diff --git a/src/basic/fileio.c b/src/basic/fileio.c index ee1621822c..c41db65eb1 100644 --- a/src/basic/fileio.c +++ b/src/basic/fileio.c @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ /* The maximum size of the file we'll read in one go in read_full_file() (64M). */ #define READ_FULL_BYTES_MAX (64U*1024U*1024U - 1U) +/* Used when a size is specified for read_full_file() with READ_FULL_FILE_UNBASE64 or _UNHEX */ +#define READ_FULL_FILE_ENCODED_STRING_AMPLIFICATION_BOUNDARY 3 /* The maximum size of virtual files (i.e. procfs, sysfs, and other virtual "API" files) we'll read in one go * in read_virtual_file(). Note that this limit is different (and much lower) than the READ_FULL_BYTES_MAX @@ -572,7 +574,7 @@ int read_full_stream_full( size_t *ret_size) { _cleanup_free_ char *buf = NULL; - size_t n, n_next = 0, l; + size_t n, n_next = 0, l, expected_decoded_size = size; int fd, r; assert(f); @@ -583,6 +585,13 @@ int read_full_stream_full( if (offset != UINT64_MAX && offset > LONG_MAX) /* fseek() can only deal with "long" offsets */ return -ERANGE; + if ((flags & (READ_FULL_FILE_UNBASE64 | READ_FULL_FILE_UNHEX)) != 0) { + if (size <= SIZE_MAX / READ_FULL_FILE_ENCODED_STRING_AMPLIFICATION_BOUNDARY) + size *= READ_FULL_FILE_ENCODED_STRING_AMPLIFICATION_BOUNDARY; + else + size = SIZE_MAX; + } + fd = fileno(f); if (fd >= 0) { /* If the FILE* object is backed by an fd (as opposed to memory or such, see * fmemopen()), let's optimize our buffering */ @@ -707,6 +716,11 @@ int read_full_stream_full( explicit_bzero_safe(buf, n); free_and_replace(buf, decoded); n = l = decoded_size; + + if (FLAGS_SET(flags, READ_FULL_FILE_FAIL_WHEN_LARGER) && l > expected_decoded_size) { + r = -E2BIG; + goto finalize; + } } if (!ret_size) { diff --git a/src/network/netdev/macsec.c b/src/network/netdev/macsec.c index 6d17d45059..98927b168d 100644 --- a/src/network/netdev/macsec.c +++ b/src/network/netdev/macsec.c @@ -959,15 +959,19 @@ static int macsec_read_key_file(NetDev *netdev, SecurityAssociation *sa) { return 0; r = read_full_file_full( - AT_FDCWD, sa->key_file, UINT64_MAX, SIZE_MAX, - READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE | READ_FULL_FILE_UNHEX | READ_FULL_FILE_WARN_WORLD_READABLE | READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET, + AT_FDCWD, sa->key_file, UINT64_MAX, MACSEC_KEYID_LEN, + READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE | + READ_FULL_FILE_UNHEX | + READ_FULL_FILE_WARN_WORLD_READABLE | + READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET | + READ_FULL_FILE_FAIL_WHEN_LARGER, NULL, (char **) &key, &key_len); if (r < 0) return log_netdev_error_errno(netdev, r, "Failed to read key from '%s', ignoring: %m", sa->key_file); - if (key_len != 16) + if (key_len != MACSEC_KEYID_LEN) return log_netdev_error_errno(netdev, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid key length (%zu bytes), ignoring: %m", key_len); diff --git a/src/network/netdev/wireguard.c b/src/network/netdev/wireguard.c index c89577609d..4c7d837c41 100644 --- a/src/network/netdev/wireguard.c +++ b/src/network/netdev/wireguard.c @@ -1037,8 +1037,12 @@ static int wireguard_read_key_file(const char *filename, uint8_t dest[static WG_ assert(dest); r = read_full_file_full( - AT_FDCWD, filename, UINT64_MAX, SIZE_MAX, - READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE | READ_FULL_FILE_UNBASE64 | READ_FULL_FILE_WARN_WORLD_READABLE | READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET, + AT_FDCWD, filename, UINT64_MAX, WG_KEY_LEN, + READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE | + READ_FULL_FILE_UNBASE64 | + READ_FULL_FILE_WARN_WORLD_READABLE | + READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET | + READ_FULL_FILE_FAIL_WHEN_LARGER, NULL, &key, &key_len); if (r < 0) return r; diff --git a/test/fuzz/fuzz-netdev-parser/oss-fuzz-62556 b/test/fuzz/fuzz-netdev-parser/oss-fuzz-62556 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e2418f9e5f Binary files /dev/null and b/test/fuzz/fuzz-netdev-parser/oss-fuzz-62556 differ