shared/serialize.c +++ b/src/shared/serialize.c @@ -240,6 +240,27 @@ int serialize_string_set(FILE *f, const char *key, Set *s) { return 1; } +int serialize_image_policy(FILE *f, const char *key, const ImagePolicy *p) { + _cleanup_free_ char *policy = NULL; + int r; + + assert(f); + assert(key); + + if (!p) + return 0; + + r = image_policy_to_string(p, /* simplify= */ false, &policy); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, key, policy); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 1; +} + int deserialize_read_line(FILE *f, char **ret) { _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL; int r; diff --git a/src/shared/serialize.h b/src/shared/serialize.h index 82657bc873..5122c42793 100644 --- a/src/shared/serialize.h +++ b/src/shared/serialize.h @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include #include "fdset.h" +#include "image-policy.h" #include "macro.h" #include "pidref.h" #include "set.h" @@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ int serialize_dual_timestamp(FILE *f, const char *key, const dual_timestamp *t); int serialize_strv(FILE *f, const char *key, char **l); int serialize_pidref(FILE *f, FDSet *fds, const char *key, PidRef *pidref); int serialize_string_set(FILE *f, const char *key, Set *s); +int serialize_image_policy(FILE *f, const char *key, const ImagePolicy *p); static inline int serialize_bool(FILE *f, const char *key, bool b) { return serialize_item(f, key, yes_no(b)); From c3166b25e24b00fa434ffeaf6c2ee64da74628e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 01:06:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 13/20] core: add cgroup_add_or_update_device_allow() --- src/core/cgroup.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ src/core/cgroup.h | 1 + src/core/dbus-cgroup.c | 28 +++------------------------- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/cgroup.c b/src/core/cgroup.c index 69c9d9a9bb..e217eab7ee 100644 --- a/src/core/cgroup.c +++ b/src/core/cgroup.c @@ -731,6 +731,23 @@ int cgroup_context_add_device_allow(CGroupContext *c, const char *dev, const cha return 0; } +int cgroup_context_add_or_update_device_allow(CGroupContext *c, const char *dev, const char *mode) { + assert(c); + assert(dev); + assert(isempty(mode) || in_charset(mode, "rwm")); + + LIST_FOREACH(device_allow, b, c->device_allow) + if (path_equal(b->path, dev)) { + b->r = isempty(mode) || strchr(mode, 'r'); + b->w = isempty(mode) || strchr(mode, 'w'); + b->m = isempty(mode) || strchr(mode, 'm'); + + return 0; + } + + return cgroup_context_add_device_allow(c, dev, mode); +} + int cgroup_context_add_bpf_foreign_program(CGroupContext *c, uint32_t attach_type, const char *bpffs_path) { CGroupBPFForeignProgram *p; _cleanup_free_ char *d = NULL; diff --git a/src/core/cgroup.h b/src/core/cgroup.h index 072c92f011..80d353fac6 100644 --- a/src/core/cgroup.h +++ b/src/core/cgroup.h @@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ static inline bool cgroup_context_want_memory_pressure(const CGroupContext *c) { } int cgroup_context_add_device_allow(CGroupContext *c, const char *dev, const char *mode); +int cgroup_context_add_or_update_device_allow(CGroupContext *c, const char *dev, const char *mode); int cgroup_context_add_bpf_foreign_program(CGroupContext *c, uint32_t attach_type, const char *path); void unit_modify_nft_set(Unit *u, bool add); diff --git a/src/core/dbus-cgroup.c b/src/core/dbus-cgroup.c index d38e8a6aeb..820b43ee1f 100644 --- a/src/core/dbus-cgroup.c +++ b/src/core/dbus-cgroup.c @@ -1820,31 +1820,9 @@ int bus_cgroup_set_property( return sd_bus_error_set(error, SD_BUS_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, "DeviceAllow= requires combination of rwm flags"); if (!UNIT_WRITE_FLAGS_NOOP(flags)) { - CGroupDeviceAllow *a = NULL; - - LIST_FOREACH(device_allow, b, c->device_allow) - if (path_equal(b->path, path)) { - a = b; - break; - } - - if (!a) { - a = new0(CGroupDeviceAllow, 1); - if (!a) - return -ENOMEM; - - a->path = strdup(path); - if (!a->path) { - free(a); - return -ENOMEM; - } - - LIST_PREPEND(device_allow, c->device_allow, a); - } - - a->r = strchr(rwm, 'r'); - a->w = strchr(rwm, 'w'); - a->m = strchr(rwm, 'm'); + r = cgroup_context_add_or_update_device_allow(c, path, rwm); + if (r < 0) + return r; } n++; From 5699a1689b7e49702e4e60d08ab3fe386ba8d4df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2023 00:31:26 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 14/20] core: add serialization/deserialization for ExecContext --- src/core/execute-serialize.c | 2141 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/core/execute-serialize.h | 15 + src/core/manager-serialize.c | 6 +- src/core/meson.build | 1 + src/core/unit-serialize.c | 6 +- src/core/unit-serialize.h | 9 +- 6 files changed, 2169 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/core/execute-serialize.c create mode 100644 src/core/execute-serialize.h diff --git a/src/core/execute-serialize.c b/src/core/execute-serialize.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c13ea82875 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/execute-serialize.c @@ -0,0 +1,2141 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ + +#include "af-list.h" +#include "capability-util.h" +#include "cgroup-setup.h" +#include "escape.h" +#include "exec-credential.h" +#include "execute-serialize.h" +#include "hexdecoct.h" +#include "fd-util.h" +#include "fileio.h" +#include "in-addr-prefix-util.h" +#include "parse-helpers.h" +#include "parse-util.h" +#include "percent-util.h" +#include "process-util.h" +#include "rlimit-util.h" +#include "serialize.h" +#include "string-util.h" +#include "strv.h" + +static int serialize_std_out_err(const ExecContext *c, FILE *f, int fileno) { + char *key, *value; + const char *type; + + assert(c); + assert(f); + assert(IN_SET(fileno, STDOUT_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO)); + + type = fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "output" : "error"; + + switch (fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? c->std_output : c->std_error) { + case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD: + key = strjoina("exec-context-std-", type, "-fd-name"); + value = c->stdio_fdname[fileno]; + + break; + + case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE: + key = strjoina("exec-context-std-", type, "-file"); + value = c->stdio_file[fileno]; + + break; + + case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND: + key = strjoina("exec-context-std-", type, "-file-append"); + value = c->stdio_file[fileno]; + + break; + + case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE: + key = strjoina("exec-context-std-", type, "-file-truncate"); + value = c->stdio_file[fileno]; + + break; + + default: + return 0; + } + + return serialize_item(f, key, value); +} + +static int exec_context_serialize(const ExecContext *c, FILE *f) { + int r; + + assert(f); + + if (!c) + return 0; + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-context-environment", c->environment); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-context-environment-files", c->environment_files); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-context-pass-environment", c->pass_environment); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-context-unset-environment", c->unset_environment); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-working-directory", c->working_directory); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-root-directory", c->root_directory); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-root-image", c->root_image); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (c->root_image_options) { + _cleanup_free_ char *options = NULL; + + LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, o, c->root_image_options) { + if (isempty(o->options)) + continue; + + _cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL; + escaped = shell_escape(o->options, ":"); + if (!escaped) + return log_oom_debug(); + + if (!strextend(&options, + " ", + partition_designator_to_string(o->partition_designator), + ":", + escaped)) + return log_oom_debug(); + } + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-root-image-options", options); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-root-verity", c->root_verity); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-root-hash-path", c->root_hash_path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-root-hash-sig-path", c->root_hash_sig_path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_hexmem(f, "exec-context-root-hash", c->root_hash, c->root_hash_size); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_base64mem(f, "exec-context-root-hash-sig", c->root_hash_sig, c->root_hash_sig_size); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-root-ephemeral", c->root_ephemeral); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-umask", "%04o", c->umask); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-non-blocking", c->non_blocking); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_tristate(f, "exec-context-private-mounts", c->private_mounts); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_tristate(f, "exec-context-memory-ksm", c->memory_ksm); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-private-tmp", c->private_tmp); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-private-devices", c->private_devices); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-protect-kernel-tunables", c->protect_kernel_tunables); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-protect-kernel-modules", c->protect_kernel_modules); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-protect-kernel-logs", c->protect_kernel_logs); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-protect-clock", c->protect_clock); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-protect-control-groups", c->protect_control_groups); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-private-network", c->private_network); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-private-users", c->private_users); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-private-ipc", c->private_ipc); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-remove-ipc", c->remove_ipc); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-protect-home", protect_home_to_string(c->protect_home)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-protect-system", protect_system_to_string(c->protect_system)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (c->mount_apivfs_set) { + r = serialize_bool(f, "exec-context-mount-api-vfs", c->mount_apivfs); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-same-pgrp", c->same_pgrp); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-cpu-sched-reset-on-fork", c->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool(f, "exec-context-ignore-sigpipe", c->ignore_sigpipe); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-memory-deny-write-execute", c->memory_deny_write_execute); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-restrict-realtime", c->restrict_realtime); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-restrict-suid-sgid", c->restrict_suid_sgid); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-keyring-mode", exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c->keyring_mode)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-protect-hostname", c->protect_hostname); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-protect-proc", protect_proc_to_string(c->protect_proc)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-proc-subset", proc_subset_to_string(c->proc_subset)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-runtime-directory-preserve-mode", exec_preserve_mode_to_string(c->runtime_directory_preserve_mode)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + for (ExecDirectoryType dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { + _cleanup_free_ char *key = NULL, *value = NULL; + + key = strjoin("exec-context-directories-", exec_directory_type_to_string(dt)); + if (!key) + return log_oom_debug(); + + if (asprintf(&value, "%04o", c->directories[dt].mode) < 0) + return log_oom_debug(); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[dt].n_items; i++) { + _cleanup_free_ char *path_escaped = NULL; + + path_escaped = shell_escape(c->directories[dt].items[i].path, ":"); + if (!path_escaped) + return log_oom_debug(); + + if (!strextend(&value, " ", path_escaped)) + return log_oom_debug(); + + if (!strextend(&value, ":", yes_no(c->directories[dt].items[i].only_create))) + return log_oom_debug(); + + STRV_FOREACH(d, c->directories[dt].items[i].symlinks) { + _cleanup_free_ char *link_escaped = NULL; + + link_escaped = shell_escape(*d, ":"); + if (!link_escaped) + return log_oom_debug(); + + if (!strextend(&value, ":", link_escaped)) + return log_oom_debug(); + } + } + + r = serialize_item(f, key, value); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_usec(f, "exec-context-timeout-clean-usec", c->timeout_clean_usec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (c->nice_set) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-nice", "%i", c->nice); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-working-directory-missing-ok", c->working_directory_missing_ok); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-working-directory-home", c->working_directory_home); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (c->oom_score_adjust_set) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-oom-score-adjust", "%i", c->oom_score_adjust); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->coredump_filter_set) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-coredump-filter", "%"PRIx64, c->coredump_filter); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + for (unsigned i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { + _cleanup_free_ char *key = NULL, *limit = NULL; + + if (!c->rlimit[i]) + continue; + + key = strjoin("exec-context-limit-", rlimit_to_string(i)); + if (!key) + return log_oom_debug(); + + r = rlimit_format(c->rlimit[i], &limit); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, key, limit); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->ioprio_set) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-ioprio", "%d", c->ioprio); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->cpu_sched_set) { + _cleanup_free_ char *policy_str = NULL; + + r = sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c->cpu_sched_policy, &policy_str); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-cpu-scheduling-policy", policy_str); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-cpu-scheduling-priority", "%i", c->cpu_sched_priority); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-cpu-scheduling-reset-on-fork", c->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->cpu_set.set) { + _cleanup_free_ char *affinity = NULL; + + affinity = cpu_set_to_range_string(&c->cpu_set); + if (!affinity) + return log_oom_debug(); + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-cpu-affinity", affinity); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&c->numa_policy))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *nodes = NULL; + + nodes = cpu_set_to_range_string(&c->numa_policy.nodes); + if (!nodes) + return log_oom_debug(); + + if (nodes) { + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-numa-mask", nodes); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-numa-policy", "%d", c->numa_policy.type); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-cpu-affinity-from-numa", c->cpu_affinity_from_numa); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (c->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-timer-slack-nsec", NSEC_FMT, c->timer_slack_nsec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-std-input", exec_input_to_string(c->std_input)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-std-output", exec_output_to_string(c->std_output)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-std-error", exec_output_to_string(c->std_error)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-stdio-as-fds", c->stdio_as_fds); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + switch (c->std_input) { + case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD: + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-std-input-fd-name", c->stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO]); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + case EXEC_INPUT_FILE: + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-std-input-file", c->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]); + if (r < 0) + return r; + break; + + default: + break; + } + + r = serialize_std_out_err(c, f, STDOUT_FILENO); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_std_out_err(c, f, STDERR_FILENO); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_base64mem(f, "exec-context-stdin-data", c->stdin_data, c->stdin_data_size); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-tty-path", c->tty_path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-tty-reset", c->tty_reset); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-tty-vhangup", c->tty_vhangup); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-tty-vt-disallocate", c->tty_vt_disallocate); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-tty-rows", "%u", c->tty_rows); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-tty-columns", "%u", c->tty_cols); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-syslog-priority", "%i", c->syslog_priority); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool(f, "exec-context-syslog-level-prefix", c->syslog_level_prefix); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-syslog-identifier", c->syslog_identifier); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-log-level-max", "%d", c->log_level_max); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (c->log_ratelimit_interval_usec > 0) { + r = serialize_usec(f, "exec-context-log-ratelimit-interval-usec", c->log_ratelimit_interval_usec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->log_ratelimit_burst > 0) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-log-ratelimit-burst", "%u", c->log_ratelimit_burst); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_string_set(f, "exec-context-log-filter-allowed-patterns", c->log_filter_allowed_patterns); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_string_set(f, "exec-context-log-filter-denied-patterns", c->log_filter_denied_patterns); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + for (size_t j = 0; j < c->n_log_extra_fields; j++) { + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-log-extra-fields", c->log_extra_fields[j].iov_base); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-log-namespace", c->log_namespace); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (c->secure_bits != 0) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-secure-bits", "%d", c->secure_bits); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->capability_bounding_set != CAP_MASK_UNSET) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-capability-bounding-set", "%" PRIu64, c->capability_bounding_set); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->capability_ambient_set != 0) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-capability-ambient-set", "%" PRIu64, c->capability_ambient_set); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->user) { + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-user", c->user); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-group", c->group); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-dynamic-user", c->dynamic_user); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-context-supplementary-groups", c->supplementary_groups); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_tristate(f, "exec-context-set-login-environment", c->set_login_environment); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-pam-name", c->pam_name); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-context-read-write-paths", c->read_write_paths); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-context-read-only-paths", c->read_only_paths); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-context-inaccessible-paths", c->inaccessible_paths); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-context-exec-paths", c->exec_paths); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-context-no-exec-paths", c->no_exec_paths); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-context-exec-search-path", c->exec_search_path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-mount-propagation-flag", "%lu", c->mount_propagation_flag); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < c->n_bind_mounts; i++) { + _cleanup_free_ char *src_escaped = NULL, *dst_escaped = NULL; + + src_escaped = shell_escape(c->bind_mounts[i].source, ":"); + if (!src_escaped) + return log_oom_debug(); + + dst_escaped = shell_escape(c->bind_mounts[i].destination, ":"); + if (!dst_escaped) + return log_oom_debug(); + + r = serialize_item_format(f, + c->bind_mounts[i].read_only ? "exec-context-bind-read-only-path" : "exec-context-bind-path", + "%s%s:%s:%s", + c->bind_mounts[i].ignore_enoent ? "-" : "", + src_escaped, + dst_escaped, + c->bind_mounts[i].recursive ? "rbind" : "norbind"); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < c->n_temporary_filesystems; i++) { + const TemporaryFileSystem *t = c->temporary_filesystems + i; + _cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL; + + if (!isempty(t->options)) { + escaped = shell_escape(t->options, ":"); + if (!escaped) + return log_oom_debug(); + } + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-temporary-filesystems", "%s%s%s", + t->path, + isempty(escaped) ? "" : ":", + strempty(escaped)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-utmp-id", c->utmp_id); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-utmp-mode", exec_utmp_mode_to_string(c->utmp_mode)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-no-new-privileges", c->no_new_privileges); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-selinux-context-ignore", c->selinux_context_ignore); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-apparmor-profile-ignore", c->apparmor_profile_ignore); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-smack-process-label-ignore", c->smack_process_label_ignore); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (c->selinux_context) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-selinux-context", + "%s%s", + c->selinux_context_ignore ? "-" : "", + c->selinux_context); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->apparmor_profile) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-apparmor-profile", + "%s%s", + c->apparmor_profile_ignore ? "-" : "", + c->apparmor_profile); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->smack_process_label) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-smack-process-label", + "%s%s", + c->smack_process_label_ignore ? "-" : "", + c->smack_process_label); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID) { + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-personality", personality_to_string(c->personality)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-lock-personality", c->lock_personality); + if (r < 0) + return r; + +#if HAVE_SECCOMP + if (!hashmap_isempty(c->syscall_filter)) { + void *errno_num, *id; + HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(errno_num, id, c->syscall_filter) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-syscall-filter", "%d %d", PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1, PTR_TO_INT(errno_num)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + } + + if (!set_isempty(c->syscall_archs)) { + void *id; + SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-syscall-archs", "%u", PTR_TO_UINT(id) - 1); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + } + + if (c->syscall_errno > 0) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-syscall-errno", "%d", c->syscall_errno); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-syscall-allow-list", c->syscall_allow_list); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (!hashmap_isempty(c->syscall_log)) { + void *errno_num, *id; + HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(errno_num, id, c->syscall_log) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-syscall-log", "%d %d", PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1, PTR_TO_INT(errno_num)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + } + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-syscall-log-allow-list", c->syscall_log_allow_list); + if (r < 0) + return r; +#endif + + if (c->restrict_namespaces != NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-restrict-namespaces", "%lu", c->restrict_namespaces); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + +#if HAVE_LIBBPF + if (exec_context_restrict_filesystems_set(c)) { + char *fs; + SET_FOREACH(fs, c->restrict_filesystems) { + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-restrict-filesystems", fs); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + } + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-restrict-filesystems-allow-list", c->restrict_filesystems_allow_list); + if (r < 0) + return r; +#endif + + if (!set_isempty(c->address_families)) { + void *afp; + + SET_FOREACH(afp, c->address_families) { + int af = PTR_TO_INT(afp); + + if (af <= 0 || af >= af_max()) + continue; + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-address-families", "%d", af); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + } + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-context-address-families-allow-list", c->address_families_allow_list); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-network-namespace-path", c->network_namespace_path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-ipc-namespace-path", c->ipc_namespace_path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < c->n_mount_images; i++) { + _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *source_escaped = NULL, *dest_escaped = NULL; + + source_escaped = shell_escape(c->mount_images[i].source, " "); + if (!source_escaped) + return log_oom_debug(); + + dest_escaped = shell_escape(c->mount_images[i].destination, " "); + if (!dest_escaped) + return log_oom_debug(); + + s = strjoin(c->mount_images[i].ignore_enoent ? "-" : "", + source_escaped, + " ", + dest_escaped); + if (!s) + return log_oom_debug(); + + LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, o, c->mount_images[i].mount_options) { + _cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL; + + if (isempty(o->options)) + continue; + + escaped = shell_escape(o->options, ":"); + if (!escaped) + return log_oom_debug(); + + if (!strextend(&s, + " ", + partition_designator_to_string(o->partition_designator), + ":", + escaped)) + return log_oom_debug(); + } + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-mount-image", s); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < c->n_extension_images; i++) { + _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *source_escaped = NULL; + + source_escaped = shell_escape(c->extension_images[i].source, ":"); + if (!source_escaped) + return log_oom_debug(); + + s = strjoin(c->extension_images[i].ignore_enoent ? "-" : "", + source_escaped); + if (!s) + return log_oom_debug(); + + LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, o, c->extension_images[i].mount_options) { + _cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL; + + if (isempty(o->options)) + continue; + + escaped = shell_escape(o->options, ":"); + if (!escaped) + return log_oom_debug(); + + if (!strextend(&s, + " ", + partition_designator_to_string(o->partition_designator), + ":", + escaped)) + return log_oom_debug(); + } + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-extension-image", s); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-context-extension-directories", c->extension_directories); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + ExecSetCredential *sc; + HASHMAP_FOREACH(sc, c->set_credentials) { + _cleanup_free_ char *data = NULL; + + if (base64mem(sc->data, sc->size, &data) < 0) + return log_oom_debug(); + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-set-credentials", "%s %s %s", sc->id, yes_no(sc->encrypted), data); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + ExecLoadCredential *lc; + HASHMAP_FOREACH(lc, c->load_credentials) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-context-load-credentials", "%s %s %s", lc->id, yes_no(lc->encrypted), lc->path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (!set_isempty(c->import_credentials)) { + char *ic; + SET_FOREACH(ic, c->import_credentials) { + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-context-import-credentials", ic); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + } + + r = serialize_image_policy(f, "exec-context-root-image-policy", c->root_image_policy); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_image_policy(f, "exec-context-mount-image-policy", c->mount_image_policy); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_image_policy(f, "exec-context-extension-image-policy", c->extension_image_policy); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + fputc('\n', f); /* End marker */ + + return 0; +} + +static int exec_context_deserialize(ExecContext *c, FILE *f) { + int r; + + assert(f); + + if (!c) + return 0; + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *l = NULL; + const char *val; + + r = deserialize_read_line(f, &l); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) /* eof or end marker */ + break; + + if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-environment="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&c->environment, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-environment-files="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&c->environment_files, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-pass-environment="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&c->pass_environment, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-unset-environment="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&c->unset_environment, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-working-directory="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->working_directory, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-root-directory="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->root_directory, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-root-image="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->root_image, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-root-image-options="))) { + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL, *mount_options = NULL, *partition = NULL; + PartitionDesignator partition_designator; + MountOptions *o = NULL; + const char *p; + + r = extract_first_word(&val, &word, NULL, 0); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + break; + + p = word; + r = extract_many_words(&p, ":", EXTRACT_CUNESCAPE|EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS, &partition, &mount_options, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + partition_designator = partition_designator_from_string(partition); + if (partition_designator < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + o = new(MountOptions, 1); + if (!o) + return log_oom_debug(); + *o = (MountOptions) { + .partition_designator = partition_designator, + .options = TAKE_PTR(mount_options), + }; + LIST_APPEND(mount_options, c->root_image_options, o); + } + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-root-verity="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->root_verity, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-root-hash-path="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->root_hash_path, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-root-hash-sig-path="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->root_hash_sig_path, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-root-hash="))) { + c->root_hash = mfree(c->root_hash); + r = unhexmem(val, strlen(val), &c->root_hash, &c->root_hash_size); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-root-hash-sig="))) { + c->root_hash_sig = mfree(c->root_hash_sig); + r= unbase64mem(val, strlen(val), &c->root_hash_sig, &c->root_hash_sig_size); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-root-ephemeral="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->root_ephemeral = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-umask="))) { + r = parse_mode(val, &c->umask); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-private-non-blocking="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->non_blocking = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-private-mounts="))) { + r = safe_atoi(val, &c->private_mounts); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-memory-ksm="))) { + r = safe_atoi(val, &c->memory_ksm); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-private-tmp="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->private_tmp = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-private-devices="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->private_devices = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-protect-kernel-tunables="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->protect_kernel_tunables = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-protect-kernel-modules="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->protect_kernel_modules = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-protect-kernel-logs="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->protect_kernel_logs = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-protect-clock="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->protect_clock = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-protect-control-groups="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->protect_control_groups = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-private-network="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->private_network = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-private-users="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->private_users = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-private-ipc="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->private_ipc = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-remove-ipc="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->remove_ipc = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-protect-home="))) { + c->protect_home = protect_home_from_string(val); + if (c->protect_home < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-protect-system="))) { + c->protect_system = protect_system_from_string(val); + if (c->protect_system < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-mount-api-vfs="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->mount_apivfs = r; + c->mount_apivfs_set = true; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-same-pgrp="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->same_pgrp = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-cpu-sched-reset-on-fork="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-non-blocking="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + r = c->non_blocking; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-ignore-sigpipe="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->ignore_sigpipe = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-memory-deny-write-execute="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->memory_deny_write_execute = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-restrict-realtime="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->restrict_realtime = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-restrict-suid-sgid="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->restrict_suid_sgid = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-keyring-mode="))) { + c->keyring_mode = exec_keyring_mode_from_string(val); + if (c->keyring_mode < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-protect-hostname="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->protect_hostname = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-protect-proc="))) { + c->protect_proc = protect_proc_from_string(val); + if (c->protect_proc < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-proc-subset="))) { + c->proc_subset = proc_subset_from_string(val); + if (c->proc_subset < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-runtime-directory-preserve-mode="))) { + c->runtime_directory_preserve_mode = exec_preserve_mode_from_string(val); + if (c->runtime_directory_preserve_mode < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-directories-"))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *type = NULL, *mode = NULL; + ExecDirectoryType dt; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, "= ", 0, &type, &mode, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0 || !mode) + return -EINVAL; + + dt = exec_directory_type_from_string(type); + if (dt < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + r = parse_mode(mode, &c->directories[dt].mode); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *tuple = NULL, *path = NULL, *only_create = NULL; + const char *p; + + r = extract_first_word(&val, &tuple, WHITESPACE, EXTRACT_RETAIN_ESCAPE); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + break; + + p = tuple; + r = extract_many_words(&p, ":", EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS, &path, &only_create, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r < 2) + continue; + + r = exec_directory_add(&c->directories[dt], path, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = parse_boolean(only_create); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->directories[dt].items[c->directories[dt].n_items - 1].only_create = r; + + if (isempty(p)) + continue; + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL; + + r = extract_first_word(&p, &link, ":", EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + break; + + r = strv_consume(&c->directories[dt].items[c->directories[dt].n_items - 1].symlinks, TAKE_PTR(link)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + } + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-timeout-clean-usec="))) { + r = deserialize_usec(val, &c->timeout_clean_usec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-nice="))) { + r = safe_atoi(val, &c->nice); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->nice_set = true; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-working-directory-missing-ok="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->working_directory_missing_ok = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-working-directory-home="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->working_directory_home = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-oom-score-adjust="))) { + r = safe_atoi(val, &c->oom_score_adjust); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->oom_score_adjust_set = true; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-coredump-filter="))) { + r = safe_atoux64(val, &c->coredump_filter); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->coredump_filter_set = true; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-limit-"))) { + _cleanup_free_ struct rlimit *rlimit = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *limit = NULL; + int type; + + r = extract_first_word(&val, &limit, "=", 0); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0 || !val) + return -EINVAL; + + type = rlimit_from_string(limit); + if (type < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!c->rlimit[type]) { + rlimit = new0(struct rlimit, 1); + if (!rlimit) + return log_oom_debug(); + + r = rlimit_parse(type, val, rlimit); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + c->rlimit[type] = TAKE_PTR(rlimit); + } else { + r = rlimit_parse(type, val, c->rlimit[type]); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-ioprio="))) { + r = safe_atoi(val, &c->ioprio); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->ioprio_set = true; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-cpu-scheduling-policy="))) { + r = sched_policy_from_string(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->cpu_sched_set = true; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-cpu-scheduling-priority="))) { + r = safe_atoi(val, &c->cpu_sched_priority); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->cpu_sched_set = true; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-cpu-scheduling-reset-on-fork="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork = r; + c->cpu_sched_set = true; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-cpu-affinity="))) { + if (c->cpu_set.set) + return -EINVAL; /* duplicated */ + + r = parse_cpu_set(val, &c->cpu_set); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-numa-mask="))) { + if (c->numa_policy.nodes.set) + return -EINVAL; /* duplicated */ + + r = parse_cpu_set(val, &c->numa_policy.nodes); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-numa-policy="))) { + r = safe_atoi(val, &c->numa_policy.type); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-cpu-affinity-from-numa="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->cpu_affinity_from_numa = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-timer-slack-nsec="))) { + r = deserialize_usec(val, (usec_t *)&c->timer_slack_nsec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-std-input="))) { + c->std_input = exec_input_from_string(val); + if (c->std_input < 0) + return c->std_input; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-std-output="))) { + c->std_output = exec_output_from_string(val); + if (c->std_output < 0) + return c->std_output; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-std-error="))) { + c->std_error = exec_output_from_string(val); + if (c->std_error < 0) + return c->std_error; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-stdio-as-fds="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->stdio_as_fds = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-std-input-fd-name="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO], val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-std-output-fd-name="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO], val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-std-error-fd-name="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO], val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-std-input-file="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-std-output-file="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO], val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-std-output-file-append="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO], val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-std-output-file-truncate="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO], val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-std-error-file="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO], val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-std-error-file-append="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO], val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-std-error-file-truncate="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO], val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-stdin-data="))) { + if (c->stdin_data) + return -EINVAL; /* duplicated */ + + r = unbase64mem(val, strlen(val), &c->stdin_data, &c->stdin_data_size); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-tty-path="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->tty_path, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-tty-reset="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->tty_reset = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-tty-vhangup="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->tty_vhangup = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-tty-vt-disallocate="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->tty_vt_disallocate = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-tty-rows="))) { + r = safe_atou(val, &c->tty_rows); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-tty-columns="))) { + r = safe_atou(val, &c->tty_cols); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-syslog-priority="))) { + r = safe_atoi(val, &c->syslog_priority); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-syslog-level-prefix="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->syslog_level_prefix = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-syslog-identifier="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->syslog_identifier, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-log-level-max="))) { + r = safe_atoi(val, &c->log_level_max); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-log-ratelimit-interval-usec="))) { + r = deserialize_usec(val, &c->log_ratelimit_interval_usec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-log-ratelimit-burst="))) { + r = safe_atou(val, &c->log_ratelimit_burst); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-log-filter-allowed-patterns="))) { + r = set_put_strdup(&c->log_filter_allowed_patterns, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-log-filter-denied-patterns="))) { + r = set_put_strdup(&c->log_filter_denied_patterns, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-log-extra-fields="))) { + if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(c->log_extra_fields, c->n_log_extra_fields + 1)) + return log_oom_debug(); + + c->log_extra_fields[c->n_log_extra_fields++].iov_base = strdup(val); + if (!c->log_extra_fields[c->n_log_extra_fields-1].iov_base) + return log_oom_debug(); + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-log-namespace="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->log_namespace, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-secure-bits="))) { + r = safe_atoi(val, &c->secure_bits); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-capability-bounding-set="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->capability_bounding_set); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-capability-ambient-set="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->capability_ambient_set); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-user="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->user, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-group="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->group, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-dynamic-user="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->dynamic_user = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-supplementary-groups="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&c->supplementary_groups, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-set-login-environment="))) { + r = safe_atoi(val, &c->set_login_environment); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-pam-name="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->pam_name, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-read-write-paths="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&c->read_write_paths, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-read-only-paths="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&c->read_only_paths, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-inaccessible-paths="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&c->inaccessible_paths, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-exec-paths="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&c->exec_paths, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-no-exec-paths="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&c->no_exec_paths, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-exec-search-path="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&c->exec_search_path, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-mount-propagation-flag="))) { + r = safe_atolu(val, &c->mount_propagation_flag); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-bind-read-only-path="))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *source = NULL, *destination = NULL; + bool rbind = true, ignore_enoent = false; + char *s = NULL, *d = NULL; + + r = extract_first_word(&val, + &source, + ":" WHITESPACE, + EXTRACT_UNQUOTE|EXTRACT_DONT_COALESCE_SEPARATORS|EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + s = source; + if (s[0] == '-') { + ignore_enoent = true; + s++; + } + + if (val && val[-1] == ':') { + r = extract_first_word(&val, + &destination, + ":" WHITESPACE, + EXTRACT_UNQUOTE|EXTRACT_DONT_COALESCE_SEPARATORS|EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + d = destination; + + if (val && val[-1] == ':') { + _cleanup_free_ char *options = NULL; + + r = extract_first_word(&val, &options, NULL, EXTRACT_UNQUOTE); + if (r < 0) + return -r; + + if (isempty(options) || streq(options, "rbind")) + rbind = true; + else if (streq(options, "norbind")) + rbind = false; + else + continue; + } + } else + d = s; + + r = bind_mount_add(&c->bind_mounts, &c->n_bind_mounts, + &(BindMount) { + .source = s, + .destination = d, + .read_only = true, + .recursive = rbind, + .ignore_enoent = ignore_enoent, + }); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom_debug(); + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-bind-path="))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *source = NULL, *destination = NULL; + bool rbind = true, ignore_enoent = false; + char *s = NULL, *d = NULL; + + r = extract_first_word(&val, + &source, + ":" WHITESPACE, + EXTRACT_UNQUOTE|EXTRACT_DONT_COALESCE_SEPARATORS|EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + s = source; + if (s[0] == '-') { + ignore_enoent = true; + s++; + } + + if (val && val[-1] == ':') { + r = extract_first_word(&val, + &destination, + ":" WHITESPACE, + EXTRACT_UNQUOTE|EXTRACT_DONT_COALESCE_SEPARATORS|EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + d = destination; + + if (val && val[-1] == ':') { + _cleanup_free_ char *options = NULL; + + r = extract_first_word(&val, &options, NULL, EXTRACT_UNQUOTE); + if (r < 0) + return -r; + + if (isempty(options) || streq(options, "rbind")) + rbind = true; + else if (streq(options, "norbind")) + rbind = false; + else + continue; + } + } else + d = s; + + r = bind_mount_add(&c->bind_mounts, &c->n_bind_mounts, + &(BindMount) { + .source = s, + .destination = d, + .read_only = false, + .recursive = rbind, + .ignore_enoent = ignore_enoent, + }); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom_debug(); + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-temporary-filesystems="))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL, *options = NULL; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, ":", EXTRACT_CUNESCAPE|EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS, &path, &options, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r < 1) + continue; + + r = temporary_filesystem_add(&c->temporary_filesystems, &c->n_temporary_filesystems, path, options); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom_debug(); + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-utmp-id="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->utmp_id, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-utmp-mode="))) { + c->utmp_mode = exec_utmp_mode_from_string(val); + if (c->utmp_mode < 0) + return c->utmp_mode; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-no-new-privileges="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->no_new_privileges = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-selinux-context-ignore="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->selinux_context_ignore = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-apparmor-profile-ignore="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->apparmor_profile_ignore = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-smack-process-label-ignore="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->smack_process_label_ignore = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-selinux-context="))) { + if (val[0] == '-') { + c->selinux_context_ignore = true; + val++; + } + + r = free_and_strdup(&c->selinux_context, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-apparmor-profile="))) { + if (val[0] == '-') { + c->apparmor_profile_ignore = true; + val++; + } + + r = free_and_strdup(&c->apparmor_profile, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-smack-process-label="))) { + if (val[0] == '-') { + c->smack_process_label_ignore = true; + val++; + } + + r = free_and_strdup(&c->smack_process_label, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-personality="))) + c->personality = personality_from_string(val); + else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-lock-personality="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->lock_personality = r; +#if HAVE_SECCOMP + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-syscall-filter="))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *s_id = NULL, *s_errno_num = NULL; + int id, errno_num; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, NULL, 0, &s_id, &s_errno_num, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r != 2) + continue; + + r = safe_atoi(s_id, &id); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = safe_atoi(s_errno_num, &errno_num); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = hashmap_ensure_put(&c->syscall_filter, NULL, INT_TO_PTR(id + 1), INT_TO_PTR(errno_num)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-syscall-archs="))) { + unsigned int id; + + r = safe_atou(val, &id); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = set_ensure_put(&c->syscall_archs, NULL, UINT_TO_PTR(id + 1)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-syscall-errno="))) { + r = safe_atoi(val, &c->syscall_errno); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-syscall-allow-list="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->syscall_allow_list = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-syscall-log="))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *s_id = NULL, *s_errno_num = NULL; + int id, errno_num; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, " ", 0, &s_id, &s_errno_num, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r != 2) + continue; + + r = safe_atoi(s_id, &id); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = safe_atoi(s_errno_num, &errno_num); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = hashmap_ensure_put(&c->syscall_log, NULL, INT_TO_PTR(id + 1), INT_TO_PTR(errno_num)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-syscall-log-allow-list="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->syscall_log_allow_list = r; +#endif + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-restrict-namespaces="))) { + r = safe_atolu(val, &c->restrict_namespaces); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-restrict-filesystems="))) { + r = set_ensure_allocated(&c->restrict_filesystems, &string_hash_ops); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = set_put_strdup(&c->restrict_filesystems, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-restrict-filesystems-allow-list="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->restrict_filesystems_allow_list = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-address-families="))) { + int af; + + r = safe_atoi(val, &af); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = set_ensure_put(&c->address_families, NULL, INT_TO_PTR(af)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-address-families-allow-list="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->address_families_allow_list = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-network-namespace-path="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->network_namespace_path, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-ipc-namespace-path="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->ipc_namespace_path, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-mount-image="))) { + _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *options = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *source = NULL, *destination = NULL; + bool permissive = false; + char *s; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, + NULL, + EXTRACT_UNQUOTE|EXTRACT_CUNESCAPE|EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS, + &source, + &destination, + NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + s = source; + if (s[0] == '-') { + permissive = true; + s++; + } + + if (isempty(destination)) + continue; + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *tuple = NULL, *partition = NULL, *opts = NULL; + PartitionDesignator partition_designator; + MountOptions *o = NULL; + const char *p; + + r = extract_first_word(&val, &tuple, NULL, EXTRACT_UNQUOTE|EXTRACT_RETAIN_ESCAPE); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + break; + + p = tuple; + r = extract_many_words(&p, + ":", + EXTRACT_CUNESCAPE|EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS, + &partition, + &opts, + NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + if (r == 1) { + o = new(MountOptions, 1); + if (!o) + return log_oom_debug(); + *o = (MountOptions) { + .partition_designator = PARTITION_ROOT, + .options = TAKE_PTR(partition), + }; + LIST_APPEND(mount_options, options, o); + + continue; + } + + partition_designator = partition_designator_from_string(partition); + if (partition_designator < 0) + continue; + + o = new(MountOptions, 1); + if (!o) + return log_oom_debug(); + *o = (MountOptions) { + .partition_designator = partition_designator, + .options = TAKE_PTR(opts), + }; + LIST_APPEND(mount_options, options, o); + } + + r = mount_image_add(&c->mount_images, &c->n_mount_images, + &(MountImage) { + .source = s, + .destination = destination, + .mount_options = options, + .ignore_enoent = permissive, + .type = MOUNT_IMAGE_DISCRETE, + }); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom_debug(); + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-extension-image="))) { + _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *options = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *source = NULL; + bool permissive = false; + char *s; + + r = extract_first_word(&val, + &source, + NULL, + EXTRACT_UNQUOTE|EXTRACT_CUNESCAPE|EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + s = source; + if (s[0] == '-') { + permissive = true; + s++; + } + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *tuple = NULL, *partition = NULL, *opts = NULL; + PartitionDesignator partition_designator; + MountOptions *o = NULL; + const char *p; + + r = extract_first_word(&val, &tuple, NULL, EXTRACT_UNQUOTE|EXTRACT_RETAIN_ESCAPE); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + break; + + p = tuple; + r = extract_many_words(&p, + ":", + EXTRACT_CUNESCAPE|EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS, + &partition, + &opts, + NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + if (r == 1) { + o = new(MountOptions, 1); + if (!o) + return log_oom_debug(); + *o = (MountOptions) { + .partition_designator = PARTITION_ROOT, + .options = TAKE_PTR(partition), + }; + LIST_APPEND(mount_options, options, o); + + continue; + } + + partition_designator = partition_designator_from_string(partition); + if (partition_designator < 0) + continue; + + o = new(MountOptions, 1); + if (!o) + return log_oom_debug(); + *o = (MountOptions) { + .partition_designator = partition_designator, + .options = TAKE_PTR(opts), + }; + LIST_APPEND(mount_options, options, o); + } + + r = mount_image_add(&c->extension_images, &c->n_extension_images, + &(MountImage) { + .source = s, + .mount_options = options, + .ignore_enoent = permissive, + .type = MOUNT_IMAGE_EXTENSION, + }); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom_debug(); + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-extension-directories="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&c->extension_directories, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-set-credentials="))) { + _cleanup_(exec_set_credential_freep) ExecSetCredential *sc = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *id = NULL, *encrypted = NULL, *data = NULL; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, " ", 0, &id, &encrypted, &data, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r != 3) + return -EINVAL; + + r = parse_boolean(encrypted); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + sc = new(ExecSetCredential, 1); + if (!sc) + return -ENOMEM; + + *sc = (ExecSetCredential) { + .id = TAKE_PTR(id), + .encrypted = r, + }; + + r = unbase64mem(data, strlen(data), &sc->data, &sc->size); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = hashmap_ensure_put(&c->set_credentials, &exec_set_credential_hash_ops, sc->id, sc); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + TAKE_PTR(sc); + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-load-credentials="))) { + _cleanup_(exec_load_credential_freep) ExecLoadCredential *lc = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *id = NULL, *encrypted = NULL, *path = NULL; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, " ", 0, &id, &encrypted, &path, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r != 3) + return -EINVAL; + + r = parse_boolean(encrypted); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + lc = new(ExecLoadCredential, 1); + if (!lc) + return -ENOMEM; + + *lc = (ExecLoadCredential) { + .id = TAKE_PTR(id), + .path = TAKE_PTR(path), + .encrypted = r, + }; + + r = hashmap_ensure_put(&c->load_credentials, &exec_load_credential_hash_ops, lc->id, lc); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + TAKE_PTR(lc); + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-import-credentials="))) { + r = set_ensure_allocated(&c->import_credentials, &string_hash_ops); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = set_put_strdup(&c->import_credentials, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-root-image-policy="))) { + if (c->root_image_policy) + return -EINVAL; /* duplicated */ + + r = image_policy_from_string(val, &c->root_image_policy); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-mount-image-policy="))) { + if (c->mount_image_policy) + return -EINVAL; /* duplicated */ + + r = image_policy_from_string(val, &c->mount_image_policy); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-context-extension-image-policy="))) { + if (c->extension_image_policy) + return -EINVAL; /* duplicated */ + + r = image_policy_from_string(val, &c->extension_image_policy); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else + log_warning("Failed to parse serialized line, ignoring: %s", l); + } + + return 0; +} + +int exec_serialize_invocation( + FILE *f, + FDSet *fds, + const ExecContext *ctx) { + + int r; + + assert(f); + assert(fds); + + r = exec_context_serialize(ctx, f); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to serialize context: %m"); + + return 0; +} + +int exec_deserialize_invocation( + FILE *f, + FDSet *fds, + ExecContext *ctx) { + + int r; + + assert(f); + assert(fds); + + r = exec_context_deserialize(ctx, f); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to deserialize context: %m"); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/src/core/execute-serialize.h b/src/core/execute-serialize.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..72635f2549 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/execute-serialize.h @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ +#pragma once + +#include "execute.h" + +/* These functions serialize/deserialize for invocation purposes (i.e.: serialized object is passed to a + * child process) rather than to save state across reload/reexec. */ + +int exec_serialize_invocation(FILE *f, + FDSet *fds, + const ExecContext *ctx); + +int exec_deserialize_invocation(FILE *f, + FDSet *fds, + ExecContext *ctx); diff --git a/src/core/manager-serialize.c b/src/core/manager-serialize.c index 8be54c7ccc..cc1be2383a 100644 --- a/src/core/manager-serialize.c +++ b/src/core/manager-serialize.c @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ int manager_serialize( if (u->id != t) continue; - r = unit_serialize(u, f, fds, switching_root); + r = unit_serialize_state(u, f, fds, switching_root); if (r < 0) return r; } @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static int manager_deserialize_one_unit(Manager *m, const char *name, FILE *f, F return log_notice_errno(r, "Failed to load unit \"%s\", skipping deserialization: %m", name); } - r = unit_deserialize(u, f, fds); + r = unit_deserialize_state(u, f, fds); if (r < 0) { if (r == -ENOMEM) return r; @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ static int manager_deserialize_units(Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { if (r == -ENOMEM) return r; if (r < 0) { - r = unit_deserialize_skip(f); + r = unit_deserialize_state_skip(f); if (r < 0) return r; } diff --git a/src/core/meson.build b/src/core/meson.build index e5b92ce4d9..8c3fd76922 100644 --- a/src/core/meson.build +++ b/src/core/meson.build @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ libcore_sources = files( 'emergency-action.c', 'exec-credential.c', 'execute.c', + 'execute-serialize.c', 'generator-setup.c', 'ima-setup.c', 'import-creds.c', diff --git a/src/core/unit-serialize.c b/src/core/unit-serialize.c index 2851002615..cd7f2ee86b 100644 --- a/src/core/unit-serialize.c +++ b/src/core/unit-serialize.c @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static const char *const io_accounting_metric_field_last[_CGROUP_IO_ACCOUNTING_M [CGROUP_IO_WRITE_OPERATIONS] = "io-accounting-write-operations-last", }; -int unit_serialize(Unit *u, FILE *f, FDSet *fds, bool switching_root) { +int unit_serialize_state(Unit *u, FILE *f, FDSet *fds, bool switching_root) { int r; assert(u); @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static int unit_deserialize_job(Unit *u, FILE *f) { _deserialize_matched; \ }) -int unit_deserialize(Unit *u, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { +int unit_deserialize_state(Unit *u, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { int r; assert(u); @@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ int unit_deserialize(Unit *u, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { return 0; } -int unit_deserialize_skip(FILE *f) { +int unit_deserialize_state_skip(FILE *f) { int r; assert(f); diff --git a/src/core/unit-serialize.h b/src/core/unit-serialize.h index 599d883dec..ab8a8e3be9 100644 --- a/src/core/unit-serialize.h +++ b/src/core/unit-serialize.h @@ -6,8 +6,11 @@ #include "unit.h" #include "fdset.h" -int unit_serialize(Unit *u, FILE *f, FDSet *fds, bool serialize_jobs); -int unit_deserialize(Unit *u, FILE *f, FDSet *fds); -int unit_deserialize_skip(FILE *f); +/* These functions serialize state for our own usage, i.e.: across a reload/reexec, rather than for being + * passed to a child process. */ + +int unit_serialize_state(Unit *u, FILE *f, FDSet *fds, bool serialize_jobs); +int unit_deserialize_state(Unit *u, FILE *f, FDSet *fds); +int unit_deserialize_state_skip(FILE *f); void unit_dump(Unit *u, FILE *f, const char *prefix); From b806a5d35e5c294adfc45baaab1c40ba80e84d37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2023 00:38:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 15/20] core: add serialization/deserialization for ExecCommand --- src/core/execute-serialize.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/core/execute-serialize.h | 6 ++- src/core/execute.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/execute-serialize.c b/src/core/execute-serialize.c index c13ea82875..2d3445e01a 100644 --- a/src/core/execute-serialize.c +++ b/src/core/execute-serialize.c @@ -2106,10 +2106,70 @@ static int exec_context_deserialize(ExecContext *c, FILE *f) { return 0; } +static int exec_command_serialize(const ExecCommand *c, FILE *f) { + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(f); + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-command-path", c->path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-command-argv", c->argv); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-command-flags", "%d", (int) c->flags); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + fputc('\n', f); /* End marker */ + + return 0; +} + +static int exec_command_deserialize(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f) { + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(f); + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *l = NULL; + const char *val; + + r = deserialize_read_line(f, &l); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) /* eof or end marker */ + break; + + if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-command-path="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->path, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-command-argv="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&c->argv, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-command-flags="))) { + r = safe_atoi(val, &c->flags); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else + log_warning("Failed to parse serialized line, ignorning: %s", l); + + } + + return 0; +} + int exec_serialize_invocation( FILE *f, FDSet *fds, - const ExecContext *ctx) { + const ExecContext *ctx, + const ExecCommand *cmd) { int r; @@ -2120,13 +2180,18 @@ int exec_serialize_invocation( if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to serialize context: %m"); + r = exec_command_serialize(cmd, f); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to serialize command: %m"); + return 0; } int exec_deserialize_invocation( FILE *f, FDSet *fds, - ExecContext *ctx) { + ExecContext *ctx, + ExecCommand *cmd) { int r; @@ -2137,5 +2202,9 @@ int exec_deserialize_invocation( if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to deserialize context: %m"); + r = exec_command_deserialize(cmd, f); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to deserialize command: %m"); + return 0; } diff --git a/src/core/execute-serialize.h b/src/core/execute-serialize.h index 72635f2549..339ba8cafa 100644 --- a/src/core/execute-serialize.h +++ b/src/core/execute-serialize.h @@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ int exec_serialize_invocation(FILE *f, FDSet *fds, - const ExecContext *ctx); + const ExecContext *ctx, + const ExecCommand *cmd); int exec_deserialize_invocation(FILE *f, FDSet *fds, - ExecContext *ctx); + ExecContext *ctx, + ExecCommand *cmd); diff --git a/src/core/execute.h b/src/core/execute.h index 6f7d0686e8..bcd4a39274 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.h +++ b/src/core/execute.h @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct ExecStatus { struct ExecCommand { char *path; char **argv; - ExecStatus exec_status; + ExecStatus exec_status; /* Note that this is not serialized to sd-executor */ ExecCommandFlags flags; LIST_FIELDS(ExecCommand, command); /* useful for chaining commands */ }; From beb4ae87558cae75d18f3d554121945a6c105887 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2023 00:40:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 16/20] core: add serialization/deserialization for ExecParameters --- src/core/execute-serialize.c | 564 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/core/execute-serialize.h | 6 +- src/core/execute.h | 12 +- src/core/unit.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 573 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/execute-serialize.c b/src/core/execute-serialize.c index 2d3445e01a..ad6275908c 100644 --- a/src/core/execute-serialize.c +++ b/src/core/execute-serialize.c @@ -19,6 +19,556 @@ #include "string-util.h" #include "strv.h" +static int exec_parameters_serialize(const ExecParameters *p, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { + int r; + + assert(f); + assert(fds); + + if (!p) + return 0; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-parameters-runtime-scope", runtime_scope_to_string(p->runtime_scope)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-parameters-environment", p->environment); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (p->n_socket_fds) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-parameters-n-socket-fds", "%zu", p->n_socket_fds); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (p->n_storage_fds) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-parameters-n-storage-fds", "%zu", p->n_storage_fds); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (p->n_socket_fds + p->n_storage_fds > 0) { + _cleanup_free_ char *serialized_fds = NULL; + + if (!p->fds) + return -EINVAL; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < p->n_socket_fds + p->n_storage_fds; ++i) { + int copy = -EBADF; + + if (p->fds[i] >= 0) { + copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, p->fds[i]); + if (copy < 0) + return copy; + } + + r = strextendf(&serialized_fds, "%d ", copy); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-parameters-fds", serialized_fds); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-parameters-fd-names", p->fd_names); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (p->flags != 0) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-parameters-flags", "%u", (unsigned) p->flags); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-parameters-selinux-context-net", p->selinux_context_net); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (p->cgroup_supported != 0) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-parameters-cgroup-supported", "%u", (unsigned) p->cgroup_supported); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-parameters-cgroup-path", p->cgroup_path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-parameters-cgroup-id", "%" PRIu64, p->cgroup_id); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + for (ExecDirectoryType dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { + _cleanup_free_ char *key = NULL; + + key = strjoin("exec-parameters-prefix-directories-", exec_directory_type_to_string(dt)); + if (!key) + return log_oom_debug(); + + /* Always serialize, even an empty prefix, as this is a fixed array and we always expect + * to have all elements (unless fuzzing is happening, hence the NULL check). */ + r = serialize_item(f, key, strempty(p->prefix ? p->prefix[dt] : NULL)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-parameters-received-credentials-directory", p->received_credentials_directory); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-parameters-received-encrypted-credentials-directory", p->received_encrypted_credentials_directory); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-parameters-confirm-spawn", p->confirm_spawn); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-parameters-shall-confirm-spawn", p->shall_confirm_spawn); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (p->watchdog_usec > 0) { + r = serialize_usec(f, "exec-parameters-watchdog-usec", p->watchdog_usec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (p->idle_pipe) { + _cleanup_free_ char *serialized_fds = NULL; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { + int copy = -EBADF; + + if (p->idle_pipe[i] >= 0) { + copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, p->idle_pipe[i]); + if (copy < 0) + return copy; + } + + r = strextendf(&serialized_fds, "%d ", copy); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-parameters-idle-pipe", serialized_fds); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (p->stdin_fd >= 0) { + r = serialize_fd(f, fds, "exec-parameters-stdin-fd", p->stdin_fd); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (p->stdout_fd >= 0) { + r = serialize_fd(f, fds, "exec-parameters-stdout-fd", p->stdout_fd); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (p->stderr_fd >= 0) { + r = serialize_fd(f, fds, "exec-parameters-stderr-fd", p->stderr_fd); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (p->exec_fd >= 0) { + r = serialize_fd(f, fds, "exec-parameters-exec-fd", p->exec_fd); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (p->bpf_outer_map_fd >= 0) { + r = serialize_fd(f, fds, "exec-parameters-bpf-outer-map-fd", p->bpf_outer_map_fd); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-parameters-notify-socket", p->notify_socket); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + LIST_FOREACH(open_files, file, p->open_files) { + _cleanup_free_ char *ofs = NULL; + + r = open_file_to_string(file, &ofs); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-parameters-open-file", ofs); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-parameters-fallback-smack-process-label", p->fallback_smack_process_label); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (p->user_lookup_fd >= 0) { + r = serialize_fd(f, fds, "exec-parameters-user-lookup-fd", p->user_lookup_fd); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-parameters-files-env", p->files_env); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-parameters-unit-id", p->unit_id); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-parameters-invocation-id-string", p->invocation_id_string); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + fputc('\n', f); /* End marker */ + + return 0; +} + +static int exec_parameters_deserialize(ExecParameters *p, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { + int r, nr_open; + + assert(p); + assert(f); + assert(fds); + + nr_open = read_nr_open(); + if (nr_open < 3) + nr_open = HIGH_RLIMIT_NOFILE; + assert(nr_open > 0); /* For compilers/static analyzers */ + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *l = NULL; + const char *val; + + r = deserialize_read_line(f, &l); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) /* eof or end marker */ + break; + + if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-runtime-scope="))) { + p->runtime_scope = runtime_scope_from_string(val); + if (p->runtime_scope < 0) + return p->runtime_scope; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-environment="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&p->environment, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-n-socket-fds="))) { + if (p->fds) + return -EINVAL; /* Already received */ + + r = safe_atozu(val, &p->n_socket_fds); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (p->n_socket_fds > (size_t) nr_open) + return -EINVAL; /* too many, someone is playing games with us */ + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-n-storage-fds="))) { + if (p->fds) + return -EINVAL; /* Already received */ + + r = safe_atozu(val, &p->n_storage_fds); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (p->n_storage_fds > (size_t) nr_open) + return -EINVAL; /* too many, someone is playing games with us */ + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-fds="))) { + if (p->n_socket_fds + p->n_storage_fds == 0) + return log_warning_errno( + SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "Got exec-parameters-fds= without " + "prior exec-parameters-n-socket-fds= or exec-parameters-n-storage-fds="); + if (p->n_socket_fds + p->n_storage_fds > (size_t) nr_open) + return -EINVAL; /* too many, someone is playing games with us */ + + if (p->fds) + return -EINVAL; /* duplicated */ + + p->fds = new(int, p->n_socket_fds + p->n_storage_fds); + if (!p->fds) + return log_oom_debug(); + + /* Ensure we don't leave any FD uninitialized on error, it makes the fuzzer sad */ + for (size_t i = 0; i < p->n_socket_fds + p->n_storage_fds; ++i) + p->fds[i] = -EBADF; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < p->n_socket_fds + p->n_storage_fds; ++i) { + _cleanup_free_ char *w = NULL; + int fd; + + r = extract_first_word(&val, &w, WHITESPACE, 0); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + break; + + if ((fd = parse_fd(w)) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) + log_debug("Failed to parse %s value: %s, ignoring.", l, w); + else { + r = fdset_remove(fds, fd); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to remove %s value=%d from fdset, ignoring: %m", l, fd); + continue; + } + + p->fds[i] = fd; + } + } + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-fd-names="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&p->fd_names, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-flags="))) { + unsigned flags; + + r = safe_atou(val, &flags); + if (r < 0) + return r; + p->flags = flags; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-selinux-context-net="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + p->selinux_context_net = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-cgroup-supported="))) { + unsigned cgroup_supported; + + r = safe_atou(val, &cgroup_supported); + if (r < 0) + return r; + p->cgroup_supported = cgroup_supported; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-cgroup-path="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&p->cgroup_path, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-cgroup-id="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &p->cgroup_id); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-prefix-directories-"))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *type = NULL, *prefix = NULL; + ExecDirectoryType dt; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, "= ", 0, &type, &prefix, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + dt = exec_directory_type_from_string(type); + if (dt < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!p->prefix) { + p->prefix = new0(char*, _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX+1); + if (!p->prefix) + return log_oom_debug(); + } + + if (isempty(prefix)) + p->prefix[dt] = mfree(p->prefix[dt]); + else + free_and_replace(p->prefix[dt], prefix); + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-received-credentials-directory="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&p->received_credentials_directory, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-received-encrypted-credentials-directory="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&p->received_encrypted_credentials_directory, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-confirm-spawn="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&p->confirm_spawn, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-shall-confirm-spawn="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + p->shall_confirm_spawn = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-watchdog-usec="))) { + r = deserialize_usec(val, &p->watchdog_usec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-idle-pipe="))) { + if (p->idle_pipe) + return -EINVAL; /* duplicated */ + + p->idle_pipe = new(int, 4); + if (!p->idle_pipe) + return log_oom_debug(); + + p->idle_pipe[0] = p->idle_pipe[1] = p->idle_pipe[2] = p->idle_pipe[3] = -EBADF; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { + _cleanup_free_ char *w = NULL; + int fd; + + r = extract_first_word(&val, &w, WHITESPACE, 0); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + break; + + if ((fd = parse_fd(w)) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) + log_debug("Failed to parse %s value: %s, ignoring.", l, w); + else { + r = fdset_remove(fds, fd); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to remove %s value=%d from fdset, ignoring: %m", l, fd); + continue; + } + + p->idle_pipe[i] = fd; + } + } + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-stdin-fd="))) { + int fd; + + if ((fd = parse_fd(val)) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) + log_debug("Failed to parse %s value: %s, ignoring.", l, val); + else { + r = fdset_remove(fds, fd); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to remove %s value=%d from fdset, ignoring: %m", l, fd); + continue; + } + + p->stdin_fd = fd; + } + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-stdout-fd="))) { + int fd; + + if ((fd = parse_fd(val)) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) + log_debug("Failed to parse %s value: %s, ignoring.", l, val); + else { + r = fdset_remove(fds, fd); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to remove %s value=%d from fdset, ignoring: %m", l, fd); + continue; + } + + p->stdout_fd = fd; + } + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-stderr-fd="))) { + int fd; + + if ((fd = parse_fd(val)) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) + log_debug("Failed to parse %s value: %s, ignoring.", l, val); + else { + r = fdset_remove(fds, fd); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to remove %s value=%d from fdset, ignoring: %m", l, fd); + continue; + } + + p->stderr_fd = fd; + } + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-exec-fd="))) { + int fd; + + if ((fd = parse_fd(val)) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) + log_debug("Failed to parse %s value: %s, ignoring.", l, val); + else { + r = fdset_remove(fds, fd); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to remove %s value=%d from fdset, ignoring: %m", l, fd); + continue; + } + + /* This is special and relies on close-on-exec semantics, make sure it's + * there */ + r = fd_cloexec(fd, true); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + p->exec_fd = fd; + } + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-bpf-outer-map-fd="))) { + int fd; + + if ((fd = parse_fd(val)) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) + log_debug("Failed to parse %s value: %s, ignoring.", l, val); + else { + r = fdset_remove(fds, fd); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to remove %s value=%d from fdset, ignoring: %m", l, fd); + continue; + } + + p->bpf_outer_map_fd = fd; + } + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-notify-socket="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&p->notify_socket, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-open-file="))) { + OpenFile *of = NULL; + + r = open_file_parse(val, &of); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + LIST_APPEND(open_files, p->open_files, of); + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-fallback-smack-process-label="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&p->fallback_smack_process_label, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-user-lookup-fd="))) { + int fd; + + if ((fd = parse_fd(val)) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) + log_debug("Failed to parse %s value: %s, ignoring.", l, val); + else { + r = fdset_remove(fds, fd); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to remove %s value=%d from fdset, ignoring: %m", l, fd); + continue; + } + + p->user_lookup_fd = fd; + } + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-files-env="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&p->files_env, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-unit-id="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&p->unit_id, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-parameters-invocation-id-string="))) { + if (strlen(val) > SD_ID128_STRING_MAX - 1) + return -EINVAL; + + r = sd_id128_from_string(val, &p->invocation_id); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + sd_id128_to_string(p->invocation_id, p->invocation_id_string); + } else + log_warning("Failed to parse serialized line, ignorning: %s", l); + } + + /* Bail out if we got exec-parameters-n-{socket/storage}-fds= but no corresponding + * exec-parameters-fds= */ + if (p->n_socket_fds + p->n_storage_fds > 0 && !p->fds) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + static int serialize_std_out_err(const ExecContext *c, FILE *f, int fileno) { char *key, *value; const char *type; @@ -2169,7 +2719,8 @@ int exec_serialize_invocation( FILE *f, FDSet *fds, const ExecContext *ctx, - const ExecCommand *cmd) { + const ExecCommand *cmd, + const ExecParameters *p) { int r; @@ -2184,6 +2735,10 @@ int exec_serialize_invocation( if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to serialize command: %m"); + r = exec_parameters_serialize(p, f, fds); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to serialize parameters: %m"); + return 0; } @@ -2191,7 +2746,8 @@ int exec_deserialize_invocation( FILE *f, FDSet *fds, ExecContext *ctx, - ExecCommand *cmd) { + ExecCommand *cmd, + ExecParameters *p) { int r; @@ -2206,5 +2762,9 @@ int exec_deserialize_invocation( if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to deserialize command: %m"); + r = exec_parameters_deserialize(p, f, fds); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to deserialize parameters: %m"); + return 0; } diff --git a/src/core/execute-serialize.h b/src/core/execute-serialize.h index 339ba8cafa..9cd908db80 100644 --- a/src/core/execute-serialize.h +++ b/src/core/execute-serialize.h @@ -9,9 +9,11 @@ int exec_serialize_invocation(FILE *f, FDSet *fds, const ExecContext *ctx, - const ExecCommand *cmd); + const ExecCommand *cmd, + const ExecParameters *p); int exec_deserialize_invocation(FILE *f, FDSet *fds, ExecContext *ctx, - ExecCommand *cmd); + ExecCommand *cmd, + ExecParameters *p); diff --git a/src/core/execute.h b/src/core/execute.h index bcd4a39274..25f8531d44 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.h +++ b/src/core/execute.h @@ -420,14 +420,14 @@ struct ExecParameters { bool selinux_context_net:1; CGroupMask cgroup_supported; - const char *cgroup_path; + char *cgroup_path; uint64_t cgroup_id; char **prefix; - const char *received_credentials_directory; - const char *received_encrypted_credentials_directory; + char *received_credentials_directory; + char *received_encrypted_credentials_directory; - const char *confirm_spawn; + char *confirm_spawn; bool shall_confirm_spawn; usec_t watchdog_usec; @@ -441,11 +441,11 @@ struct ExecParameters { /* An fd that is closed by the execve(), and thus will result in EOF when the execve() is done */ int exec_fd; - const char *notify_socket; + char *notify_socket; LIST_HEAD(OpenFile, open_files); - const char *fallback_smack_process_label; + char *fallback_smack_process_label; char **files_env; int user_lookup_fd; diff --git a/src/core/unit.c b/src/core/unit.c index cd4282a26b..b71c21580e 100644 --- a/src/core/unit.c +++ b/src/core/unit.c @@ -5369,7 +5369,7 @@ int unit_set_exec_params(Unit *u, ExecParameters *p) { p->runtime_scope = u->manager->runtime_scope; - p->confirm_spawn = manager_get_confirm_spawn(u->manager); + p->confirm_spawn = (char *)manager_get_confirm_spawn(u->manager); p->cgroup_supported = u->manager->cgroup_supported; p->prefix = u->manager->prefix; SET_FLAG(p->flags, EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT|EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES, MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(u->manager)); From 73c12fac1b15afc82086d1f39c986b7b48dd3a6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2023 00:41:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 17/20] core: add serialization/deserialization for ExecRuntime --- src/core/execute-serialize.c | 238 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/core/execute-serialize.h | 6 +- 2 files changed, 240 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/execute-serialize.c b/src/core/execute-serialize.c index ad6275908c..b7803023d2 100644 --- a/src/core/execute-serialize.c +++ b/src/core/execute-serialize.c @@ -19,6 +19,230 @@ #include "string-util.h" #include "strv.h" +static int exec_runtime_serialize(const ExecRuntime *rt, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { + int r; + + assert(f); + assert(fds); + + if (!rt) { + fputc('\n', f); /* End marker */ + return 0; + } + + if (rt->shared) { + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-runtime-id", rt->shared->id); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-runtime-tmp-dir", rt->shared->tmp_dir); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-runtime-var-tmp-dir", rt->shared->var_tmp_dir); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (rt->shared->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0 && rt->shared->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) { + int a, b; + + a = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->shared->netns_storage_socket[0]); + if (a < 0) + return a; + + b = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->shared->netns_storage_socket[1]); + if (b < 0) + return b; + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-runtime-netns-storage-socket", "%d %d", a, b); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (rt->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0 && rt->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) { + int a, b; + + a = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[0]); + if (a < 0) + return a; + + b = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[1]); + if (b < 0) + return b; + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-runtime-ipcns-storage-socket", "%d %d", a, b); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + } + + if (rt->dynamic_creds) { + r = dynamic_user_serialize_one(rt->dynamic_creds->user, "exec-runtime-dynamic-creds-user", f, fds); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (rt->dynamic_creds && rt->dynamic_creds->group && rt->dynamic_creds->group == rt->dynamic_creds->user) { + r = serialize_bool(f, "exec-runtime-dynamic-creds-group-copy", true); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if (rt->dynamic_creds) { + r = dynamic_user_serialize_one(rt->dynamic_creds->group, "exec-runtime-dynamic-creds-group", f, fds); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-runtime-ephemeral-copy", rt->ephemeral_copy); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (rt->ephemeral_storage_socket[0] >= 0 && rt->ephemeral_storage_socket[1] >= 0) { + int a, b; + + a = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->ephemeral_storage_socket[0]); + if (a < 0) + return a; + + b = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->ephemeral_storage_socket[1]); + if (b < 0) + return b; + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-runtime-ephemeral-storage-socket", "%d %d", a, b); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + fputc('\n', f); /* End marker */ + + return 0; +} + +static int exec_runtime_deserialize(ExecRuntime *rt, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { + int r; + + assert(rt); + assert(rt->shared); + assert(rt->dynamic_creds); + assert(f); + assert(fds); + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *l = NULL; + const char *val; + + r = deserialize_read_line(f, &l); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) /* eof or end marker */ + break; + + if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-runtime-id="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&rt->shared->id, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-runtime-tmp-dir="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&rt->shared->tmp_dir, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-runtime-var-tmp-dir="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&rt->shared->var_tmp_dir, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-runtime-netns-storage-socket="))) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < 2; ++i) { + _cleanup_free_ char *w = NULL; + int fd; + + r = extract_first_word(&val, &w, WHITESPACE, 0); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + break; + + if ((fd = parse_fd(w)) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) + log_debug("Failed to parse %s value: %s, ignoring.", l, w); + else { + r = fdset_remove(fds, fd); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to remove %s value=%d from fdset, ignoring: %m", l, fd); + continue; + } + + rt->shared->netns_storage_socket[i] = fd; + } + } + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-runtime-ipcns-storage-socket="))) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < 2; ++i) { + _cleanup_free_ char *w = NULL; + int fd; + + r = extract_first_word(&val, &w, WHITESPACE, 0); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + break; + + if ((fd = parse_fd(w)) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) + log_debug("Failed to parse %s value: %s, ignoring.", l, w); + else { + r = fdset_remove(fds, fd); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to remove %s value=%d from fdset, ignoring: %m", l, fd); + continue; + } + + rt->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[i] = fd; + } + } + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-runtime-dynamic-creds-user="))) + dynamic_user_deserialize_one(/* m= */ NULL, val, fds, &rt->dynamic_creds->user); + else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-runtime-dynamic-creds-group="))) + dynamic_user_deserialize_one(/* m= */ NULL, val, fds, &rt->dynamic_creds->group); + else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-runtime-dynamic-creds-group-copy="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (!r) + continue; /* Nothing to do */ + + if (!rt->dynamic_creds->user) + return -EINVAL; + + rt->dynamic_creds->group = dynamic_user_ref(rt->dynamic_creds->user); + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-runtime-ephemeral-copy="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&rt->ephemeral_copy, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-runtime-ephemeral-storage-socket="))) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < 2; ++i) { + _cleanup_free_ char *w = NULL; + int fd; + + r = extract_first_word(&val, &w, WHITESPACE, 0); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + break; + + if ((fd = parse_fd(w)) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) + log_debug("Failed to parse %s value: %s, ignoring.", l, w); + else { + r = fdset_remove(fds, fd); + if (r < 0) { + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to remove %s value=%d from fdset, ignoring: %m", l, fd); + continue; + } + + rt->ephemeral_storage_socket[i] = fd; + } + } + } else + log_warning("Failed to parse serialized line, ignorning: %s", l); + } + + return 0; +} + static int exec_parameters_serialize(const ExecParameters *p, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { int r; @@ -2720,7 +2944,8 @@ int exec_serialize_invocation( FDSet *fds, const ExecContext *ctx, const ExecCommand *cmd, - const ExecParameters *p) { + const ExecParameters *p, + const ExecRuntime *rt) { int r; @@ -2739,6 +2964,10 @@ int exec_serialize_invocation( if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to serialize parameters: %m"); + r = exec_runtime_serialize(rt, f, fds); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to serialize runtime: %m"); + return 0; } @@ -2747,7 +2976,8 @@ int exec_deserialize_invocation( FDSet *fds, ExecContext *ctx, ExecCommand *cmd, - ExecParameters *p) { + ExecParameters *p, + ExecRuntime *rt) { int r; @@ -2766,5 +2996,9 @@ int exec_deserialize_invocation( if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to deserialize parameters: %m"); + r = exec_runtime_deserialize(rt, f, fds); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to deserialize runtime: %m"); + return 0; } diff --git a/src/core/execute-serialize.h b/src/core/execute-serialize.h index 9cd908db80..1110d236cf 100644 --- a/src/core/execute-serialize.h +++ b/src/core/execute-serialize.h @@ -10,10 +10,12 @@ int exec_serialize_invocation(FILE *f, FDSet *fds, const ExecContext *ctx, const ExecCommand *cmd, - const ExecParameters *p); + const ExecParameters *p, + const ExecRuntime *rt); int exec_deserialize_invocation(FILE *f, FDSet *fds, ExecContext *ctx, ExecCommand *cmd, - ExecParameters *p); + ExecParameters *p, + ExecRuntime *rt); From 56df7a461f05b39851e9f95581cd6f6c66dc3b22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2023 00:42:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 18/20] core: add serialization/deserialization for CGroupContext --- src/core/execute-serialize.c | 1084 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/core/execute-serialize.h | 6 +- 2 files changed, 1086 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/execute-serialize.c b/src/core/execute-serialize.c index b7803023d2..0d9204fc14 100644 --- a/src/core/execute-serialize.c +++ b/src/core/execute-serialize.c @@ -19,6 +19,1076 @@ #include "string-util.h" #include "strv.h" +static int exec_cgroup_context_serialize(const CGroupContext *c, FILE *f) { + _cleanup_free_ char *disable_controllers_str = NULL, *delegate_controllers_str = NULL, + *cpuset_cpus = NULL, *cpuset_mems = NULL, *startup_cpuset_cpus = NULL, + *startup_cpuset_mems = NULL; + char *iface; + struct in_addr_prefix *iaai; + int r; + + assert(f); + + if (!c) + return 0; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-cpu-accounting", c->cpu_accounting); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-io-accounting", c->io_accounting); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-block-io-accounting", c->blockio_accounting); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-accounting", c->memory_accounting); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-tasks-accounting", c->tasks_accounting); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-ip-accounting", c->ip_accounting); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-oom-group", c->memory_oom_group); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (c->cpu_weight != CGROUP_WEIGHT_INVALID) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-cpu-weight", "%" PRIu64, c->cpu_weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->startup_cpu_weight != CGROUP_WEIGHT_INVALID) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-cpu-weight", "%" PRIu64, c->startup_cpu_weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->cpu_shares != CGROUP_CPU_SHARES_INVALID) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-cpu-shares", "%" PRIu64, c->cpu_shares); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->startup_cpu_shares != CGROUP_CPU_SHARES_INVALID) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-cpu-shares", "%" PRIu64, c->startup_cpu_shares); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->cpu_quota_per_sec_usec != USEC_INFINITY) { + r = serialize_usec(f, "exec-cgroup-context-cpu-quota-per-sec-usec", c->cpu_quota_per_sec_usec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->cpu_quota_period_usec != USEC_INFINITY) { + r = serialize_usec(f, "exec-cgroup-context-cpu-quota-period-usec", c->cpu_quota_period_usec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + cpuset_cpus = cpu_set_to_range_string(&c->cpuset_cpus); + if (!cpuset_cpus) + return log_oom_debug(); + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-cgroup-context-allowed-cpus", cpuset_cpus); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + startup_cpuset_cpus = cpu_set_to_range_string(&c->startup_cpuset_cpus); + if (!startup_cpuset_cpus) + return log_oom_debug(); + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-allowed-cpus", startup_cpuset_cpus); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + cpuset_mems = cpu_set_to_range_string(&c->cpuset_mems); + if (!cpuset_mems) + return log_oom_debug(); + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-cgroup-context-allowed-memory-nodes", cpuset_mems); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + startup_cpuset_mems = cpu_set_to_range_string(&c->startup_cpuset_mems); + if (!startup_cpuset_mems) + return log_oom_debug(); + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-allowed-memory-nodes", startup_cpuset_mems); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (c->io_weight != CGROUP_WEIGHT_INVALID) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-io-weight", "%" PRIu64, c->io_weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->startup_io_weight != CGROUP_WEIGHT_INVALID) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-io-weight", "%" PRIu64, c->startup_io_weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->blockio_weight != CGROUP_BLKIO_WEIGHT_INVALID) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-block-io-weight", "%" PRIu64, c->blockio_weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->startup_blockio_weight != CGROUP_BLKIO_WEIGHT_INVALID) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-block-io-weight", "%" PRIu64, c->startup_blockio_weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->default_memory_min > 0) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-default-memory-min", "%" PRIu64, c->default_memory_min); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->default_memory_low > 0) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-default-memory-low", "%" PRIu64, c->default_memory_low); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->memory_min > 0) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-min", "%" PRIu64, c->memory_min); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->memory_low > 0) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-low", "%" PRIu64, c->memory_low); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->startup_memory_low > 0) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-low", "%" PRIu64, c->startup_memory_low); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->memory_high != CGROUP_LIMIT_MAX) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-high", "%" PRIu64, c->memory_high); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->startup_memory_high != CGROUP_LIMIT_MAX) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-high", "%" PRIu64, c->startup_memory_high); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->memory_max != CGROUP_LIMIT_MAX) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-max", "%" PRIu64, c->memory_max); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->startup_memory_max != CGROUP_LIMIT_MAX) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-max", "%" PRIu64, c->startup_memory_max); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->memory_swap_max != CGROUP_LIMIT_MAX) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-swap-max", "%" PRIu64, c->memory_swap_max); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->startup_memory_swap_max != CGROUP_LIMIT_MAX) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-swap-max", "%" PRIu64, c->startup_memory_swap_max); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->memory_zswap_max != CGROUP_LIMIT_MAX) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-zswap-max", "%" PRIu64, c->memory_zswap_max); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->startup_memory_zswap_max != CGROUP_LIMIT_MAX) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-zswap-max", "%" PRIu64, c->startup_memory_zswap_max); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->memory_limit != CGROUP_LIMIT_MAX) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-limit", "%" PRIu64, c->memory_limit); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->tasks_max.value != UINT64_MAX) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-tasks-max-value", "%" PRIu64, c->tasks_max.value); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (c->tasks_max.scale > 0) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-tasks-max-scale", "%" PRIu64, c->tasks_max.scale); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-default-memory-min-set", c->default_memory_min_set); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-default-memory-low-set", c->default_memory_low_set); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-default-startup-memory-low-set", c->default_startup_memory_low_set); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-min-set", c->memory_min_set); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-low-set", c->memory_low_set); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-low-set", c->startup_memory_low_set); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-high-set", c->startup_memory_high_set); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-max-set", c->startup_memory_max_set); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-swap-max-set", c->startup_memory_swap_max_set); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-zswap-max-set", c->startup_memory_zswap_max_set); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-cgroup-context-device-policy", cgroup_device_policy_to_string(c->device_policy)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = cg_mask_to_string(c->disable_controllers, &disable_controllers_str); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-cgroup-context-disable-controllers", disable_controllers_str); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = cg_mask_to_string(c->delegate_controllers, &delegate_controllers_str); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-cgroup-context-delegate-controllers", delegate_controllers_str); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-delegate", c->delegate); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-cgroup-context-managed-oom-swap", managed_oom_mode_to_string(c->moom_swap)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-cgroup-context-managed-oom-memory-pressure", managed_oom_mode_to_string(c->moom_mem_pressure)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-managed-oom-memory-pressure-limit", "%" PRIu32, c->moom_mem_pressure_limit); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-cgroup-context-managed-oom-preference", managed_oom_preference_to_string(c->moom_preference)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-pressure-watch", cgroup_pressure_watch_to_string(c->memory_pressure_watch)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-cgroup-context-delegate-subgroup", c->delegate_subgroup); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (c->memory_pressure_threshold_usec != USEC_INFINITY) { + r = serialize_usec(f, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-pressure-threshold-usec", c->memory_pressure_threshold_usec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + LIST_FOREACH(device_allow, a, c->device_allow) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-device-allow", "%s %s%s%s", + a->path, + a->r ? "r" : "", a->w ? "w" : "", a->m ? "m" : ""); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + LIST_FOREACH(device_weights, iw, c->io_device_weights) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-io-device-weight", "%s %" PRIu64, + iw->path, + iw->weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + LIST_FOREACH(device_latencies, l, c->io_device_latencies) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-io-device-latency-target-usec", "%s " USEC_FMT, + l->path, + l->target_usec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + LIST_FOREACH(device_limits, il, c->io_device_limits) + for (CGroupIOLimitType type = 0; type < _CGROUP_IO_LIMIT_TYPE_MAX; type++) { + _cleanup_free_ char *key = NULL; + + if (il->limits[type] == cgroup_io_limit_defaults[type]) + continue; + + key = strjoin("exec-cgroup-context-io-device-limit-", + cgroup_io_limit_type_to_string(type)); + if (!key) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = serialize_item_format(f, key, "%s %" PRIu64, il->path, il->limits[type]); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + LIST_FOREACH(device_weights, w, c->blockio_device_weights) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-blockio-device-weight", "%s %" PRIu64, + w->path, + w->weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + LIST_FOREACH(device_bandwidths, b, c->blockio_device_bandwidths) { + if (b->rbps != CGROUP_LIMIT_MAX) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-blockio-read-bandwidth", "%s %" PRIu64, + b->path, + b->rbps); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + if (b->wbps != CGROUP_LIMIT_MAX) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-blockio-write-bandwidth", "%s %" PRIu64, + b->path, + b->wbps); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + } + + SET_FOREACH(iaai, c->ip_address_allow) { + r = serialize_item(f, + "exec-cgroup-context-ip-address-allow", + IN_ADDR_PREFIX_TO_STRING(iaai->family, &iaai->address, iaai->prefixlen)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + SET_FOREACH(iaai, c->ip_address_deny) { + r = serialize_item(f, + "exec-cgroup-context-ip-address-deny", + IN_ADDR_PREFIX_TO_STRING(iaai->family, &iaai->address, iaai->prefixlen)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-ip-address-allow-reduced", c->ip_address_allow_reduced); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_bool_elide(f, "exec-cgroup-context-ip-address-deny-reduced", c->ip_address_deny_reduced); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-cgroup-context-ip-ingress-filter-path=", c->ip_filters_ingress); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = serialize_strv(f, "exec-cgroup-context-ip-egress-filter-path=", c->ip_filters_egress); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + LIST_FOREACH(programs, p, c->bpf_foreign_programs) { + r = serialize_item_format(f, "exec-cgroup-context-bpf-program", "%" PRIu32 " %s", + p->attach_type, + p->bpffs_path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + LIST_FOREACH(socket_bind_items, bi, c->socket_bind_allow) { + fprintf(f, "exec-cgroup-context-socket-bind-allow="); + cgroup_context_dump_socket_bind_item(bi, f); + fputc('\n', f); + } + + LIST_FOREACH(socket_bind_items, bi, c->socket_bind_deny) { + fprintf(f, "exec-cgroup-context-socket-bind-deny="); + cgroup_context_dump_socket_bind_item(bi, f); + fputc('\n', f); + } + + SET_FOREACH(iface, c->restrict_network_interfaces) { + r = serialize_item(f, "exec-cgroup-context-restrict-network-interfaces", iface); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = serialize_bool_elide( + f, + "exec-cgroup-context-restrict-network-interfaces-is-allow-list", + c->restrict_network_interfaces_is_allow_list); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + fputc('\n', f); /* End marker */ + + return 0; +} + +static int exec_cgroup_context_deserialize(CGroupContext *c, FILE *f) { + int r; + + assert(f); + + if (!c) + return 0; + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *l = NULL; + const char *val; + + r = deserialize_read_line(f, &l); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) /* eof or end marker */ + break; + + if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-cpu-accounting="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->cpu_accounting = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-io-accounting="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->io_accounting = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-block-io-accounting="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->blockio_accounting = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-accounting="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->memory_accounting = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-tasks-accounting="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->tasks_accounting = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-ip-accounting="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->ip_accounting = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-oom-group="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->memory_oom_group = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-cpu-weight="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->cpu_weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-cpu-weight="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->startup_cpu_weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-cpu-shares="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->cpu_shares); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-cpu-shares="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->startup_cpu_shares); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-cpu-quota-per-sec-usec="))) { + r = deserialize_usec(val, &c->cpu_quota_per_sec_usec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-cpu-quota-period-usec="))) { + r = deserialize_usec(val, &c->cpu_quota_period_usec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-allowed-cpus="))) { + if (c->cpuset_cpus.set) + return -EINVAL; /* duplicated */ + + r = parse_cpu_set_full( + val, + &c->cpuset_cpus, + /* warn= */ false, + /* unit= */ NULL, + /* filename= */ NULL, + /* line= */ 0, + /* lvalue= */ NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-allowed-cpus="))) { + if (c->startup_cpuset_cpus.set) + return -EINVAL; /* duplicated */ + + r = parse_cpu_set_full( + val, + &c->startup_cpuset_cpus, + /* warn= */ false, + /* unit= */ NULL, + /* filename= */ NULL, + /* line= */ 0, + /* lvalue= */ NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-allowed-memory-nodes="))) { + if (c->cpuset_mems.set) + return -EINVAL; /* duplicated */ + + r = parse_cpu_set_full( + val, + &c->cpuset_mems, + /* warn= */ false, + /* unit= */ NULL, + /* filename= */ NULL, + /* line= */ 0, + /* lvalue= */ NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-allowed-memory-nodes="))) { + if (c->startup_cpuset_mems.set) + return -EINVAL; /* duplicated */ + + r = parse_cpu_set_full( + val, + &c->startup_cpuset_mems, + /* warn= */ false, + /* unit= */ NULL, + /* filename= */ NULL, + /* line= */ 0, + /* lvalue= */ NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-io-weight="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->io_weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-io-weight="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->startup_io_weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-block-io-weight="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->blockio_weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-block-io-weight="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->startup_blockio_weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-default-memory-min="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->default_memory_min); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-default-memory-low="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->default_memory_low); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-min="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->memory_min); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-low="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->memory_low); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-low="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->startup_memory_low); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-high="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->memory_high); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-high="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->startup_memory_high); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-max="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->memory_max); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-max="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->startup_memory_max); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-swap-max="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->memory_swap_max); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-swap-max="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->startup_memory_swap_max); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-zswap-max="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->memory_zswap_max); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-zswap-max="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->startup_memory_zswap_max); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-limit="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->memory_limit); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-tasks-max-value="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->tasks_max.value); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-tasks-max-scale="))) { + r = safe_atou64(val, &c->tasks_max.scale); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-default-memory-min-set="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->default_memory_min_set = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-default-memory-low-set="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->default_memory_low_set = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-default-startup-memory-low-set="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->default_startup_memory_low_set = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-min-set="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->memory_min_set = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-low-set="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->memory_low_set = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-low-set="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->startup_memory_low_set = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-high-set="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->startup_memory_high_set = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-max-set="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->startup_memory_max_set = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-swap-max-set="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->startup_memory_swap_max_set = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-startup-memory-zswap-max-set="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->startup_memory_zswap_max_set = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-device-policy="))) { + c->device_policy = cgroup_device_policy_from_string(val); + if (c->device_policy < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-disable-controllers="))) { + r = cg_mask_from_string(val, &c->disable_controllers); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-delegate-controllers="))) { + r = cg_mask_from_string(val, &c->delegate_controllers); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-delegate="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->delegate = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-managed-oom-swap="))) { + c->moom_swap = managed_oom_mode_from_string(val); + if (c->moom_swap < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-managed-oom-memory-pressure="))) { + c->moom_mem_pressure = managed_oom_mode_from_string(val); + if (c->moom_mem_pressure < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-managed-oom-memory-pressure-limit="))) { + r = safe_atou32(val, &c->moom_mem_pressure_limit); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-managed-oom-preference="))) { + c->moom_preference = managed_oom_preference_from_string(val); + if (c->moom_preference < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-pressure-watch="))) { + c->memory_pressure_watch = cgroup_pressure_watch_from_string(val); + if (c->memory_pressure_watch < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-delegate-subgroup="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&c->delegate_subgroup, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-memory-pressure-threshold-usec="))) { + r = deserialize_usec(val, &c->memory_pressure_threshold_usec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-device-allow="))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL, *rwm = NULL; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, " ", 0, &path, &rwm, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + return -EINVAL; + if (!isempty(rwm) && !in_charset(rwm, "rwm")) + return -EINVAL; + + r = cgroup_context_add_or_update_device_allow(c, path, rwm); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-io-device-weight="))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL, *weight = NULL; + CGroupIODeviceWeight *a = NULL; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, " ", 0, &path, &weight, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r != 2) + return -EINVAL; + + LIST_FOREACH(device_weights, b, c->io_device_weights) + if (path_equal(b->path, path)) { + a = b; + break; + } + + if (!a) { + a = new0(CGroupIODeviceWeight, 1); + if (!a) + return log_oom_debug(); + + a->path = TAKE_PTR(path); + + LIST_PREPEND(device_weights, c->io_device_weights, a); + } + + r = safe_atou64(weight, &a->weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-io-device-latency-target-usec="))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL, *target = NULL; + CGroupIODeviceLatency *a = NULL; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, " ", 0, &path, &target, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r != 2) + return -EINVAL; + + LIST_FOREACH(device_latencies, b, c->io_device_latencies) + if (path_equal(b->path, path)) { + a = b; + break; + } + + if (!a) { + a = new0(CGroupIODeviceLatency, 1); + if (!a) + return log_oom_debug(); + + a->path = TAKE_PTR(path); + + LIST_PREPEND(device_latencies, c->io_device_latencies, a); + } + + r = deserialize_usec(target, &a->target_usec); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-io-device-limit-"))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *type = NULL, *path = NULL, *limits = NULL; + CGroupIODeviceLimit *limit = NULL; + CGroupIOLimitType t; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, "= ", 0, &type, &path, &limits, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r != 3) + return -EINVAL; + + t = cgroup_io_limit_type_from_string(type); + if (t < 0) + return t; + + LIST_FOREACH(device_limits, i, c->io_device_limits) + if (path_equal(path, i->path)) { + limit = i; + break; + } + + if (!limit) { + limit = new0(CGroupIODeviceLimit, 1); + if (!limit) + return log_oom_debug(); + + limit->path = TAKE_PTR(path); + for (CGroupIOLimitType i = 0; i < _CGROUP_IO_LIMIT_TYPE_MAX; i++) + limit->limits[i] = cgroup_io_limit_defaults[i]; + + LIST_PREPEND(device_limits, c->io_device_limits, limit); + } + + r = safe_atou64(limits, &limit->limits[t]); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-block-io-device-weight="))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL, *weight = NULL; + CGroupBlockIODeviceWeight *a = NULL; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, " ", 0, &path, &weight, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r != 2) + return -EINVAL; + + a = new0(CGroupBlockIODeviceWeight, 1); + if (!a) + return log_oom_debug(); + + a->path = TAKE_PTR(path); + + LIST_PREPEND(device_weights, c->blockio_device_weights, a); + + r = safe_atou64(weight, &a->weight); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-block-io-read-bandwidth="))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL, *bw = NULL; + CGroupBlockIODeviceBandwidth *a = NULL; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, " ", 0, &path, &bw, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r != 2) + return -EINVAL; + + LIST_FOREACH(device_bandwidths, b, c->blockio_device_bandwidths) + if (path_equal(b->path, path)) { + a = b; + break; + } + + if (!a) { + a = new0(CGroupBlockIODeviceBandwidth, 1); + if (!a) + return log_oom_debug(); + + a->path = TAKE_PTR(path); + a->wbps = CGROUP_LIMIT_MAX; + + LIST_PREPEND(device_bandwidths, c->blockio_device_bandwidths, a); + } + + r = safe_atou64(bw, &a->rbps); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-block-io-write-bandwidth="))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL, *bw = NULL; + CGroupBlockIODeviceBandwidth *a = NULL; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, " ", 0, &path, &bw, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r != 2) + return -EINVAL; + + LIST_FOREACH(device_bandwidths, b, c->blockio_device_bandwidths) + if (path_equal(b->path, path)) { + a = b; + break; + } + + if (!a) { + a = new0(CGroupBlockIODeviceBandwidth, 1); + if (!a) + return log_oom_debug(); + + a->path = TAKE_PTR(path); + a->rbps = CGROUP_LIMIT_MAX; + + LIST_PREPEND(device_bandwidths, c->blockio_device_bandwidths, a); + } + + r = safe_atou64(bw, &a->wbps); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-ip-address-allow="))) { + struct in_addr_prefix a; + + r = in_addr_prefix_from_string_auto(val, &a.family, &a.address, &a.prefixlen); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = in_addr_prefix_add(&c->ip_address_allow, &a); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-ip-address-deny="))) { + struct in_addr_prefix a; + + r = in_addr_prefix_from_string_auto(val, &a.family, &a.address, &a.prefixlen); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = in_addr_prefix_add(&c->ip_address_deny, &a); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-ip-address-allow-reduced="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->ip_address_allow_reduced = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-ip-address-deny-reduced="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->ip_address_deny_reduced = r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-ip-ingress-filter-path="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&c->ip_filters_ingress, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-ip-egress-filter-path="))) { + r = deserialize_strv(&c->ip_filters_egress, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-bpf-program="))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *type = NULL, *path = NULL; + uint32_t t; + + r = extract_many_words(&val, " ", 0, &type, &path, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r != 2) + return -EINVAL; + + r = safe_atou32(type, &t); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = cgroup_context_add_bpf_foreign_program(c, t, path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-socket-bind-allow="))) { + CGroupSocketBindItem *item; + uint16_t nr_ports, port_min; + int af, ip_protocol; + + r = parse_socket_bind_item(val, &af, &ip_protocol, &nr_ports, &port_min); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + item = new(CGroupSocketBindItem, 1); + if (!item) + return log_oom_debug(); + *item = (CGroupSocketBindItem) { + .address_family = af, + .ip_protocol = ip_protocol, + .nr_ports = nr_ports, + .port_min = port_min, + }; + + LIST_PREPEND(socket_bind_items, c->socket_bind_allow, item); + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-socket-bind-deny="))) { + CGroupSocketBindItem *item; + uint16_t nr_ports, port_min; + int af, ip_protocol; + + r = parse_socket_bind_item(val, &af, &ip_protocol, &nr_ports, &port_min); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + item = new(CGroupSocketBindItem, 1); + if (!item) + return log_oom_debug(); + *item = (CGroupSocketBindItem) { + .address_family = af, + .ip_protocol = ip_protocol, + .nr_ports = nr_ports, + .port_min = port_min, + }; + + LIST_PREPEND(socket_bind_items, c->socket_bind_deny, item); + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-restrict-network-interfaces="))) { + r = set_ensure_allocated(&c->restrict_network_interfaces, &string_hash_ops); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = set_put_strdup(&c->restrict_network_interfaces, val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if ((val = startswith(l, "exec-cgroup-context-restrict-network-interfaces-is-allow-list="))) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) + return r; + c->restrict_network_interfaces_is_allow_list = r; + } else + log_warning("Failed to parse serialized line, ignorning: %s", l); + } + + return 0; +} + static int exec_runtime_serialize(const ExecRuntime *rt, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { int r; @@ -2945,7 +4015,8 @@ int exec_serialize_invocation( const ExecContext *ctx, const ExecCommand *cmd, const ExecParameters *p, - const ExecRuntime *rt) { + const ExecRuntime *rt, + const CGroupContext *cg) { int r; @@ -2968,6 +4039,10 @@ int exec_serialize_invocation( if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to serialize runtime: %m"); + r = exec_cgroup_context_serialize(cg, f); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to serialize cgroup context: %m"); + return 0; } @@ -2977,7 +4052,8 @@ int exec_deserialize_invocation( ExecContext *ctx, ExecCommand *cmd, ExecParameters *p, - ExecRuntime *rt) { + ExecRuntime *rt, + CGroupContext *cg) { int r; @@ -3000,5 +4076,9 @@ int exec_deserialize_invocation( if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to deserialize runtime: %m"); + r = exec_cgroup_context_deserialize(cg, f); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to deserialize cgroup context: %m"); + return 0; } diff --git a/src/core/execute-serialize.h b/src/core/execute-serialize.h index 1110d236cf..89c8e09edb 100644 --- a/src/core/execute-serialize.h +++ b/src/core/execute-serialize.h @@ -11,11 +11,13 @@ int exec_serialize_invocation(FILE *f, const ExecContext *ctx, const ExecCommand *cmd, const ExecParameters *p, - const ExecRuntime *rt); + const ExecRuntime *rt, + const CGroupContext *cg); int exec_deserialize_invocation(FILE *f, FDSet *fds, ExecContext *ctx, ExecCommand *cmd, ExecParameters *p, - ExecRuntime *rt); + ExecRuntime *rt, + CGroupContext *cg); From bb5232b6a3b8af075ee06cc87416e5f49a6170d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2023 19:51:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 19/20] core: add systemd-executor binary Currently we spawn services by forking a child process, doing a bunch of work, and then exec'ing the service executable. There are some advantages to this approach: - quick: we immediately have access to all the enourmous amount of state simply by virtue of sharing the memory with the parent - easy to refactor and add features - part of the same binary, will never be out of sync There are however significant drawbacks: - doing work after fork and before exec is against glibc's supported case for several APIs we call - copy-on-write trap: anytime any memory is touched in either parent or child, a copy of that page will be triggered - memory footprint of the child process will be memory footprint of PID1, but using the cgroup memory limits of the unit The last issue is especially problematic on resource constrained systems where hard memory caps are enforced and swap is not allowed. As soon as PID1 is under load, with no page out due to no swap, and a service with a low MemoryMax= tries to start, hilarity ensues. Add a new systemd-executor binary, that is able to receive all the required state via memfd, deserialize it, prepare the appropriate data structures and call exec_child. Use posix_spawn which uses CLONE_VM + CLONE_VFORK, to ensure there is no copy-on-write (same address space will be used, and parent process will be frozen, until exec). The sd-executor binary is pinned by FD on startup, so that we can guarantee there will be no incompatibilities during upgrades. --- docs/ARCHITECTURE.md | 22 +++ meson.build | 1 + src/basic/cgroup-util.h | 2 +- src/core/dynamic-user.c | 11 +- src/core/dynamic-user.h | 2 + src/core/execute.c | 140 +++++++++++++---- src/core/execute.h | 11 ++ src/core/executor.c | 251 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/core/fuzz-manager-serialize.c | 2 +- src/core/fuzz-unit-file.c | 2 +- src/core/manager.c | 51 ++++++ src/core/manager.h | 7 + src/core/meson.build | 15 ++ src/core/unit.c | 9 +- test/units/testsuite-55.sh | 6 + 15 files changed, 497 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/core/executor.c diff --git a/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md b/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md index c777fa75de..33486203a6 100644 --- a/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +++ b/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md @@ -201,3 +201,25 @@ can be found under various directories such as `factory/`, `modprobe.d/`, `netwo `tools/`, `coccinelle/`, `.github/`, `.semaphore/`, `.mkosi/` host various utilities and scripts that are used by maintainers and developers. They are not shipped or installed. + +# Service Manager Overview + +The Service Manager takes configuration in the form of unit files, credentials, +kernel command line options and D-Bus commands, and based on those manages the +system and spawns other processes. It runs in system mode as PID1, and in user +mode with one instance per user session. + +When starting a unit requires forking a new process, configuration for the new +process will be serialized and passed over to the new process, created via a +posix_spawn() call. This is done in order to avoid excessive processing after +a fork() but before an exec(), which is against glibc's best practices and can +also result in a copy-on-write trap. The new process will start as the +`systemd-executor` binary, which will deserialize the configuration and apply +all the options (sandboxing, namespacing, cgroup, etc.) before exec'ing the +configured executable. + +``` + ┌──────┐posix_spawn() ┌───────────┐execve() ┌────────┐ + │ PID1 ├─────────────►│sd-executor├────────►│program │ + └──────┘ (memfd) └───────────┘ └────────┘ +``` diff --git a/meson.build b/meson.build index 1517065db6..5b6b928276 100644 --- a/meson.build +++ b/meson.build @@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ conf.set_quoted('SYSCONF_DIR', sysconfdir) conf.set_quoted('SYSCTL_DIR', sysctldir) conf.set_quoted('SYSTEMCTL_BINARY_PATH', bindir / 'systemctl') conf.set_quoted('SYSTEMD_BINARY_PATH', libexecdir / 'systemd') +conf.set_quoted('SYSTEMD_EXECUTOR_BINARY_PATH', libexecdir / 'systemd-executor') conf.set_quoted('SYSTEMD_CATALOG_DIR', catalogdir) conf.set_quoted('SYSTEMD_CGROUPS_AGENT_PATH', libexecdir / 'systemd-cgroups-agent') conf.set_quoted('SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_PATH', bindir / 'systemd-cryptsetup') diff --git a/src/basic/cgroup-util.h b/src/basic/cgroup-util.h index 625816d9cf..80ea7e7ffa 100644 --- a/src/basic/cgroup-util.h +++ b/src/basic/cgroup-util.h @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ typedef enum CGroupController { CGROUP_CONTROLLER_BPF_SOCKET_BIND, CGROUP_CONTROLLER_BPF_RESTRICT_NETWORK_INTERFACES, /* The BPF hook implementing RestrictFileSystems= is not defined here. - * It's applied as late as possible in exec_child() so we don't block + * It's applied as late as possible in exec_invoke() so we don't block * our own unit setup code. */ _CGROUP_CONTROLLER_MAX, diff --git a/src/core/dynamic-user.c b/src/core/dynamic-user.c index 2cab0d44ac..dc349afecf 100644 --- a/src/core/dynamic-user.c +++ b/src/core/dynamic-user.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ DEFINE_TRIVIAL_REF_FUNC(DynamicUser, dynamic_user); -static DynamicUser* dynamic_user_free(DynamicUser *d) { +DynamicUser* dynamic_user_free(DynamicUser *d) { if (!d) return NULL; @@ -850,3 +850,12 @@ DynamicCreds* dynamic_creds_destroy(DynamicCreds *creds) { return mfree(creds); } + +void dynamic_creds_done(DynamicCreds *creds) { + if (!creds) + return; + + if (creds->group != creds->user) + dynamic_user_free(creds->group); + creds->group = creds->user = dynamic_user_free(creds->user); +} diff --git a/src/core/dynamic-user.h b/src/core/dynamic-user.h index 679c588a76..e86ee02796 100644 --- a/src/core/dynamic-user.h +++ b/src/core/dynamic-user.h @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ struct DynamicUser { int dynamic_user_serialize(Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds); int dynamic_user_serialize_one(DynamicUser *d, const char *key, FILE *f, FDSet *fds); void dynamic_user_deserialize_one(Manager *m, const char *value, FDSet *fds, DynamicUser **ret); +DynamicUser* dynamic_user_free(DynamicUser *d); void dynamic_user_vacuum(Manager *m, bool close_user); int dynamic_user_current(DynamicUser *d, uid_t *ret); @@ -39,6 +40,7 @@ int dynamic_creds_realize(DynamicCreds *creds, char **suggested_paths, uid_t *ui DynamicCreds *dynamic_creds_unref(DynamicCreds *creds); DynamicCreds *dynamic_creds_destroy(DynamicCreds *creds); +void dynamic_creds_done(DynamicCreds *creds); DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(DynamicCreds*, dynamic_creds_unref); DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(DynamicCreds*, dynamic_creds_destroy); diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c index c13024b1f8..ff9560665c 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.c +++ b/src/core/execute.c @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ #include "argv-util.h" #include "async.h" #include "barrier.h" +#include "bpf-dlopen.h" #include "bpf-lsm.h" #include "btrfs-util.h" #include "cap-list.h" @@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ #include "escape.h" #include "exec-credential.h" #include "execute.h" +#include "execute-serialize.h" #include "exit-status.h" #include "fd-util.h" #include "fileio.h" @@ -85,6 +87,7 @@ #include "seccomp-util.h" #include "securebits-util.h" #include "selinux-util.h" +#include "serialize.h" #include "signal-util.h" #include "smack-util.h" #include "socket-util.h" @@ -1789,6 +1792,8 @@ static int apply_lock_personality(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) #if HAVE_LIBBPF static int apply_restrict_filesystems(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { + int r; + assert(c); assert(p); @@ -1801,6 +1806,11 @@ static int apply_restrict_filesystems(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters return 0; } + /* We are in a new binary, so dl-open again */ + r = dlopen_bpf(); + if (r < 0) + return r; + return lsm_bpf_restrict_filesystems(c->restrict_filesystems, p->cgroup_id, p->bpf_outer_map_fd, c->restrict_filesystems_allow_list); } #endif @@ -4062,7 +4072,7 @@ static bool exec_context_shall_confirm_spawn(const ExecContext *context) { static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l); static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, int named_iofds[static 3]); -static int exec_child( +int exec_invoke( const ExecCommand *command, const ExecContext *context, ExecParameters *params, @@ -4117,6 +4127,8 @@ static int exec_child( assert(command->path); assert(!strv_isempty(command->argv)); + LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_EXEC(context, params); + if (context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET || context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET || context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) { @@ -5283,7 +5295,6 @@ static int exec_child( return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to execute %s: %m", executable); } - int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, ExecCommand *command, const ExecContext *context, @@ -5292,12 +5303,16 @@ int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, pid_t *ret) { - _cleanup_free_ char *subcgroup_path = NULL; + char serialization_fd_number[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int) + 1]; + _cleanup_free_ char *subcgroup_path = NULL, *log_level = NULL, *executor_path = NULL; + _cleanup_fdset_free_ FDSet *fdset = NULL; + _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL; pid_t pid; int r; assert(unit); assert(unit->manager); + assert(unit->manager->executor_fd >= 0); assert(command); assert(context); assert(ret); @@ -5333,35 +5348,56 @@ int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, } } - pid = fork(); - if (pid < 0) - return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to fork: %m"); + /* In order to avoid copy-on-write traps and OOM-kills when pid1's memory.current is above the + * child's memory.max, serialize all the state needed to start the unit, and pass it to the + * systemd-executor binary. clone() with CLONE_VM + CLONE_VFORK will pause the parent until the exec + * and ensure all memory is shared. The child immediately execs the new binary so the delay should + * be minimal. Once glibc provides a clone3 wrapper we can switch to that, and clone directly in the + * target cgroup. */ - if (pid == 0) { - int exit_status; + r = open_serialization_file("sd-executor-state", &f); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to open serialization stream: %m"); - r = exec_child(command, - context, - params, - runtime, - cgroup_context, - &exit_status); + fdset = fdset_new(); + if (!fdset) + return log_oom(); - if (r < 0) { - const char *status = ASSERT_PTR( - exit_status_to_string(exit_status, EXIT_STATUS_LIBC | EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD)); + r = exec_serialize_invocation(f, fdset, context, command, params, runtime, cgroup_context); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to serialize parameters: %m"); - log_unit_struct_errno(unit, LOG_ERR, r, - "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, - LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit), - LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m", - status, command->path), - "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path); - } else - assert(exit_status == EXIT_SUCCESS); + if (fseeko(f, 0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t) -1) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to reseek on serialization stream: %m"); - _exit(exit_status); - } + r = fd_cloexec(fileno(f), false); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set O_CLOEXEC on serialization fd: %m"); + + r = fdset_cloexec(fdset, false); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set O_CLOEXEC on serialized fds: %m"); + + r = log_level_to_string_alloc(log_get_max_level(), &log_level); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to convert log level to string: %m"); + + r = fd_get_path(unit->manager->executor_fd, &executor_path); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to get executor path from fd: %m"); + + xsprintf(serialization_fd_number, "%i", fileno(f)); + + /* The executor binary is pinned, to avoid compatibility problems during upgrades. */ + r = posix_spawn_wrapper(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(unit->manager->executor_fd), + STRV_MAKE(executor_path, + "--deserialize", serialization_fd_number, + "--log-level", log_level, + "--log-target", log_target_to_string(manager_get_executor_log_target(unit->manager))), + environ, + &pid); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to spawn executor: %m"); log_unit_debug(unit, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT, command->path, pid); @@ -5563,7 +5599,7 @@ int exec_context_destroy_mount_ns_dir(Unit *u) { return 0; } -static void exec_command_done(ExecCommand *c) { +void exec_command_done(ExecCommand *c) { assert(c); c->path = mfree(c->path); @@ -6679,9 +6715,9 @@ static char *destroy_tree(char *path) { return mfree(path); } -static ExecSharedRuntime* exec_shared_runtime_free(ExecSharedRuntime *rt) { +void exec_shared_runtime_done(ExecSharedRuntime *rt) { if (!rt) - return NULL; + return; if (rt->manager) (void) hashmap_remove(rt->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, rt->id); @@ -6691,6 +6727,11 @@ static ExecSharedRuntime* exec_shared_runtime_free(ExecSharedRuntime *rt) { rt->var_tmp_dir = mfree(rt->var_tmp_dir); safe_close_pair(rt->netns_storage_socket); safe_close_pair(rt->ipcns_storage_socket); +} + +static ExecSharedRuntime* exec_shared_runtime_free(ExecSharedRuntime *rt) { + exec_shared_runtime_done(rt); + return mfree(rt); } @@ -7216,6 +7257,14 @@ ExecRuntime* exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime *rt) { return exec_runtime_free(rt); } +void exec_runtime_clear(ExecRuntime *rt) { + if (!rt) + return; + + safe_close_pair(rt->ephemeral_storage_socket); + rt->ephemeral_copy = mfree(rt->ephemeral_copy); +} + void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters *p) { if (!p) return; @@ -7230,6 +7279,37 @@ void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters *p) { p->unit_id = mfree(p->unit_id); p->invocation_id = SD_ID128_NULL; p->invocation_id_string[0] = '\0'; + p->confirm_spawn = mfree(p->confirm_spawn); +} + +void exec_params_serialized_done(ExecParameters *p) { + if (!p) + return; + + for (size_t i = 0; p->fds && i < p->n_socket_fds + p->n_storage_fds; i++) + p->fds[i] = safe_close(p->fds[i]); + + p->cgroup_path = mfree(p->cgroup_path); + + p->prefix = strv_free(p->prefix); + p->received_credentials_directory = mfree(p->received_credentials_directory); + p->received_encrypted_credentials_directory = mfree(p->received_encrypted_credentials_directory); + + for (size_t i = 0; p->idle_pipe && i < 4; i++) + p->idle_pipe[i] = safe_close(p->idle_pipe[i]); + p->idle_pipe = mfree(p->idle_pipe); + + p->stdin_fd = safe_close(p->stdin_fd); + p->stdout_fd = safe_close(p->stdout_fd); + p->stderr_fd = safe_close(p->stderr_fd); + + p->notify_socket = mfree(p->notify_socket); + + open_file_free_many(&p->open_files); + + p->fallback_smack_process_label = mfree(p->fallback_smack_process_label); + + exec_params_clear(p); } void exec_directory_done(ExecDirectory *d) { diff --git a/src/core/execute.h b/src/core/execute.h index 25f8531d44..f315044582 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.h +++ b/src/core/execute.h @@ -471,6 +471,13 @@ struct ExecParameters { #include "unit.h" #include "dynamic-user.h" +int exec_invoke(const ExecCommand *command, + const ExecContext *context, + ExecParameters *params, + ExecRuntime *runtime, + const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, + int *exit_status); + int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, ExecCommand *command, const ExecContext *context, @@ -479,6 +486,7 @@ int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, pid_t *ret); +void exec_command_done(ExecCommand *c); void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand *c, size_t n); ExecCommand* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand *c); void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand **c, size_t n); @@ -524,15 +532,18 @@ DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(ExecSharedRuntime*, exec_shared_runtime_unref); int exec_shared_runtime_serialize(const Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds); int exec_shared_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit *u, const char *key, const char *value, FDSet *fds); int exec_shared_runtime_deserialize_one(Manager *m, const char *value, FDSet *fds); +void exec_shared_runtime_done(ExecSharedRuntime *rt); void exec_shared_runtime_vacuum(Manager *m); int exec_runtime_make(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *context, ExecSharedRuntime *shared, DynamicCreds *creds, ExecRuntime **ret); ExecRuntime* exec_runtime_free(ExecRuntime *rt); DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(ExecRuntime*, exec_runtime_free); ExecRuntime* exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime *rt); +void exec_runtime_clear(ExecRuntime *rt); void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters *p); void exec_params_dump(const ExecParameters *p, FILE* f, const char *prefix); +void exec_params_serialized_done(ExecParameters *p); bool exec_context_get_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext *c); diff --git a/src/core/executor.c b/src/core/executor.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0f154ea347 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/executor.c @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ + +#include +#include + +#include "sd-messages.h" + +#include "alloc-util.h" +#include "build.h" +#include "execute-serialize.h" +#include "execute.h" +#include "exit-status.h" +#include "fdset.h" +#include "fd-util.h" +#include "fileio.h" +#include "getopt-defs.h" +#include "parse-util.h" +#include "pretty-print.h" +#include "static-destruct.h" + +static FILE* arg_serialization = NULL; + +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_serialization, fclosep); + +static int help(void) { + _cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL; + int r; + + r = terminal_urlify_man("systemd", "1", &link); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + printf("%s [OPTIONS...]\n\n" + "%sSandbox and execute processes.%s\n\n" + " -h --help Show this help and exit\n" + " --version Print version string and exit\n" + " --log-target=TARGET Set log target (console, journal,\n" + " journal-or-kmsg,\n" + " kmsg, null)\n" + " --log-level=LEVEL Set log level (debug, info, notice,\n" + " warning, err, crit,\n" + " alert, emerg)\n" + " --log-color=BOOL Highlight important messages\n" + " --log-location=BOOL Include code location in messages\n" + " --log-time=BOOL Prefix messages with current time\n" + " --deserialize=FD Deserialize process config from FD\n" + "\nSee the %s for details.\n", + program_invocation_short_name, + ansi_highlight(), + ansi_normal(), + link); + + return 0; +} + +static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) { + enum { + COMMON_GETOPT_ARGS, + ARG_VERSION, + ARG_DESERIALIZE, + }; + + static const struct option options[] = { + { "log-level", required_argument, NULL, ARG_LOG_LEVEL }, + { "log-target", required_argument, NULL, ARG_LOG_TARGET }, + { "log-color", required_argument, NULL, ARG_LOG_COLOR }, + { "log-location", required_argument, NULL, ARG_LOG_LOCATION }, + { "log-time", required_argument, NULL, ARG_LOG_TIME }, + { "help", no_argument, NULL, 'h' }, + { "version", no_argument, NULL, ARG_VERSION }, + { "deserialize", required_argument, NULL, ARG_DESERIALIZE }, + {} + }; + + int c, r; + + assert(argc >= 0); + assert(argv); + + while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "h", options, NULL)) >= 0) + switch (c) { + case 'h': + return help(); + + case ARG_VERSION: + return version(); + + case ARG_LOG_LEVEL: + r = log_set_max_level_from_string(optarg); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse log level \"%s\": %m", optarg); + + break; + + case ARG_LOG_TARGET: + r = log_set_target_from_string(optarg); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse log target \"%s\": %m", optarg); + + break; + + case ARG_LOG_COLOR: + r = log_show_color_from_string(optarg); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno( + r, + "Failed to parse log color setting \"%s\": %m", + optarg); + + break; + + case ARG_LOG_LOCATION: + r = log_show_location_from_string(optarg); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno( + r, + "Failed to parse log location setting \"%s\": %m", + optarg); + + break; + + case ARG_LOG_TIME: + r = log_show_time_from_string(optarg); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno( + r, + "Failed to parse log time setting \"%s\": %m", + optarg); + + break; + + case ARG_DESERIALIZE: { + FILE *f; + int fd; + + fd = parse_fd(optarg); + if (fd < 0) + return log_error_errno( + fd, + "Failed to parse serialization fd \"%s\": %m", + optarg); + + r = fd_cloexec(fd, /* cloexec= */ true); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno( + r, + "Failed to set serialization fd \"%s\" to close-on-exec: %m", + optarg); + + f = fdopen(fd, "r"); + if (!f) + return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open serialization fd %d: %m", fd); + + safe_fclose(arg_serialization); + arg_serialization = f; + + break; + } + + case '?': + return -EINVAL; + + default: + assert_not_reached(); + } + + if (!arg_serialization) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "No serialization fd specified."); + + return 1 /* work to do */; +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { + _cleanup_fdset_free_ FDSet *fdset = NULL; + int exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS, r; + _cleanup_(cgroup_context_done) CGroupContext cgroup_context = {}; + _cleanup_(exec_context_done) ExecContext context = {}; + _cleanup_(exec_command_done) ExecCommand command = {}; + _cleanup_(exec_params_serialized_done) ExecParameters params = EXEC_PARAMETERS_INIT(/* flags= */ 0); + _cleanup_(exec_shared_runtime_done) ExecSharedRuntime shared = { + .netns_storage_socket = PIPE_EBADF, + .ipcns_storage_socket = PIPE_EBADF, + }; + _cleanup_(dynamic_creds_done) DynamicCreds dynamic_creds = {}; + _cleanup_(exec_runtime_clear) ExecRuntime runtime = { + .ephemeral_storage_socket = PIPE_EBADF, + .shared = &shared, + .dynamic_creds = &dynamic_creds, + }; + + exec_context_init(&context); + cgroup_context_init(&cgroup_context); + + /* We might be starting the journal itself, we'll be told by the caller what to do */ + log_set_always_reopen_console(true); + log_set_prohibit_ipc(true); + log_setup(); + + r = fdset_new_fill(/* filter_cloexec= */ 0, &fdset); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create fd set: %m"); + + r = parse_argv(argc, argv); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + /* Now try again if we were told it's fine to use a different target */ + if (log_get_target() != LOG_TARGET_KMSG) { + log_set_prohibit_ipc(false); + log_open(); + } + + r = fdset_remove(fdset, fileno(arg_serialization)); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to remove serialization fd from fd set: %m"); + + r = exec_deserialize_invocation(arg_serialization, + fdset, + &context, + &command, + ¶ms, + &runtime, + &cgroup_context); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to deserialize: %m"); + + arg_serialization = safe_fclose(arg_serialization); + fdset = fdset_free(fdset); + + r = exec_invoke(&command, + &context, + ¶ms, + &runtime, + &cgroup_context, + &exit_status); + if (r < 0) { + const char *status = ASSERT_PTR( + exit_status_to_string(exit_status, EXIT_STATUS_LIBC | EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD)); + + log_exec_struct_errno(&context, ¶ms, LOG_ERR, r, + "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, + LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID(¶ms), + LOG_EXEC_MESSAGE(¶ms, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m", + status, command.path), + "EXECUTABLE=%s", command.path); + } else + assert(exit_status == EXIT_SUCCESS); /* When 'skip' is chosen in the confirm spawn prompt */ + + return exit_status; +} diff --git a/src/core/fuzz-manager-serialize.c b/src/core/fuzz-manager-serialize.c index cbc89f5737..0e4bfa4484 100644 --- a/src/core/fuzz-manager-serialize.c +++ b/src/core/fuzz-manager-serialize.c @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *data, size_t size) { log_set_target(LOG_TARGET_NULL); } - assert_se(manager_new(RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM, MANAGER_TEST_RUN_MINIMAL, &m) >= 0); + assert_se(manager_new(RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM, MANAGER_TEST_RUN_MINIMAL|MANAGER_TEST_DONT_OPEN_EXECUTOR, &m) >= 0); /* Set log overrides as well to make it harder for a serialization file * to switch log levels/targets during fuzzing */ manager_override_log_level(m, log_get_max_level()); diff --git a/src/core/fuzz-unit-file.c b/src/core/fuzz-unit-file.c index a11d6b53b5..7b738062b5 100644 --- a/src/core/fuzz-unit-file.c +++ b/src/core/fuzz-unit-file.c @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *data, size_t size) { if (!getenv("SYSTEMD_LOG_LEVEL")) log_set_max_level(LOG_CRIT); - assert_se(manager_new(RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM, MANAGER_TEST_RUN_MINIMAL, &m) >= 0); + assert_se(manager_new(RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM, MANAGER_TEST_RUN_MINIMAL|MANAGER_TEST_DONT_OPEN_EXECUTOR, &m) >= 0); name = strjoina("a.", unit_type_to_string(t)); assert_se(unit_new_for_name(m, unit_vtable[t]->object_size, name, &u) >= 0); diff --git a/src/core/manager.c b/src/core/manager.c index 6042bda239..9307a13a79 100644 --- a/src/core/manager.c +++ b/src/core/manager.c @@ -921,6 +921,8 @@ int manager_new(RuntimeScope runtime_scope, ManagerTestRunFlags test_run_flags, .interval = 10 * USEC_PER_MINUTE, .burst = 10, }, + + .executor_fd = -EBADF, }; unit_defaults_init(&m->defaults, runtime_scope); @@ -1039,6 +1041,42 @@ int manager_new(RuntimeScope runtime_scope, ManagerTestRunFlags test_run_flags, if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) return r; + + m->executor_fd = open(SYSTEMD_EXECUTOR_BINARY_PATH, O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH); + if (m->executor_fd < 0) + return log_warning_errno(errno, + "Failed to open executor binary '%s': %m", + SYSTEMD_EXECUTOR_BINARY_PATH); + } else if (!FLAGS_SET(test_run_flags, MANAGER_TEST_DONT_OPEN_EXECUTOR)) { + _cleanup_free_ char *self_exe = NULL, *executor_path = NULL; + _cleanup_close_ int self_dir_fd = -EBADF; + int level = LOG_DEBUG; + + /* Prefer sd-executor from the same directory as the test, e.g.: when running unit tests from the + * build directory. Fallback to working directory and then the installation path. */ + r = readlink_and_make_absolute("/proc/self/exe", &self_exe); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + self_dir_fd = open_parent(self_exe, O_CLOEXEC|O_DIRECTORY, 0); + if (self_dir_fd < 0) + return -errno; + + m->executor_fd = openat(self_dir_fd, "systemd-executor", O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH); + if (m->executor_fd < 0 && errno == ENOENT) + m->executor_fd = openat(AT_FDCWD, "systemd-executor", O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH); + if (m->executor_fd < 0 && errno == ENOENT) { + m->executor_fd = open(SYSTEMD_EXECUTOR_BINARY_PATH, O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH); + level = LOG_WARNING; /* Tests should normally use local builds */ + } + if (m->executor_fd < 0) + return -errno; + + r = fd_get_path(m->executor_fd, &executor_path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + log_full(level, "Using systemd-executor binary from '%s'", executor_path); } /* Note that we do not set up the notify fd here. We do that after deserialization, @@ -1701,6 +1739,8 @@ Manager* manager_free(Manager *m) { lsm_bpf_destroy(m->restrict_fs); #endif + safe_close(m->executor_fd); + return mfree(m); } @@ -4956,6 +4996,17 @@ void unit_defaults_done(UnitDefaults *defaults) { rlimit_free_all(defaults->rlimit); } +LogTarget manager_get_executor_log_target(Manager *m) { + assert(m); + + /* If journald is not available tell sd-executor to go to kmsg, as it might be starting journald */ + + if (manager_journal_is_running(m)) + return log_get_target(); + + return LOG_TARGET_KMSG; +} + static const char *const manager_state_table[_MANAGER_STATE_MAX] = { [MANAGER_INITIALIZING] = "initializing", [MANAGER_STARTING] = "starting", diff --git a/src/core/manager.h b/src/core/manager.h index 4595b1b686..6321a353a5 100644 --- a/src/core/manager.h +++ b/src/core/manager.h @@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ typedef enum ManagerTestRunFlags { MANAGER_TEST_RUN_ENV_GENERATORS = 1 << 2, /* also run env generators */ MANAGER_TEST_RUN_GENERATORS = 1 << 3, /* also run unit generators */ MANAGER_TEST_RUN_IGNORE_DEPENDENCIES = 1 << 4, /* run while ignoring dependencies */ + MANAGER_TEST_DONT_OPEN_EXECUTOR = 1 << 5, /* avoid trying to load sd-executor */ MANAGER_TEST_FULL = MANAGER_TEST_RUN_BASIC | MANAGER_TEST_RUN_ENV_GENERATORS | MANAGER_TEST_RUN_GENERATORS, } ManagerTestRunFlags; @@ -496,6 +497,10 @@ struct Manager { /* For NFTSet= */ FirewallContext *fw_ctx; + + /* Pin the systemd-executor binary, so that it never changes until re-exec, ensuring we don't have + * serialization/deserialization compatibility issues during upgrades. */ + int executor_fd; }; static inline usec_t manager_default_timeout_abort_usec(Manager *m) { @@ -628,6 +633,8 @@ void manager_override_watchdog(Manager *m, WatchdogType t, usec_t timeout); int manager_set_watchdog_pretimeout_governor(Manager *m, const char *governor); int manager_override_watchdog_pretimeout_governor(Manager *m, const char *governor); +LogTarget manager_get_executor_log_target(Manager *m); + const char* oom_policy_to_string(OOMPolicy i) _const_; OOMPolicy oom_policy_from_string(const char *s) _pure_; diff --git a/src/core/meson.build b/src/core/meson.build index 8c3fd76922..0508254d9a 100644 --- a/src/core/meson.build +++ b/src/core/meson.build @@ -144,6 +144,10 @@ systemd_sources = files( 'crash-handler.c', ) +systemd_executor_sources = files( + 'executor.c', +) + executables += [ libexec_template + { 'name' : 'systemd', @@ -156,6 +160,17 @@ executables += [ ], 'dependencies' : libseccomp, }, + libexec_template + { + 'name' : 'systemd-executor', + 'public' : true, + 'sources' : systemd_executor_sources, + 'include_directories' : core_includes, + 'link_with' : [ + libcore, + libshared, + ], + 'dependencies' : libseccomp, + }, fuzz_template + { 'sources' : files('fuzz-unit-file.c'), 'link_with' : [ diff --git a/src/core/unit.c b/src/core/unit.c index b71c21580e..aa809843f7 100644 --- a/src/core/unit.c +++ b/src/core/unit.c @@ -5357,6 +5357,7 @@ int unit_acquire_invocation_id(Unit *u) { } int unit_set_exec_params(Unit *u, ExecParameters *p) { + const char *confirm_spawn; int r; assert(u); @@ -5369,7 +5370,13 @@ int unit_set_exec_params(Unit *u, ExecParameters *p) { p->runtime_scope = u->manager->runtime_scope; - p->confirm_spawn = (char *)manager_get_confirm_spawn(u->manager); + confirm_spawn = manager_get_confirm_spawn(u->manager); + if (confirm_spawn) { + p->confirm_spawn = strdup(confirm_spawn); + if (!p->confirm_spawn) + return -ENOMEM; + } + p->cgroup_supported = u->manager->cgroup_supported; p->prefix = u->manager->prefix; SET_FLAG(p->flags, EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT|EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES, MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(u->manager)); diff --git a/test/units/testsuite-55.sh b/test/units/testsuite-55.sh index c6258dead6..ffa9af2f6a 100755 --- a/test/units/testsuite-55.sh +++ b/test/units/testsuite-55.sh @@ -68,6 +68,12 @@ if systemctl is-active systemd-oomd.service; then systemctl restart systemd-oomd.service fi +# Ensure that we can start services even with a very low hard memory cap without oom-kills, but skip under +# sanitizers as they balloon memory usage. +if ! [[ -v ASAN_OPTIONS || -v UBSAN_OPTIONS ]]; then + systemd-run -t -p MemoryMax=10M -p MemorySwapMax=0 -p MemoryZSwapMax=0 /bin/true +fi + systemctl start testsuite-55-testchill.service systemctl start testsuite-55-testbloat.service From 75689fb2d41fa6225b238f640699f43a1067d203 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luca Boccassi Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2023 02:24:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 20/20] core: move code from execute.c to exec-invoke.c No functional changes, only moving code that is only needed in exec_invoke, and adding new dependencies for seccomp/selinux/apparmor/pam in meson for the sd-executor binary. --- src/core/exec-invoke.c | 5082 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/core/exec-invoke.h | 16 + src/core/execute.c | 5051 +-------------------------------------- src/core/execute.h | 14 +- src/core/executor.c | 1 + src/core/meson.build | 8 +- 6 files changed, 5126 insertions(+), 5046 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/core/exec-invoke.c create mode 100644 src/core/exec-invoke.h diff --git a/src/core/exec-invoke.c b/src/core/exec-invoke.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ea39e0aff1 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/exec-invoke.c @@ -0,0 +1,5082 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if HAVE_PAM +#include +#include +#endif + +#if HAVE_APPARMOR +#include +#endif + +#include "sd-messages.h" + +#if HAVE_APPARMOR +#include "apparmor-util.h" +#endif +#include "argv-util.h" +#include "barrier.h" +#include "bpf-dlopen.h" +#include "bpf-lsm.h" +#include "btrfs-util.h" +#include "capability-util.h" +#include "cgroup-setup.h" +#include "chase.h" +#include "chattr-util.h" +#include "chown-recursive.h" +#include "copy.h" +#include "data-fd-util.h" +#include "env-util.h" +#include "escape.h" +#include "exec-credential.h" +#include "exec-invoke.h" +#include "execute.h" +#include "exit-status.h" +#include "fd-util.h" +#include "hexdecoct.h" +#include "io-util.h" +#include "missing_ioprio.h" +#include "missing_prctl.h" +#include "missing_securebits.h" +#include "missing_syscall.h" +#include "mkdir-label.h" +#include "proc-cmdline.h" +#include "process-util.h" +#include "psi-util.h" +#include "rlimit-util.h" +#include "seccomp-util.h" +#include "selinux-util.h" +#include "signal-util.h" +#include "smack-util.h" +#include "socket-util.h" +#include "string-table.h" +#include "strv.h" +#include "terminal-util.h" +#include "utmp-wtmp.h" + +#define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC) +#define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC) + +#define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024) + +static int shift_fds(int fds[], size_t n_fds) { + if (n_fds <= 0) + return 0; + + /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */ + + assert(fds); + + for (int start = 0;;) { + int restart_from = -1; + + for (int i = start; i < (int) n_fds; i++) { + int nfd; + + /* Already at right index? */ + if (fds[i] == i+3) + continue; + + nfd = fcntl(fds[i], F_DUPFD, i + 3); + if (nfd < 0) + return -errno; + + safe_close(fds[i]); + fds[i] = nfd; + + /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then + * let's remember that and try again from here */ + if (nfd != i+3 && restart_from < 0) + restart_from = i; + } + + if (restart_from < 0) + break; + + start = restart_from; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int flags_fds( + const int fds[], + size_t n_socket_fds, + size_t n_fds, + bool nonblock) { + + int r; + + if (n_fds <= 0) + return 0; + + assert(fds); + + /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags. + * O_NONBLOCK only applies to socket activation though. */ + + for (size_t i = 0; i < n_fds; i++) { + + if (i < n_socket_fds) { + r = fd_nonblock(fds[i], nonblock); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds, + * since after all we want to pass these fds to our + * children */ + + r = fd_cloexec(fds[i], false); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + return 0; +} + +static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i) { + return IN_SET(i, + EXEC_INPUT_TTY, + EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE, + EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL); +} + +static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o) { + return IN_SET(o, + EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY, + EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE, + EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE); +} + +static bool is_kmsg_output(ExecOutput o) { + return IN_SET(o, + EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG, + EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE); +} + +static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext *c) { + assert(c); + + /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */ + + if (is_terminal_input(c->std_input)) + return true; + + if (is_terminal_output(c->std_output)) + return true; + + if (is_terminal_output(c->std_error)) + return true; + + return !!c->tty_path; +} + +static int open_null_as(int flags, int nfd) { + int fd; + + assert(nfd >= 0); + + fd = open("/dev/null", flags|O_NOCTTY); + if (fd < 0) + return -errno; + + return move_fd(fd, nfd, false); +} + +static int connect_journal_socket( + int fd, + const char *log_namespace, + uid_t uid, + gid_t gid) { + + uid_t olduid = UID_INVALID; + gid_t oldgid = GID_INVALID; + const char *j; + int r; + + j = log_namespace ? + strjoina("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace, "/stdout") : + "/run/systemd/journal/stdout"; + + if (gid_is_valid(gid)) { + oldgid = getgid(); + + if (setegid(gid) < 0) + return -errno; + } + + if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { + olduid = getuid(); + + if (seteuid(uid) < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto restore_gid; + } + } + + r = connect_unix_path(fd, AT_FDCWD, j); + + /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely fail later on. This should only happen if + an LSM interferes. */ + + if (uid_is_valid(uid)) + (void) seteuid(olduid); + + restore_gid: + if (gid_is_valid(gid)) + (void) setegid(oldgid); + + return r; +} + +static int connect_logger_as( + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + ExecOutput output, + const char *ident, + int nfd, + uid_t uid, + gid_t gid) { + + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; + int r; + + assert(context); + assert(params); + assert(output < _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX); + assert(ident); + assert(nfd >= 0); + + fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + return -errno; + + r = connect_journal_socket(fd, context->log_namespace, uid, gid); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD) < 0) + return -errno; + + (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd, SNDBUF_SIZE); + + if (dprintf(fd, + "%s\n" + "%s\n" + "%i\n" + "%i\n" + "%i\n" + "%i\n" + "%i\n", + context->syslog_identifier ?: ident, + params->flags & EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT ? params->unit_id : "", + context->syslog_priority, + !!context->syslog_level_prefix, + false, + is_kmsg_output(output), + is_terminal_output(output)) < 0) + return -errno; + + return move_fd(TAKE_FD(fd), nfd, false); +} + +static int open_terminal_as(const char *path, int flags, int nfd) { + int fd; + + assert(path); + assert(nfd >= 0); + + fd = open_terminal(path, flags | O_NOCTTY); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + return move_fd(fd, nfd, false); +} + +static int acquire_path(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; + int r; + + assert(path); + + if (IN_SET(flags & O_ACCMODE, O_WRONLY, O_RDWR)) + flags |= O_CREAT; + + fd = open(path, flags|O_NOCTTY, mode); + if (fd >= 0) + return TAKE_FD(fd); + + if (errno != ENXIO) /* ENXIO is returned when we try to open() an AF_UNIX file system socket on Linux */ + return -errno; + + /* So, it appears the specified path could be an AF_UNIX socket. Let's see if we can connect to it. */ + + fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + return -errno; + + r = connect_unix_path(fd, AT_FDCWD, path); + if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTSOCK, -EINVAL)) + /* Propagate initial error if we get ENOTSOCK or EINVAL, i.e. we have indication that this + * wasn't an AF_UNIX socket after all */ + return -ENXIO; + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) + r = shutdown(fd, SHUT_WR); + else if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY) + r = shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD); + else + r = 0; + if (r < 0) + return -errno; + + return TAKE_FD(fd); +} + +static int fixup_input( + const ExecContext *context, + int socket_fd, + bool apply_tty_stdin) { + + ExecInput std_input; + + assert(context); + + std_input = context->std_input; + + if (is_terminal_input(std_input) && !apply_tty_stdin) + return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; + + if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0) + return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; + + if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_DATA && context->stdin_data_size == 0) + return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; + + return std_input; +} + +static int fixup_output(ExecOutput output, int socket_fd) { + + if (output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0) + return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT; + + return output; +} + +static int setup_input( + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + int socket_fd, + const int named_iofds[static 3]) { + + ExecInput i; + int r; + + assert(context); + assert(params); + assert(named_iofds); + + if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) { + if (dup2(params->stdin_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0) + return -errno; + + /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */ + if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { + unsigned rows = context->tty_rows, cols = context->tty_cols; + + (void) exec_context_tty_size(context, &rows, &cols); + (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCSCTTY, context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE); + (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO, true); + (void) terminal_set_size_fd(STDIN_FILENO, NULL, rows, cols); + } + + return STDIN_FILENO; + } + + i = fixup_input(context, socket_fd, params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN); + + switch (i) { + + case EXEC_INPUT_NULL: + return open_null_as(O_RDONLY, STDIN_FILENO); + + case EXEC_INPUT_TTY: + case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE: + case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL: { + unsigned rows, cols; + int fd; + + fd = acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context), + i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL ? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY : + i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE ? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE : + ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT, + USEC_INFINITY); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + r = exec_context_tty_size(context, &rows, &cols); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = terminal_set_size_fd(fd, exec_context_tty_path(context), rows, cols); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false); + } + + case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET: + assert(socket_fd >= 0); + + return RET_NERRNO(dup2(socket_fd, STDIN_FILENO)); + + case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD: + assert(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] >= 0); + + (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO], false); + return RET_NERRNO(dup2(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO], STDIN_FILENO)); + + case EXEC_INPUT_DATA: { + int fd; + + fd = acquire_data_fd(context->stdin_data, context->stdin_data_size, 0); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false); + } + + case EXEC_INPUT_FILE: { + bool rw; + int fd; + + assert(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]); + + rw = (context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE && streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO])) || + (context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE && streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO])); + + fd = acquire_path(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], rw ? O_RDWR : O_RDONLY, 0666 & ~context->umask); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false); + } + + default: + assert_not_reached(); + } +} + +static bool can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout( + const ExecContext *context, + ExecOutput o, + ExecOutput e) { + + assert(context); + + /* Returns true, if given the specified STDERR and STDOUT output we can directly dup() the stdout fd to the + * stderr fd */ + + if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) + return true; + if (e != o) + return false; + + if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) + return streq_ptr(context->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO], context->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO]); + + if (IN_SET(e, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE)) + return streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); + + return true; +} + +static int setup_output( + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + int fileno, + int socket_fd, + const int named_iofds[static 3], + const char *ident, + uid_t uid, + gid_t gid, + dev_t *journal_stream_dev, + ino_t *journal_stream_ino) { + + ExecOutput o; + ExecInput i; + int r; + + assert(context); + assert(params); + assert(ident); + assert(journal_stream_dev); + assert(journal_stream_ino); + + if (fileno == STDOUT_FILENO && params->stdout_fd >= 0) { + + if (dup2(params->stdout_fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) + return -errno; + + return STDOUT_FILENO; + } + + if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO && params->stderr_fd >= 0) { + if (dup2(params->stderr_fd, STDERR_FILENO) < 0) + return -errno; + + return STDERR_FILENO; + } + + i = fixup_input(context, socket_fd, params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN); + o = fixup_output(context->std_output, socket_fd); + + if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO) { + ExecOutput e; + e = fixup_output(context->std_error, socket_fd); + + /* This expects the input and output are already set up */ + + /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all + * the way and are not on a tty */ + if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT && + o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT && + i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && + !is_terminal_input(context->std_input) && + getppid() != 1) + return fileno; + + /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */ + if (can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(context, o, e)) + return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDOUT_FILENO, fileno)); + + o = e; + + } else if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) { + /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */ + if (i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && is_terminal_input(context->std_input)) + return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno); + + /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null or a data fd, inherit that... */ + if (!IN_SET(i, EXEC_INPUT_NULL, EXEC_INPUT_DATA)) + return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno)); + + /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */ + if (getppid() != 1) + return fileno; + + /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */ + return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); + } + + switch (o) { + + case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL: + return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); + + case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY: + if (is_terminal_input(i)) + return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno)); + + /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */ + return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno); + + case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG: + case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE: + case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL: + case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE: + r = connect_logger_as(context, params, o, ident, fileno, uid, gid); + if (r < 0) { + log_exec_warning_errno(context, + params, + r, + "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", + fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "stdout" : "stderr"); + r = open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); + } else { + struct stat st; + + /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed + * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits + * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not. + * + * If both stdout and stderr are connected to a stream then let's make sure to store the data + * about STDERR as that's usually the best way to do logging. */ + + if (fstat(fileno, &st) >= 0 && + (*journal_stream_ino == 0 || fileno == STDERR_FILENO)) { + *journal_stream_dev = st.st_dev; + *journal_stream_ino = st.st_ino; + } + } + return r; + + case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET: + assert(socket_fd >= 0); + + return RET_NERRNO(dup2(socket_fd, fileno)); + + case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD: + assert(named_iofds[fileno] >= 0); + + (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds[fileno], false); + return RET_NERRNO(dup2(named_iofds[fileno], fileno)); + + case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE: + case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND: + case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE: { + bool rw; + int fd, flags; + + assert(context->stdio_file[fileno]); + + rw = context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_FILE && + streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[fileno], context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]); + + if (rw) + return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno)); + + flags = O_WRONLY; + if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND) + flags |= O_APPEND; + else if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE) + flags |= O_TRUNC; + + fd = acquire_path(context->stdio_file[fileno], flags, 0666 & ~context->umask); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + return move_fd(fd, fileno, 0); + } + + default: + assert_not_reached(); + } +} + +static int chown_terminal(int fd, uid_t uid) { + int r; + + assert(fd >= 0); + + /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */ + if (isatty(fd) < 1) { + if (IN_SET(errno, EINVAL, ENOTTY)) + return 0; /* not a tty */ + + return -errno; + } + + /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */ + r = fchmod_and_chown(fd, TTY_MODE, uid, GID_INVALID); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 1; +} + +static int setup_confirm_stdio( + const ExecContext *context, + const char *vc, + int *ret_saved_stdin, + int *ret_saved_stdout) { + + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF, saved_stdin = -EBADF, saved_stdout = -EBADF; + unsigned rows, cols; + int r; + + assert(ret_saved_stdin); + assert(ret_saved_stdout); + + saved_stdin = fcntl(STDIN_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3); + if (saved_stdin < 0) + return -errno; + + saved_stdout = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3); + if (saved_stdout < 0) + return -errno; + + fd = acquire_terminal(vc, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT, DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + r = chown_terminal(fd, getuid()); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = reset_terminal_fd(fd, true); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = exec_context_tty_size(context, &rows, &cols); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = terminal_set_size_fd(fd, vc, rows, cols); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = rearrange_stdio(fd, fd, STDERR_FILENO); /* Invalidates 'fd' also on failure */ + TAKE_FD(fd); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + *ret_saved_stdin = TAKE_FD(saved_stdin); + *ret_saved_stdout = TAKE_FD(saved_stdout); + return 0; +} + +static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err, int fd, const char *unit_id) { + assert(err < 0); + assert(unit_id); + + if (err == -ETIMEDOUT) + dprintf(fd, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", unit_id); + else { + errno = -err; + dprintf(fd, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", unit_id); + } +} + +static void write_confirm_error(int err, const char *vc, const char *unit_id) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; + + assert(vc); + + fd = open_terminal(vc, O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0) + return; + + write_confirm_error_fd(err, fd, unit_id); +} + +static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin, int *saved_stdout) { + int r = 0; + + assert(saved_stdin); + assert(saved_stdout); + + release_terminal(); + + if (*saved_stdin >= 0) + if (dup2(*saved_stdin, STDIN_FILENO) < 0) + r = -errno; + + if (*saved_stdout >= 0) + if (dup2(*saved_stdout, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) + r = -errno; + + *saved_stdin = safe_close(*saved_stdin); + *saved_stdout = safe_close(*saved_stdout); + + return r; +} + +enum { + CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE = -1, + CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS = 0, + CONFIRM_EXECUTE = 1, +}; + +static bool confirm_spawn_disabled(void) { + return access("/run/systemd/confirm_spawn_disabled", F_OK) >= 0; +} + +static int ask_for_confirmation(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *params, const char *cmdline) { + int saved_stdout = -1, saved_stdin = -1, r; + _cleanup_free_ char *e = NULL; + char c; + + assert(context); + assert(params); + + /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */ + r = setup_confirm_stdio(context, params->confirm_spawn, &saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); + if (r < 0) { + write_confirm_error(r, params->confirm_spawn, params->unit_id); + return CONFIRM_EXECUTE; + } + + /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */ + if (!params->confirm_spawn || confirm_spawn_disabled()) { + r = 1; + goto restore_stdio; + } + + e = ellipsize(cmdline, 60, 100); + if (!e) { + log_oom(); + r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; + goto restore_stdio; + } + + for (;;) { + r = ask_char(&c, "yfshiDjcn", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e); + if (r < 0) { + write_confirm_error_fd(r, STDOUT_FILENO, params->unit_id); + r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; + goto restore_stdio; + } + + switch (c) { + case 'c': + printf("Resuming normal execution.\n"); + manager_disable_confirm_spawn(); + r = 1; + break; + case 'D': + printf(" Unit: %s\n", + params->unit_id); + exec_context_dump(context, stdout, " "); + exec_params_dump(params, stdout, " "); + continue; /* ask again */ + case 'f': + printf("Failing execution.\n"); + r = CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE; + break; + case 'h': + printf(" c - continue, proceed without asking anymore\n" + " D - dump, show the state of the unit\n" + " f - fail, don't execute the command and pretend it failed\n" + " h - help\n" + " i - info, show a short summary of the unit\n" + " j - jobs, show jobs that are in progress\n" + " s - skip, don't execute the command and pretend it succeeded\n" + " y - yes, execute the command\n"); + continue; /* ask again */ + case 'i': + printf(" Unit: %s\n" + " Command: %s\n", + params->unit_id, cmdline); + continue; /* ask again */ + case 'j': + if (sigqueue(getppid(), + SIGRTMIN+18, + (const union sigval) { .sival_int = MANAGER_SIGNAL_COMMAND_DUMP_JOBS }) < 0) + return -errno; + + continue; /* ask again */ + case 'n': + /* 'n' was removed in favor of 'f'. */ + printf("Didn't understand 'n', did you mean 'f'?\n"); + continue; /* ask again */ + case 's': + printf("Skipping execution.\n"); + r = CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS; + break; + case 'y': + r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; + break; + default: + assert_not_reached(); + } + break; + } + +restore_stdio: + restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); + return r; +} + +static int get_fixed_user( + const char *username, + const char **ret_user, + uid_t *ret_uid, + gid_t *ret_gid, + const char **ret_home, + const char **ret_shell) { + + int r; + + assert(username); + assert(ret_user); + + /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway + * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */ + + r = get_user_creds(&username, ret_uid, ret_gid, ret_home, ret_shell, USER_CREDS_CLEAN); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + *ret_user = username; + return 0; +} + +static int get_fixed_group( + const char *groupname, + const char **ret_group, + gid_t *ret_gid) { + + int r; + + assert(groupname); + assert(ret_group); + + r = get_group_creds(&groupname, ret_gid, /* flags = */ 0); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + *ret_group = groupname; + return 0; +} + +static int get_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext *c, const char *user, + const char *group, gid_t gid, + gid_t **supplementary_gids, int *ngids) { + int r, k = 0; + int ngroups_max; + bool keep_groups = false; + gid_t *groups = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ gid_t *l_gids = NULL; + + assert(c); + + /* + * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list. + * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups + * here and as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary + * groups of the caller. + */ + if (user && gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != 0) { + /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */ + if (initgroups(user, gid) < 0) + return -errno; + + keep_groups = true; + } + + if (strv_isempty(c->supplementary_groups)) + return 0; + + /* + * If SupplementaryGroups= was passed then NGROUPS_MAX has to + * be positive, otherwise fail. + */ + errno = 0; + ngroups_max = (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX); + if (ngroups_max <= 0) + return errno_or_else(EOPNOTSUPP); + + l_gids = new(gid_t, ngroups_max); + if (!l_gids) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (keep_groups) { + /* + * Lookup the list of groups that the user belongs to, we + * avoid NSS lookups here too for gid=0. + */ + k = ngroups_max; + if (getgrouplist(user, gid, l_gids, &k) < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else + k = 0; + + STRV_FOREACH(i, c->supplementary_groups) { + const char *g; + + if (k >= ngroups_max) + return -E2BIG; + + g = *i; + r = get_group_creds(&g, l_gids+k, 0); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + k++; + } + + /* + * Sets ngids to zero to drop all supplementary groups, happens + * when we are under root and SupplementaryGroups= is empty. + */ + if (k == 0) { + *ngids = 0; + return 0; + } + + /* Otherwise get the final list of supplementary groups */ + groups = memdup(l_gids, sizeof(gid_t) * k); + if (!groups) + return -ENOMEM; + + *supplementary_gids = groups; + *ngids = k; + + groups = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +static int enforce_groups(gid_t gid, const gid_t *supplementary_gids, int ngids) { + int r; + + /* Handle SupplementaryGroups= if it is not empty */ + if (ngids > 0) { + r = maybe_setgroups(ngids, supplementary_gids); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (gid_is_valid(gid)) { + /* Then set our gids */ + if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0) + return -errno; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int set_securebits(unsigned bits, unsigned mask) { + unsigned applied; + int current; + + current = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS); + if (current < 0) + return -errno; + + /* Clear all securebits defined in mask and set bits */ + applied = ((unsigned) current & ~mask) | bits; + if ((unsigned) current == applied) + return 0; + + if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, applied) < 0) + return -errno; + + return 1; +} + +static int enforce_user( + const ExecContext *context, + uid_t uid, + uint64_t capability_ambient_set) { + assert(context); + int r; + + if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) + return 0; + + /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the UIS and makes sure we keep the capabilities while doing so. For + * setting secure bits the capability CAP_SETPCAP is required, so we also need keep-caps in this + * case. */ + + if ((capability_ambient_set != 0 || context->secure_bits != 0) && uid != 0) { + + /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but drop privileges we need to make sure we + * keep our caps, while we drop privileges. Add KEEP_CAPS to the securebits */ + r = set_securebits(1U << SECURE_KEEP_CAPS, 0); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + /* Second step: actually set the uids */ + if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) + return -errno; + + /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but are otherwise a normal user. However, + * the caps might got corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up later. This is done + * outside of this call. */ + return 0; +} + +#if HAVE_PAM + +static int null_conv( + int num_msg, + const struct pam_message **msg, + struct pam_response **resp, + void *appdata_ptr) { + + /* We don't support conversations */ + + return PAM_CONV_ERR; +} + +#endif + +static int setup_pam( + const char *name, + const char *user, + uid_t uid, + gid_t gid, + const char *tty, + char ***env, /* updated on success */ + const int fds[], size_t n_fds) { + +#if HAVE_PAM + + static const struct pam_conv conv = { + .conv = null_conv, + .appdata_ptr = NULL + }; + + _cleanup_(barrier_destroy) Barrier barrier = BARRIER_NULL; + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **e = NULL; + pam_handle_t *handle = NULL; + sigset_t old_ss; + int pam_code = PAM_SUCCESS, r; + bool close_session = false; + pid_t pam_pid = 0, parent_pid; + int flags = 0; + + assert(name); + assert(user); + assert(env); + + /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child + * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or + * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM + * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual + * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID + * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */ + + r = barrier_create(&barrier); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + + if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG) + flags |= PAM_SILENT; + + pam_code = pam_start(name, user, &conv, &handle); + if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) { + handle = NULL; + goto fail; + } + + if (!tty) { + _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL; + + /* Hmm, so no TTY was explicitly passed, but an fd passed to us directly might be a TTY. Let's figure + * out if that's the case, and read the TTY off it. */ + + if (getttyname_malloc(STDIN_FILENO, &q) >= 0) + tty = strjoina("/dev/", q); + } + + if (tty) { + pam_code = pam_set_item(handle, PAM_TTY, tty); + if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) + goto fail; + } + + STRV_FOREACH(nv, *env) { + pam_code = pam_putenv(handle, *nv); + if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) + goto fail; + } + + pam_code = pam_acct_mgmt(handle, flags); + if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) + goto fail; + + pam_code = pam_setcred(handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | flags); + if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) + log_debug("pam_setcred() failed, ignoring: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code)); + + pam_code = pam_open_session(handle, flags); + if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) + goto fail; + + close_session = true; + + e = pam_getenvlist(handle); + if (!e) { + pam_code = PAM_BUF_ERR; + goto fail; + } + + /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in the child */ + + assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK, &old_ss, SIGTERM, -1) >= 0); + + parent_pid = getpid_cached(); + + r = safe_fork("(sd-pam)", 0, &pam_pid); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + if (r == 0) { + int sig, ret = EXIT_PAM; + + /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on termination */ + barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_CHILD); + + /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only + * those fds are open here that have been opened by PAM. */ + (void) close_many(fds, n_fds); + + /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session and this will make + * PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases. If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam + * threads to fail to exit normally */ + + r = maybe_setgroups(0, NULL); + if (r < 0) + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m"); + if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0) + log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m"); + if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) + log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m"); + + (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE); + + /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if the above setresuid() succeeds, + * otherwise the kernel will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged children + * this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic to do the rest for us. */ + if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM) < 0) + goto child_finish; + + /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially important regarding dropping + * privileges. Otherwise, unit setup might race against our setresuid(2) call. + * + * If the parent aborted, we'll detect this below, hence ignore return failure here. */ + (void) barrier_place(&barrier); + + /* Check if our parent process might already have died? */ + if (getppid() == parent_pid) { + sigset_t ss; + + assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss) >= 0); + assert_se(sigaddset(&ss, SIGTERM) >= 0); + + for (;;) { + if (sigwait(&ss, &sig) < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + + goto child_finish; + } + + assert(sig == SIGTERM); + break; + } + } + + pam_code = pam_setcred(handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED | flags); + if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) + goto child_finish; + + /* If our parent died we'll end the session */ + if (getppid() != parent_pid) { + pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags); + if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) + goto child_finish; + } + + ret = 0; + + child_finish: + /* NB: pam_end() when called in child processes should set PAM_DATA_SILENT to let the module + * know about this. See pam_end(3) */ + (void) pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags | PAM_DATA_SILENT); + _exit(ret); + } + + barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_PARENT); + + /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the cleanups, so forget about the handle + * here. */ + handle = NULL; + + /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */ + assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_ss, NULL) >= 0); + + /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules might have opened it, but we don't want + * this fd around. */ + closelog(); + + /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for errors as we cannot + * recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */ + if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier)) + log_error("PAM initialization failed"); + + return strv_free_and_replace(*env, e); + +fail: + if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) { + log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code)); + r = -EPERM; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */ + } else + log_error_errno(r, "PAM failed: %m"); + + if (handle) { + if (close_session) + pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags); + + (void) pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags); + } + + closelog(); + return r; +#else + return 0; +#endif +} + +static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path) { + _cleanup_free_ char *buf = NULL; + const char *p; + + assert(path); + + /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in + * /bin/ps */ + + if (path_extract_filename(path, &buf) < 0) { + rename_process("(...)"); + return; + } + + size_t l = strlen(buf); + if (l > 8) { + /* The end of the process name is usually more interesting, since the first bit might just be + * "systemd-" */ + p = buf + l - 8; + l = 8; + } else + p = buf; + + char process_name[11]; + process_name[0] = '('; + memcpy(process_name+1, p, l); + process_name[1+l] = ')'; + process_name[1+l+1] = 0; + + rename_process(process_name); +} + +static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext *c) { + assert(c); + + return c->address_families_allow_list || + !set_isempty(c->address_families); +} + +static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext *c) { + assert(c); + + return c->syscall_allow_list || + !hashmap_isempty(c->syscall_filter); +} + +static bool context_has_syscall_logs(const ExecContext *c) { + assert(c); + + return c->syscall_log_allow_list || + !hashmap_isempty(c->syscall_log); +} + +static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext *c) { + assert(c); + + if (c->no_new_privileges) + return true; + + if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) > 0) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */ + return false; + + /* We need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */ + return c->lock_personality || + c->memory_deny_write_execute || + c->private_devices || + c->protect_clock || + c->protect_hostname || + c->protect_kernel_tunables || + c->protect_kernel_modules || + c->protect_kernel_logs || + context_has_address_families(c) || + exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c) || + c->restrict_realtime || + c->restrict_suid_sgid || + !set_isempty(c->syscall_archs) || + context_has_syscall_filters(c) || + context_has_syscall_logs(c); +} + +#if HAVE_SECCOMP + +static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, const char* msg) { + + if (is_seccomp_available()) + return false; + + log_exec_debug(c, p, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg); + return true; +} + +static int apply_syscall_filter(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, bool needs_ambient_hack) { + uint32_t negative_action, default_action, action; + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(p); + + if (!context_has_syscall_filters(c)) + return 0; + + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "SystemCallFilter=")) + return 0; + + negative_action = c->syscall_errno == SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL ? scmp_act_kill_process() : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c->syscall_errno); + + if (c->syscall_allow_list) { + default_action = negative_action; + action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; + } else { + default_action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; + action = negative_action; + } + + if (needs_ambient_hack) { + r = seccomp_filter_set_add(c->syscall_filter, c->syscall_allow_list, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action, c->syscall_filter, action, false); +} + +static int apply_syscall_log(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { +#ifdef SCMP_ACT_LOG + uint32_t default_action, action; +#endif + + assert(c); + assert(p); + + if (!context_has_syscall_logs(c)) + return 0; + +#ifdef SCMP_ACT_LOG + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "SystemCallLog=")) + return 0; + + if (c->syscall_log_allow_list) { + /* Log nothing but the ones listed */ + default_action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; + action = SCMP_ACT_LOG; + } else { + /* Log everything but the ones listed */ + default_action = SCMP_ACT_LOG; + action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; + } + + return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action, c->syscall_log, action, false); +#else + /* old libseccomp */ + log_exec_debug(c, p, "SECCOMP feature SCMP_ACT_LOG not available, skipping SystemCallLog="); + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int apply_syscall_archs(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { + assert(c); + assert(p); + + if (set_isempty(c->syscall_archs)) + return 0; + + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "SystemCallArchitectures=")) + return 0; + + return seccomp_restrict_archs(c->syscall_archs); +} + +static int apply_address_families(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { + assert(c); + assert(p); + + if (!context_has_address_families(c)) + return 0; + + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "RestrictAddressFamilies=")) + return 0; + + return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c->address_families, c->address_families_allow_list); +} + +static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(p); + + if (!c->memory_deny_write_execute) + return 0; + + /* use prctl() if kernel supports it (6.3) */ + r = prctl(PR_SET_MDWE, PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN, 0, 0, 0); + if (r == 0) { + log_exec_debug(c, p, "Enabled MemoryDenyWriteExecute= with PR_SET_MDWE"); + return 0; + } + if (r < 0 && errno != EINVAL) + return log_exec_debug_errno(c, + p, + errno, + "Failed to enable MemoryDenyWriteExecute= with PR_SET_MDWE: %m"); + /* else use seccomp */ + log_exec_debug(c, p, "Kernel doesn't support PR_SET_MDWE: falling back to seccomp"); + + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute=")) + return 0; + + return seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute(); +} + +static int apply_restrict_realtime(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { + assert(c); + assert(p); + + if (!c->restrict_realtime) + return 0; + + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "RestrictRealtime=")) + return 0; + + return seccomp_restrict_realtime(); +} + +static int apply_restrict_suid_sgid(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { + assert(c); + assert(p); + + if (!c->restrict_suid_sgid) + return 0; + + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "RestrictSUIDSGID=")) + return 0; + + return seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid(); +} + +static int apply_protect_sysctl(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { + assert(c); + assert(p); + + /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but + * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */ + + if (!c->protect_kernel_tunables) + return 0; + + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "ProtectKernelTunables=")) + return 0; + + return seccomp_protect_sysctl(); +} + +static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { + assert(c); + assert(p); + + /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */ + + if (!c->protect_kernel_modules) + return 0; + + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "ProtectKernelModules=")) + return 0; + + return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); +} + +static int apply_protect_kernel_logs(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { + assert(c); + assert(p); + + if (!c->protect_kernel_logs) + return 0; + + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "ProtectKernelLogs=")) + return 0; + + return seccomp_protect_syslog(); +} + +static int apply_protect_clock(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { + assert(c); + assert(p); + + if (!c->protect_clock) + return 0; + + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "ProtectClock=")) + return 0; + + return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); +} + +static int apply_private_devices(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { + assert(c); + assert(p); + + /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */ + + if (!c->private_devices) + return 0; + + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "PrivateDevices=")) + return 0; + + return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); +} + +static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { + assert(c); + assert(p); + + if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c)) + return 0; + + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "RestrictNamespaces=")) + return 0; + + return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c->restrict_namespaces); +} + +static int apply_lock_personality(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { + unsigned long personality; + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(p); + + if (!c->lock_personality) + return 0; + + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "LockPersonality=")) + return 0; + + personality = c->personality; + + /* If personality is not specified, use either PER_LINUX or PER_LINUX32 depending on what is currently set. */ + if (personality == PERSONALITY_INVALID) { + + r = opinionated_personality(&personality); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + return seccomp_lock_personality(personality); +} + +#endif + +#if HAVE_LIBBPF +static int apply_restrict_filesystems(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(p); + + if (!exec_context_restrict_filesystems_set(c)) + return 0; + + if (p->bpf_outer_map_fd < 0) { + /* LSM BPF is unsupported or lsm_bpf_setup failed */ + log_exec_debug(c, p, "LSM BPF not supported, skipping RestrictFileSystems="); + return 0; + } + + /* We are in a new binary, so dl-open again */ + r = dlopen_bpf(); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return lsm_bpf_restrict_filesystems(c->restrict_filesystems, p->cgroup_id, p->bpf_outer_map_fd, c->restrict_filesystems_allow_list); +} +#endif + +static int apply_protect_hostname(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, int *ret_exit_status) { + assert(c); + assert(p); + + if (!c->protect_hostname) + return 0; + + if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_UTS)) { + if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS) < 0) { + if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno)) { + *ret_exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; + return log_exec_error_errno(c, + p, + errno, + "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m"); + } + + log_exec_warning(c, + p, + "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but UTS namespace setup is " + "prohibited (container manager?), ignoring namespace setup."); + } + } else + log_exec_warning(c, + p, + "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not " + "support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup."); + +#if HAVE_SECCOMP + int r; + + if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "ProtectHostname=")) + return 0; + + r = seccomp_protect_hostname(); + if (r < 0) { + *ret_exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, r, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m"); + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + +static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[static 4]) { + assert(idle_pipe); + + idle_pipe[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe[1]); + idle_pipe[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe[2]); + + if (idle_pipe[0] >= 0) { + int r; + + r = fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC); + + if (idle_pipe[3] >= 0 && r == 0 /* timeout */) { + ssize_t n; + + /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */ + n = write(idle_pipe[3], "x", 1); + if (n > 0) + /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */ + (void) fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC); + } + + idle_pipe[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe[0]); + + } + + idle_pipe[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe[3]); +} + +static const char *exec_directory_env_name_to_string(ExecDirectoryType t); + +/* And this table also maps ExecDirectoryType, to the environment variable we pass the selected directory to + * the service payload in. */ +static const char* const exec_directory_env_name_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "RUNTIME_DIRECTORY", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "STATE_DIRECTORY", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "CACHE_DIRECTORY", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "LOGS_DIRECTORY", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY", +}; + +DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(exec_directory_env_name, ExecDirectoryType); + +static int build_environment( + const ExecContext *c, + const ExecParameters *p, + const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, + size_t n_fds, + char **fdnames, + const char *home, + const char *username, + const char *shell, + dev_t journal_stream_dev, + ino_t journal_stream_ino, + const char *memory_pressure_path, + char ***ret) { + + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL; + size_t n_env = 0; + char *x; + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(p); + assert(ret); + +#define N_ENV_VARS 19 + our_env = new0(char*, N_ENV_VARS + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); + if (!our_env) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (n_fds > 0) { + _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL; + + if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + + if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_FDS=%zu", n_fds) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + + joined = strv_join(fdnames, ":"); + if (!joined) + return -ENOMEM; + + x = strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + if ((p->flags & EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG) && p->watchdog_usec > 0) { + if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + + if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT, p->watchdog_usec) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use blocking + * Varlink calls back to us for look up dynamic users in PID 1. Break the deadlock between D-Bus and + * PID 1 by disabling use of PID1' NSS interface for looking up dynamic users. */ + if (p->flags & EXEC_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS) { + x = strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1"); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + /* We query "root" if this is a system unit and User= is not specified. $USER is always set. $HOME + * could cause problem for e.g. getty, since login doesn't override $HOME, and $LOGNAME and $SHELL don't + * really make much sense since we're not logged in. Hence we conditionalize the three based on + * SetLoginEnvironment= switch. */ + if (!c->user && !c->dynamic_user && p->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM) { + r = get_fixed_user("root", &username, NULL, NULL, &home, &shell); + if (r < 0) + return log_exec_debug_errno(c, + p, + r, + "Failed to determine user credentials for root: %m"); + } + + bool set_user_login_env = c->set_login_environment >= 0 ? c->set_login_environment : (c->user || c->dynamic_user); + + if (username) { + x = strjoin("USER=", username); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + + if (set_user_login_env) { + x = strjoin("LOGNAME=", username); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + } + + if (home && set_user_login_env) { + x = strjoin("HOME=", home); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + + path_simplify(x + 5); + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + if (shell && set_user_login_env) { + x = strjoin("SHELL=", shell); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + + path_simplify(x + 6); + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + if (!sd_id128_is_null(p->invocation_id)) { + assert(p->invocation_id_string); + + x = strjoin("INVOCATION_ID=", p->invocation_id_string); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + if (exec_context_needs_term(c)) { + _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = NULL; + const char *tty_path, *term = NULL; + + tty_path = exec_context_tty_path(c); + + /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try + * to inherit the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the + * container manager passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */ + + if (path_equal_ptr(tty_path, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1) + term = getenv("TERM"); + else if (tty_path && in_charset(skip_dev_prefix(tty_path), ALPHANUMERICAL)) { + _cleanup_free_ char *key = NULL; + + key = strjoin("systemd.tty.term.", skip_dev_prefix(tty_path)); + if (!key) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = proc_cmdline_get_key(key, 0, &cmdline); + if (r < 0) + log_exec_debug_errno(c, + p, + r, + "Failed to read %s from kernel cmdline, ignoring: %m", + key); + else if (r > 0) + term = cmdline; + } + + if (!term) + term = default_term_for_tty(tty_path); + + x = strjoin("TERM=", term); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + if (journal_stream_dev != 0 && journal_stream_ino != 0) { + if (asprintf(&x, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT ":" INO_FMT, journal_stream_dev, journal_stream_ino) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + if (c->log_namespace) { + x = strjoin("LOG_NAMESPACE=", c->log_namespace); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { + _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL; + const char *n; + + if (!p->prefix[t]) + continue; + + if (c->directories[t].n_items == 0) + continue; + + n = exec_directory_env_name_to_string(t); + if (!n) + continue; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[t].n_items; i++) { + _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed = NULL; + + prefixed = path_join(p->prefix[t], c->directories[t].items[i].path); + if (!prefixed) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (!strextend_with_separator(&joined, ":", prefixed)) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + x = strjoin(n, "=", joined); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + _cleanup_free_ char *creds_dir = NULL; + r = exec_context_get_credential_directory(c, p, p->unit_id, &creds_dir); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) { + x = strjoin("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY=", creds_dir); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + if (asprintf(&x, "SYSTEMD_EXEC_PID=" PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + our_env[n_env++] = x; + + if (memory_pressure_path) { + x = strjoin("MEMORY_PRESSURE_WATCH=", memory_pressure_path); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + + our_env[n_env++] = x; + + if (cgroup_context && !path_equal(memory_pressure_path, "/dev/null")) { + _cleanup_free_ char *b = NULL, *e = NULL; + + if (asprintf(&b, "%s " USEC_FMT " " USEC_FMT, + MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_TYPE, + cgroup_context->memory_pressure_threshold_usec == USEC_INFINITY ? MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_THRESHOLD_USEC : + CLAMP(cgroup_context->memory_pressure_threshold_usec, 1U, MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_WINDOW_USEC), + MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_WINDOW_USEC) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (base64mem(b, strlen(b) + 1, &e) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + x = strjoin("MEMORY_PRESSURE_WRITE=", e); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + } + + assert(n_env < N_ENV_VARS + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); +#undef N_ENV_VARS + + *ret = TAKE_PTR(our_env); + + return 0; +} + +static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **pass_env = NULL; + size_t n_env = 0; + + STRV_FOREACH(i, c->pass_environment) { + _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL; + char *v; + + v = getenv(*i); + if (!v) + continue; + x = strjoin(*i, "=", v); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env, n_env + 2)) + return -ENOMEM; + + pass_env[n_env++] = TAKE_PTR(x); + pass_env[n_env] = NULL; + } + + *ret = TAKE_PTR(pass_env); + + return 0; +} + +static int setup_private_users(uid_t ouid, gid_t ogid, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { + _cleanup_free_ char *uid_map = NULL, *gid_map = NULL; + _cleanup_close_pair_ int errno_pipe[2] = PIPE_EBADF; + _cleanup_close_ int unshare_ready_fd = -EBADF; + _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp) pid_t pid = 0; + uint64_t c = 1; + ssize_t n; + int r; + + /* Set up a user namespace and map the original UID/GID (IDs from before any user or group changes, i.e. + * the IDs from the user or system manager(s)) to itself, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to + * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which + * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process, + * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The + * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and + * continues execution normally. + * For unprivileged users (i.e. without capabilities), the root to root mapping is excluded. As such, it + * does not need CAP_SETUID to write the single line mapping to itself. */ + + /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETUID. */ + if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETUID) > 0 && uid != ouid && uid_is_valid(uid)) + r = asprintf(&uid_map, + UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n" /* Map $OUID → $OUID */ + UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */ + ouid, ouid, uid, uid); + else + r = asprintf(&uid_map, + UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $OUID → $OUID */ + ouid, ouid); + + if (r < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETGID. */ + if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETGID) > 0 && gid != ogid && gid_is_valid(gid)) + r = asprintf(&gid_map, + GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n" /* Map $OGID → $OGID */ + GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */ + ogid, ogid, gid, gid); + else + r = asprintf(&gid_map, + GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $OGID -> $OGID */ + ogid, ogid); + + if (r < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user + * namespace. */ + unshare_ready_fd = eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC); + if (unshare_ready_fd < 0) + return -errno; + + /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it + * failed. */ + if (pipe2(errno_pipe, O_CLOEXEC) < 0) + return -errno; + + r = safe_fork("(sd-userns)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS|FORK_DEATHSIG, &pid); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; + const char *a; + pid_t ppid; + + /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from + * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */ + + ppid = getppid(); + errno_pipe[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe[0]); + + /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */ + if (read(unshare_ready_fd, &c, sizeof(c)) < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto child_fail; + } + + /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */ + a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "setgroups"); + fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0) { + if (errno != ENOENT) { + r = -errno; + goto child_fail; + } + + /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */ + } else { + if (write(fd, "deny\n", 5) < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto child_fail; + } + + fd = safe_close(fd); + } + + /* First write the GID map */ + a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "gid_map"); + fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto child_fail; + } + if (write(fd, gid_map, strlen(gid_map)) < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto child_fail; + } + fd = safe_close(fd); + + /* The write the UID map */ + a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "uid_map"); + fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto child_fail; + } + if (write(fd, uid_map, strlen(uid_map)) < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto child_fail; + } + + _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); + + child_fail: + (void) write(errno_pipe[1], &r, sizeof(r)); + _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + + errno_pipe[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe[1]); + + if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) < 0) + return -errno; + + /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */ + if (write(unshare_ready_fd, &c, sizeof(c)) < 0) + return -errno; + + /* Try to read an error code from the child */ + n = read(errno_pipe[0], &r, sizeof(r)); + if (n < 0) + return -errno; + if (n == sizeof(r)) { /* an error code was sent to us */ + if (r < 0) + return r; + return -EIO; + } + if (n != 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */ + return -EIO; + + r = wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-userns)", TAKE_PID(pid), 0); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r != EXIT_SUCCESS) /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */ + return -EIO; + + return 0; +} + +static int create_many_symlinks(const char *root, const char *source, char **symlinks) { + _cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL; + int r; + + assert(source); + + src_abs = path_join(root, source); + if (!src_abs) + return -ENOMEM; + + STRV_FOREACH(dst, symlinks) { + _cleanup_free_ char *dst_abs = NULL; + + dst_abs = path_join(root, *dst); + if (!dst_abs) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = mkdir_parents_label(dst_abs, 0755); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = symlink_idempotent(src_abs, dst_abs, true); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int setup_exec_directory( + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + uid_t uid, + gid_t gid, + ExecDirectoryType type, + bool needs_mount_namespace, + int *exit_status) { + + static const int exit_status_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY, + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY, + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = EXIT_CACHE_DIRECTORY, + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = EXIT_LOGS_DIRECTORY, + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = EXIT_CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY, + }; + int r; + + assert(context); + assert(params); + assert(type >= 0 && type < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); + assert(exit_status); + + if (!params->prefix[type]) + return 0; + + if (params->flags & EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES) { + if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) + uid = 0; + if (!gid_is_valid(gid)) + gid = 0; + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[type].n_items; i++) { + _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *pp = NULL; + + p = path_join(params->prefix[type], context->directories[type].items[i].path); + if (!p) { + r = -ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + + r = mkdir_parents_label(p, 0755); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + + if (IN_SET(type, EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE, EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS) && params->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER) { + + /* If we are in user mode, and a configuration directory exists but a state directory + * doesn't exist, then we likely are upgrading from an older systemd version that + * didn't know the more recent addition to the xdg-basedir spec: the $XDG_STATE_HOME + * directory. In older systemd versions EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE was aliased to + * EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION, with the advent of $XDG_STATE_HOME is is now + * separated. If a service has both dirs configured but only the configuration dir + * exists and the state dir does not, we assume we are looking at an update + * situation. Hence, create a compatibility symlink, so that all expectations are + * met. + * + * (We also do something similar with the log directory, which still doesn't exist in + * the xdg basedir spec. We'll make it a subdir of the state dir.) */ + + /* this assumes the state dir is always created before the configuration dir */ + assert_cc(EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE < EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS); + assert_cc(EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS < EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION); + + r = laccess(p, F_OK); + if (r == -ENOENT) { + _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL; + + /* OK, we know that the state dir does not exist. Let's see if the dir exists + * under the configuration hierarchy. */ + + if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE) + q = path_join(params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION], context->directories[type].items[i].path); + else if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS) + q = path_join(params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION], "log", context->directories[type].items[i].path); + else + assert_not_reached(); + if (!q) { + r = -ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + + r = laccess(q, F_OK); + if (r >= 0) { + /* It does exist! This hence looks like an update. Symlink the + * configuration directory into the state directory. */ + + r = symlink_idempotent(q, p, /* make_relative= */ true); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + + log_exec_notice(context, params, "Unit state directory %s missing but matching configuration directory %s exists, assuming update from systemd 253 or older, creating compatibility symlink.", p, q); + continue; + } else if (r != -ENOENT) + log_exec_warning_errno(context, params, r, "Unable to detect whether unit configuration directory '%s' exists, assuming not: %m", q); + + } else if (r < 0) + log_exec_warning_errno(context, params, r, "Unable to detect whether unit state directory '%s' is missing, assuming it is: %m", p); + } + + if (exec_directory_is_private(context, type)) { + /* So, here's one extra complication when dealing with DynamicUser=1 units. In that + * case we want to avoid leaving a directory around fully accessible that is owned by + * a dynamic user whose UID is later on reused. To lock this down we use the same + * trick used by container managers to prohibit host users to get access to files of + * the same UID in containers: we place everything inside a directory that has an + * access mode of 0700 and is owned root:root, so that it acts as security boundary + * for unprivileged host code. We then use fs namespacing to make this directory + * permeable for the service itself. + * + * Specifically: for a service which wants a special directory "foo/" we first create + * a directory "private/" with access mode 0700 owned by root:root. Then we place + * "foo" inside of that directory (i.e. "private/foo/"), and make "foo" a symlink to + * "private/foo". This way, privileged host users can access "foo/" as usual, but + * unprivileged host users can't look into it. Inside of the namespace of the unit + * "private/" is replaced by a more liberally accessible tmpfs, into which the host's + * "private/foo/" is mounted under the same name, thus disabling the access boundary + * for the service and making sure it only gets access to the dirs it needs but no + * others. Tricky? Yes, absolutely, but it works! + * + * Note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION as that's assumed not + * to be owned by the service itself. + * + * Also, note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME as that's often used + * for sharing files or sockets with other services. */ + + pp = path_join(params->prefix[type], "private"); + if (!pp) { + r = -ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + + /* First set up private root if it doesn't exist yet, with access mode 0700 and owned by root:root */ + r = mkdir_safe_label(pp, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + + if (!path_extend(&pp, context->directories[type].items[i].path)) { + r = -ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + + /* Create all directories between the configured directory and this private root, and mark them 0755 */ + r = mkdir_parents_label(pp, 0755); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + + if (is_dir(p, false) > 0 && + (laccess(pp, F_OK) == -ENOENT)) { + + /* Hmm, the private directory doesn't exist yet, but the normal one exists? If so, move + * it over. Most likely the service has been upgraded from one that didn't use + * DynamicUser=1, to one that does. */ + + log_exec_info(context, + params, + "Found pre-existing public %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n" + "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned off, and has now turned it on.", + exec_directory_type_to_string(type), p, pp); + + r = RET_NERRNO(rename(p, pp)); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + } else { + /* Otherwise, create the actual directory for the service */ + + r = mkdir_label(pp, context->directories[type].mode); + if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) + goto fail; + } + + if (!context->directories[type].items[i].only_create) { + /* And link it up from the original place. + * Notes + * 1) If a mount namespace is going to be used, then this symlink remains on + * the host, and a new one for the child namespace will be created later. + * 2) It is not necessary to create this symlink when one of its parent + * directories is specified and already created. E.g. + * StateDirectory=foo foo/bar + * In that case, the inode points to pp and p for "foo/bar" are the same: + * pp = "/var/lib/private/foo/bar" + * p = "/var/lib/foo/bar" + * and, /var/lib/foo is a symlink to /var/lib/private/foo. So, not only + * we do not need to create the symlink, but we cannot create the symlink. + * See issue #24783. */ + r = symlink_idempotent(pp, p, true); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + } + + } else { + _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL; + + if (type != EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION && + readlink_and_make_absolute(p, &target) >= 0) { + _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL, *q_resolved = NULL, *target_resolved = NULL; + + /* This already exists and is a symlink? Interesting. Maybe it's one created + * by DynamicUser=1 (see above)? + * + * We do this for all directory types except for ConfigurationDirectory=, + * since they all support the private/ symlink logic at least in some + * configurations, see above. */ + + r = chase(target, NULL, 0, &target_resolved, NULL); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + + q = path_join(params->prefix[type], "private", context->directories[type].items[i].path); + if (!q) { + r = -ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + + /* /var/lib or friends may be symlinks. So, let's chase them also. */ + r = chase(q, NULL, CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &q_resolved, NULL); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + + if (path_equal(q_resolved, target_resolved)) { + + /* Hmm, apparently DynamicUser= was once turned on for this service, + * but is no longer. Let's move the directory back up. */ + + log_exec_info(context, + params, + "Found pre-existing private %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n" + "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned on, and has now turned it off.", + exec_directory_type_to_string(type), q, p); + + r = RET_NERRNO(unlink(p)); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + + r = RET_NERRNO(rename(q, p)); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + } + } + + r = mkdir_label(p, context->directories[type].mode); + if (r < 0) { + if (r != -EEXIST) + goto fail; + + if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) { + struct stat st; + + /* Don't change the owner/access mode of the configuration directory, + * as in the common case it is not written to by a service, and shall + * not be writable. */ + + r = RET_NERRNO(stat(p, &st)); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + + /* Still complain if the access mode doesn't match */ + if (((st.st_mode ^ context->directories[type].mode) & 07777) != 0) + log_exec_warning(context, + params, + "%s \'%s\' already exists but the mode is different. " + "(File system: %o %sMode: %o)", + exec_directory_type_to_string(type), context->directories[type].items[i].path, + st.st_mode & 07777, exec_directory_type_to_string(type), context->directories[type].mode & 07777); + + continue; + } + } + } + + /* Lock down the access mode (we use chmod_and_chown() to make this idempotent. We don't + * specify UID/GID here, so that path_chown_recursive() can optimize things depending on the + * current UID/GID ownership.) */ + r = chmod_and_chown(pp ?: p, context->directories[type].mode, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + + /* Skip the rest (which deals with ownership) in user mode, since ownership changes are not + * available to user code anyway */ + if (params->runtime_scope != RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM) + continue; + + /* Then, change the ownership of the whole tree, if necessary. When dynamic users are used we + * drop the suid/sgid bits, since we really don't want SUID/SGID files for dynamic UID/GID + * assignments to exist. */ + r = path_chown_recursive(pp ?: p, uid, gid, context->dynamic_user ? 01777 : 07777, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + } + + /* If we are not going to run in a namespace, set up the symlinks - otherwise + * they are set up later, to allow configuring empty var/run/etc. */ + if (!needs_mount_namespace) + for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[type].n_items; i++) { + r = create_many_symlinks(params->prefix[type], + context->directories[type].items[i].path, + context->directories[type].items[i].symlinks); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + } + + return 0; + +fail: + *exit_status = exit_status_table[type]; + return r; +} + +#if ENABLE_SMACK +static int setup_smack( + const ExecParameters *params, + const ExecContext *context, + int executable_fd) { + int r; + + assert(params); + assert(executable_fd >= 0); + + if (context->smack_process_label) { + r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if (params->fallback_smack_process_label) { + _cleanup_free_ char *exec_label = NULL; + + r = mac_smack_read_fd(executable_fd, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label); + if (r < 0 && !ERRNO_IS_XATTR_ABSENT(r)) + return r; + + r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label ?: params->fallback_smack_process_label); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif + +static int compile_bind_mounts( + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + BindMount **ret_bind_mounts, + size_t *ret_n_bind_mounts, + char ***ret_empty_directories) { + + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **empty_directories = NULL; + BindMount *bind_mounts = NULL; + size_t n, h = 0; + int r; + + assert(context); + assert(params); + assert(ret_bind_mounts); + assert(ret_n_bind_mounts); + assert(ret_empty_directories); + + CLEANUP_ARRAY(bind_mounts, h, bind_mount_free_many); + + n = context->n_bind_mounts; + for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { + if (!params->prefix[t]) + continue; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[t].n_items; i++) + n += !context->directories[t].items[i].only_create; + } + + if (n <= 0) { + *ret_bind_mounts = NULL; + *ret_n_bind_mounts = 0; + *ret_empty_directories = NULL; + return 0; + } + + bind_mounts = new(BindMount, n); + if (!bind_mounts) + return -ENOMEM; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < context->n_bind_mounts; i++) { + BindMount *item = context->bind_mounts + i; + _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL; + + s = strdup(item->source); + if (!s) + return -ENOMEM; + + d = strdup(item->destination); + if (!d) + return -ENOMEM; + + bind_mounts[h++] = (BindMount) { + .source = TAKE_PTR(s), + .destination = TAKE_PTR(d), + .read_only = item->read_only, + .recursive = item->recursive, + .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent, + }; + } + + for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { + if (!params->prefix[t]) + continue; + + if (context->directories[t].n_items == 0) + continue; + + if (exec_directory_is_private(context, t) && + !exec_context_with_rootfs(context)) { + char *private_root; + + /* So this is for a dynamic user, and we need to make sure the process can access its own + * directory. For that we overmount the usually inaccessible "private" subdirectory with a + * tmpfs that makes it accessible and is empty except for the submounts we do this for. */ + + private_root = path_join(params->prefix[t], "private"); + if (!private_root) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = strv_consume(&empty_directories, private_root); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[t].n_items; i++) { + _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL; + + /* When one of the parent directories is in the list, we cannot create the symlink + * for the child directory. See also the comments in setup_exec_directory(). */ + if (context->directories[t].items[i].only_create) + continue; + + if (exec_directory_is_private(context, t)) + s = path_join(params->prefix[t], "private", context->directories[t].items[i].path); + else + s = path_join(params->prefix[t], context->directories[t].items[i].path); + if (!s) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (exec_directory_is_private(context, t) && + exec_context_with_rootfs(context)) + /* When RootDirectory= or RootImage= are set, then the symbolic link to the private + * directory is not created on the root directory. So, let's bind-mount the directory + * on the 'non-private' place. */ + d = path_join(params->prefix[t], context->directories[t].items[i].path); + else + d = strdup(s); + if (!d) + return -ENOMEM; + + bind_mounts[h++] = (BindMount) { + .source = TAKE_PTR(s), + .destination = TAKE_PTR(d), + .read_only = false, + .nosuid = context->dynamic_user, /* don't allow suid/sgid when DynamicUser= is on */ + .recursive = true, + .ignore_enoent = false, + }; + } + } + + assert(h == n); + + *ret_bind_mounts = TAKE_PTR(bind_mounts); + *ret_n_bind_mounts = n; + *ret_empty_directories = TAKE_PTR(empty_directories); + + return (int) n; +} + +/* ret_symlinks will contain a list of pairs src:dest that describes + * the symlinks to create later on. For example, the symlinks needed + * to safely give private directories to DynamicUser=1 users. */ +static int compile_symlinks( + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + bool setup_os_release_symlink, + char ***ret_symlinks) { + + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **symlinks = NULL; + int r; + + assert(context); + assert(params); + assert(ret_symlinks); + + for (ExecDirectoryType dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[dt].n_items; i++) { + _cleanup_free_ char *private_path = NULL, *path = NULL; + + STRV_FOREACH(symlink, context->directories[dt].items[i].symlinks) { + _cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL, *dst_abs = NULL; + + src_abs = path_join(params->prefix[dt], context->directories[dt].items[i].path); + dst_abs = path_join(params->prefix[dt], *symlink); + if (!src_abs || !dst_abs) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = strv_consume_pair(&symlinks, TAKE_PTR(src_abs), TAKE_PTR(dst_abs)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (!exec_directory_is_private(context, dt) || + exec_context_with_rootfs(context) || + context->directories[dt].items[i].only_create) + continue; + + private_path = path_join(params->prefix[dt], "private", context->directories[dt].items[i].path); + if (!private_path) + return -ENOMEM; + + path = path_join(params->prefix[dt], context->directories[dt].items[i].path); + if (!path) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = strv_consume_pair(&symlinks, TAKE_PTR(private_path), TAKE_PTR(path)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + } + + /* We make the host's os-release available via a symlink, so that we can copy it atomically + * and readers will never get a half-written version. Note that, while the paths specified here are + * absolute, when they are processed in namespace.c they will be made relative automatically, i.e.: + * 'os-release -> .os-release-stage/os-release' is what will be created. */ + if (setup_os_release_symlink) { + r = strv_extend(&symlinks, "/run/host/.os-release-stage/os-release"); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = strv_extend(&symlinks, "/run/host/os-release"); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + *ret_symlinks = TAKE_PTR(symlinks); + + return 0; +} + +static bool insist_on_sandboxing( + const ExecContext *context, + const char *root_dir, + const char *root_image, + const BindMount *bind_mounts, + size_t n_bind_mounts) { + + assert(context); + assert(n_bind_mounts == 0 || bind_mounts); + + /* Checks whether we need to insist on fs namespacing. i.e. whether we have settings configured that + * would alter the view on the file system beyond making things read-only or invisible, i.e. would + * rearrange stuff in a way we cannot ignore gracefully. */ + + if (context->n_temporary_filesystems > 0) + return true; + + if (root_dir || root_image) + return true; + + if (context->n_mount_images > 0) + return true; + + if (context->dynamic_user) + return true; + + if (context->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(context->extension_directories)) + return true; + + /* If there are any bind mounts set that don't map back onto themselves, fs namespacing becomes + * essential. */ + for (size_t i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++) + if (!path_equal(bind_mounts[i].source, bind_mounts[i].destination)) + return true; + + if (context->log_namespace) + return true; + + return false; +} + +static int setup_ephemeral(const ExecContext *context, ExecRuntime *runtime) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; + int r; + + if (!runtime || !runtime->ephemeral_copy) + return 0; + + r = posix_lock(runtime->ephemeral_storage_socket[0], LOCK_EX); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to lock ephemeral storage socket: %m"); + + CLEANUP_POSIX_UNLOCK(runtime->ephemeral_storage_socket[0]); + + fd = receive_one_fd(runtime->ephemeral_storage_socket[0], MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT); + if (fd >= 0) + /* We got an fd! That means ephemeral has already been set up, so nothing to do here. */ + return 0; + + if (fd != -EAGAIN) + return log_debug_errno(fd, "Failed to receive file descriptor queued on ephemeral storage socket: %m"); + + log_debug("Making ephemeral snapshot of %s to %s", + context->root_image ?: context->root_directory, runtime->ephemeral_copy); + + if (context->root_image) + fd = copy_file(context->root_image, runtime->ephemeral_copy, O_EXCL, 0600, + COPY_LOCK_BSD|COPY_REFLINK|COPY_CRTIME); + else + fd = btrfs_subvol_snapshot_at(AT_FDCWD, context->root_directory, + AT_FDCWD, runtime->ephemeral_copy, + BTRFS_SNAPSHOT_FALLBACK_COPY | + BTRFS_SNAPSHOT_FALLBACK_DIRECTORY | + BTRFS_SNAPSHOT_RECURSIVE | + BTRFS_SNAPSHOT_LOCK_BSD); + if (fd < 0) + return log_debug_errno(fd, "Failed to snapshot %s to %s: %m", + context->root_image ?: context->root_directory, runtime->ephemeral_copy); + + if (context->root_image) { + /* A root image might be subject to lots of random writes so let's try to disable COW on it + * which tends to not perform well in combination with lots of random writes. + * + * Note: btrfs actually isn't impressed by us setting the flag after making the reflink'ed + * copy, but we at least want to make the intention clear. + */ + r = chattr_fd(fd, FS_NOCOW_FL, FS_NOCOW_FL, NULL); + if (r < 0) + log_debug_errno(fd, "Failed to disable copy-on-write for %s, ignoring: %m", runtime->ephemeral_copy); + } + + r = send_one_fd(runtime->ephemeral_storage_socket[1], fd, MSG_DONTWAIT); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to queue file descriptor on ephemeral storage socket: %m"); + + return 1; +} + +static int verity_settings_prepare( + VeritySettings *verity, + const char *root_image, + const void *root_hash, + size_t root_hash_size, + const char *root_hash_path, + const void *root_hash_sig, + size_t root_hash_sig_size, + const char *root_hash_sig_path, + const char *verity_data_path) { + + int r; + + assert(verity); + + if (root_hash) { + void *d; + + d = memdup(root_hash, root_hash_size); + if (!d) + return -ENOMEM; + + free_and_replace(verity->root_hash, d); + verity->root_hash_size = root_hash_size; + verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT; + } + + if (root_hash_sig) { + void *d; + + d = memdup(root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size); + if (!d) + return -ENOMEM; + + free_and_replace(verity->root_hash_sig, d); + verity->root_hash_sig_size = root_hash_sig_size; + verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT; + } + + if (verity_data_path) { + r = free_and_strdup(&verity->data_path, verity_data_path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + r = verity_settings_load( + verity, + root_image, + root_hash_path, + root_hash_sig_path); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to load root hash: %m"); + + return 0; +} + +static int apply_mount_namespace( + ExecCommandFlags command_flags, + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + ExecRuntime *runtime, + const char *memory_pressure_path, + char **error_path) { + + _cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT; + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **empty_directories = NULL, **symlinks = NULL, + **read_write_paths_cleanup = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *creds_path = NULL, *incoming_dir = NULL, *propagate_dir = NULL, + *extension_dir = NULL, *host_os_release_stage = NULL; + const char *root_dir = NULL, *root_image = NULL, *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL; + char **read_write_paths; + bool needs_sandboxing, setup_os_release_symlink; + BindMount *bind_mounts = NULL; + size_t n_bind_mounts = 0; + int r; + + assert(context); + + CLEANUP_ARRAY(bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, bind_mount_free_many); + + if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) { + r = setup_ephemeral(context, runtime); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (context->root_image) + root_image = (runtime ? runtime->ephemeral_copy : NULL) ?: context->root_image; + else + root_dir = (runtime ? runtime->ephemeral_copy : NULL) ?: context->root_directory; + } + + r = compile_bind_mounts(context, params, &bind_mounts, &n_bind_mounts, &empty_directories); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + /* We need to make the pressure path writable even if /sys/fs/cgroups is made read-only, as the + * service will need to write to it in order to start the notifications. */ + if (context->protect_control_groups && memory_pressure_path && !streq(memory_pressure_path, "/dev/null")) { + read_write_paths_cleanup = strv_copy(context->read_write_paths); + if (!read_write_paths_cleanup) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = strv_extend(&read_write_paths_cleanup, memory_pressure_path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + read_write_paths = read_write_paths_cleanup; + } else + read_write_paths = context->read_write_paths; + + needs_sandboxing = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command_flags & EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED); + if (needs_sandboxing) { + /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp, which is non-accessible + * to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp that is sticky, and that's the one we want to + * use here. This does not apply when we are using /run/systemd/empty as fallback. */ + + if (context->private_tmp && runtime && runtime->shared) { + if (streq_ptr(runtime->shared->tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY)) + tmp_dir = runtime->shared->tmp_dir; + else if (runtime->shared->tmp_dir) + tmp_dir = strjoina(runtime->shared->tmp_dir, "/tmp"); + + if (streq_ptr(runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY)) + var_tmp_dir = runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir; + else if (runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir) + var_tmp_dir = strjoina(runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp"); + } + } + + /* Symlinks (exec dirs, os-release) are set up after other mounts, before they are made read-only. */ + setup_os_release_symlink = needs_sandboxing && exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context) && (root_dir || root_image); + r = compile_symlinks(context, params, setup_os_release_symlink, &symlinks); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (context->mount_propagation_flag == MS_SHARED) + log_exec_debug(context, + params, + "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring"); + + if (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_WRITE_CREDENTIALS)) { + r = exec_context_get_credential_directory(context, params, params->unit_id, &creds_path); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (params->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM) { + propagate_dir = path_join("/run/systemd/propagate/", params->unit_id); + if (!propagate_dir) + return -ENOMEM; + + incoming_dir = strdup("/run/systemd/incoming"); + if (!incoming_dir) + return -ENOMEM; + + extension_dir = strdup("/run/systemd/unit-extensions"); + if (!extension_dir) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* If running under a different root filesystem, propagate the host's os-release. We make a + * copy rather than just bind mounting it, so that it can be updated on soft-reboot. */ + if (setup_os_release_symlink) { + host_os_release_stage = strdup("/run/systemd/propagate/.os-release-stage"); + if (!host_os_release_stage) + return -ENOMEM; + } + } else { + assert(params->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER); + + if (asprintf(&extension_dir, "/run/user/" UID_FMT "/systemd/unit-extensions", geteuid()) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (setup_os_release_symlink) { + if (asprintf(&host_os_release_stage, + "/run/user/" UID_FMT "/systemd/propagate/.os-release-stage", + geteuid()) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + } + } + + if (root_image) { + r = verity_settings_prepare( + &verity, + root_image, + context->root_hash, context->root_hash_size, context->root_hash_path, + context->root_hash_sig, context->root_hash_sig_size, context->root_hash_sig_path, + context->root_verity); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + NamespaceParameters parameters = { + .runtime_scope = params->runtime_scope, + + .root_directory = root_dir, + .root_image = root_image, + .root_image_options = context->root_image_options, + .root_image_policy = context->root_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service, + + .read_write_paths = read_write_paths, + .read_only_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->read_only_paths : NULL, + .inaccessible_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->inaccessible_paths : NULL, + + .exec_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->exec_paths : NULL, + .no_exec_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->no_exec_paths : NULL, + + .empty_directories = empty_directories, + .symlinks = symlinks, + + .bind_mounts = bind_mounts, + .n_bind_mounts = n_bind_mounts, + + .temporary_filesystems = context->temporary_filesystems, + .n_temporary_filesystems = context->n_temporary_filesystems, + + .mount_images = context->mount_images, + .n_mount_images = context->n_mount_images, + .mount_image_policy = context->mount_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service, + + .tmp_dir = tmp_dir, + .var_tmp_dir = var_tmp_dir, + + .creds_path = creds_path, + .log_namespace = context->log_namespace, + .mount_propagation_flag = context->mount_propagation_flag, + + .verity = &verity, + + .extension_images = context->extension_images, + .n_extension_images = context->n_extension_images, + .extension_image_policy = context->extension_image_policy ?: &image_policy_sysext, + .extension_directories = context->extension_directories, + + .propagate_dir = propagate_dir, + .incoming_dir = incoming_dir, + .extension_dir = extension_dir, + .notify_socket = root_dir || root_image ? params->notify_socket : NULL, + .host_os_release_stage = host_os_release_stage, + + /* If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed sandbox info, + * otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and fail if we are enable to apply the + * sandbox inside the mount namespace. */ + .ignore_protect_paths = !needs_sandboxing && !context->dynamic_user && root_dir, + + .protect_control_groups = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_control_groups, + .protect_kernel_tunables = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_kernel_tunables, + .protect_kernel_modules = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_kernel_modules, + .protect_kernel_logs = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_kernel_logs, + .protect_hostname = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_hostname, + + .private_dev = needs_sandboxing && context->private_devices, + .private_network = needs_sandboxing && exec_needs_network_namespace(context), + .private_ipc = needs_sandboxing && exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context), + + .mount_apivfs = needs_sandboxing && exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context), + + /* If NNP is on, we can turn on MS_NOSUID, since it won't have any effect anymore. */ + .mount_nosuid = needs_sandboxing && context->no_new_privileges && !mac_selinux_use(), + + .protect_home = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_home, + .protect_system = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_system, + .protect_proc = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_proc, + .proc_subset = needs_sandboxing && context->proc_subset, + }; + + r = setup_namespace(¶meters, error_path); + /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports + * that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceed, but only if exclusively + * sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a + * completely different execution environment. */ + if (r == -ENOANO) { + if (insist_on_sandboxing( + context, + root_dir, root_image, + bind_mounts, + n_bind_mounts)) + return log_exec_debug_errno(context, + params, + SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), + "Failed to set up namespace, and refusing to continue since " + "the selected namespacing options alter mount environment non-trivially.\n" + "Bind mounts: %zu, temporary filesystems: %zu, root directory: %s, root image: %s, dynamic user: %s", + n_bind_mounts, + context->n_temporary_filesystems, + yes_no(root_dir), + yes_no(root_image), + yes_no(context->dynamic_user)); + + log_exec_debug(context, params, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring."); + return 0; + } + + return r; +} + +static int apply_working_directory( + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + ExecRuntime *runtime, + const char *home, + int *exit_status) { + + const char *d, *wd; + + assert(context); + assert(exit_status); + + if (context->working_directory_home) { + + if (!home) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; + return -ENXIO; + } + + wd = home; + + } else + wd = empty_to_root(context->working_directory); + + if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) + d = wd; + else + d = prefix_roota((runtime ? runtime->ephemeral_copy : NULL) ?: context->root_directory, wd); + + if (chdir(d) < 0 && !context->working_directory_missing_ok) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; + return -errno; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int apply_root_directory( + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + ExecRuntime *runtime, + const bool needs_mount_ns, + int *exit_status) { + + assert(context); + assert(exit_status); + + if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) + if (!needs_mount_ns && context->root_directory) + if (chroot((runtime ? runtime->ephemeral_copy : NULL) ?: context->root_directory) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CHROOT; + return -errno; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int setup_keyring( + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *p, + uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { + + key_serial_t keyring; + int r = 0; + uid_t saved_uid; + gid_t saved_gid; + + assert(context); + assert(p); + + /* Let's set up a new per-service "session" kernel keyring for each system service. This has the benefit that + * each service runs with its own keyring shared among all processes of the service, but with no hook-up beyond + * that scope, and in particular no link to the per-UID keyring. If we don't do this the keyring will be + * automatically created on-demand and then linked to the per-UID keyring, by the kernel. The kernel's built-in + * on-demand behaviour is very appropriate for login users, but probably not so much for system services, where + * UIDs are not necessarily specific to a service but reused (at least in the case of UID 0). */ + + if (context->keyring_mode == EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT) + return 0; + + /* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things set up + * properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that sucks for parallel + * execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too. Setting up session keyring, to be owned by the right user + * & group is just as nasty as acquiring a reference to the user keyring. */ + + saved_uid = getuid(); + saved_gid = getgid(); + + if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) { + if (setregid(gid, -1) < 0) + return log_exec_error_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m"); + } + + if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) { + if (setreuid(uid, -1) < 0) { + r = log_exec_error_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m"); + goto out; + } + } + + keyring = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0, 0, 0); + if (keyring == -1) { + if (errno == ENOSYS) + log_exec_debug_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring."); + else if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno)) + log_exec_debug_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring."); + else if (errno == EDQUOT) + log_exec_debug_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring."); + else + r = log_exec_error_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m"); + + goto out; + } + + /* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */ + if (context->keyring_mode == EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED) { + + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK, + KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, + KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0) < 0) { + r = log_exec_error_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m"); + goto out; + } + } + + /* Restore uid/gid back */ + if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) { + if (setreuid(saved_uid, -1) < 0) { + r = log_exec_error_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m"); + goto out; + } + } + + if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) { + if (setregid(saved_gid, -1) < 0) + return log_exec_error_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m"); + } + + /* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */ + if (!sd_id128_is_null(p->invocation_id)) { + key_serial_t key; + + key = add_key("user", + "invocation_id", + &p->invocation_id, + sizeof(p->invocation_id), + KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING); + if (key == -1) + log_exec_debug_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m"); + else { + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, key, + KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_READ|KEY_POS_SEARCH| + KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_READ|KEY_USR_SEARCH, 0, 0) < 0) + r = log_exec_error_errno(context, + p, + errno, + "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m"); + } + } + +out: + /* Revert back uid & gid for the last time, and exit */ + /* no extra logging, as only the first already reported error matters */ + if (getuid() != saved_uid) + (void) setreuid(saved_uid, -1); + + if (getgid() != saved_gid) + (void) setregid(saved_gid, -1); + + return r; +} + +static void append_socket_pair(int *array, size_t *n, const int pair[static 2]) { + assert(array); + assert(n); + assert(pair); + + if (pair[0] >= 0) + array[(*n)++] = pair[0]; + if (pair[1] >= 0) + array[(*n)++] = pair[1]; +} + +static int close_remaining_fds( + const ExecParameters *params, + const ExecRuntime *runtime, + int socket_fd, + const int *fds, size_t n_fds) { + + size_t n_dont_close = 0; + int dont_close[n_fds + 14]; + + assert(params); + + if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdin_fd; + if (params->stdout_fd >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdout_fd; + if (params->stderr_fd >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stderr_fd; + + if (socket_fd >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = socket_fd; + if (n_fds > 0) { + memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds); + n_dont_close += n_fds; + } + + if (runtime) + append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->ephemeral_storage_socket); + + if (runtime && runtime->shared) { + append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket); + append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket); + } + + if (runtime && runtime->dynamic_creds) { + if (runtime->dynamic_creds->user) + append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->dynamic_creds->user->storage_socket); + if (runtime->dynamic_creds->group) + append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->dynamic_creds->group->storage_socket); + } + + if (params->user_lookup_fd >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->user_lookup_fd; + + return close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close); +} + +static int send_user_lookup( + const char *unit_id, + int user_lookup_fd, + uid_t uid, + gid_t gid) { + + assert(unit_id); + + /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID + * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was + * specified. */ + + if (user_lookup_fd < 0) + return 0; + + if (!uid_is_valid(uid) && !gid_is_valid(gid)) + return 0; + + if (writev(user_lookup_fd, + (struct iovec[]) { + IOVEC_MAKE(&uid, sizeof(uid)), + IOVEC_MAKE(&gid, sizeof(gid)), + IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(unit_id) }, 3) < 0) + return -errno; + + return 0; +} + +static int acquire_home(const ExecContext *c, uid_t uid, const char** home, char **buf) { + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(home); + assert(buf); + + /* If WorkingDirectory=~ is set, try to acquire a usable home directory. */ + + if (*home) + return 0; + + if (!c->working_directory_home) + return 0; + + r = get_home_dir(buf); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + *home = *buf; + return 1; +} + +static int compile_suggested_paths(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, char ***ret) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char ** list = NULL; + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(p); + assert(ret); + + assert(c->dynamic_user); + + /* Compile a list of paths that it might make sense to read the owning UID from to use as initial candidate for + * dynamic UID allocation, in order to save us from doing costly recursive chown()s of the special + * directories. */ + + for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { + if (t == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) + continue; + + if (!p->prefix[t]) + continue; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[t].n_items; i++) { + char *e; + + if (exec_directory_is_private(c, t)) + e = path_join(p->prefix[t], "private", c->directories[t].items[i].path); + else + e = path_join(p->prefix[t], c->directories[t].items[i].path); + if (!e) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = strv_consume(&list, e); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + } + + *ret = TAKE_PTR(list); + + return 0; +} + +static int exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext *c, CPUSet *ret) { + _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset) CPUSet s = {}; + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(ret); + + if (!c->numa_policy.nodes.set) { + log_debug("Can't derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask because NUMA mask is not set, ignoring"); + return 0; + } + + r = numa_to_cpu_set(&c->numa_policy, &s); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + cpu_set_reset(ret); + + return cpu_set_add_all(ret, &s); +} + +static int add_shifted_fd(int *fds, size_t fds_size, size_t *n_fds, int fd, int *ret_fd) { + int r; + + assert(fds); + assert(n_fds); + assert(*n_fds < fds_size); + assert(ret_fd); + + if (fd < 0) { + *ret_fd = -EBADF; + return 0; + } + + if (fd < 3 + (int) *n_fds) { + /* Let's move the fd up, so that it's outside of the fd range we will use to store + * the fds we pass to the process (or which are closed only during execve). */ + + r = fcntl(fd, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, 3 + (int) *n_fds); + if (r < 0) + return -errno; + + close_and_replace(fd, r); + } + + *ret_fd = fds[*n_fds] = fd; + (*n_fds) ++; + return 1; +} + +static int connect_unix_harder(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, const OpenFile *of, int ofd) { + union sockaddr_union addr = { + .un.sun_family = AF_UNIX, + }; + socklen_t sa_len; + static const int socket_types[] = { SOCK_DGRAM, SOCK_STREAM, SOCK_SEQPACKET }; + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(p); + assert(of); + assert(ofd >= 0); + + r = sockaddr_un_set_path(&addr.un, FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(ofd)); + if (r < 0) + return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, r, "Failed to set sockaddr for %s: %m", of->path); + + sa_len = r; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(socket_types); i++) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; + + fd = socket(AF_UNIX, socket_types[i] | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0); + if (fd < 0) + return log_exec_error_errno(c, + p, + errno, + "Failed to create socket for %s: %m", + of->path); + + r = RET_NERRNO(connect(fd, &addr.sa, sa_len)); + if (r == -EPROTOTYPE) + continue; + if (r < 0) + return log_exec_error_errno(c, + p, + r, + "Failed to connect socket for %s: %m", + of->path); + + return TAKE_FD(fd); + } + + return log_exec_error_errno(c, + p, + SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPROTOTYPE), "Failed to connect socket for \"%s\".", + of->path); +} + +static int get_open_file_fd(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, const OpenFile *of) { + struct stat st; + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF, ofd = -EBADF; + + assert(c); + assert(p); + assert(of); + + ofd = open(of->path, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); + if (ofd < 0) + return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, errno, "Could not open \"%s\": %m", of->path); + + if (fstat(ofd, &st) < 0) + return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, errno, "Failed to stat %s: %m", of->path); + + if (S_ISSOCK(st.st_mode)) { + fd = connect_unix_harder(c, p, of, ofd); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_READ_ONLY) && shutdown(fd, SHUT_WR) < 0) + return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, errno, "Failed to shutdown send for socket %s: %m", + of->path); + + log_exec_debug(c, p, "socket %s opened (fd=%d)", of->path, fd); + } else { + int flags = FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR; + if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_APPEND)) + flags |= O_APPEND; + else if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_TRUNCATE)) + flags |= O_TRUNC; + + fd = fd_reopen(ofd, flags | O_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0) + return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, fd, "Failed to open file %s: %m", of->path); + + log_exec_debug(c, p, "file %s opened (fd=%d)", of->path, fd); + } + + return TAKE_FD(fd); +} + +static int collect_open_file_fds( + const ExecContext *c, + const ExecParameters *p, + int **fds, + char ***fdnames, + size_t *n_fds) { + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(p); + assert(fds); + assert(fdnames); + assert(n_fds); + + LIST_FOREACH(open_files, of, p->open_files) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; + + fd = get_open_file_fd(c, p, of); + if (fd < 0) { + if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_GRACEFUL)) { + log_exec_debug_errno(c, p, fd, "Failed to get OpenFile= file descriptor for %s, ignoring: %m", of->path); + continue; + } + + return fd; + } + + if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(*fds, *n_fds + 1)) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = strv_extend(fdnames, of->fdname); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + (*fds)[*n_fds] = TAKE_FD(fd); + + (*n_fds)++; + } + + return 0; +} + +static void log_command_line( + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + const char *msg, + const char *executable, + char **argv) { + + assert(context); + assert(params); + assert(msg); + assert(executable); + + if (!DEBUG_LOGGING) + return; + + _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = quote_command_line(argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY); + + log_exec_struct(context, params, LOG_DEBUG, + "EXECUTABLE=%s", executable, + LOG_EXEC_MESSAGE(params, "%s: %s", msg, strnull(cmdline)), + LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID(params)); +} + +static bool exec_context_need_unprivileged_private_users( + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params) { + + assert(context); + assert(params); + + /* These options require PrivateUsers= when used in user units, as we need to be in a user namespace + * to have permission to enable them when not running as root. If we have effective CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * (system manager) then we have privileges and don't need this. */ + if (params->runtime_scope != RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER) + return false; + + return context->private_users || + context->private_tmp || + context->private_devices || + context->private_network || + context->network_namespace_path || + context->private_ipc || + context->ipc_namespace_path || + context->private_mounts > 0 || + context->mount_apivfs || + context->n_bind_mounts > 0 || + context->n_temporary_filesystems > 0 || + context->root_directory || + !strv_isempty(context->extension_directories) || + context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO || + context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO || + context->protect_kernel_tunables || + context->protect_kernel_modules || + context->protect_kernel_logs || + context->protect_control_groups || + context->protect_clock || + context->protect_hostname || + !strv_isempty(context->read_write_paths) || + !strv_isempty(context->read_only_paths) || + !strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_paths) || + !strv_isempty(context->exec_paths) || + !strv_isempty(context->no_exec_paths); +} + +static bool exec_context_shall_confirm_spawn(const ExecContext *context) { + assert(context); + + if (confirm_spawn_disabled()) + return false; + + /* For some reasons units remaining in the same process group + * as PID 1 fail to acquire the console even if it's not used + * by any process. So skip the confirmation question for them. */ + return !context->same_pgrp; +} + +static int exec_context_named_iofds( + const ExecContext *c, + const ExecParameters *p, + int named_iofds[static 3]) { + + size_t targets; + const char* stdio_fdname[3]; + size_t n_fds; + + assert(c); + assert(p); + assert(named_iofds); + + targets = (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD) + + (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) + + (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; i++) + stdio_fdname[i] = exec_context_fdname(c, i); + + n_fds = p->n_storage_fds + p->n_socket_fds; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < n_fds && targets > 0; i++) + if (named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] < 0 && + c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD && + stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO] && + streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO])) { + + named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] = p->fds[i]; + targets--; + + } else if (named_iofds[STDOUT_FILENO] < 0 && + c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD && + stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO] && + streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO])) { + + named_iofds[STDOUT_FILENO] = p->fds[i]; + targets--; + + } else if (named_iofds[STDERR_FILENO] < 0 && + c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD && + stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO] && + streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO])) { + + named_iofds[STDERR_FILENO] = p->fds[i]; + targets--; + } + + return targets == 0 ? 0 : -ENOENT; +} + +int exec_invoke( + const ExecCommand *command, + const ExecContext *context, + ExecParameters *params, + ExecRuntime *runtime, + const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, + int *exit_status) { + + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pass_env = NULL, **joined_exec_search_path = NULL, **accum_env = NULL, **replaced_argv = NULL; + int r, ngids = 0, exec_fd; + _cleanup_free_ gid_t *supplementary_gids = NULL; + const char *username = NULL, *groupname = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *home_buffer = NULL, *memory_pressure_path = NULL; + const char *home = NULL, *shell = NULL; + char **final_argv = NULL; + dev_t journal_stream_dev = 0; + ino_t journal_stream_ino = 0; + bool userns_set_up = false; + bool needs_sandboxing, /* Do we need to set up full sandboxing? (i.e. all namespacing, all MAC stuff, caps, yadda yadda */ + needs_setuid, /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */ + needs_mount_namespace, /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */ + needs_ambient_hack; /* Do we need to apply the ambient capabilities hack? */ +#if HAVE_SELINUX + _cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL; + bool use_selinux = false; +#endif +#if ENABLE_SMACK + bool use_smack = false; +#endif +#if HAVE_APPARMOR + bool use_apparmor = false; +#endif + uid_t saved_uid = getuid(); + gid_t saved_gid = getgid(); + uid_t uid = UID_INVALID; + gid_t gid = GID_INVALID; + size_t n_fds, /* fds to pass to the child */ + n_keep_fds; /* total number of fds not to close */ + int secure_bits; + _cleanup_free_ gid_t *gids_after_pam = NULL; + int ngids_after_pam = 0; + _cleanup_free_ int *fds = NULL; + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **fdnames = NULL; + + int socket_fd = -EBADF, named_iofds[3] = { -EBADF, -EBADF, -EBADF }, *params_fds = NULL; + size_t n_storage_fds = 0, n_socket_fds = 0; + + assert(command); + assert(context); + assert(params); + assert(exit_status); + + /* Explicitly test for CVE-2021-4034 inspired invocations */ + assert(command->path); + assert(!strv_isempty(command->argv)); + + LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_EXEC(context, params); + + if (context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET || + context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET || + context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) { + + if (params->n_socket_fds > 1) + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got more than one socket."); + + if (params->n_socket_fds == 0) + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got no socket."); + + socket_fd = params->fds[0]; + } else { + params_fds = params->fds; + n_socket_fds = params->n_socket_fds; + n_storage_fds = params->n_storage_fds; + } + n_fds = n_socket_fds + n_storage_fds; + + r = exec_context_named_iofds(context, params, named_iofds); + if (r < 0) + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m"); + + rename_process_from_path(command->path); + + /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main + * daemon. All others we leave untouched because we set them to SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, + * both of which will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */ + (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER, + SIGNALS_IGNORE); + + if (context->ignore_sigpipe) + (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE); + + r = reset_signal_mask(); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m"); + } + + if (params->idle_pipe) + do_idle_pipe_dance(params->idle_pipe); + + /* Close fds we don't need very early to make sure we don't block init reexecution because it cannot bind its + * sockets. Among the fds we close are the logging fds, and we want to keep them closed, so that we don't have + * any fds open we don't really want open during the transition. In order to make logging work, we switch the + * log subsystem into open_when_needed mode, so that it reopens the logs on every single log call. */ + + log_forget_fds(); + log_set_open_when_needed(true); + log_settle_target(); + if (context->log_level_max >= 0) + log_set_max_level(context->log_level_max); + + /* In case anything used libc syslog(), close this here, too */ + closelog(); + + fds = newdup(int, params_fds, n_fds); + if (!fds) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_oom(); + } + + fdnames = strv_copy((char**) params->fd_names); + if (!fdnames) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_oom(); + } + + r = collect_open_file_fds(context, params, &fds, &fdnames, &n_fds); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to get OpenFile= file descriptors: %m"); + } + + int keep_fds[n_fds + 3]; + memcpy_safe(keep_fds, fds, n_fds * sizeof(int)); + n_keep_fds = n_fds; + + r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, params->exec_fd, &exec_fd); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); + } + +#if HAVE_LIBBPF + if (params->bpf_outer_map_fd >= 0) { + r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, params->bpf_outer_map_fd, (int *)¶ms->bpf_outer_map_fd); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); + } + } +#endif + + r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, socket_fd, keep_fds, n_keep_fds); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m"); + } + + if (!context->same_pgrp && + setsid() < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SETSID; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to create new process session: %m"); + } + + exec_context_tty_reset(context, params); + + if (params->shall_confirm_spawn && exec_context_shall_confirm_spawn(context)) { + _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = NULL; + + cmdline = quote_command_line(command->argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY); + if (!cmdline) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_oom(); + } + + r = ask_for_confirmation(context, params, cmdline); + if (r != CONFIRM_EXECUTE) { + if (r == CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS; + return 0; + } + + *exit_status = EXIT_CONFIRM; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ECANCELED), + "Execution cancelled by the user"); + } + } + + /* We are about to invoke NSS and PAM modules. Let's tell them what we are doing here, maybe they care. This is + * used by nss-resolve to disable itself when we are about to start systemd-resolved, to avoid deadlocks. Note + * that these env vars do not survive the execve(), which means they really only apply to the PAM and NSS + * invocations themselves. Also note that while we'll only invoke NSS modules involved in user management they + * might internally call into other NSS modules that are involved in hostname resolution, we never know. */ + if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", params->unit_id, true) != 0 || + setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_SCOPE", runtime_scope_to_string(params->runtime_scope), true) != 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m"); + } + + if (context->dynamic_user && runtime && runtime->dynamic_creds) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **suggested_paths = NULL; + + /* On top of that, make sure we bypass our own NSS module nss-systemd comprehensively for any NSS + * checks, if DynamicUser=1 is used, as we shouldn't create a feedback loop with ourselves here. */ + if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_USER; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m"); + } + + r = compile_suggested_paths(context, params, &suggested_paths); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_oom(); + } + + r = dynamic_creds_realize(runtime->dynamic_creds, suggested_paths, &uid, &gid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_USER; + if (r == -EILSEQ) + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), + "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: User or group with specified name already exists."); + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m"); + } + + if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) { + *exit_status = EXIT_USER; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH), "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT"\"", uid); + } + + if (!gid_is_valid(gid)) { + *exit_status = EXIT_USER; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH), "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT"\"", gid); + } + + if (runtime->dynamic_creds->user) + username = runtime->dynamic_creds->user->name; + + } else { + if (context->user) { + r = get_fixed_user(context->user, &username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_USER; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m"); + } + } + + if (context->group) { + r = get_fixed_group(context->group, &groupname, &gid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m"); + } + } + } + + /* Initialize user supplementary groups and get SupplementaryGroups= ones */ + r = get_supplementary_groups(context, username, groupname, gid, + &supplementary_gids, &ngids); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m"); + } + + r = send_user_lookup(params->unit_id, params->user_lookup_fd, uid, gid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_USER; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m"); + } + + params->user_lookup_fd = safe_close(params->user_lookup_fd); + + r = acquire_home(context, uid, &home, &home_buffer); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m"); + } + + /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we must drop O_NONBLOCK */ + if (socket_fd >= 0) + (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd, false); + + /* Journald will try to look-up our cgroup in order to populate _SYSTEMD_CGROUP and _SYSTEMD_UNIT fields. + * Hence we need to migrate to the target cgroup from init.scope before connecting to journald */ + if (params->cgroup_path) { + _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; + + r = exec_params_get_cgroup_path(params, cgroup_context, &p); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m"); + } + + r = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, p, 0, NULL, NULL); + if (r == -EUCLEAN) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to attach process to cgroup %s " + "because the cgroup or one of its parents or " + "siblings is in the threaded mode: %m", p); + } + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p); + } + } + + if (context->network_namespace_path && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { + r = open_shareable_ns_path(runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket, context->network_namespace_path, CLONE_NEWNET); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to open network namespace path %s: %m", context->network_namespace_path); + } + } + + if (context->ipc_namespace_path && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { + r = open_shareable_ns_path(runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket, context->ipc_namespace_path, CLONE_NEWIPC); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to open IPC namespace path %s: %m", context->ipc_namespace_path); + } + } + + r = setup_input(context, params, socket_fd, named_iofds); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up standard input: %m"); + } + + r = setup_output(context, params, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_STDOUT; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up standard output: %m"); + } + + r = setup_output(context, params, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_STDERR; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m"); + } + + if (context->oom_score_adjust_set) { + /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then let's silently skip over it. User + * namespaces prohibit write access to this file, and we shouldn't trip up over that. */ + r = set_oom_score_adjust(context->oom_score_adjust); + if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) + log_exec_debug_errno(context, params, r, + "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m"); + else if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_OOM_ADJUST; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m"); + } + } + + if (context->coredump_filter_set) { + r = set_coredump_filter(context->coredump_filter); + if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) + log_exec_debug_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter, ignoring: %m"); + else if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter: %m"); + } + } + + if (context->nice_set) { + r = setpriority_closest(context->nice); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_NICE; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m"); + } + } + + if (context->cpu_sched_set) { + struct sched_param param = { + .sched_priority = context->cpu_sched_priority, + }; + + r = sched_setscheduler(0, + context->cpu_sched_policy | + (context->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork ? + SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK : 0), + ¶m); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SETSCHEDULER; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m"); + } + } + + if (context->cpu_affinity_from_numa || context->cpu_set.set) { + _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset) CPUSet converted_cpu_set = {}; + const CPUSet *cpu_set; + + if (context->cpu_affinity_from_numa) { + r = exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(context, &converted_cpu_set); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask: %m"); + } + + cpu_set = &converted_cpu_set; + } else + cpu_set = &context->cpu_set; + + if (sched_setaffinity(0, cpu_set->allocated, cpu_set->set) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m"); + } + } + + if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&context->numa_policy))) { + r = apply_numa_policy(&context->numa_policy); + if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) + log_exec_debug_errno(context, params, r, "NUMA support not available, ignoring."); + else if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_NUMA_POLICY; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set NUMA memory policy: %m"); + } + } + + if (context->ioprio_set) + if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, context->ioprio) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_IOPRIO; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m"); + } + + if (context->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) + if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, context->timer_slack_nsec) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_TIMERSLACK; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m"); + } + + if (context->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID) { + r = safe_personality(context->personality); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_PERSONALITY; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m"); + } + } + + if (context->utmp_id) { + const char *line = context->tty_path ? + (path_startswith(context->tty_path, "/dev/") ?: context->tty_path) : + NULL; + utmp_put_init_process(context->utmp_id, getpid_cached(), getsid(0), + line, + context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_INIT ? INIT_PROCESS : + context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN ? LOGIN_PROCESS : + USER_PROCESS, + username); + } + + if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { + r = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m"); + } + } + + if (params->cgroup_path) { + /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup to the user of the new process. On cgroup v1 + * this is only about systemd's own hierarchy, i.e. not the controller hierarchies, simply because that's not + * safe. On cgroup v2 there's only one hierarchy anyway, and delegation is safe there, hence in that case only + * touch a single hierarchy too. */ + + if (params->flags & EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE) { + _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; + + r = cg_set_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, uid, gid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m"); + } + + r = exec_params_get_cgroup_path(params, cgroup_context, &p); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m"); + } + if (r > 0) { + r = cg_set_access_recursive(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, p, uid, gid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust control subgroup access: %m"); + } + } + } + + if (cgroup_context && cg_unified() > 0 && is_pressure_supported() > 0) { + if (cgroup_context_want_memory_pressure(cgroup_context)) { + r = cg_get_path("memory", params->cgroup_path, "memory.pressure", &memory_pressure_path); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_oom(); + } + + r = chmod_and_chown(memory_pressure_path, 0644, uid, gid); + if (r < 0) { + log_exec_full_errno(context, params, r == -ENOENT || ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r) ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, r, + "Failed to adjust ownership of '%s', ignoring: %m", memory_pressure_path); + memory_pressure_path = mfree(memory_pressure_path); + } + } else if (cgroup_context->memory_pressure_watch == CGROUP_PRESSURE_WATCH_OFF) { + memory_pressure_path = strdup("/dev/null"); /* /dev/null is explicit indicator for turning of memory pressure watch */ + if (!memory_pressure_path) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_oom(); + } + } + } + } + + needs_mount_namespace = exec_needs_mount_namespace(context, params, runtime); + + for (ExecDirectoryType dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { + r = setup_exec_directory(context, params, uid, gid, dt, needs_mount_namespace, exit_status); + if (r < 0) + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params->prefix[dt]); + } + + if (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_WRITE_CREDENTIALS)) { + r = exec_setup_credentials(context, params, params->unit_id, uid, gid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CREDENTIALS; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up credentials: %m"); + } + } + + r = build_environment( + context, + params, + cgroup_context, + n_fds, + fdnames, + home, + username, + shell, + journal_stream_dev, + journal_stream_ino, + memory_pressure_path, + &our_env); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_oom(); + } + + r = build_pass_environment(context, &pass_env); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_oom(); + } + + /* The $PATH variable is set to the default path in params->environment. However, this is overridden + * if user-specified fields have $PATH set. The intention is to also override $PATH if the unit does + * not specify PATH but the unit has ExecSearchPath. */ + if (!strv_isempty(context->exec_search_path)) { + _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL; + + joined = strv_join(context->exec_search_path, ":"); + if (!joined) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_oom(); + } + + r = strv_env_assign(&joined_exec_search_path, "PATH", joined); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_oom(); + } + } + + accum_env = strv_env_merge(params->environment, + our_env, + joined_exec_search_path, + pass_env, + context->environment, + params->files_env); + if (!accum_env) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_oom(); + } + accum_env = strv_env_clean(accum_env); + + (void) umask(context->umask); + + r = setup_keyring(context, params, uid, gid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_KEYRING; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m"); + } + + /* We need sandboxing if the caller asked us to apply it and the command isn't explicitly excepted + * from it. */ + needs_sandboxing = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED); + + /* We need the ambient capability hack, if the caller asked us to apply it and the command is marked + * for it, and the kernel doesn't actually support ambient caps. */ + needs_ambient_hack = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && (command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC) && !ambient_capabilities_supported(); + + /* We need setresuid() if the caller asked us to apply sandboxing and the command isn't explicitly + * excepted from either whole sandboxing or just setresuid() itself, and the ambient hack is not + * desired. */ + if (needs_ambient_hack) + needs_setuid = false; + else + needs_setuid = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command->flags & (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID)); + + uint64_t capability_ambient_set = context->capability_ambient_set; + + if (needs_sandboxing) { + /* MAC enablement checks need to be done before a new mount ns is created, as they rely on + * /sys being present. The actual MAC context application will happen later, as late as + * possible, to avoid impacting our own code paths. */ + +#if HAVE_SELINUX + use_selinux = mac_selinux_use(); +#endif +#if ENABLE_SMACK + use_smack = mac_smack_use(); +#endif +#if HAVE_APPARMOR + use_apparmor = mac_apparmor_use(); +#endif + } + + if (needs_sandboxing) { + int which_failed; + + /* Let's set the resource limits before we call into PAM, so that pam_limits wins over what + * is set here. (See below.) */ + + r = setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit* const *) context->rlimit, &which_failed); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed)); + } + } + + if (needs_setuid && context->pam_name && username) { + /* Let's call into PAM after we set up our own idea of resource limits to that pam_limits + * wins here. (See above.) */ + + /* All fds passed in the fds array will be closed in the pam child process. */ + r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, gid, context->tty_path, &accum_env, fds, n_fds); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_PAM; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m"); + } + + if (ambient_capabilities_supported()) { + uint64_t ambient_after_pam; + + /* PAM modules might have set some ambient caps. Query them here and merge them into + * the caps we want to set in the end, so that we don't end up unsetting them. */ + r = capability_get_ambient(&ambient_after_pam); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to query ambient caps: %m"); + } + + capability_ambient_set |= ambient_after_pam; + } + + ngids_after_pam = getgroups_alloc(&gids_after_pam); + if (ngids_after_pam < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, ngids_after_pam, "Failed to obtain groups after setting up PAM: %m"); + } + } + + if (needs_sandboxing && exec_context_need_unprivileged_private_users(context, params)) { + /* If we're unprivileged, set up the user namespace first to enable use of the other namespaces. + * Users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can set up user namespaces last because they will be able to + * set up the all of the other namespaces (i.e. network, mount, UTS) without a user namespace. */ + + r = setup_private_users(saved_uid, saved_gid, uid, gid); + /* If it was requested explicitly and we can't set it up, fail early. Otherwise, continue and let + * the actual requested operations fail (or silently continue). */ + if (r < 0 && context->private_users) { + *exit_status = EXIT_USER; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user: %m"); + } + if (r < 0) + log_exec_info_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user, ignoring: %m"); + else + userns_set_up = true; + } + + if (exec_needs_network_namespace(context) && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { + + /* Try to enable network namespacing if network namespacing is available and we have + * CAP_NET_ADMIN. We need CAP_NET_ADMIN to be able to configure the loopback device in the + * new network namespace. And if we don't have that, then we could only create a network + * namespace without the ability to set up "lo". Hence gracefully skip things then. */ + if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_NET) && have_effective_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN) > 0) { + r = setup_shareable_ns(runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket, CLONE_NEWNET); + if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) + log_exec_notice_errno(context, params, r, + "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but network namespace setup not permitted, proceeding without: %m"); + else if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m"); + } + } else if (context->network_namespace_path) { + *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), + "NetworkNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing."); + } else + log_exec_notice(context, params, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support or we lack privileges for network namespace, proceeding without."); + } + + if (exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context) && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { + + if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_IPC)) { + r = setup_shareable_ns(runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket, CLONE_NEWIPC); + if (r == -EPERM) + log_exec_warning_errno(context, params, r, + "PrivateIPC=yes is configured, but IPC namespace setup failed, ignoring: %m"); + else if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up IPC namespacing: %m"); + } + } else if (context->ipc_namespace_path) { + *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), + "IPCNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing."); + } else + log_exec_warning(context, params, "PrivateIPC=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support IPC namespaces, ignoring."); + } + + if (needs_mount_namespace) { + _cleanup_free_ char *error_path = NULL; + + r = apply_mount_namespace(command->flags, context, params, runtime, memory_pressure_path, &error_path); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up mount namespacing%s%s: %m", + error_path ? ": " : "", strempty(error_path)); + } + } + + if (needs_sandboxing) { + r = apply_protect_hostname(context, params, exit_status); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (context->memory_ksm >= 0) + if (prctl(PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE, context->memory_ksm) < 0) { + if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno)) + log_exec_debug_errno(context, + params, + errno, + "KSM support not available, ignoring."); + else { + *exit_status = EXIT_KSM; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set KSM: %m"); + } + } + + /* Drop groups as early as possible. + * This needs to be done after PrivateDevices=y setup as device nodes should be owned by the host's root. + * For non-root in a userns, devices will be owned by the user/group before the group change, and nobody. */ + if (needs_setuid) { + _cleanup_free_ gid_t *gids_to_enforce = NULL; + int ngids_to_enforce = 0; + + ngids_to_enforce = merge_gid_lists(supplementary_gids, + ngids, + gids_after_pam, + ngids_after_pam, + &gids_to_enforce); + if (ngids_to_enforce < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, + ngids_to_enforce, + "Failed to merge group lists. Group membership might be incorrect: %m"); + } + + r = enforce_groups(gid, gids_to_enforce, ngids_to_enforce); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Changing group credentials failed: %m"); + } + } + + /* If the user namespace was not set up above, try to do it now. + * It's preferred to set up the user namespace later (after all other namespaces) so as not to be + * restricted by rules pertaining to combining user namespaces with other namespaces (e.g. in the + * case of mount namespaces being less privileged when the mount point list is copied from a + * different user namespace). */ + + if (needs_sandboxing && context->private_users && !userns_set_up) { + r = setup_private_users(saved_uid, saved_gid, uid, gid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_USER; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m"); + } + } + + /* Now that the mount namespace has been set up and privileges adjusted, let's look for the thing we + * shall execute. */ + + _cleanup_free_ char *executable = NULL; + _cleanup_close_ int executable_fd = -EBADF; + r = find_executable_full(command->path, /* root= */ NULL, context->exec_search_path, false, &executable, &executable_fd); + if (r < 0) { + if (r != -ENOMEM && (command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE)) { + log_exec_struct_errno(context, params, LOG_INFO, r, + "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, + LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID(params), + LOG_EXEC_MESSAGE(params, + "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m", + command->path), + "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path); + *exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS; + return 0; + } + + *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; + return log_exec_struct_errno(context, params, LOG_INFO, r, + "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, + LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID(params), + LOG_EXEC_MESSAGE(params, + "Failed to locate executable %s: %m", + command->path), + "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path); + } + + r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, executable_fd, &executable_fd); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); + } + +#if HAVE_SELINUX + if (needs_sandboxing && use_selinux && params->selinux_context_net) { + int fd = -EBADF; + + if (socket_fd >= 0) + fd = socket_fd; + else if (params->n_socket_fds == 1) + /* If stdin is not connected to a socket but we are triggered by exactly one socket unit then we + * use context from that fd to compute the label. */ + fd = params->fds[0]; + + if (fd >= 0) { + r = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(fd, executable, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net); + if (r < 0) { + if (!context->selinux_context_ignore) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, + params, + r, + "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m"); + } + log_exec_debug_errno(context, + params, + r, + "Failed to determine SELinux context, ignoring: %m"); + } + } + } +#endif + + /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that + * we are more aggressive this time, since we don't need socket_fd and the netns and ipcns fds any + * more. We do keep exec_fd however, if we have it, since we need to keep it open until the final + * execve(). */ + + r = close_all_fds(keep_fds, n_keep_fds); + if (r >= 0) + r = shift_fds(fds, n_fds); + if (r >= 0) + r = flags_fds(fds, n_socket_fds, n_fds, context->non_blocking); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m"); + } + + /* At this point, the fds we want to pass to the program are all ready and set up, with O_CLOEXEC turned off + * and at the right fd numbers. The are no other fds open, with one exception: the exec_fd if it is defined, + * and it has O_CLOEXEC set, after all we want it to be closed by the execve(), so that our parent knows we + * came this far. */ + + secure_bits = context->secure_bits; + + if (needs_sandboxing) { + uint64_t bset; + + /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly requested. + * (Note this is placed after the general resource limit initialization, see above, in order + * to take precedence.) */ + if (context->restrict_realtime && !context->rlimit[RLIMIT_RTPRIO]) { + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m"); + } + } + +#if ENABLE_SMACK + /* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the + * process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */ + if (use_smack && context->smack_process_label) { + r = setup_smack(params, context, executable_fd); + if (r < 0 && !context->smack_process_label_ignore) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m"); + } + } +#endif + + bset = context->capability_bounding_set; + /* If the ambient caps hack is enabled (which means the kernel can't do them, and the user asked for + * our magic fallback), then let's add some extra caps, so that the service can drop privs of its own, + * instead of us doing that */ + if (needs_ambient_hack) + bset |= (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETPCAP) | + (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETUID) | + (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETGID); + + if (!cap_test_all(bset)) { + r = capability_bounding_set_drop(bset, /* right_now= */ false); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m"); + } + } + + /* Ambient capabilities are cleared during setresuid() (in enforce_user()) even with + * keep-caps set. + * + * To be able to raise the ambient capabilities after setresuid() they have to be added to + * the inherited set and keep caps has to be set (done in enforce_user()). After setresuid() + * the ambient capabilities can be raised as they are present in the permitted and + * inhertiable set. However it is possible that someone wants to set ambient capabilities + * without changing the user, so we also set the ambient capabilities here. + * + * The requested ambient capabilities are raised in the inheritable set if the second + * argument is true. */ + if (!needs_ambient_hack) { + r = capability_ambient_set_apply(capability_ambient_set, /* also_inherit= */ true); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m"); + } + } + } + + /* chroot to root directory first, before we lose the ability to chroot */ + r = apply_root_directory(context, params, runtime, needs_mount_namespace, exit_status); + if (r < 0) + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Chrooting to the requested root directory failed: %m"); + + if (needs_setuid) { + if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { + r = enforce_user(context, uid, capability_ambient_set); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_USER; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT ": %m", uid); + } + + if (!needs_ambient_hack && capability_ambient_set != 0) { + + /* Raise the ambient capabilities after user change. */ + r = capability_ambient_set_apply(capability_ambient_set, /* also_inherit= */ false); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m"); + } + } + } + } + + /* Apply working directory here, because the working directory might be on NFS and only the user running + * this service might have the correct privilege to change to the working directory */ + r = apply_working_directory(context, params, runtime, home, exit_status); + if (r < 0) + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m"); + + if (needs_sandboxing) { + /* Apply other MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to + * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires + * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls + * are restricted. */ + +#if HAVE_SELINUX + if (use_selinux) { + char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context; + + if (exec_context) { + r = setexeccon(exec_context); + if (r < 0) { + if (!context->selinux_context_ignore) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context); + } + log_exec_debug_errno(context, + params, + r, + "Failed to change SELinux context to %s, ignoring: %m", + exec_context); + } + } + } +#endif + +#if HAVE_APPARMOR + if (use_apparmor && context->apparmor_profile) { + r = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile); + if (r < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) { + *exit_status = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, + params, + errno, + "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", + context->apparmor_profile); + } + } +#endif + + /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress potential + * EPERMs we'll try not to call PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. Setting securebits + * requires CAP_SETPCAP. */ + if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != secure_bits) { + /* CAP_SETPCAP is required to set securebits. This capability is raised into the + * effective set here. + * + * The effective set is overwritten during execve() with the following values: + * + * - ambient set (for non-root processes) + * + * - (inheritable | bounding) set for root processes) + * + * Hence there is no security impact to raise it in the effective set before execve + */ + r = capability_gain_cap_setpcap(/* return_caps= */ NULL); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to gain CAP_SETPCAP for setting secure bits"); + } + if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secure_bits) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECUREBITS; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m"); + } + } + + if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context)) + if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m"); + } + +#if HAVE_SECCOMP + r = apply_address_families(context, params); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to restrict address families: %m"); + } + + r = apply_memory_deny_write_execute(context, params); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m"); + } + + r = apply_restrict_realtime(context, params); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m"); + } + + r = apply_restrict_suid_sgid(context, params); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply SUID/SGID restrictions: %m"); + } + + r = apply_restrict_namespaces(context, params); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m"); + } + + r = apply_protect_sysctl(context, params); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m"); + } + + r = apply_protect_kernel_modules(context, params); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m"); + } + + r = apply_protect_kernel_logs(context, params); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply kernel log restrictions: %m"); + } + + r = apply_protect_clock(context, params); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply clock restrictions: %m"); + } + + r = apply_private_devices(context, params); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up private devices: %m"); + } + + r = apply_syscall_archs(context, params); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m"); + } + + r = apply_lock_personality(context, params); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to lock personalities: %m"); + } + + r = apply_syscall_log(context, params); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply system call log filters: %m"); + } + + /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected + * by the filter as little as possible. */ + r = apply_syscall_filter(context, params, needs_ambient_hack); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m"); + } +#endif + +#if HAVE_LIBBPF + r = apply_restrict_filesystems(context, params); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_BPF; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to restrict filesystems: %m"); + } +#endif + + } + + if (!strv_isempty(context->unset_environment)) { + char **ee = NULL; + + ee = strv_env_delete(accum_env, 1, context->unset_environment); + if (!ee) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_oom(); + } + + strv_free_and_replace(accum_env, ee); + } + + if (!FLAGS_SET(command->flags, EXEC_COMMAND_NO_ENV_EXPAND)) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **unset_variables = NULL, **bad_variables = NULL; + + r = replace_env_argv(command->argv, accum_env, &replaced_argv, &unset_variables, &bad_variables); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, + params, + r, + "Failed to replace environment variables: %m"); + } + final_argv = replaced_argv; + + if (!strv_isempty(unset_variables)) { + _cleanup_free_ char *ju = strv_join(unset_variables, ", "); + log_exec_warning(context, + params, + "Referenced but unset environment variable evaluates to an empty string: %s", + strna(ju)); + } + + if (!strv_isempty(bad_variables)) { + _cleanup_free_ char *jb = strv_join(bad_variables, ", "); + log_exec_warning(context, + params, + "Invalid environment variable name evaluates to an empty string: %s", + strna(jb)); + } + } else + final_argv = command->argv; + + log_command_line(context, params, "Executing", executable, final_argv); + + if (exec_fd >= 0) { + uint8_t hot = 1; + + /* We have finished with all our initializations. Let's now let the manager know that. From this point + * on, if the manager sees POLLHUP on the exec_fd, then execve() was successful. */ + + if (write(exec_fd, &hot, sizeof(hot)) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m"); + } + } + + r = fexecve_or_execve(executable_fd, executable, final_argv, accum_env); + + if (exec_fd >= 0) { + uint8_t hot = 0; + + /* The execve() failed. This means the exec_fd is still open. Which means we need to tell the manager + * that POLLHUP on it no longer means execve() succeeded. */ + + if (write(exec_fd, &hot, sizeof(hot)) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m"); + } + } + + *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; + return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to execute %s: %m", executable); +} diff --git a/src/core/exec-invoke.h b/src/core/exec-invoke.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a8a3ac6e56 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/exec-invoke.h @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ +#pragma once + +typedef struct ExecCommand ExecCommand; +typedef struct ExecContext ExecContext; +typedef struct ExecParameters ExecParameters; +typedef struct ExecRuntime ExecRuntime; +typedef struct CGroupContext CGroupContext; + +int exec_invoke( + const ExecCommand *command, + const ExecContext *context, + ExecParameters *params, + ExecRuntime *runtime, + const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, + int *exit_status); diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c index ff9560665c..e4e4008cc8 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.c +++ b/src/core/execute.c @@ -3,9 +3,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -17,40 +15,16 @@ #include /* Must be included after */ -#if HAVE_PAM -#include -#endif - -#if HAVE_SELINUX -#include -#endif - -#if HAVE_APPARMOR -#include -#endif - #include "sd-messages.h" #include "af-list.h" #include "alloc-util.h" -#if HAVE_APPARMOR -#include "apparmor-util.h" -#endif -#include "argv-util.h" #include "async.h" -#include "barrier.h" -#include "bpf-dlopen.h" -#include "bpf-lsm.h" -#include "btrfs-util.h" #include "cap-list.h" #include "capability-util.h" -#include "chattr-util.h" #include "cgroup-setup.h" -#include "chase.h" -#include "chown-recursive.h" #include "constants.h" #include "cpu-set-util.h" -#include "data-fd-util.h" #include "env-file.h" #include "env-util.h" #include "errno-list.h" @@ -64,7 +38,6 @@ #include "format-util.h" #include "glob-util.h" #include "hexdecoct.h" -#include "io-util.h" #include "ioprio-util.h" #include "lock-util.h" #include "log.h" @@ -73,24 +46,18 @@ #include "manager-dump.h" #include "memory-util.h" #include "missing_fs.h" -#include "missing_ioprio.h" #include "missing_prctl.h" #include "mkdir-label.h" #include "namespace.h" #include "parse-util.h" #include "path-util.h" -#include "proc-cmdline.h" #include "process-util.h" -#include "psi-util.h" #include "rlimit-util.h" #include "rm-rf.h" #include "seccomp-util.h" #include "securebits-util.h" #include "selinux-util.h" #include "serialize.h" -#include "signal-util.h" -#include "smack-util.h" -#include "socket-util.h" #include "sort-util.h" #include "special.h" #include "stat-util.h" @@ -105,88 +72,7 @@ #include "user-util.h" #include "utmp-wtmp.h" -#define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC) -#define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC) - -#define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024) - -static int shift_fds(int fds[], size_t n_fds) { - if (n_fds <= 0) - return 0; - - /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */ - - assert(fds); - - for (int start = 0;;) { - int restart_from = -1; - - for (int i = start; i < (int) n_fds; i++) { - int nfd; - - /* Already at right index? */ - if (fds[i] == i+3) - continue; - - nfd = fcntl(fds[i], F_DUPFD, i + 3); - if (nfd < 0) - return -errno; - - safe_close(fds[i]); - fds[i] = nfd; - - /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then - * let's remember that and try again from here */ - if (nfd != i+3 && restart_from < 0) - restart_from = i; - } - - if (restart_from < 0) - break; - - start = restart_from; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int flags_fds( - const int fds[], - size_t n_socket_fds, - size_t n_fds, - bool nonblock) { - - int r; - - if (n_fds <= 0) - return 0; - - assert(fds); - - /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags. - * O_NONBLOCK only applies to socket activation though. */ - - for (size_t i = 0; i < n_fds; i++) { - - if (i < n_socket_fds) { - r = fd_nonblock(fds[i], nonblock); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds, - * since after all we want to pass these fds to our - * children */ - - r = fd_cloexec(fds[i], false); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - return 0; -} - -static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext *context) { +const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext *context) { assert(context); if (context->stdio_as_fds) @@ -198,7 +84,7 @@ static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext *context) { return "/dev/console"; } -static int exec_context_tty_size(const ExecContext *context, unsigned *ret_rows, unsigned *ret_cols) { +int exec_context_tty_size(const ExecContext *context, unsigned *ret_rows, unsigned *ret_cols) { unsigned rows, cols; const char *tty; @@ -219,7 +105,7 @@ static int exec_context_tty_size(const ExecContext *context, unsigned *ret_rows, return 0; } -static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *p) { +void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *p) { _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; const char *path = exec_context_tty_path(ASSERT_PTR(context)); @@ -274,1913 +160,6 @@ static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o) { EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE); } -static bool is_kmsg_output(ExecOutput o) { - return IN_SET(o, - EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG, - EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE); -} - -static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext *c) { - assert(c); - - /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */ - - if (is_terminal_input(c->std_input)) - return true; - - if (is_terminal_output(c->std_output)) - return true; - - if (is_terminal_output(c->std_error)) - return true; - - return !!c->tty_path; -} - -static int open_null_as(int flags, int nfd) { - int fd; - - assert(nfd >= 0); - - fd = open("/dev/null", flags|O_NOCTTY); - if (fd < 0) - return -errno; - - return move_fd(fd, nfd, false); -} - -static int connect_journal_socket( - int fd, - const char *log_namespace, - uid_t uid, - gid_t gid) { - - uid_t olduid = UID_INVALID; - gid_t oldgid = GID_INVALID; - const char *j; - int r; - - j = log_namespace ? - strjoina("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace, "/stdout") : - "/run/systemd/journal/stdout"; - - if (gid_is_valid(gid)) { - oldgid = getgid(); - - if (setegid(gid) < 0) - return -errno; - } - - if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { - olduid = getuid(); - - if (seteuid(uid) < 0) { - r = -errno; - goto restore_gid; - } - } - - r = connect_unix_path(fd, AT_FDCWD, j); - - /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely fail later on. This should only happen if - an LSM interferes. */ - - if (uid_is_valid(uid)) - (void) seteuid(olduid); - - restore_gid: - if (gid_is_valid(gid)) - (void) setegid(oldgid); - - return r; -} - -static int connect_logger_as( - const ExecContext *context, - const ExecParameters *params, - ExecOutput output, - const char *ident, - int nfd, - uid_t uid, - gid_t gid) { - - _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; - int r; - - assert(context); - assert(params); - assert(output < _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX); - assert(ident); - assert(nfd >= 0); - - fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - if (fd < 0) - return -errno; - - r = connect_journal_socket(fd, context->log_namespace, uid, gid); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - if (shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD) < 0) - return -errno; - - (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd, SNDBUF_SIZE); - - if (dprintf(fd, - "%s\n" - "%s\n" - "%i\n" - "%i\n" - "%i\n" - "%i\n" - "%i\n", - context->syslog_identifier ?: ident, - params->flags & EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT ? params->unit_id : "", - context->syslog_priority, - !!context->syslog_level_prefix, - false, - is_kmsg_output(output), - is_terminal_output(output)) < 0) - return -errno; - - return move_fd(TAKE_FD(fd), nfd, false); -} - -static int open_terminal_as(const char *path, int flags, int nfd) { - int fd; - - assert(path); - assert(nfd >= 0); - - fd = open_terminal(path, flags | O_NOCTTY); - if (fd < 0) - return fd; - - return move_fd(fd, nfd, false); -} - -static int acquire_path(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode) { - _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; - int r; - - assert(path); - - if (IN_SET(flags & O_ACCMODE, O_WRONLY, O_RDWR)) - flags |= O_CREAT; - - fd = open(path, flags|O_NOCTTY, mode); - if (fd >= 0) - return TAKE_FD(fd); - - if (errno != ENXIO) /* ENXIO is returned when we try to open() an AF_UNIX file system socket on Linux */ - return -errno; - - /* So, it appears the specified path could be an AF_UNIX socket. Let's see if we can connect to it. */ - - fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - if (fd < 0) - return -errno; - - r = connect_unix_path(fd, AT_FDCWD, path); - if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTSOCK, -EINVAL)) - /* Propagate initial error if we get ENOTSOCK or EINVAL, i.e. we have indication that this - * wasn't an AF_UNIX socket after all */ - return -ENXIO; - if (r < 0) - return r; - - if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) - r = shutdown(fd, SHUT_WR); - else if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY) - r = shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD); - else - r = 0; - if (r < 0) - return -errno; - - return TAKE_FD(fd); -} - -static int fixup_input( - const ExecContext *context, - int socket_fd, - bool apply_tty_stdin) { - - ExecInput std_input; - - assert(context); - - std_input = context->std_input; - - if (is_terminal_input(std_input) && !apply_tty_stdin) - return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; - - if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0) - return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; - - if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_DATA && context->stdin_data_size == 0) - return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; - - return std_input; -} - -static int fixup_output(ExecOutput output, int socket_fd) { - - if (output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0) - return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT; - - return output; -} - -static int setup_input( - const ExecContext *context, - const ExecParameters *params, - int socket_fd, - const int named_iofds[static 3]) { - - ExecInput i; - int r; - - assert(context); - assert(params); - assert(named_iofds); - - if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) { - if (dup2(params->stdin_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0) - return -errno; - - /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */ - if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { - unsigned rows = context->tty_rows, cols = context->tty_cols; - - (void) exec_context_tty_size(context, &rows, &cols); - (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCSCTTY, context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE); - (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO, true); - (void) terminal_set_size_fd(STDIN_FILENO, NULL, rows, cols); - } - - return STDIN_FILENO; - } - - i = fixup_input(context, socket_fd, params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN); - - switch (i) { - - case EXEC_INPUT_NULL: - return open_null_as(O_RDONLY, STDIN_FILENO); - - case EXEC_INPUT_TTY: - case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE: - case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL: { - unsigned rows, cols; - int fd; - - fd = acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context), - i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL ? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY : - i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE ? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE : - ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT, - USEC_INFINITY); - if (fd < 0) - return fd; - - r = exec_context_tty_size(context, &rows, &cols); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - r = terminal_set_size_fd(fd, exec_context_tty_path(context), rows, cols); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false); - } - - case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET: - assert(socket_fd >= 0); - - return RET_NERRNO(dup2(socket_fd, STDIN_FILENO)); - - case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD: - assert(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] >= 0); - - (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO], false); - return RET_NERRNO(dup2(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO], STDIN_FILENO)); - - case EXEC_INPUT_DATA: { - int fd; - - fd = acquire_data_fd(context->stdin_data, context->stdin_data_size, 0); - if (fd < 0) - return fd; - - return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false); - } - - case EXEC_INPUT_FILE: { - bool rw; - int fd; - - assert(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]); - - rw = (context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE && streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO])) || - (context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE && streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO])); - - fd = acquire_path(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], rw ? O_RDWR : O_RDONLY, 0666 & ~context->umask); - if (fd < 0) - return fd; - - return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false); - } - - default: - assert_not_reached(); - } -} - -static bool can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout( - const ExecContext *context, - ExecOutput o, - ExecOutput e) { - - assert(context); - - /* Returns true, if given the specified STDERR and STDOUT output we can directly dup() the stdout fd to the - * stderr fd */ - - if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) - return true; - if (e != o) - return false; - - if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) - return streq_ptr(context->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO], context->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO]); - - if (IN_SET(e, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE)) - return streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); - - return true; -} - -static int setup_output( - const ExecContext *context, - const ExecParameters *params, - int fileno, - int socket_fd, - const int named_iofds[static 3], - const char *ident, - uid_t uid, - gid_t gid, - dev_t *journal_stream_dev, - ino_t *journal_stream_ino) { - - ExecOutput o; - ExecInput i; - int r; - - assert(context); - assert(params); - assert(ident); - assert(journal_stream_dev); - assert(journal_stream_ino); - - if (fileno == STDOUT_FILENO && params->stdout_fd >= 0) { - - if (dup2(params->stdout_fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) - return -errno; - - return STDOUT_FILENO; - } - - if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO && params->stderr_fd >= 0) { - if (dup2(params->stderr_fd, STDERR_FILENO) < 0) - return -errno; - - return STDERR_FILENO; - } - - i = fixup_input(context, socket_fd, params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN); - o = fixup_output(context->std_output, socket_fd); - - if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO) { - ExecOutput e; - e = fixup_output(context->std_error, socket_fd); - - /* This expects the input and output are already set up */ - - /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all - * the way and are not on a tty */ - if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT && - o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT && - i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && - !is_terminal_input(context->std_input) && - getppid() != 1) - return fileno; - - /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */ - if (can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(context, o, e)) - return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDOUT_FILENO, fileno)); - - o = e; - - } else if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) { - /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */ - if (i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && is_terminal_input(context->std_input)) - return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno); - - /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null or a data fd, inherit that... */ - if (!IN_SET(i, EXEC_INPUT_NULL, EXEC_INPUT_DATA)) - return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno)); - - /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */ - if (getppid() != 1) - return fileno; - - /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */ - return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); - } - - switch (o) { - - case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL: - return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); - - case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY: - if (is_terminal_input(i)) - return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno)); - - /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */ - return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno); - - case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG: - case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE: - case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL: - case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE: - r = connect_logger_as(context, params, o, ident, fileno, uid, gid); - if (r < 0) { - log_exec_warning_errno(context, - params, - r, - "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", - fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "stdout" : "stderr"); - r = open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); - } else { - struct stat st; - - /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed - * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits - * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not. - * - * If both stdout and stderr are connected to a stream then let's make sure to store the data - * about STDERR as that's usually the best way to do logging. */ - - if (fstat(fileno, &st) >= 0 && - (*journal_stream_ino == 0 || fileno == STDERR_FILENO)) { - *journal_stream_dev = st.st_dev; - *journal_stream_ino = st.st_ino; - } - } - return r; - - case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET: - assert(socket_fd >= 0); - - return RET_NERRNO(dup2(socket_fd, fileno)); - - case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD: - assert(named_iofds[fileno] >= 0); - - (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds[fileno], false); - return RET_NERRNO(dup2(named_iofds[fileno], fileno)); - - case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE: - case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND: - case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE: { - bool rw; - int fd, flags; - - assert(context->stdio_file[fileno]); - - rw = context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_FILE && - streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[fileno], context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]); - - if (rw) - return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno)); - - flags = O_WRONLY; - if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND) - flags |= O_APPEND; - else if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE) - flags |= O_TRUNC; - - fd = acquire_path(context->stdio_file[fileno], flags, 0666 & ~context->umask); - if (fd < 0) - return fd; - - return move_fd(fd, fileno, 0); - } - - default: - assert_not_reached(); - } -} - -static int chown_terminal(int fd, uid_t uid) { - int r; - - assert(fd >= 0); - - /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */ - if (isatty(fd) < 1) { - if (IN_SET(errno, EINVAL, ENOTTY)) - return 0; /* not a tty */ - - return -errno; - } - - /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */ - r = fchmod_and_chown(fd, TTY_MODE, uid, GID_INVALID); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - return 1; -} - -static int setup_confirm_stdio( - const ExecContext *context, - const char *vc, - int *ret_saved_stdin, - int *ret_saved_stdout) { - - _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF, saved_stdin = -EBADF, saved_stdout = -EBADF; - unsigned rows, cols; - int r; - - assert(ret_saved_stdin); - assert(ret_saved_stdout); - - saved_stdin = fcntl(STDIN_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3); - if (saved_stdin < 0) - return -errno; - - saved_stdout = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3); - if (saved_stdout < 0) - return -errno; - - fd = acquire_terminal(vc, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT, DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC); - if (fd < 0) - return fd; - - r = chown_terminal(fd, getuid()); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - r = reset_terminal_fd(fd, true); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - r = exec_context_tty_size(context, &rows, &cols); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - r = terminal_set_size_fd(fd, vc, rows, cols); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - r = rearrange_stdio(fd, fd, STDERR_FILENO); /* Invalidates 'fd' also on failure */ - TAKE_FD(fd); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - *ret_saved_stdin = TAKE_FD(saved_stdin); - *ret_saved_stdout = TAKE_FD(saved_stdout); - return 0; -} - -static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err, int fd, const char *unit_id) { - assert(err < 0); - assert(unit_id); - - if (err == -ETIMEDOUT) - dprintf(fd, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", unit_id); - else { - errno = -err; - dprintf(fd, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", unit_id); - } -} - -static void write_confirm_error(int err, const char *vc, const char *unit_id) { - _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; - - assert(vc); - - fd = open_terminal(vc, O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC); - if (fd < 0) - return; - - write_confirm_error_fd(err, fd, unit_id); -} - -static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin, int *saved_stdout) { - int r = 0; - - assert(saved_stdin); - assert(saved_stdout); - - release_terminal(); - - if (*saved_stdin >= 0) - if (dup2(*saved_stdin, STDIN_FILENO) < 0) - r = -errno; - - if (*saved_stdout >= 0) - if (dup2(*saved_stdout, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) - r = -errno; - - *saved_stdin = safe_close(*saved_stdin); - *saved_stdout = safe_close(*saved_stdout); - - return r; -} - -enum { - CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE = -1, - CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS = 0, - CONFIRM_EXECUTE = 1, -}; - -static bool confirm_spawn_disabled(void) { - return access("/run/systemd/confirm_spawn_disabled", F_OK) >= 0; -} - -static int ask_for_confirmation(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *params, const char *cmdline) { - int saved_stdout = -1, saved_stdin = -1, r; - _cleanup_free_ char *e = NULL; - char c; - - assert(context); - assert(params); - - /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */ - r = setup_confirm_stdio(context, params->confirm_spawn, &saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); - if (r < 0) { - write_confirm_error(r, params->confirm_spawn, params->unit_id); - return CONFIRM_EXECUTE; - } - - /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */ - if (!params->confirm_spawn || confirm_spawn_disabled()) { - r = 1; - goto restore_stdio; - } - - e = ellipsize(cmdline, 60, 100); - if (!e) { - log_oom(); - r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; - goto restore_stdio; - } - - for (;;) { - r = ask_char(&c, "yfshiDjcn", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e); - if (r < 0) { - write_confirm_error_fd(r, STDOUT_FILENO, params->unit_id); - r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; - goto restore_stdio; - } - - switch (c) { - case 'c': - printf("Resuming normal execution.\n"); - manager_disable_confirm_spawn(); - r = 1; - break; - case 'D': - printf(" Unit: %s\n", - params->unit_id); - exec_context_dump(context, stdout, " "); - exec_params_dump(params, stdout, " "); - continue; /* ask again */ - case 'f': - printf("Failing execution.\n"); - r = CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE; - break; - case 'h': - printf(" c - continue, proceed without asking anymore\n" - " D - dump, show the state of the unit\n" - " f - fail, don't execute the command and pretend it failed\n" - " h - help\n" - " i - info, show a short summary of the unit\n" - " j - jobs, show jobs that are in progress\n" - " s - skip, don't execute the command and pretend it succeeded\n" - " y - yes, execute the command\n"); - continue; /* ask again */ - case 'i': - printf(" Unit: %s\n" - " Command: %s\n", - params->unit_id, cmdline); - continue; /* ask again */ - case 'j': - if (sigqueue(getppid(), - SIGRTMIN+18, - (const union sigval) { .sival_int = MANAGER_SIGNAL_COMMAND_DUMP_JOBS }) < 0) - return -errno; - - continue; /* ask again */ - case 'n': - /* 'n' was removed in favor of 'f'. */ - printf("Didn't understand 'n', did you mean 'f'?\n"); - continue; /* ask again */ - case 's': - printf("Skipping execution.\n"); - r = CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS; - break; - case 'y': - r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; - break; - default: - assert_not_reached(); - } - break; - } - -restore_stdio: - restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); - return r; -} - -static int get_fixed_user( - const char *username, - const char **ret_user, - uid_t *ret_uid, - gid_t *ret_gid, - const char **ret_home, - const char **ret_shell) { - - int r; - - assert(username); - assert(ret_user); - - /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway - * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */ - - r = get_user_creds(&username, ret_uid, ret_gid, ret_home, ret_shell, USER_CREDS_CLEAN); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - *ret_user = username; - return 0; -} - -static int get_fixed_group( - const char *groupname, - const char **ret_group, - gid_t *ret_gid) { - - int r; - - assert(groupname); - assert(ret_group); - - r = get_group_creds(&groupname, ret_gid, /* flags = */ 0); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - *ret_group = groupname; - return 0; -} - -static int get_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext *c, const char *user, - const char *group, gid_t gid, - gid_t **supplementary_gids, int *ngids) { - int r, k = 0; - int ngroups_max; - bool keep_groups = false; - gid_t *groups = NULL; - _cleanup_free_ gid_t *l_gids = NULL; - - assert(c); - - /* - * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list. - * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups - * here and as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary - * groups of the caller. - */ - if (user && gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != 0) { - /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */ - if (initgroups(user, gid) < 0) - return -errno; - - keep_groups = true; - } - - if (strv_isempty(c->supplementary_groups)) - return 0; - - /* - * If SupplementaryGroups= was passed then NGROUPS_MAX has to - * be positive, otherwise fail. - */ - errno = 0; - ngroups_max = (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX); - if (ngroups_max <= 0) - return errno_or_else(EOPNOTSUPP); - - l_gids = new(gid_t, ngroups_max); - if (!l_gids) - return -ENOMEM; - - if (keep_groups) { - /* - * Lookup the list of groups that the user belongs to, we - * avoid NSS lookups here too for gid=0. - */ - k = ngroups_max; - if (getgrouplist(user, gid, l_gids, &k) < 0) - return -EINVAL; - } else - k = 0; - - STRV_FOREACH(i, c->supplementary_groups) { - const char *g; - - if (k >= ngroups_max) - return -E2BIG; - - g = *i; - r = get_group_creds(&g, l_gids+k, 0); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - k++; - } - - /* - * Sets ngids to zero to drop all supplementary groups, happens - * when we are under root and SupplementaryGroups= is empty. - */ - if (k == 0) { - *ngids = 0; - return 0; - } - - /* Otherwise get the final list of supplementary groups */ - groups = memdup(l_gids, sizeof(gid_t) * k); - if (!groups) - return -ENOMEM; - - *supplementary_gids = groups; - *ngids = k; - - groups = NULL; - - return 0; -} - -static int enforce_groups(gid_t gid, const gid_t *supplementary_gids, int ngids) { - int r; - - /* Handle SupplementaryGroups= if it is not empty */ - if (ngids > 0) { - r = maybe_setgroups(ngids, supplementary_gids); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - if (gid_is_valid(gid)) { - /* Then set our gids */ - if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0) - return -errno; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int set_securebits(unsigned bits, unsigned mask) { - unsigned applied; - int current; - - current = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS); - if (current < 0) - return -errno; - - /* Clear all securebits defined in mask and set bits */ - applied = ((unsigned) current & ~mask) | bits; - if ((unsigned) current == applied) - return 0; - - if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, applied) < 0) - return -errno; - - return 1; -} - -static int enforce_user( - const ExecContext *context, - uid_t uid, - uint64_t capability_ambient_set) { - assert(context); - int r; - - if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) - return 0; - - /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the UIS and makes sure we keep the capabilities while doing so. For - * setting secure bits the capability CAP_SETPCAP is required, so we also need keep-caps in this - * case. */ - - if ((capability_ambient_set != 0 || context->secure_bits != 0) && uid != 0) { - - /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but drop privileges we need to make sure we - * keep our caps, while we drop privileges. Add KEEP_CAPS to the securebits */ - r = set_securebits(1U << SECURE_KEEP_CAPS, 0); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - /* Second step: actually set the uids */ - if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) - return -errno; - - /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but are otherwise a normal user. However, - * the caps might got corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up later. This is done - * outside of this call. */ - return 0; -} - -#if HAVE_PAM - -static int null_conv( - int num_msg, - const struct pam_message **msg, - struct pam_response **resp, - void *appdata_ptr) { - - /* We don't support conversations */ - - return PAM_CONV_ERR; -} - -#endif - -static int setup_pam( - const char *name, - const char *user, - uid_t uid, - gid_t gid, - const char *tty, - char ***env, /* updated on success */ - const int fds[], size_t n_fds) { - -#if HAVE_PAM - - static const struct pam_conv conv = { - .conv = null_conv, - .appdata_ptr = NULL - }; - - _cleanup_(barrier_destroy) Barrier barrier = BARRIER_NULL; - _cleanup_strv_free_ char **e = NULL; - pam_handle_t *handle = NULL; - sigset_t old_ss; - int pam_code = PAM_SUCCESS, r; - bool close_session = false; - pid_t pam_pid = 0, parent_pid; - int flags = 0; - - assert(name); - assert(user); - assert(env); - - /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child - * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or - * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM - * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual - * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID - * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */ - - r = barrier_create(&barrier); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - - if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG) - flags |= PAM_SILENT; - - pam_code = pam_start(name, user, &conv, &handle); - if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) { - handle = NULL; - goto fail; - } - - if (!tty) { - _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL; - - /* Hmm, so no TTY was explicitly passed, but an fd passed to us directly might be a TTY. Let's figure - * out if that's the case, and read the TTY off it. */ - - if (getttyname_malloc(STDIN_FILENO, &q) >= 0) - tty = strjoina("/dev/", q); - } - - if (tty) { - pam_code = pam_set_item(handle, PAM_TTY, tty); - if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) - goto fail; - } - - STRV_FOREACH(nv, *env) { - pam_code = pam_putenv(handle, *nv); - if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) - goto fail; - } - - pam_code = pam_acct_mgmt(handle, flags); - if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) - goto fail; - - pam_code = pam_setcred(handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | flags); - if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) - log_debug("pam_setcred() failed, ignoring: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code)); - - pam_code = pam_open_session(handle, flags); - if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) - goto fail; - - close_session = true; - - e = pam_getenvlist(handle); - if (!e) { - pam_code = PAM_BUF_ERR; - goto fail; - } - - /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in the child */ - - assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK, &old_ss, SIGTERM, -1) >= 0); - - parent_pid = getpid_cached(); - - r = safe_fork("(sd-pam)", 0, &pam_pid); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - if (r == 0) { - int sig, ret = EXIT_PAM; - - /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on termination */ - barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_CHILD); - - /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only - * those fds are open here that have been opened by PAM. */ - (void) close_many(fds, n_fds); - - /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session and this will make - * PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases. If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam - * threads to fail to exit normally */ - - r = maybe_setgroups(0, NULL); - if (r < 0) - log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m"); - if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0) - log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m"); - if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) - log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m"); - - (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE); - - /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if the above setresuid() succeeds, - * otherwise the kernel will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged children - * this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic to do the rest for us. */ - if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM) < 0) - goto child_finish; - - /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially important regarding dropping - * privileges. Otherwise, unit setup might race against our setresuid(2) call. - * - * If the parent aborted, we'll detect this below, hence ignore return failure here. */ - (void) barrier_place(&barrier); - - /* Check if our parent process might already have died? */ - if (getppid() == parent_pid) { - sigset_t ss; - - assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss) >= 0); - assert_se(sigaddset(&ss, SIGTERM) >= 0); - - for (;;) { - if (sigwait(&ss, &sig) < 0) { - if (errno == EINTR) - continue; - - goto child_finish; - } - - assert(sig == SIGTERM); - break; - } - } - - pam_code = pam_setcred(handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED | flags); - if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) - goto child_finish; - - /* If our parent died we'll end the session */ - if (getppid() != parent_pid) { - pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags); - if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) - goto child_finish; - } - - ret = 0; - - child_finish: - /* NB: pam_end() when called in child processes should set PAM_DATA_SILENT to let the module - * know about this. See pam_end(3) */ - (void) pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags | PAM_DATA_SILENT); - _exit(ret); - } - - barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_PARENT); - - /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the cleanups, so forget about the handle - * here. */ - handle = NULL; - - /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */ - assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_ss, NULL) >= 0); - - /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules might have opened it, but we don't want - * this fd around. */ - closelog(); - - /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for errors as we cannot - * recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */ - if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier)) - log_error("PAM initialization failed"); - - return strv_free_and_replace(*env, e); - -fail: - if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) { - log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code)); - r = -EPERM; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */ - } else - log_error_errno(r, "PAM failed: %m"); - - if (handle) { - if (close_session) - pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags); - - (void) pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags); - } - - closelog(); - return r; -#else - return 0; -#endif -} - -static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path) { - _cleanup_free_ char *buf = NULL; - const char *p; - - assert(path); - - /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in - * /bin/ps */ - - if (path_extract_filename(path, &buf) < 0) { - rename_process("(...)"); - return; - } - - size_t l = strlen(buf); - if (l > 8) { - /* The end of the process name is usually more interesting, since the first bit might just be - * "systemd-" */ - p = buf + l - 8; - l = 8; - } else - p = buf; - - char process_name[11]; - process_name[0] = '('; - memcpy(process_name+1, p, l); - process_name[1+l] = ')'; - process_name[1+l+1] = 0; - - rename_process(process_name); -} - -static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext *c) { - assert(c); - - return c->address_families_allow_list || - !set_isempty(c->address_families); -} - -static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext *c) { - assert(c); - - return c->syscall_allow_list || - !hashmap_isempty(c->syscall_filter); -} - -static bool context_has_syscall_logs(const ExecContext *c) { - assert(c); - - return c->syscall_log_allow_list || - !hashmap_isempty(c->syscall_log); -} - -static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext *c) { - assert(c); - - if (c->no_new_privileges) - return true; - - if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) > 0) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */ - return false; - - /* We need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */ - return c->lock_personality || - c->memory_deny_write_execute || - c->private_devices || - c->protect_clock || - c->protect_hostname || - c->protect_kernel_tunables || - c->protect_kernel_modules || - c->protect_kernel_logs || - context_has_address_families(c) || - exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c) || - c->restrict_realtime || - c->restrict_suid_sgid || - !set_isempty(c->syscall_archs) || - context_has_syscall_filters(c) || - context_has_syscall_logs(c); -} - -#if HAVE_SECCOMP - -static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, const char* msg) { - - if (is_seccomp_available()) - return false; - - log_exec_debug(c, p, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg); - return true; -} - -static int apply_syscall_filter(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, bool needs_ambient_hack) { - uint32_t negative_action, default_action, action; - int r; - - assert(c); - assert(p); - - if (!context_has_syscall_filters(c)) - return 0; - - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "SystemCallFilter=")) - return 0; - - negative_action = c->syscall_errno == SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL ? scmp_act_kill_process() : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c->syscall_errno); - - if (c->syscall_allow_list) { - default_action = negative_action; - action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; - } else { - default_action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; - action = negative_action; - } - - if (needs_ambient_hack) { - r = seccomp_filter_set_add(c->syscall_filter, c->syscall_allow_list, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action, c->syscall_filter, action, false); -} - -static int apply_syscall_log(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { -#ifdef SCMP_ACT_LOG - uint32_t default_action, action; -#endif - - assert(c); - assert(p); - - if (!context_has_syscall_logs(c)) - return 0; - -#ifdef SCMP_ACT_LOG - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "SystemCallLog=")) - return 0; - - if (c->syscall_log_allow_list) { - /* Log nothing but the ones listed */ - default_action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; - action = SCMP_ACT_LOG; - } else { - /* Log everything but the ones listed */ - default_action = SCMP_ACT_LOG; - action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; - } - - return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action, c->syscall_log, action, false); -#else - /* old libseccomp */ - log_exec_debug(c, p, "SECCOMP feature SCMP_ACT_LOG not available, skipping SystemCallLog="); - return 0; -#endif -} - -static int apply_syscall_archs(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { - assert(c); - assert(p); - - if (set_isempty(c->syscall_archs)) - return 0; - - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "SystemCallArchitectures=")) - return 0; - - return seccomp_restrict_archs(c->syscall_archs); -} - -static int apply_address_families(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { - assert(c); - assert(p); - - if (!context_has_address_families(c)) - return 0; - - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "RestrictAddressFamilies=")) - return 0; - - return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c->address_families, c->address_families_allow_list); -} - -static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { - int r; - - assert(c); - assert(p); - - if (!c->memory_deny_write_execute) - return 0; - - /* use prctl() if kernel supports it (6.3) */ - r = prctl(PR_SET_MDWE, PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN, 0, 0, 0); - if (r == 0) { - log_exec_debug(c, p, "Enabled MemoryDenyWriteExecute= with PR_SET_MDWE"); - return 0; - } - if (r < 0 && errno != EINVAL) - return log_exec_debug_errno(c, - p, - errno, - "Failed to enable MemoryDenyWriteExecute= with PR_SET_MDWE: %m"); - /* else use seccomp */ - log_exec_debug(c, p, "Kernel doesn't support PR_SET_MDWE: falling back to seccomp"); - - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute=")) - return 0; - - return seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute(); -} - -static int apply_restrict_realtime(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { - assert(c); - assert(p); - - if (!c->restrict_realtime) - return 0; - - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "RestrictRealtime=")) - return 0; - - return seccomp_restrict_realtime(); -} - -static int apply_restrict_suid_sgid(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { - assert(c); - assert(p); - - if (!c->restrict_suid_sgid) - return 0; - - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "RestrictSUIDSGID=")) - return 0; - - return seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid(); -} - -static int apply_protect_sysctl(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { - assert(c); - assert(p); - - /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but - * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */ - - if (!c->protect_kernel_tunables) - return 0; - - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "ProtectKernelTunables=")) - return 0; - - return seccomp_protect_sysctl(); -} - -static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { - assert(c); - assert(p); - - /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */ - - if (!c->protect_kernel_modules) - return 0; - - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "ProtectKernelModules=")) - return 0; - - return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); -} - -static int apply_protect_kernel_logs(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { - assert(c); - assert(p); - - if (!c->protect_kernel_logs) - return 0; - - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "ProtectKernelLogs=")) - return 0; - - return seccomp_protect_syslog(); -} - -static int apply_protect_clock(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { - assert(c); - assert(p); - - if (!c->protect_clock) - return 0; - - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "ProtectClock=")) - return 0; - - return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); -} - -static int apply_private_devices(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { - assert(c); - assert(p); - - /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */ - - if (!c->private_devices) - return 0; - - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "PrivateDevices=")) - return 0; - - return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); -} - -static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { - assert(c); - assert(p); - - if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c)) - return 0; - - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "RestrictNamespaces=")) - return 0; - - return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c->restrict_namespaces); -} - -static int apply_lock_personality(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { - unsigned long personality; - int r; - - assert(c); - assert(p); - - if (!c->lock_personality) - return 0; - - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "LockPersonality=")) - return 0; - - personality = c->personality; - - /* If personality is not specified, use either PER_LINUX or PER_LINUX32 depending on what is currently set. */ - if (personality == PERSONALITY_INVALID) { - - r = opinionated_personality(&personality); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - return seccomp_lock_personality(personality); -} - -#endif - -#if HAVE_LIBBPF -static int apply_restrict_filesystems(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) { - int r; - - assert(c); - assert(p); - - if (!exec_context_restrict_filesystems_set(c)) - return 0; - - if (p->bpf_outer_map_fd < 0) { - /* LSM BPF is unsupported or lsm_bpf_setup failed */ - log_exec_debug(c, p, "LSM BPF not supported, skipping RestrictFileSystems="); - return 0; - } - - /* We are in a new binary, so dl-open again */ - r = dlopen_bpf(); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - return lsm_bpf_restrict_filesystems(c->restrict_filesystems, p->cgroup_id, p->bpf_outer_map_fd, c->restrict_filesystems_allow_list); -} -#endif - -static int apply_protect_hostname(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, int *ret_exit_status) { - assert(c); - assert(p); - - if (!c->protect_hostname) - return 0; - - if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_UTS)) { - if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS) < 0) { - if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno)) { - *ret_exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; - return log_exec_error_errno(c, - p, - errno, - "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m"); - } - - log_exec_warning(c, - p, - "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but UTS namespace setup is " - "prohibited (container manager?), ignoring namespace setup."); - } - } else - log_exec_warning(c, - p, - "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not " - "support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup."); - -#if HAVE_SECCOMP - int r; - - if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(c, p, "ProtectHostname=")) - return 0; - - r = seccomp_protect_hostname(); - if (r < 0) { - *ret_exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, r, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m"); - } -#endif - - return 0; -} - -static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[static 4]) { - assert(idle_pipe); - - idle_pipe[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe[1]); - idle_pipe[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe[2]); - - if (idle_pipe[0] >= 0) { - int r; - - r = fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC); - - if (idle_pipe[3] >= 0 && r == 0 /* timeout */) { - ssize_t n; - - /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */ - n = write(idle_pipe[3], "x", 1); - if (n > 0) - /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */ - (void) fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC); - } - - idle_pipe[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe[0]); - - } - - idle_pipe[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe[3]); -} - -static const char *exec_directory_env_name_to_string(ExecDirectoryType t); - -static int build_environment( - const ExecContext *c, - const ExecParameters *p, - const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, - size_t n_fds, - char **fdnames, - const char *home, - const char *username, - const char *shell, - dev_t journal_stream_dev, - ino_t journal_stream_ino, - const char *memory_pressure_path, - char ***ret) { - - _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL; - size_t n_env = 0; - char *x; - int r; - - assert(c); - assert(p); - assert(ret); - -#define N_ENV_VARS 19 - our_env = new0(char*, N_ENV_VARS + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); - if (!our_env) - return -ENOMEM; - - if (n_fds > 0) { - _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL; - - if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0) - return -ENOMEM; - our_env[n_env++] = x; - - if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_FDS=%zu", n_fds) < 0) - return -ENOMEM; - our_env[n_env++] = x; - - joined = strv_join(fdnames, ":"); - if (!joined) - return -ENOMEM; - - x = strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined); - if (!x) - return -ENOMEM; - our_env[n_env++] = x; - } - - if ((p->flags & EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG) && p->watchdog_usec > 0) { - if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0) - return -ENOMEM; - our_env[n_env++] = x; - - if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT, p->watchdog_usec) < 0) - return -ENOMEM; - our_env[n_env++] = x; - } - - /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use blocking - * Varlink calls back to us for look up dynamic users in PID 1. Break the deadlock between D-Bus and - * PID 1 by disabling use of PID1' NSS interface for looking up dynamic users. */ - if (p->flags & EXEC_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS) { - x = strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1"); - if (!x) - return -ENOMEM; - our_env[n_env++] = x; - } - - /* We query "root" if this is a system unit and User= is not specified. $USER is always set. $HOME - * could cause problem for e.g. getty, since login doesn't override $HOME, and $LOGNAME and $SHELL don't - * really make much sense since we're not logged in. Hence we conditionalize the three based on - * SetLoginEnvironment= switch. */ - if (!c->user && !c->dynamic_user && p->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM) { - r = get_fixed_user("root", &username, NULL, NULL, &home, &shell); - if (r < 0) - return log_exec_debug_errno(c, - p, - r, - "Failed to determine user credentials for root: %m"); - } - - bool set_user_login_env = c->set_login_environment >= 0 ? c->set_login_environment : (c->user || c->dynamic_user); - - if (username) { - x = strjoin("USER=", username); - if (!x) - return -ENOMEM; - our_env[n_env++] = x; - - if (set_user_login_env) { - x = strjoin("LOGNAME=", username); - if (!x) - return -ENOMEM; - our_env[n_env++] = x; - } - } - - if (home && set_user_login_env) { - x = strjoin("HOME=", home); - if (!x) - return -ENOMEM; - - path_simplify(x + 5); - our_env[n_env++] = x; - } - - if (shell && set_user_login_env) { - x = strjoin("SHELL=", shell); - if (!x) - return -ENOMEM; - - path_simplify(x + 6); - our_env[n_env++] = x; - } - - if (!sd_id128_is_null(p->invocation_id)) { - assert(p->invocation_id_string); - - x = strjoin("INVOCATION_ID=", p->invocation_id_string); - if (!x) - return -ENOMEM; - - our_env[n_env++] = x; - } - - if (exec_context_needs_term(c)) { - _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = NULL; - const char *tty_path, *term = NULL; - - tty_path = exec_context_tty_path(c); - - /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try - * to inherit the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the - * container manager passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */ - - if (path_equal_ptr(tty_path, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1) - term = getenv("TERM"); - else if (tty_path && in_charset(skip_dev_prefix(tty_path), ALPHANUMERICAL)) { - _cleanup_free_ char *key = NULL; - - key = strjoin("systemd.tty.term.", skip_dev_prefix(tty_path)); - if (!key) - return -ENOMEM; - - r = proc_cmdline_get_key(key, 0, &cmdline); - if (r < 0) - log_exec_debug_errno(c, - p, - r, - "Failed to read %s from kernel cmdline, ignoring: %m", - key); - else if (r > 0) - term = cmdline; - } - - if (!term) - term = default_term_for_tty(tty_path); - - x = strjoin("TERM=", term); - if (!x) - return -ENOMEM; - our_env[n_env++] = x; - } - - if (journal_stream_dev != 0 && journal_stream_ino != 0) { - if (asprintf(&x, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT ":" INO_FMT, journal_stream_dev, journal_stream_ino) < 0) - return -ENOMEM; - - our_env[n_env++] = x; - } - - if (c->log_namespace) { - x = strjoin("LOG_NAMESPACE=", c->log_namespace); - if (!x) - return -ENOMEM; - - our_env[n_env++] = x; - } - - for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { - _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL; - const char *n; - - if (!p->prefix[t]) - continue; - - if (c->directories[t].n_items == 0) - continue; - - n = exec_directory_env_name_to_string(t); - if (!n) - continue; - - for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[t].n_items; i++) { - _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed = NULL; - - prefixed = path_join(p->prefix[t], c->directories[t].items[i].path); - if (!prefixed) - return -ENOMEM; - - if (!strextend_with_separator(&joined, ":", prefixed)) - return -ENOMEM; - } - - x = strjoin(n, "=", joined); - if (!x) - return -ENOMEM; - - our_env[n_env++] = x; - } - - _cleanup_free_ char *creds_dir = NULL; - r = exec_context_get_credential_directory(c, p, p->unit_id, &creds_dir); - if (r < 0) - return r; - if (r > 0) { - x = strjoin("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY=", creds_dir); - if (!x) - return -ENOMEM; - - our_env[n_env++] = x; - } - - if (asprintf(&x, "SYSTEMD_EXEC_PID=" PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0) - return -ENOMEM; - - our_env[n_env++] = x; - - if (memory_pressure_path) { - x = strjoin("MEMORY_PRESSURE_WATCH=", memory_pressure_path); - if (!x) - return -ENOMEM; - - our_env[n_env++] = x; - - if (cgroup_context && !path_equal(memory_pressure_path, "/dev/null")) { - _cleanup_free_ char *b = NULL, *e = NULL; - - if (asprintf(&b, "%s " USEC_FMT " " USEC_FMT, - MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_TYPE, - cgroup_context->memory_pressure_threshold_usec == USEC_INFINITY ? MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_THRESHOLD_USEC : - CLAMP(cgroup_context->memory_pressure_threshold_usec, 1U, MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_WINDOW_USEC), - MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_WINDOW_USEC) < 0) - return -ENOMEM; - - if (base64mem(b, strlen(b) + 1, &e) < 0) - return -ENOMEM; - - x = strjoin("MEMORY_PRESSURE_WRITE=", e); - if (!x) - return -ENOMEM; - - our_env[n_env++] = x; - } - } - - assert(n_env < N_ENV_VARS + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); -#undef N_ENV_VARS - - *ret = TAKE_PTR(our_env); - - return 0; -} - -static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) { - _cleanup_strv_free_ char **pass_env = NULL; - size_t n_env = 0; - - STRV_FOREACH(i, c->pass_environment) { - _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL; - char *v; - - v = getenv(*i); - if (!v) - continue; - x = strjoin(*i, "=", v); - if (!x) - return -ENOMEM; - - if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env, n_env + 2)) - return -ENOMEM; - - pass_env[n_env++] = TAKE_PTR(x); - pass_env[n_env] = NULL; - } - - *ret = TAKE_PTR(pass_env); - - return 0; -} - bool exec_needs_network_namespace(const ExecContext *context) { assert(context); @@ -2191,7 +170,7 @@ static bool exec_needs_ephemeral(const ExecContext *context) { return (context->root_image || context->root_directory) && context->root_ephemeral; } -static bool exec_needs_ipc_namespace(const ExecContext *context) { +bool exec_needs_ipc_namespace(const ExecContext *context) { assert(context); return context->private_ipc || context->ipc_namespace_path; @@ -2274,166 +253,7 @@ bool exec_needs_mount_namespace( return false; } -static int setup_private_users(uid_t ouid, gid_t ogid, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { - _cleanup_free_ char *uid_map = NULL, *gid_map = NULL; - _cleanup_close_pair_ int errno_pipe[2] = PIPE_EBADF; - _cleanup_close_ int unshare_ready_fd = -EBADF; - _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp) pid_t pid = 0; - uint64_t c = 1; - ssize_t n; - int r; - - /* Set up a user namespace and map the original UID/GID (IDs from before any user or group changes, i.e. - * the IDs from the user or system manager(s)) to itself, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to - * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which - * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process, - * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The - * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and - * continues execution normally. - * For unprivileged users (i.e. without capabilities), the root to root mapping is excluded. As such, it - * does not need CAP_SETUID to write the single line mapping to itself. */ - - /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETUID. */ - if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETUID) > 0 && uid != ouid && uid_is_valid(uid)) - r = asprintf(&uid_map, - UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n" /* Map $OUID → $OUID */ - UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */ - ouid, ouid, uid, uid); - else - r = asprintf(&uid_map, - UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $OUID → $OUID */ - ouid, ouid); - - if (r < 0) - return -ENOMEM; - - /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETGID. */ - if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETGID) > 0 && gid != ogid && gid_is_valid(gid)) - r = asprintf(&gid_map, - GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n" /* Map $OGID → $OGID */ - GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */ - ogid, ogid, gid, gid); - else - r = asprintf(&gid_map, - GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $OGID -> $OGID */ - ogid, ogid); - - if (r < 0) - return -ENOMEM; - - /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user - * namespace. */ - unshare_ready_fd = eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC); - if (unshare_ready_fd < 0) - return -errno; - - /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it - * failed. */ - if (pipe2(errno_pipe, O_CLOEXEC) < 0) - return -errno; - - r = safe_fork("(sd-userns)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS|FORK_DEATHSIG, &pid); - if (r < 0) - return r; - if (r == 0) { - _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; - const char *a; - pid_t ppid; - - /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from - * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */ - - ppid = getppid(); - errno_pipe[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe[0]); - - /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */ - if (read(unshare_ready_fd, &c, sizeof(c)) < 0) { - r = -errno; - goto child_fail; - } - - /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */ - a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "setgroups"); - fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); - if (fd < 0) { - if (errno != ENOENT) { - r = -errno; - goto child_fail; - } - - /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */ - } else { - if (write(fd, "deny\n", 5) < 0) { - r = -errno; - goto child_fail; - } - - fd = safe_close(fd); - } - - /* First write the GID map */ - a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "gid_map"); - fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); - if (fd < 0) { - r = -errno; - goto child_fail; - } - if (write(fd, gid_map, strlen(gid_map)) < 0) { - r = -errno; - goto child_fail; - } - fd = safe_close(fd); - - /* The write the UID map */ - a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "uid_map"); - fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); - if (fd < 0) { - r = -errno; - goto child_fail; - } - if (write(fd, uid_map, strlen(uid_map)) < 0) { - r = -errno; - goto child_fail; - } - - _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); - - child_fail: - (void) write(errno_pipe[1], &r, sizeof(r)); - _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); - } - - errno_pipe[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe[1]); - - if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) < 0) - return -errno; - - /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */ - if (write(unshare_ready_fd, &c, sizeof(c)) < 0) - return -errno; - - /* Try to read an error code from the child */ - n = read(errno_pipe[0], &r, sizeof(r)); - if (n < 0) - return -errno; - if (n == sizeof(r)) { /* an error code was sent to us */ - if (r < 0) - return r; - return -EIO; - } - if (n != 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */ - return -EIO; - - r = wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-userns)", TAKE_PID(pid), 0); - if (r < 0) - return r; - if (r != EXIT_SUCCESS) /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */ - return -EIO; - - return 0; -} - -static bool exec_directory_is_private(const ExecContext *context, ExecDirectoryType type) { +bool exec_directory_is_private(const ExecContext *context, ExecDirectoryType type) { assert(context); if (!context->dynamic_user) @@ -2448,1322 +268,7 @@ static bool exec_directory_is_private(const ExecContext *context, ExecDirectoryT return true; } -static int create_many_symlinks(const char *root, const char *source, char **symlinks) { - _cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL; - int r; - - assert(source); - - src_abs = path_join(root, source); - if (!src_abs) - return -ENOMEM; - - STRV_FOREACH(dst, symlinks) { - _cleanup_free_ char *dst_abs = NULL; - - dst_abs = path_join(root, *dst); - if (!dst_abs) - return -ENOMEM; - - r = mkdir_parents_label(dst_abs, 0755); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - r = symlink_idempotent(src_abs, dst_abs, true); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int setup_exec_directory( - const ExecContext *context, - const ExecParameters *params, - uid_t uid, - gid_t gid, - ExecDirectoryType type, - bool needs_mount_namespace, - int *exit_status) { - - static const int exit_status_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { - [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY, - [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY, - [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = EXIT_CACHE_DIRECTORY, - [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = EXIT_LOGS_DIRECTORY, - [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = EXIT_CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY, - }; - int r; - - assert(context); - assert(params); - assert(type >= 0 && type < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); - assert(exit_status); - - if (!params->prefix[type]) - return 0; - - if (params->flags & EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES) { - if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) - uid = 0; - if (!gid_is_valid(gid)) - gid = 0; - } - - for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[type].n_items; i++) { - _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *pp = NULL; - - p = path_join(params->prefix[type], context->directories[type].items[i].path); - if (!p) { - r = -ENOMEM; - goto fail; - } - - r = mkdir_parents_label(p, 0755); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - - if (IN_SET(type, EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE, EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS) && params->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER) { - - /* If we are in user mode, and a configuration directory exists but a state directory - * doesn't exist, then we likely are upgrading from an older systemd version that - * didn't know the more recent addition to the xdg-basedir spec: the $XDG_STATE_HOME - * directory. In older systemd versions EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE was aliased to - * EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION, with the advent of $XDG_STATE_HOME is is now - * separated. If a service has both dirs configured but only the configuration dir - * exists and the state dir does not, we assume we are looking at an update - * situation. Hence, create a compatibility symlink, so that all expectations are - * met. - * - * (We also do something similar with the log directory, which still doesn't exist in - * the xdg basedir spec. We'll make it a subdir of the state dir.) */ - - /* this assumes the state dir is always created before the configuration dir */ - assert_cc(EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE < EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS); - assert_cc(EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS < EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION); - - r = laccess(p, F_OK); - if (r == -ENOENT) { - _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL; - - /* OK, we know that the state dir does not exist. Let's see if the dir exists - * under the configuration hierarchy. */ - - if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE) - q = path_join(params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION], context->directories[type].items[i].path); - else if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS) - q = path_join(params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION], "log", context->directories[type].items[i].path); - else - assert_not_reached(); - if (!q) { - r = -ENOMEM; - goto fail; - } - - r = laccess(q, F_OK); - if (r >= 0) { - /* It does exist! This hence looks like an update. Symlink the - * configuration directory into the state directory. */ - - r = symlink_idempotent(q, p, /* make_relative= */ true); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - - log_exec_notice(context, params, "Unit state directory %s missing but matching configuration directory %s exists, assuming update from systemd 253 or older, creating compatibility symlink.", p, q); - continue; - } else if (r != -ENOENT) - log_exec_warning_errno(context, params, r, "Unable to detect whether unit configuration directory '%s' exists, assuming not: %m", q); - - } else if (r < 0) - log_exec_warning_errno(context, params, r, "Unable to detect whether unit state directory '%s' is missing, assuming it is: %m", p); - } - - if (exec_directory_is_private(context, type)) { - /* So, here's one extra complication when dealing with DynamicUser=1 units. In that - * case we want to avoid leaving a directory around fully accessible that is owned by - * a dynamic user whose UID is later on reused. To lock this down we use the same - * trick used by container managers to prohibit host users to get access to files of - * the same UID in containers: we place everything inside a directory that has an - * access mode of 0700 and is owned root:root, so that it acts as security boundary - * for unprivileged host code. We then use fs namespacing to make this directory - * permeable for the service itself. - * - * Specifically: for a service which wants a special directory "foo/" we first create - * a directory "private/" with access mode 0700 owned by root:root. Then we place - * "foo" inside of that directory (i.e. "private/foo/"), and make "foo" a symlink to - * "private/foo". This way, privileged host users can access "foo/" as usual, but - * unprivileged host users can't look into it. Inside of the namespace of the unit - * "private/" is replaced by a more liberally accessible tmpfs, into which the host's - * "private/foo/" is mounted under the same name, thus disabling the access boundary - * for the service and making sure it only gets access to the dirs it needs but no - * others. Tricky? Yes, absolutely, but it works! - * - * Note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION as that's assumed not - * to be owned by the service itself. - * - * Also, note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME as that's often used - * for sharing files or sockets with other services. */ - - pp = path_join(params->prefix[type], "private"); - if (!pp) { - r = -ENOMEM; - goto fail; - } - - /* First set up private root if it doesn't exist yet, with access mode 0700 and owned by root:root */ - r = mkdir_safe_label(pp, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - - if (!path_extend(&pp, context->directories[type].items[i].path)) { - r = -ENOMEM; - goto fail; - } - - /* Create all directories between the configured directory and this private root, and mark them 0755 */ - r = mkdir_parents_label(pp, 0755); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - - if (is_dir(p, false) > 0 && - (laccess(pp, F_OK) == -ENOENT)) { - - /* Hmm, the private directory doesn't exist yet, but the normal one exists? If so, move - * it over. Most likely the service has been upgraded from one that didn't use - * DynamicUser=1, to one that does. */ - - log_exec_info(context, - params, - "Found pre-existing public %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n" - "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned off, and has now turned it on.", - exec_directory_type_to_string(type), p, pp); - - r = RET_NERRNO(rename(p, pp)); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - } else { - /* Otherwise, create the actual directory for the service */ - - r = mkdir_label(pp, context->directories[type].mode); - if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) - goto fail; - } - - if (!context->directories[type].items[i].only_create) { - /* And link it up from the original place. - * Notes - * 1) If a mount namespace is going to be used, then this symlink remains on - * the host, and a new one for the child namespace will be created later. - * 2) It is not necessary to create this symlink when one of its parent - * directories is specified and already created. E.g. - * StateDirectory=foo foo/bar - * In that case, the inode points to pp and p for "foo/bar" are the same: - * pp = "/var/lib/private/foo/bar" - * p = "/var/lib/foo/bar" - * and, /var/lib/foo is a symlink to /var/lib/private/foo. So, not only - * we do not need to create the symlink, but we cannot create the symlink. - * See issue #24783. */ - r = symlink_idempotent(pp, p, true); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - } - - } else { - _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL; - - if (type != EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION && - readlink_and_make_absolute(p, &target) >= 0) { - _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL, *q_resolved = NULL, *target_resolved = NULL; - - /* This already exists and is a symlink? Interesting. Maybe it's one created - * by DynamicUser=1 (see above)? - * - * We do this for all directory types except for ConfigurationDirectory=, - * since they all support the private/ symlink logic at least in some - * configurations, see above. */ - - r = chase(target, NULL, 0, &target_resolved, NULL); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - - q = path_join(params->prefix[type], "private", context->directories[type].items[i].path); - if (!q) { - r = -ENOMEM; - goto fail; - } - - /* /var/lib or friends may be symlinks. So, let's chase them also. */ - r = chase(q, NULL, CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &q_resolved, NULL); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - - if (path_equal(q_resolved, target_resolved)) { - - /* Hmm, apparently DynamicUser= was once turned on for this service, - * but is no longer. Let's move the directory back up. */ - - log_exec_info(context, - params, - "Found pre-existing private %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n" - "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned on, and has now turned it off.", - exec_directory_type_to_string(type), q, p); - - r = RET_NERRNO(unlink(p)); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - - r = RET_NERRNO(rename(q, p)); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - } - } - - r = mkdir_label(p, context->directories[type].mode); - if (r < 0) { - if (r != -EEXIST) - goto fail; - - if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) { - struct stat st; - - /* Don't change the owner/access mode of the configuration directory, - * as in the common case it is not written to by a service, and shall - * not be writable. */ - - r = RET_NERRNO(stat(p, &st)); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - - /* Still complain if the access mode doesn't match */ - if (((st.st_mode ^ context->directories[type].mode) & 07777) != 0) - log_exec_warning(context, - params, - "%s \'%s\' already exists but the mode is different. " - "(File system: %o %sMode: %o)", - exec_directory_type_to_string(type), context->directories[type].items[i].path, - st.st_mode & 07777, exec_directory_type_to_string(type), context->directories[type].mode & 07777); - - continue; - } - } - } - - /* Lock down the access mode (we use chmod_and_chown() to make this idempotent. We don't - * specify UID/GID here, so that path_chown_recursive() can optimize things depending on the - * current UID/GID ownership.) */ - r = chmod_and_chown(pp ?: p, context->directories[type].mode, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - - /* Skip the rest (which deals with ownership) in user mode, since ownership changes are not - * available to user code anyway */ - if (params->runtime_scope != RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM) - continue; - - /* Then, change the ownership of the whole tree, if necessary. When dynamic users are used we - * drop the suid/sgid bits, since we really don't want SUID/SGID files for dynamic UID/GID - * assignments to exist. */ - r = path_chown_recursive(pp ?: p, uid, gid, context->dynamic_user ? 01777 : 07777, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - } - - /* If we are not going to run in a namespace, set up the symlinks - otherwise - * they are set up later, to allow configuring empty var/run/etc. */ - if (!needs_mount_namespace) - for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[type].n_items; i++) { - r = create_many_symlinks(params->prefix[type], - context->directories[type].items[i].path, - context->directories[type].items[i].symlinks); - if (r < 0) - goto fail; - } - - return 0; - -fail: - *exit_status = exit_status_table[type]; - return r; -} - -#if ENABLE_SMACK -static int setup_smack( - const ExecParameters *params, - const ExecContext *context, - int executable_fd) { - int r; - - assert(params); - assert(executable_fd >= 0); - - if (context->smack_process_label) { - r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } else if (params->fallback_smack_process_label) { - _cleanup_free_ char *exec_label = NULL; - - r = mac_smack_read_fd(executable_fd, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label); - if (r < 0 && !ERRNO_IS_XATTR_ABSENT(r)) - return r; - - r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label ?: params->fallback_smack_process_label); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif - -static int compile_bind_mounts( - const ExecContext *context, - const ExecParameters *params, - BindMount **ret_bind_mounts, - size_t *ret_n_bind_mounts, - char ***ret_empty_directories) { - - _cleanup_strv_free_ char **empty_directories = NULL; - BindMount *bind_mounts = NULL; - size_t n, h = 0; - int r; - - assert(context); - assert(params); - assert(ret_bind_mounts); - assert(ret_n_bind_mounts); - assert(ret_empty_directories); - - CLEANUP_ARRAY(bind_mounts, h, bind_mount_free_many); - - n = context->n_bind_mounts; - for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { - if (!params->prefix[t]) - continue; - - for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[t].n_items; i++) - n += !context->directories[t].items[i].only_create; - } - - if (n <= 0) { - *ret_bind_mounts = NULL; - *ret_n_bind_mounts = 0; - *ret_empty_directories = NULL; - return 0; - } - - bind_mounts = new(BindMount, n); - if (!bind_mounts) - return -ENOMEM; - - for (size_t i = 0; i < context->n_bind_mounts; i++) { - BindMount *item = context->bind_mounts + i; - _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL; - - s = strdup(item->source); - if (!s) - return -ENOMEM; - - d = strdup(item->destination); - if (!d) - return -ENOMEM; - - bind_mounts[h++] = (BindMount) { - .source = TAKE_PTR(s), - .destination = TAKE_PTR(d), - .read_only = item->read_only, - .recursive = item->recursive, - .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent, - }; - } - - for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { - if (!params->prefix[t]) - continue; - - if (context->directories[t].n_items == 0) - continue; - - if (exec_directory_is_private(context, t) && - !exec_context_with_rootfs(context)) { - char *private_root; - - /* So this is for a dynamic user, and we need to make sure the process can access its own - * directory. For that we overmount the usually inaccessible "private" subdirectory with a - * tmpfs that makes it accessible and is empty except for the submounts we do this for. */ - - private_root = path_join(params->prefix[t], "private"); - if (!private_root) - return -ENOMEM; - - r = strv_consume(&empty_directories, private_root); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[t].n_items; i++) { - _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL; - - /* When one of the parent directories is in the list, we cannot create the symlink - * for the child directory. See also the comments in setup_exec_directory(). */ - if (context->directories[t].items[i].only_create) - continue; - - if (exec_directory_is_private(context, t)) - s = path_join(params->prefix[t], "private", context->directories[t].items[i].path); - else - s = path_join(params->prefix[t], context->directories[t].items[i].path); - if (!s) - return -ENOMEM; - - if (exec_directory_is_private(context, t) && - exec_context_with_rootfs(context)) - /* When RootDirectory= or RootImage= are set, then the symbolic link to the private - * directory is not created on the root directory. So, let's bind-mount the directory - * on the 'non-private' place. */ - d = path_join(params->prefix[t], context->directories[t].items[i].path); - else - d = strdup(s); - if (!d) - return -ENOMEM; - - bind_mounts[h++] = (BindMount) { - .source = TAKE_PTR(s), - .destination = TAKE_PTR(d), - .read_only = false, - .nosuid = context->dynamic_user, /* don't allow suid/sgid when DynamicUser= is on */ - .recursive = true, - .ignore_enoent = false, - }; - } - } - - assert(h == n); - - *ret_bind_mounts = TAKE_PTR(bind_mounts); - *ret_n_bind_mounts = n; - *ret_empty_directories = TAKE_PTR(empty_directories); - - return (int) n; -} - -/* ret_symlinks will contain a list of pairs src:dest that describes - * the symlinks to create later on. For example, the symlinks needed - * to safely give private directories to DynamicUser=1 users. */ -static int compile_symlinks( - const ExecContext *context, - const ExecParameters *params, - bool setup_os_release_symlink, - char ***ret_symlinks) { - - _cleanup_strv_free_ char **symlinks = NULL; - int r; - - assert(context); - assert(params); - assert(ret_symlinks); - - for (ExecDirectoryType dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { - for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[dt].n_items; i++) { - _cleanup_free_ char *private_path = NULL, *path = NULL; - - STRV_FOREACH(symlink, context->directories[dt].items[i].symlinks) { - _cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL, *dst_abs = NULL; - - src_abs = path_join(params->prefix[dt], context->directories[dt].items[i].path); - dst_abs = path_join(params->prefix[dt], *symlink); - if (!src_abs || !dst_abs) - return -ENOMEM; - - r = strv_consume_pair(&symlinks, TAKE_PTR(src_abs), TAKE_PTR(dst_abs)); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - if (!exec_directory_is_private(context, dt) || - exec_context_with_rootfs(context) || - context->directories[dt].items[i].only_create) - continue; - - private_path = path_join(params->prefix[dt], "private", context->directories[dt].items[i].path); - if (!private_path) - return -ENOMEM; - - path = path_join(params->prefix[dt], context->directories[dt].items[i].path); - if (!path) - return -ENOMEM; - - r = strv_consume_pair(&symlinks, TAKE_PTR(private_path), TAKE_PTR(path)); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - } - - /* We make the host's os-release available via a symlink, so that we can copy it atomically - * and readers will never get a half-written version. Note that, while the paths specified here are - * absolute, when they are processed in namespace.c they will be made relative automatically, i.e.: - * 'os-release -> .os-release-stage/os-release' is what will be created. */ - if (setup_os_release_symlink) { - r = strv_extend(&symlinks, "/run/host/.os-release-stage/os-release"); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - r = strv_extend(&symlinks, "/run/host/os-release"); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - *ret_symlinks = TAKE_PTR(symlinks); - - return 0; -} - -static bool insist_on_sandboxing( - const ExecContext *context, - const char *root_dir, - const char *root_image, - const BindMount *bind_mounts, - size_t n_bind_mounts) { - - assert(context); - assert(n_bind_mounts == 0 || bind_mounts); - - /* Checks whether we need to insist on fs namespacing. i.e. whether we have settings configured that - * would alter the view on the file system beyond making things read-only or invisible, i.e. would - * rearrange stuff in a way we cannot ignore gracefully. */ - - if (context->n_temporary_filesystems > 0) - return true; - - if (root_dir || root_image) - return true; - - if (context->n_mount_images > 0) - return true; - - if (context->dynamic_user) - return true; - - if (context->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(context->extension_directories)) - return true; - - /* If there are any bind mounts set that don't map back onto themselves, fs namespacing becomes - * essential. */ - for (size_t i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++) - if (!path_equal(bind_mounts[i].source, bind_mounts[i].destination)) - return true; - - if (context->log_namespace) - return true; - - return false; -} - -static int setup_ephemeral(const ExecContext *context, ExecRuntime *runtime) { - _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; - int r; - - if (!runtime || !runtime->ephemeral_copy) - return 0; - - r = posix_lock(runtime->ephemeral_storage_socket[0], LOCK_EX); - if (r < 0) - return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to lock ephemeral storage socket: %m"); - - CLEANUP_POSIX_UNLOCK(runtime->ephemeral_storage_socket[0]); - - fd = receive_one_fd(runtime->ephemeral_storage_socket[0], MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT); - if (fd >= 0) - /* We got an fd! That means ephemeral has already been set up, so nothing to do here. */ - return 0; - - if (fd != -EAGAIN) - return log_debug_errno(fd, "Failed to receive file descriptor queued on ephemeral storage socket: %m"); - - log_debug("Making ephemeral snapshot of %s to %s", - context->root_image ?: context->root_directory, runtime->ephemeral_copy); - - if (context->root_image) - fd = copy_file(context->root_image, runtime->ephemeral_copy, O_EXCL, 0600, - COPY_LOCK_BSD|COPY_REFLINK|COPY_CRTIME); - else - fd = btrfs_subvol_snapshot_at(AT_FDCWD, context->root_directory, - AT_FDCWD, runtime->ephemeral_copy, - BTRFS_SNAPSHOT_FALLBACK_COPY | - BTRFS_SNAPSHOT_FALLBACK_DIRECTORY | - BTRFS_SNAPSHOT_RECURSIVE | - BTRFS_SNAPSHOT_LOCK_BSD); - if (fd < 0) - return log_debug_errno(fd, "Failed to snapshot %s to %s: %m", - context->root_image ?: context->root_directory, runtime->ephemeral_copy); - - if (context->root_image) { - /* A root image might be subject to lots of random writes so let's try to disable COW on it - * which tends to not perform well in combination with lots of random writes. - * - * Note: btrfs actually isn't impressed by us setting the flag after making the reflink'ed - * copy, but we at least want to make the intention clear. - */ - r = chattr_fd(fd, FS_NOCOW_FL, FS_NOCOW_FL, NULL); - if (r < 0) - log_debug_errno(fd, "Failed to disable copy-on-write for %s, ignoring: %m", runtime->ephemeral_copy); - } - - r = send_one_fd(runtime->ephemeral_storage_socket[1], fd, MSG_DONTWAIT); - if (r < 0) - return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to queue file descriptor on ephemeral storage socket: %m"); - - return 1; -} - -static int verity_settings_prepare( - VeritySettings *verity, - const char *root_image, - const void *root_hash, - size_t root_hash_size, - const char *root_hash_path, - const void *root_hash_sig, - size_t root_hash_sig_size, - const char *root_hash_sig_path, - const char *verity_data_path) { - - int r; - - assert(verity); - - if (root_hash) { - void *d; - - d = memdup(root_hash, root_hash_size); - if (!d) - return -ENOMEM; - - free_and_replace(verity->root_hash, d); - verity->root_hash_size = root_hash_size; - verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT; - } - - if (root_hash_sig) { - void *d; - - d = memdup(root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size); - if (!d) - return -ENOMEM; - - free_and_replace(verity->root_hash_sig, d); - verity->root_hash_sig_size = root_hash_sig_size; - verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT; - } - - if (verity_data_path) { - r = free_and_strdup(&verity->data_path, verity_data_path); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - r = verity_settings_load( - verity, - root_image, - root_hash_path, - root_hash_sig_path); - if (r < 0) - return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to load root hash: %m"); - - return 0; -} - -static int apply_mount_namespace( - ExecCommandFlags command_flags, - const ExecContext *context, - const ExecParameters *params, - ExecRuntime *runtime, - const char *memory_pressure_path, - char **error_path) { - - _cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT; - _cleanup_strv_free_ char **empty_directories = NULL, **symlinks = NULL, - **read_write_paths_cleanup = NULL; - _cleanup_free_ char *creds_path = NULL, *incoming_dir = NULL, *propagate_dir = NULL, - *extension_dir = NULL, *host_os_release_stage = NULL; - const char *root_dir = NULL, *root_image = NULL, *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL; - char **read_write_paths; - bool needs_sandboxing, setup_os_release_symlink; - BindMount *bind_mounts = NULL; - size_t n_bind_mounts = 0; - int r; - - assert(context); - - CLEANUP_ARRAY(bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, bind_mount_free_many); - - if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) { - r = setup_ephemeral(context, runtime); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - if (context->root_image) - root_image = (runtime ? runtime->ephemeral_copy : NULL) ?: context->root_image; - else - root_dir = (runtime ? runtime->ephemeral_copy : NULL) ?: context->root_directory; - } - - r = compile_bind_mounts(context, params, &bind_mounts, &n_bind_mounts, &empty_directories); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - /* We need to make the pressure path writable even if /sys/fs/cgroups is made read-only, as the - * service will need to write to it in order to start the notifications. */ - if (context->protect_control_groups && memory_pressure_path && !streq(memory_pressure_path, "/dev/null")) { - read_write_paths_cleanup = strv_copy(context->read_write_paths); - if (!read_write_paths_cleanup) - return -ENOMEM; - - r = strv_extend(&read_write_paths_cleanup, memory_pressure_path); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - read_write_paths = read_write_paths_cleanup; - } else - read_write_paths = context->read_write_paths; - - needs_sandboxing = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command_flags & EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED); - if (needs_sandboxing) { - /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp, which is non-accessible - * to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp that is sticky, and that's the one we want to - * use here. This does not apply when we are using /run/systemd/empty as fallback. */ - - if (context->private_tmp && runtime && runtime->shared) { - if (streq_ptr(runtime->shared->tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY)) - tmp_dir = runtime->shared->tmp_dir; - else if (runtime->shared->tmp_dir) - tmp_dir = strjoina(runtime->shared->tmp_dir, "/tmp"); - - if (streq_ptr(runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY)) - var_tmp_dir = runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir; - else if (runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir) - var_tmp_dir = strjoina(runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp"); - } - } - - /* Symlinks (exec dirs, os-release) are set up after other mounts, before they are made read-only. */ - setup_os_release_symlink = needs_sandboxing && exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context) && (root_dir || root_image); - r = compile_symlinks(context, params, setup_os_release_symlink, &symlinks); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - if (context->mount_propagation_flag == MS_SHARED) - log_exec_debug(context, - params, - "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring"); - - if (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_WRITE_CREDENTIALS)) { - r = exec_context_get_credential_directory(context, params, params->unit_id, &creds_path); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - if (params->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM) { - propagate_dir = path_join("/run/systemd/propagate/", params->unit_id); - if (!propagate_dir) - return -ENOMEM; - - incoming_dir = strdup("/run/systemd/incoming"); - if (!incoming_dir) - return -ENOMEM; - - extension_dir = strdup("/run/systemd/unit-extensions"); - if (!extension_dir) - return -ENOMEM; - - /* If running under a different root filesystem, propagate the host's os-release. We make a - * copy rather than just bind mounting it, so that it can be updated on soft-reboot. */ - if (setup_os_release_symlink) { - host_os_release_stage = strdup("/run/systemd/propagate/.os-release-stage"); - if (!host_os_release_stage) - return -ENOMEM; - } - } else { - assert(params->runtime_scope == RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER); - - if (asprintf(&extension_dir, "/run/user/" UID_FMT "/systemd/unit-extensions", geteuid()) < 0) - return -ENOMEM; - - if (setup_os_release_symlink) { - if (asprintf(&host_os_release_stage, - "/run/user/" UID_FMT "/systemd/propagate/.os-release-stage", - geteuid()) < 0) - return -ENOMEM; - } - } - - if (root_image) { - r = verity_settings_prepare( - &verity, - root_image, - context->root_hash, context->root_hash_size, context->root_hash_path, - context->root_hash_sig, context->root_hash_sig_size, context->root_hash_sig_path, - context->root_verity); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - NamespaceParameters parameters = { - .runtime_scope = params->runtime_scope, - - .root_directory = root_dir, - .root_image = root_image, - .root_image_options = context->root_image_options, - .root_image_policy = context->root_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service, - - .read_write_paths = read_write_paths, - .read_only_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->read_only_paths : NULL, - .inaccessible_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->inaccessible_paths : NULL, - - .exec_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->exec_paths : NULL, - .no_exec_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->no_exec_paths : NULL, - - .empty_directories = empty_directories, - .symlinks = symlinks, - - .bind_mounts = bind_mounts, - .n_bind_mounts = n_bind_mounts, - - .temporary_filesystems = context->temporary_filesystems, - .n_temporary_filesystems = context->n_temporary_filesystems, - - .mount_images = context->mount_images, - .n_mount_images = context->n_mount_images, - .mount_image_policy = context->mount_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service, - - .tmp_dir = tmp_dir, - .var_tmp_dir = var_tmp_dir, - - .creds_path = creds_path, - .log_namespace = context->log_namespace, - .mount_propagation_flag = context->mount_propagation_flag, - - .verity = &verity, - - .extension_images = context->extension_images, - .n_extension_images = context->n_extension_images, - .extension_image_policy = context->extension_image_policy ?: &image_policy_sysext, - .extension_directories = context->extension_directories, - - .propagate_dir = propagate_dir, - .incoming_dir = incoming_dir, - .extension_dir = extension_dir, - .notify_socket = root_dir || root_image ? params->notify_socket : NULL, - .host_os_release_stage = host_os_release_stage, - - /* If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed sandbox info, - * otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and fail if we are enable to apply the - * sandbox inside the mount namespace. */ - .ignore_protect_paths = !needs_sandboxing && !context->dynamic_user && root_dir, - - .protect_control_groups = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_control_groups, - .protect_kernel_tunables = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_kernel_tunables, - .protect_kernel_modules = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_kernel_modules, - .protect_kernel_logs = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_kernel_logs, - .protect_hostname = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_hostname, - - .private_dev = needs_sandboxing && context->private_devices, - .private_network = needs_sandboxing && exec_needs_network_namespace(context), - .private_ipc = needs_sandboxing && exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context), - - .mount_apivfs = needs_sandboxing && exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context), - - /* If NNP is on, we can turn on MS_NOSUID, since it won't have any effect anymore. */ - .mount_nosuid = needs_sandboxing && context->no_new_privileges && !mac_selinux_use(), - - .protect_home = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_home, - .protect_system = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_system, - .protect_proc = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_proc, - .proc_subset = needs_sandboxing && context->proc_subset, - }; - - r = setup_namespace(¶meters, error_path); - /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports - * that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceed, but only if exclusively - * sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a - * completely different execution environment. */ - if (r == -ENOANO) { - if (insist_on_sandboxing( - context, - root_dir, root_image, - bind_mounts, - n_bind_mounts)) - return log_exec_debug_errno(context, - params, - SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), - "Failed to set up namespace, and refusing to continue since " - "the selected namespacing options alter mount environment non-trivially.\n" - "Bind mounts: %zu, temporary filesystems: %zu, root directory: %s, root image: %s, dynamic user: %s", - n_bind_mounts, - context->n_temporary_filesystems, - yes_no(root_dir), - yes_no(root_image), - yes_no(context->dynamic_user)); - - log_exec_debug(context, params, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring."); - return 0; - } - - return r; -} - -static int apply_working_directory( - const ExecContext *context, - const ExecParameters *params, - ExecRuntime *runtime, - const char *home, - int *exit_status) { - - const char *d, *wd; - - assert(context); - assert(exit_status); - - if (context->working_directory_home) { - - if (!home) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; - return -ENXIO; - } - - wd = home; - - } else - wd = empty_to_root(context->working_directory); - - if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) - d = wd; - else - d = prefix_roota((runtime ? runtime->ephemeral_copy : NULL) ?: context->root_directory, wd); - - if (chdir(d) < 0 && !context->working_directory_missing_ok) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; - return -errno; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int apply_root_directory( - const ExecContext *context, - const ExecParameters *params, - ExecRuntime *runtime, - const bool needs_mount_ns, - int *exit_status) { - - assert(context); - assert(exit_status); - - if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) - if (!needs_mount_ns && context->root_directory) - if (chroot((runtime ? runtime->ephemeral_copy : NULL) ?: context->root_directory) < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CHROOT; - return -errno; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int setup_keyring( - const ExecContext *context, - const ExecParameters *p, - uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { - - key_serial_t keyring; - int r = 0; - uid_t saved_uid; - gid_t saved_gid; - - assert(context); - assert(p); - - /* Let's set up a new per-service "session" kernel keyring for each system service. This has the benefit that - * each service runs with its own keyring shared among all processes of the service, but with no hook-up beyond - * that scope, and in particular no link to the per-UID keyring. If we don't do this the keyring will be - * automatically created on-demand and then linked to the per-UID keyring, by the kernel. The kernel's built-in - * on-demand behaviour is very appropriate for login users, but probably not so much for system services, where - * UIDs are not necessarily specific to a service but reused (at least in the case of UID 0). */ - - if (context->keyring_mode == EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT) - return 0; - - /* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things set up - * properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that sucks for parallel - * execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too. Setting up session keyring, to be owned by the right user - * & group is just as nasty as acquiring a reference to the user keyring. */ - - saved_uid = getuid(); - saved_gid = getgid(); - - if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) { - if (setregid(gid, -1) < 0) - return log_exec_error_errno(context, - p, - errno, - "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m"); - } - - if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) { - if (setreuid(uid, -1) < 0) { - r = log_exec_error_errno(context, - p, - errno, - "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m"); - goto out; - } - } - - keyring = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0, 0, 0); - if (keyring == -1) { - if (errno == ENOSYS) - log_exec_debug_errno(context, - p, - errno, - "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring."); - else if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno)) - log_exec_debug_errno(context, - p, - errno, - "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring."); - else if (errno == EDQUOT) - log_exec_debug_errno(context, - p, - errno, - "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring."); - else - r = log_exec_error_errno(context, - p, - errno, - "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m"); - - goto out; - } - - /* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */ - if (context->keyring_mode == EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED) { - - if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK, - KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, - KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0) < 0) { - r = log_exec_error_errno(context, - p, - errno, - "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m"); - goto out; - } - } - - /* Restore uid/gid back */ - if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) { - if (setreuid(saved_uid, -1) < 0) { - r = log_exec_error_errno(context, - p, - errno, - "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m"); - goto out; - } - } - - if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) { - if (setregid(saved_gid, -1) < 0) - return log_exec_error_errno(context, - p, - errno, - "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m"); - } - - /* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */ - if (!sd_id128_is_null(p->invocation_id)) { - key_serial_t key; - - key = add_key("user", - "invocation_id", - &p->invocation_id, - sizeof(p->invocation_id), - KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING); - if (key == -1) - log_exec_debug_errno(context, - p, - errno, - "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m"); - else { - if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, key, - KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_READ|KEY_POS_SEARCH| - KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_READ|KEY_USR_SEARCH, 0, 0) < 0) - r = log_exec_error_errno(context, - p, - errno, - "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m"); - } - } - -out: - /* Revert back uid & gid for the last time, and exit */ - /* no extra logging, as only the first already reported error matters */ - if (getuid() != saved_uid) - (void) setreuid(saved_uid, -1); - - if (getgid() != saved_gid) - (void) setregid(saved_gid, -1); - - return r; -} - -static void append_socket_pair(int *array, size_t *n, const int pair[static 2]) { - assert(array); - assert(n); - assert(pair); - - if (pair[0] >= 0) - array[(*n)++] = pair[0]; - if (pair[1] >= 0) - array[(*n)++] = pair[1]; -} - -static int close_remaining_fds( - const ExecParameters *params, - const ExecRuntime *runtime, - int socket_fd, - const int *fds, size_t n_fds) { - - size_t n_dont_close = 0; - int dont_close[n_fds + 14]; - - assert(params); - - if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) - dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdin_fd; - if (params->stdout_fd >= 0) - dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdout_fd; - if (params->stderr_fd >= 0) - dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stderr_fd; - - if (socket_fd >= 0) - dont_close[n_dont_close++] = socket_fd; - if (n_fds > 0) { - memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds); - n_dont_close += n_fds; - } - - if (runtime) - append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->ephemeral_storage_socket); - - if (runtime && runtime->shared) { - append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket); - append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket); - } - - if (runtime && runtime->dynamic_creds) { - if (runtime->dynamic_creds->user) - append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->dynamic_creds->user->storage_socket); - if (runtime->dynamic_creds->group) - append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->dynamic_creds->group->storage_socket); - } - - if (params->user_lookup_fd >= 0) - dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->user_lookup_fd; - - return close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close); -} - -static int send_user_lookup( - const char *unit_id, - int user_lookup_fd, - uid_t uid, - gid_t gid) { - - assert(unit_id); - - /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID - * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was - * specified. */ - - if (user_lookup_fd < 0) - return 0; - - if (!uid_is_valid(uid) && !gid_is_valid(gid)) - return 0; - - if (writev(user_lookup_fd, - (struct iovec[]) { - IOVEC_MAKE(&uid, sizeof(uid)), - IOVEC_MAKE(&gid, sizeof(gid)), - IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(unit_id) }, 3) < 0) - return -errno; - - return 0; -} - -static int acquire_home(const ExecContext *c, uid_t uid, const char** home, char **buf) { - int r; - - assert(c); - assert(home); - assert(buf); - - /* If WorkingDirectory=~ is set, try to acquire a usable home directory. */ - - if (*home) - return 0; - - if (!c->working_directory_home) - return 0; - - r = get_home_dir(buf); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - *home = *buf; - return 1; -} - -static int compile_suggested_paths(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, char ***ret) { - _cleanup_strv_free_ char ** list = NULL; - int r; - - assert(c); - assert(p); - assert(ret); - - assert(c->dynamic_user); - - /* Compile a list of paths that it might make sense to read the owning UID from to use as initial candidate for - * dynamic UID allocation, in order to save us from doing costly recursive chown()s of the special - * directories. */ - - for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { - if (t == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) - continue; - - if (!p->prefix[t]) - continue; - - for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[t].n_items; i++) { - char *e; - - if (exec_directory_is_private(c, t)) - e = path_join(p->prefix[t], "private", c->directories[t].items[i].path); - else - e = path_join(p->prefix[t], c->directories[t].items[i].path); - if (!e) - return -ENOMEM; - - r = strv_consume(&list, e); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - } - - *ret = TAKE_PTR(list); - - return 0; -} - -static int exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path( +int exec_params_get_cgroup_path( const ExecParameters *params, const CGroupContext *c, char **ret) { @@ -3804,204 +309,14 @@ static int exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path( return !!subgroup; } -static int exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext *c, CPUSet *ret) { - _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset) CPUSet s = {}; - int r; - - assert(c); - assert(ret); - - if (!c->numa_policy.nodes.set) { - log_debug("Can't derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask because NUMA mask is not set, ignoring"); - return 0; - } - - r = numa_to_cpu_set(&c->numa_policy, &s); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - cpu_set_reset(ret); - - return cpu_set_add_all(ret, &s); -} - bool exec_context_get_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext *c) { assert(c); return c->cpu_affinity_from_numa; } -static int add_shifted_fd(int *fds, size_t fds_size, size_t *n_fds, int fd, int *ret_fd) { - int r; - - assert(fds); - assert(n_fds); - assert(*n_fds < fds_size); - assert(ret_fd); - - if (fd < 0) { - *ret_fd = -EBADF; - return 0; - } - - if (fd < 3 + (int) *n_fds) { - /* Let's move the fd up, so that it's outside of the fd range we will use to store - * the fds we pass to the process (or which are closed only during execve). */ - - r = fcntl(fd, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, 3 + (int) *n_fds); - if (r < 0) - return -errno; - - close_and_replace(fd, r); - } - - *ret_fd = fds[*n_fds] = fd; - (*n_fds) ++; - return 1; -} - -static int connect_unix_harder(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, const OpenFile *of, int ofd) { - union sockaddr_union addr = { - .un.sun_family = AF_UNIX, - }; - socklen_t sa_len; - static const int socket_types[] = { SOCK_DGRAM, SOCK_STREAM, SOCK_SEQPACKET }; - int r; - - assert(c); - assert(p); - assert(of); - assert(ofd >= 0); - - r = sockaddr_un_set_path(&addr.un, FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(ofd)); - if (r < 0) - return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, r, "Failed to set sockaddr for %s: %m", of->path); - - sa_len = r; - - for (size_t i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(socket_types); i++) { - _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; - - fd = socket(AF_UNIX, socket_types[i] | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0); - if (fd < 0) - return log_exec_error_errno(c, - p, - errno, - "Failed to create socket for %s: %m", - of->path); - - r = RET_NERRNO(connect(fd, &addr.sa, sa_len)); - if (r == -EPROTOTYPE) - continue; - if (r < 0) - return log_exec_error_errno(c, - p, - r, - "Failed to connect socket for %s: %m", - of->path); - - return TAKE_FD(fd); - } - - return log_exec_error_errno(c, - p, - SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPROTOTYPE), "Failed to connect socket for \"%s\".", - of->path); -} - -static int get_open_file_fd(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, const OpenFile *of) { - struct stat st; - _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF, ofd = -EBADF; - - assert(c); - assert(p); - assert(of); - - ofd = open(of->path, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); - if (ofd < 0) - return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, errno, "Could not open \"%s\": %m", of->path); - - if (fstat(ofd, &st) < 0) - return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, errno, "Failed to stat %s: %m", of->path); - - if (S_ISSOCK(st.st_mode)) { - fd = connect_unix_harder(c, p, of, ofd); - if (fd < 0) - return fd; - - if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_READ_ONLY) && shutdown(fd, SHUT_WR) < 0) - return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, errno, "Failed to shutdown send for socket %s: %m", - of->path); - - log_exec_debug(c, p, "socket %s opened (fd=%d)", of->path, fd); - } else { - int flags = FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR; - if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_APPEND)) - flags |= O_APPEND; - else if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_TRUNCATE)) - flags |= O_TRUNC; - - fd = fd_reopen(ofd, flags | O_CLOEXEC); - if (fd < 0) - return log_exec_error_errno(c, p, fd, "Failed to open file %s: %m", of->path); - - log_exec_debug(c, p, "file %s opened (fd=%d)", of->path, fd); - } - - return TAKE_FD(fd); -} - -static int collect_open_file_fds( - const ExecContext *c, - const ExecParameters *p, - int **fds, - char ***fdnames, - size_t *n_fds) { - int r; - - assert(c); - assert(p); - assert(fds); - assert(fdnames); - assert(n_fds); - - LIST_FOREACH(open_files, of, p->open_files) { - _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; - - fd = get_open_file_fd(c, p, of); - if (fd < 0) { - if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_GRACEFUL)) { - log_exec_debug_errno(c, p, fd, "Failed to get OpenFile= file descriptor for %s, ignoring: %m", of->path); - continue; - } - - return fd; - } - - if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(*fds, *n_fds + 1)) - return -ENOMEM; - - r = strv_extend(fdnames, of->fdname); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - (*fds)[*n_fds] = TAKE_FD(fd); - - (*n_fds)++; - } - - return 0; -} - -static void log_command_line( - const ExecContext *context, - const ExecParameters *params, - const char *msg, - const char *executable, - char **argv) { - - assert(context); - assert(params); +static void log_command_line(Unit *unit, const char *msg, const char *executable, char **argv) { + assert(unit); assert(msg); assert(executable); @@ -4010,1290 +325,13 @@ static void log_command_line( _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = quote_command_line(argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY); - log_exec_struct(context, params, LOG_DEBUG, + log_unit_struct(unit, LOG_DEBUG, "EXECUTABLE=%s", executable, - LOG_EXEC_MESSAGE(params, "%s: %s", msg, strnull(cmdline)), - LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID(params)); -} - -static bool exec_context_need_unprivileged_private_users( - const ExecContext *context, - const ExecParameters *params) { - - assert(context); - assert(params); - - /* These options require PrivateUsers= when used in user units, as we need to be in a user namespace - * to have permission to enable them when not running as root. If we have effective CAP_SYS_ADMIN - * (system manager) then we have privileges and don't need this. */ - if (params->runtime_scope != RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER) - return false; - - return context->private_users || - context->private_tmp || - context->private_devices || - context->private_network || - context->network_namespace_path || - context->private_ipc || - context->ipc_namespace_path || - context->private_mounts > 0 || - context->mount_apivfs || - context->n_bind_mounts > 0 || - context->n_temporary_filesystems > 0 || - context->root_directory || - !strv_isempty(context->extension_directories) || - context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO || - context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO || - context->protect_kernel_tunables || - context->protect_kernel_modules || - context->protect_kernel_logs || - context->protect_control_groups || - context->protect_clock || - context->protect_hostname || - !strv_isempty(context->read_write_paths) || - !strv_isempty(context->read_only_paths) || - !strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_paths) || - !strv_isempty(context->exec_paths) || - !strv_isempty(context->no_exec_paths); -} - -static bool exec_context_shall_confirm_spawn(const ExecContext *context) { - assert(context); - - if (confirm_spawn_disabled()) - return false; - - /* For some reasons units remaining in the same process group - * as PID 1 fail to acquire the console even if it's not used - * by any process. So skip the confirmation question for them. */ - return !context->same_pgrp; + LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "%s: %s", msg, strnull(cmdline)), + LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit)); } static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l); -static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, int named_iofds[static 3]); - -int exec_invoke( - const ExecCommand *command, - const ExecContext *context, - ExecParameters *params, - ExecRuntime *runtime, - const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, - int *exit_status) { - - _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pass_env = NULL, **joined_exec_search_path = NULL, **accum_env = NULL, **replaced_argv = NULL; - int r, ngids = 0, exec_fd; - _cleanup_free_ gid_t *supplementary_gids = NULL; - const char *username = NULL, *groupname = NULL; - _cleanup_free_ char *home_buffer = NULL, *memory_pressure_path = NULL; - const char *home = NULL, *shell = NULL; - char **final_argv = NULL; - dev_t journal_stream_dev = 0; - ino_t journal_stream_ino = 0; - bool userns_set_up = false; - bool needs_sandboxing, /* Do we need to set up full sandboxing? (i.e. all namespacing, all MAC stuff, caps, yadda yadda */ - needs_setuid, /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */ - needs_mount_namespace, /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */ - needs_ambient_hack; /* Do we need to apply the ambient capabilities hack? */ -#if HAVE_SELINUX - _cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL; - bool use_selinux = false; -#endif -#if ENABLE_SMACK - bool use_smack = false; -#endif -#if HAVE_APPARMOR - bool use_apparmor = false; -#endif - uid_t saved_uid = getuid(); - gid_t saved_gid = getgid(); - uid_t uid = UID_INVALID; - gid_t gid = GID_INVALID; - size_t n_fds, /* fds to pass to the child */ - n_keep_fds; /* total number of fds not to close */ - int secure_bits; - _cleanup_free_ gid_t *gids_after_pam = NULL; - int ngids_after_pam = 0; - _cleanup_free_ int *fds = NULL; - _cleanup_strv_free_ char **fdnames = NULL; - int socket_fd = -EBADF, named_iofds[3] = { -EBADF, -EBADF, -EBADF }, *params_fds = NULL; - size_t n_storage_fds = 0, n_socket_fds = 0; - - assert(command); - assert(context); - assert(params); - assert(exit_status); - - /* Explicitly test for CVE-2021-4034 inspired invocations */ - assert(command->path); - assert(!strv_isempty(command->argv)); - - LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_EXEC(context, params); - - if (context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET || - context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET || - context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) { - - if (params->n_socket_fds > 1) - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got more than one socket."); - - if (params->n_socket_fds == 0) - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got no socket."); - - socket_fd = params->fds[0]; - } else { - params_fds = params->fds; - n_socket_fds = params->n_socket_fds; - n_storage_fds = params->n_storage_fds; - } - n_fds = n_socket_fds + n_storage_fds; - - r = exec_context_named_iofds(context, params, named_iofds); - if (r < 0) - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m"); - - rename_process_from_path(command->path); - - /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main - * daemon. All others we leave untouched because we set them to SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, - * both of which will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */ - (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER, - SIGNALS_IGNORE); - - if (context->ignore_sigpipe) - (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE); - - r = reset_signal_mask(); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m"); - } - - if (params->idle_pipe) - do_idle_pipe_dance(params->idle_pipe); - - /* Close fds we don't need very early to make sure we don't block init reexecution because it cannot bind its - * sockets. Among the fds we close are the logging fds, and we want to keep them closed, so that we don't have - * any fds open we don't really want open during the transition. In order to make logging work, we switch the - * log subsystem into open_when_needed mode, so that it reopens the logs on every single log call. */ - - log_forget_fds(); - log_set_open_when_needed(true); - log_settle_target(); - if (context->log_level_max >= 0) - log_set_max_level(context->log_level_max); - - /* In case anything used libc syslog(), close this here, too */ - closelog(); - - fds = newdup(int, params_fds, n_fds); - if (!fds) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_oom(); - } - - fdnames = strv_copy((char**) params->fd_names); - if (!fdnames) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_oom(); - } - - r = collect_open_file_fds(context, params, &fds, &fdnames, &n_fds); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to get OpenFile= file descriptors: %m"); - } - - int keep_fds[n_fds + 3]; - memcpy_safe(keep_fds, fds, n_fds * sizeof(int)); - n_keep_fds = n_fds; - - r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, params->exec_fd, &exec_fd); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); - } - -#if HAVE_LIBBPF - if (params->bpf_outer_map_fd >= 0) { - r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, params->bpf_outer_map_fd, (int *)¶ms->bpf_outer_map_fd); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); - } - } -#endif - - r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, socket_fd, keep_fds, n_keep_fds); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m"); - } - - if (!context->same_pgrp && - setsid() < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SETSID; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to create new process session: %m"); - } - - exec_context_tty_reset(context, params); - - if (params->shall_confirm_spawn && exec_context_shall_confirm_spawn(context)) { - _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = NULL; - - cmdline = quote_command_line(command->argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY); - if (!cmdline) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_oom(); - } - - r = ask_for_confirmation(context, params, cmdline); - if (r != CONFIRM_EXECUTE) { - if (r == CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS; - return 0; - } - - *exit_status = EXIT_CONFIRM; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ECANCELED), - "Execution cancelled by the user"); - } - } - - /* We are about to invoke NSS and PAM modules. Let's tell them what we are doing here, maybe they care. This is - * used by nss-resolve to disable itself when we are about to start systemd-resolved, to avoid deadlocks. Note - * that these env vars do not survive the execve(), which means they really only apply to the PAM and NSS - * invocations themselves. Also note that while we'll only invoke NSS modules involved in user management they - * might internally call into other NSS modules that are involved in hostname resolution, we never know. */ - if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", params->unit_id, true) != 0 || - setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_SCOPE", runtime_scope_to_string(params->runtime_scope), true) != 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m"); - } - - if (context->dynamic_user && runtime && runtime->dynamic_creds) { - _cleanup_strv_free_ char **suggested_paths = NULL; - - /* On top of that, make sure we bypass our own NSS module nss-systemd comprehensively for any NSS - * checks, if DynamicUser=1 is used, as we shouldn't create a feedback loop with ourselves here. */ - if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m"); - } - - r = compile_suggested_paths(context, params, &suggested_paths); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_oom(); - } - - r = dynamic_creds_realize(runtime->dynamic_creds, suggested_paths, &uid, &gid); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - if (r == -EILSEQ) - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), - "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: User or group with specified name already exists."); - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m"); - } - - if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) { - *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH), "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT"\"", uid); - } - - if (!gid_is_valid(gid)) { - *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH), "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT"\"", gid); - } - - if (runtime->dynamic_creds->user) - username = runtime->dynamic_creds->user->name; - - } else { - if (context->user) { - r = get_fixed_user(context->user, &username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m"); - } - } - - if (context->group) { - r = get_fixed_group(context->group, &groupname, &gid); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m"); - } - } - } - - /* Initialize user supplementary groups and get SupplementaryGroups= ones */ - r = get_supplementary_groups(context, username, groupname, gid, - &supplementary_gids, &ngids); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m"); - } - - r = send_user_lookup(params->unit_id, params->user_lookup_fd, uid, gid); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m"); - } - - params->user_lookup_fd = safe_close(params->user_lookup_fd); - - r = acquire_home(context, uid, &home, &home_buffer); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m"); - } - - /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we must drop O_NONBLOCK */ - if (socket_fd >= 0) - (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd, false); - - /* Journald will try to look-up our cgroup in order to populate _SYSTEMD_CGROUP and _SYSTEMD_UNIT fields. - * Hence we need to migrate to the target cgroup from init.scope before connecting to journald */ - if (params->cgroup_path) { - _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; - - r = exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params, cgroup_context, &p); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m"); - } - - r = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, p, 0, NULL, NULL); - if (r == -EUCLEAN) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to attach process to cgroup %s " - "because the cgroup or one of its parents or " - "siblings is in the threaded mode: %m", p); - } - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p); - } - } - - if (context->network_namespace_path && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { - r = open_shareable_ns_path(runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket, context->network_namespace_path, CLONE_NEWNET); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to open network namespace path %s: %m", context->network_namespace_path); - } - } - - if (context->ipc_namespace_path && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { - r = open_shareable_ns_path(runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket, context->ipc_namespace_path, CLONE_NEWIPC); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to open IPC namespace path %s: %m", context->ipc_namespace_path); - } - } - - r = setup_input(context, params, socket_fd, named_iofds); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up standard input: %m"); - } - - r = setup_output(context, params, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_STDOUT; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up standard output: %m"); - } - - r = setup_output(context, params, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_STDERR; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m"); - } - - if (context->oom_score_adjust_set) { - /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then let's silently skip over it. User - * namespaces prohibit write access to this file, and we shouldn't trip up over that. */ - r = set_oom_score_adjust(context->oom_score_adjust); - if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) - log_exec_debug_errno(context, params, r, - "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m"); - else if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_OOM_ADJUST; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m"); - } - } - - if (context->coredump_filter_set) { - r = set_coredump_filter(context->coredump_filter); - if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) - log_exec_debug_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter, ignoring: %m"); - else if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter: %m"); - } - } - - if (context->nice_set) { - r = setpriority_closest(context->nice); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_NICE; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m"); - } - } - - if (context->cpu_sched_set) { - struct sched_param param = { - .sched_priority = context->cpu_sched_priority, - }; - - r = sched_setscheduler(0, - context->cpu_sched_policy | - (context->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork ? - SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK : 0), - ¶m); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SETSCHEDULER; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m"); - } - } - - if (context->cpu_affinity_from_numa || context->cpu_set.set) { - _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset) CPUSet converted_cpu_set = {}; - const CPUSet *cpu_set; - - if (context->cpu_affinity_from_numa) { - r = exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(context, &converted_cpu_set); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask: %m"); - } - - cpu_set = &converted_cpu_set; - } else - cpu_set = &context->cpu_set; - - if (sched_setaffinity(0, cpu_set->allocated, cpu_set->set) < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m"); - } - } - - if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&context->numa_policy))) { - r = apply_numa_policy(&context->numa_policy); - if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) - log_exec_debug_errno(context, params, r, "NUMA support not available, ignoring."); - else if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_NUMA_POLICY; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set NUMA memory policy: %m"); - } - } - - if (context->ioprio_set) - if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, context->ioprio) < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_IOPRIO; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m"); - } - - if (context->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) - if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, context->timer_slack_nsec) < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_TIMERSLACK; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m"); - } - - if (context->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID) { - r = safe_personality(context->personality); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_PERSONALITY; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m"); - } - } - - if (context->utmp_id) { - const char *line = context->tty_path ? - (path_startswith(context->tty_path, "/dev/") ?: context->tty_path) : - NULL; - utmp_put_init_process(context->utmp_id, getpid_cached(), getsid(0), - line, - context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_INIT ? INIT_PROCESS : - context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN ? LOGIN_PROCESS : - USER_PROCESS, - username); - } - - if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { - r = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m"); - } - } - - if (params->cgroup_path) { - /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup to the user of the new process. On cgroup v1 - * this is only about systemd's own hierarchy, i.e. not the controller hierarchies, simply because that's not - * safe. On cgroup v2 there's only one hierarchy anyway, and delegation is safe there, hence in that case only - * touch a single hierarchy too. */ - - if (params->flags & EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE) { - _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; - - r = cg_set_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, uid, gid); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m"); - } - - r = exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params, cgroup_context, &p); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m"); - } - if (r > 0) { - r = cg_set_access_recursive(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, p, uid, gid); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust control subgroup access: %m"); - } - } - } - - if (cgroup_context && cg_unified() > 0 && is_pressure_supported() > 0) { - if (cgroup_context_want_memory_pressure(cgroup_context)) { - r = cg_get_path("memory", params->cgroup_path, "memory.pressure", &memory_pressure_path); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_oom(); - } - - r = chmod_and_chown(memory_pressure_path, 0644, uid, gid); - if (r < 0) { - log_exec_full_errno(context, params, r == -ENOENT || ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r) ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, r, - "Failed to adjust ownership of '%s', ignoring: %m", memory_pressure_path); - memory_pressure_path = mfree(memory_pressure_path); - } - } else if (cgroup_context->memory_pressure_watch == CGROUP_PRESSURE_WATCH_OFF) { - memory_pressure_path = strdup("/dev/null"); /* /dev/null is explicit indicator for turning of memory pressure watch */ - if (!memory_pressure_path) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_oom(); - } - } - } - } - - needs_mount_namespace = exec_needs_mount_namespace(context, params, runtime); - - for (ExecDirectoryType dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { - r = setup_exec_directory(context, params, uid, gid, dt, needs_mount_namespace, exit_status); - if (r < 0) - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params->prefix[dt]); - } - - if (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_WRITE_CREDENTIALS)) { - r = exec_setup_credentials(context, params, params->unit_id, uid, gid); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CREDENTIALS; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up credentials: %m"); - } - } - - r = build_environment( - context, - params, - cgroup_context, - n_fds, - fdnames, - home, - username, - shell, - journal_stream_dev, - journal_stream_ino, - memory_pressure_path, - &our_env); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_oom(); - } - - r = build_pass_environment(context, &pass_env); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_oom(); - } - - /* The $PATH variable is set to the default path in params->environment. However, this is overridden - * if user-specified fields have $PATH set. The intention is to also override $PATH if the unit does - * not specify PATH but the unit has ExecSearchPath. */ - if (!strv_isempty(context->exec_search_path)) { - _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL; - - joined = strv_join(context->exec_search_path, ":"); - if (!joined) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_oom(); - } - - r = strv_env_assign(&joined_exec_search_path, "PATH", joined); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_oom(); - } - } - - accum_env = strv_env_merge(params->environment, - our_env, - joined_exec_search_path, - pass_env, - context->environment, - params->files_env); - if (!accum_env) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_oom(); - } - accum_env = strv_env_clean(accum_env); - - (void) umask(context->umask); - - r = setup_keyring(context, params, uid, gid); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_KEYRING; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m"); - } - - /* We need sandboxing if the caller asked us to apply it and the command isn't explicitly excepted - * from it. */ - needs_sandboxing = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED); - - /* We need the ambient capability hack, if the caller asked us to apply it and the command is marked - * for it, and the kernel doesn't actually support ambient caps. */ - needs_ambient_hack = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && (command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC) && !ambient_capabilities_supported(); - - /* We need setresuid() if the caller asked us to apply sandboxing and the command isn't explicitly - * excepted from either whole sandboxing or just setresuid() itself, and the ambient hack is not - * desired. */ - if (needs_ambient_hack) - needs_setuid = false; - else - needs_setuid = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command->flags & (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID)); - - uint64_t capability_ambient_set = context->capability_ambient_set; - - if (needs_sandboxing) { - /* MAC enablement checks need to be done before a new mount ns is created, as they rely on - * /sys being present. The actual MAC context application will happen later, as late as - * possible, to avoid impacting our own code paths. */ - -#if HAVE_SELINUX - use_selinux = mac_selinux_use(); -#endif -#if ENABLE_SMACK - use_smack = mac_smack_use(); -#endif -#if HAVE_APPARMOR - use_apparmor = mac_apparmor_use(); -#endif - } - - if (needs_sandboxing) { - int which_failed; - - /* Let's set the resource limits before we call into PAM, so that pam_limits wins over what - * is set here. (See below.) */ - - r = setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit* const *) context->rlimit, &which_failed); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed)); - } - } - - if (needs_setuid && context->pam_name && username) { - /* Let's call into PAM after we set up our own idea of resource limits to that pam_limits - * wins here. (See above.) */ - - /* All fds passed in the fds array will be closed in the pam child process. */ - r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, gid, context->tty_path, &accum_env, fds, n_fds); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_PAM; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m"); - } - - if (ambient_capabilities_supported()) { - uint64_t ambient_after_pam; - - /* PAM modules might have set some ambient caps. Query them here and merge them into - * the caps we want to set in the end, so that we don't end up unsetting them. */ - r = capability_get_ambient(&ambient_after_pam); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to query ambient caps: %m"); - } - - capability_ambient_set |= ambient_after_pam; - } - - ngids_after_pam = getgroups_alloc(&gids_after_pam); - if (ngids_after_pam < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, ngids_after_pam, "Failed to obtain groups after setting up PAM: %m"); - } - } - - if (needs_sandboxing && exec_context_need_unprivileged_private_users(context, params)) { - /* If we're unprivileged, set up the user namespace first to enable use of the other namespaces. - * Users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can set up user namespaces last because they will be able to - * set up the all of the other namespaces (i.e. network, mount, UTS) without a user namespace. */ - - r = setup_private_users(saved_uid, saved_gid, uid, gid); - /* If it was requested explicitly and we can't set it up, fail early. Otherwise, continue and let - * the actual requested operations fail (or silently continue). */ - if (r < 0 && context->private_users) { - *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user: %m"); - } - if (r < 0) - log_exec_info_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user, ignoring: %m"); - else - userns_set_up = true; - } - - if (exec_needs_network_namespace(context) && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { - - /* Try to enable network namespacing if network namespacing is available and we have - * CAP_NET_ADMIN. We need CAP_NET_ADMIN to be able to configure the loopback device in the - * new network namespace. And if we don't have that, then we could only create a network - * namespace without the ability to set up "lo". Hence gracefully skip things then. */ - if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_NET) && have_effective_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN) > 0) { - r = setup_shareable_ns(runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket, CLONE_NEWNET); - if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) - log_exec_notice_errno(context, params, r, - "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but network namespace setup not permitted, proceeding without: %m"); - else if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m"); - } - } else if (context->network_namespace_path) { - *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), - "NetworkNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing."); - } else - log_exec_notice(context, params, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support or we lack privileges for network namespace, proceeding without."); - } - - if (exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context) && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { - - if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_IPC)) { - r = setup_shareable_ns(runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket, CLONE_NEWIPC); - if (r == -EPERM) - log_exec_warning_errno(context, params, r, - "PrivateIPC=yes is configured, but IPC namespace setup failed, ignoring: %m"); - else if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up IPC namespacing: %m"); - } - } else if (context->ipc_namespace_path) { - *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), - "IPCNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing."); - } else - log_exec_warning(context, params, "PrivateIPC=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support IPC namespaces, ignoring."); - } - - if (needs_mount_namespace) { - _cleanup_free_ char *error_path = NULL; - - r = apply_mount_namespace(command->flags, context, params, runtime, memory_pressure_path, &error_path); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up mount namespacing%s%s: %m", - error_path ? ": " : "", strempty(error_path)); - } - } - - if (needs_sandboxing) { - r = apply_protect_hostname(context, params, exit_status); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - if (context->memory_ksm >= 0) - if (prctl(PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE, context->memory_ksm) < 0) { - if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno)) - log_exec_debug_errno(context, - params, - errno, - "KSM support not available, ignoring."); - else { - *exit_status = EXIT_KSM; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set KSM: %m"); - } - } - - /* Drop groups as early as possible. - * This needs to be done after PrivateDevices=y setup as device nodes should be owned by the host's root. - * For non-root in a userns, devices will be owned by the user/group before the group change, and nobody. */ - if (needs_setuid) { - _cleanup_free_ gid_t *gids_to_enforce = NULL; - int ngids_to_enforce = 0; - - ngids_to_enforce = merge_gid_lists(supplementary_gids, - ngids, - gids_after_pam, - ngids_after_pam, - &gids_to_enforce); - if (ngids_to_enforce < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, - ngids_to_enforce, - "Failed to merge group lists. Group membership might be incorrect: %m"); - } - - r = enforce_groups(gid, gids_to_enforce, ngids_to_enforce); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Changing group credentials failed: %m"); - } - } - - /* If the user namespace was not set up above, try to do it now. - * It's preferred to set up the user namespace later (after all other namespaces) so as not to be - * restricted by rules pertaining to combining user namespaces with other namespaces (e.g. in the - * case of mount namespaces being less privileged when the mount point list is copied from a - * different user namespace). */ - - if (needs_sandboxing && context->private_users && !userns_set_up) { - r = setup_private_users(saved_uid, saved_gid, uid, gid); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m"); - } - } - - /* Now that the mount namespace has been set up and privileges adjusted, let's look for the thing we - * shall execute. */ - - _cleanup_free_ char *executable = NULL; - _cleanup_close_ int executable_fd = -EBADF; - r = find_executable_full(command->path, /* root= */ NULL, context->exec_search_path, false, &executable, &executable_fd); - if (r < 0) { - if (r != -ENOMEM && (command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE)) { - log_exec_struct_errno(context, params, LOG_INFO, r, - "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, - LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID(params), - LOG_EXEC_MESSAGE(params, - "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m", - command->path), - "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path); - *exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS; - return 0; - } - - *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; - return log_exec_struct_errno(context, params, LOG_INFO, r, - "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, - LOG_EXEC_INVOCATION_ID(params), - LOG_EXEC_MESSAGE(params, - "Failed to locate executable %s: %m", - command->path), - "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path); - } - - r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, executable_fd, &executable_fd); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); - } - -#if HAVE_SELINUX - if (needs_sandboxing && use_selinux && params->selinux_context_net) { - int fd = -EBADF; - - if (socket_fd >= 0) - fd = socket_fd; - else if (params->n_socket_fds == 1) - /* If stdin is not connected to a socket but we are triggered by exactly one socket unit then we - * use context from that fd to compute the label. */ - fd = params->fds[0]; - - if (fd >= 0) { - r = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(fd, executable, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net); - if (r < 0) { - if (!context->selinux_context_ignore) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, - params, - r, - "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m"); - } - log_exec_debug_errno(context, - params, - r, - "Failed to determine SELinux context, ignoring: %m"); - } - } - } -#endif - - /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that - * we are more aggressive this time, since we don't need socket_fd and the netns and ipcns fds any - * more. We do keep exec_fd however, if we have it, since we need to keep it open until the final - * execve(). */ - - r = close_all_fds(keep_fds, n_keep_fds); - if (r >= 0) - r = shift_fds(fds, n_fds); - if (r >= 0) - r = flags_fds(fds, n_socket_fds, n_fds, context->non_blocking); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m"); - } - - /* At this point, the fds we want to pass to the program are all ready and set up, with O_CLOEXEC turned off - * and at the right fd numbers. The are no other fds open, with one exception: the exec_fd if it is defined, - * and it has O_CLOEXEC set, after all we want it to be closed by the execve(), so that our parent knows we - * came this far. */ - - secure_bits = context->secure_bits; - - if (needs_sandboxing) { - uint64_t bset; - - /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly requested. - * (Note this is placed after the general resource limit initialization, see above, in order - * to take precedence.) */ - if (context->restrict_realtime && !context->rlimit[RLIMIT_RTPRIO]) { - if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m"); - } - } - -#if ENABLE_SMACK - /* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the - * process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */ - if (use_smack) { - r = setup_smack(params, context, executable_fd); - if (r < 0 && !context->smack_process_label_ignore) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m"); - } - } -#endif - - bset = context->capability_bounding_set; - /* If the ambient caps hack is enabled (which means the kernel can't do them, and the user asked for - * our magic fallback), then let's add some extra caps, so that the service can drop privs of its own, - * instead of us doing that */ - if (needs_ambient_hack) - bset |= (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETPCAP) | - (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETUID) | - (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETGID); - - if (!cap_test_all(bset)) { - r = capability_bounding_set_drop(bset, /* right_now= */ false); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m"); - } - } - - /* Ambient capabilities are cleared during setresuid() (in enforce_user()) even with - * keep-caps set. - * - * To be able to raise the ambient capabilities after setresuid() they have to be added to - * the inherited set and keep caps has to be set (done in enforce_user()). After setresuid() - * the ambient capabilities can be raised as they are present in the permitted and - * inhertiable set. However it is possible that someone wants to set ambient capabilities - * without changing the user, so we also set the ambient capabilities here. - * - * The requested ambient capabilities are raised in the inheritable set if the second - * argument is true. */ - if (!needs_ambient_hack) { - r = capability_ambient_set_apply(capability_ambient_set, /* also_inherit= */ true); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m"); - } - } - } - - /* chroot to root directory first, before we lose the ability to chroot */ - r = apply_root_directory(context, params, runtime, needs_mount_namespace, exit_status); - if (r < 0) - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Chrooting to the requested root directory failed: %m"); - - if (needs_setuid) { - if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { - r = enforce_user(context, uid, capability_ambient_set); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_USER; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT ": %m", uid); - } - - if (!needs_ambient_hack && capability_ambient_set != 0) { - - /* Raise the ambient capabilities after user change. */ - r = capability_ambient_set_apply(capability_ambient_set, /* also_inherit= */ false); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m"); - } - } - } - } - - /* Apply working directory here, because the working directory might be on NFS and only the user running - * this service might have the correct privilege to change to the working directory */ - r = apply_working_directory(context, params, runtime, home, exit_status); - if (r < 0) - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m"); - - if (needs_sandboxing) { - /* Apply other MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to - * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires - * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls - * are restricted. */ - -#if HAVE_SELINUX - if (use_selinux) { - char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context; - - if (exec_context) { - r = setexeccon(exec_context); - if (r < 0) { - if (!context->selinux_context_ignore) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context); - } - log_exec_debug_errno(context, - params, - r, - "Failed to change SELinux context to %s, ignoring: %m", - exec_context); - } - } - } -#endif - -#if HAVE_APPARMOR - if (use_apparmor && context->apparmor_profile) { - r = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile); - if (r < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) { - *exit_status = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, - params, - errno, - "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", - context->apparmor_profile); - } - } -#endif - - /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress potential - * EPERMs we'll try not to call PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. Setting securebits - * requires CAP_SETPCAP. */ - if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != secure_bits) { - /* CAP_SETPCAP is required to set securebits. This capability is raised into the - * effective set here. - * - * The effective set is overwritten during execve() with the following values: - * - * - ambient set (for non-root processes) - * - * - (inheritable | bounding) set for root processes) - * - * Hence there is no security impact to raise it in the effective set before execve - */ - r = capability_gain_cap_setpcap(/* return_caps= */ NULL); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to gain CAP_SETPCAP for setting secure bits"); - } - if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secure_bits) < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SECUREBITS; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m"); - } - } - - if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context)) - if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m"); - } - -#if HAVE_SECCOMP - r = apply_address_families(context, params); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to restrict address families: %m"); - } - - r = apply_memory_deny_write_execute(context, params); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m"); - } - - r = apply_restrict_realtime(context, params); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m"); - } - - r = apply_restrict_suid_sgid(context, params); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply SUID/SGID restrictions: %m"); - } - - r = apply_restrict_namespaces(context, params); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m"); - } - - r = apply_protect_sysctl(context, params); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m"); - } - - r = apply_protect_kernel_modules(context, params); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m"); - } - - r = apply_protect_kernel_logs(context, params); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply kernel log restrictions: %m"); - } - - r = apply_protect_clock(context, params); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply clock restrictions: %m"); - } - - r = apply_private_devices(context, params); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set up private devices: %m"); - } - - r = apply_syscall_archs(context, params); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m"); - } - - r = apply_lock_personality(context, params); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to lock personalities: %m"); - } - - r = apply_syscall_log(context, params); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply system call log filters: %m"); - } - - /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected - * by the filter as little as possible. */ - r = apply_syscall_filter(context, params, needs_ambient_hack); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m"); - } -#endif - -#if HAVE_LIBBPF - r = apply_restrict_filesystems(context, params); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_BPF; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to restrict filesystems: %m"); - } -#endif - - } - - if (!strv_isempty(context->unset_environment)) { - char **ee = NULL; - - ee = strv_env_delete(accum_env, 1, context->unset_environment); - if (!ee) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_oom(); - } - - strv_free_and_replace(accum_env, ee); - } - - if (!FLAGS_SET(command->flags, EXEC_COMMAND_NO_ENV_EXPAND)) { - _cleanup_strv_free_ char **unset_variables = NULL, **bad_variables = NULL; - - r = replace_env_argv(command->argv, accum_env, &replaced_argv, &unset_variables, &bad_variables); - if (r < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, - params, - r, - "Failed to replace environment variables: %m"); - } - final_argv = replaced_argv; - - if (!strv_isempty(unset_variables)) { - _cleanup_free_ char *ju = strv_join(unset_variables, ", "); - log_exec_warning(context, - params, - "Referenced but unset environment variable evaluates to an empty string: %s", - strna(ju)); - } - - if (!strv_isempty(bad_variables)) { - _cleanup_free_ char *jb = strv_join(bad_variables, ", "); - log_exec_warning(context, - params, - "Invalid environment variable name evaluates to an empty string: %s", - strna(jb)); - } - } else - final_argv = command->argv; - - log_command_line(context, params, "Executing", executable, final_argv); - - if (exec_fd >= 0) { - uint8_t hot = 1; - - /* We have finished with all our initializations. Let's now let the manager know that. From this point - * on, if the manager sees POLLHUP on the exec_fd, then execve() was successful. */ - - if (write(exec_fd, &hot, sizeof(hot)) < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m"); - } - } - - r = fexecve_or_execve(executable_fd, executable, final_argv, accum_env); - - if (exec_fd >= 0) { - uint8_t hot = 0; - - /* The execve() failed. This means the exec_fd is still open. Which means we need to tell the manager - * that POLLHUP on it no longer means execve() succeeded. */ - - if (write(exec_fd, &hot, sizeof(hot)) < 0) { - *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m"); - } - } - - *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; - return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to execute %s: %m", executable); -} int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, ExecCommand *command, @@ -5332,10 +370,10 @@ int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, /* We won't know the real executable path until we create the mount namespace in the child, but we want to log from the parent, so we use the possibly inaccurate path here. */ - log_command_line(context, params, "About to execute", command->path, command->argv); + log_command_line(unit, "About to execute", command->path, command->argv); if (params->cgroup_path) { - r = exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params, cgroup_context, &subcgroup_path); + r = exec_params_get_cgroup_path(params, cgroup_context, &subcgroup_path); if (r < 0) return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to acquire subcgroup path: %m"); if (r > 0) { @@ -5677,57 +715,6 @@ const char* exec_context_fdname(const ExecContext *c, int fd_index) { } } -static int exec_context_named_iofds( - const ExecContext *c, - const ExecParameters *p, - int named_iofds[static 3]) { - - size_t targets; - const char* stdio_fdname[3]; - size_t n_fds; - - assert(c); - assert(p); - assert(named_iofds); - - targets = (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD) + - (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) + - (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD); - - for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; i++) - stdio_fdname[i] = exec_context_fdname(c, i); - - n_fds = p->n_storage_fds + p->n_socket_fds; - - for (size_t i = 0; i < n_fds && targets > 0; i++) - if (named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] < 0 && - c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD && - stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO] && - streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO])) { - - named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] = p->fds[i]; - targets--; - - } else if (named_iofds[STDOUT_FILENO] < 0 && - c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD && - stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO] && - streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO])) { - - named_iofds[STDOUT_FILENO] = p->fds[i]; - targets--; - - } else if (named_iofds[STDERR_FILENO] < 0 && - c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD && - stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO] && - streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO])) { - - named_iofds[STDERR_FILENO] = p->fds[i]; - targets--; - } - - return targets == 0 ? 0 : -ENOENT; -} - static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) { _cleanup_strv_free_ char **v = NULL; int r; @@ -7502,18 +2489,6 @@ static const char* const exec_resource_type_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_resource_type, ExecDirectoryType); -/* And this table also maps ExecDirectoryType, to the environment variable we pass the selected directory to - * the service payload in. */ -static const char* const exec_directory_env_name_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { - [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "RUNTIME_DIRECTORY", - [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "STATE_DIRECTORY", - [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "CACHE_DIRECTORY", - [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "LOGS_DIRECTORY", - [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY", -}; - -DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(exec_directory_env_name, ExecDirectoryType); - static const char* const exec_keyring_mode_table[_EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_MAX] = { [EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT] = "inherit", [EXEC_KEYRING_PRIVATE] = "private", diff --git a/src/core/execute.h b/src/core/execute.h index f315044582..81e9684870 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.h +++ b/src/core/execute.h @@ -471,13 +471,6 @@ struct ExecParameters { #include "unit.h" #include "dynamic-user.h" -int exec_invoke(const ExecCommand *command, - const ExecContext *context, - ExecParameters *params, - ExecRuntime *runtime, - const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, - int *exit_status); - int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, ExecCommand *command, const ExecContext *context, @@ -519,6 +512,10 @@ void exec_context_revert_tty(ExecContext *c); int exec_context_get_clean_directories(ExecContext *c, char **prefix, ExecCleanMask mask, char ***ret); int exec_context_get_clean_mask(ExecContext *c, ExecCleanMask *ret); +const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext *context); +int exec_context_tty_size(const ExecContext *context, unsigned *ret_rows, unsigned *ret_cols); +void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *p); + void exec_status_start(ExecStatus *s, pid_t pid); void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus *s, const ExecContext *context, pid_t pid, int code, int status); void exec_status_dump(const ExecStatus *s, FILE *f, const char *prefix); @@ -541,6 +538,7 @@ DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(ExecRuntime*, exec_runtime_free); ExecRuntime* exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime *rt); void exec_runtime_clear(ExecRuntime *rt); +int exec_params_get_cgroup_path(const ExecParameters *params, const CGroupContext *c, char **ret); void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters *p); void exec_params_dump(const ExecParameters *p, FILE* f, const char *prefix); void exec_params_serialized_done(ExecParameters *p); @@ -550,6 +548,7 @@ bool exec_context_get_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext *c); void exec_directory_done(ExecDirectory *d); int exec_directory_add(ExecDirectory *d, const char *path, const char *symlink); void exec_directory_sort(ExecDirectory *d); +bool exec_directory_is_private(const ExecContext *context, ExecDirectoryType type); ExecCleanMask exec_clean_mask_from_string(const char *s); @@ -579,6 +578,7 @@ ExecDirectoryType exec_resource_type_from_string(const char *s) _pure_; bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *params, const ExecRuntime *runtime); bool exec_needs_network_namespace(const ExecContext *context); +bool exec_needs_ipc_namespace(const ExecContext *context); /* These logging macros do the same logging as those in unit.h, but using ExecContext and ExecParameters * instead of the unit object, so that it can be used in the sd-executor context (where the unit object is diff --git a/src/core/executor.c b/src/core/executor.c index 0f154ea347..93ebad4b03 100644 --- a/src/core/executor.c +++ b/src/core/executor.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include "alloc-util.h" #include "build.h" +#include "exec-invoke.h" #include "execute-serialize.h" #include "execute.h" #include "exit-status.h" diff --git a/src/core/meson.build b/src/core/meson.build index 0508254d9a..44af28a3f3 100644 --- a/src/core/meson.build +++ b/src/core/meson.build @@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ systemd_sources = files( systemd_executor_sources = files( 'executor.c', + 'exec-invoke.c', ) executables += [ @@ -169,7 +170,12 @@ executables += [ libcore, libshared, ], - 'dependencies' : libseccomp, + 'dependencies' : [ + libapparmor, + libpam, + libseccomp, + libselinux, + ], }, fuzz_template + { 'sources' : files('fuzz-unit-file.c'),