tree-wide: fix typo

This commit is contained in:
Yu Watanabe
2023-10-04 08:58:10 +09:00
parent 31438511e0
commit fcdd21ec6a
19 changed files with 26 additions and 26 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@
#define LIST_CLEAR(name, head, free_func) \
_LIST_CLEAR(name, head, free_func, UNIQ_T(elem, UNIQ))
/* Clear the list, destroing each element with free_func */
/* Clear the list, destroying each element with free_func */
#define _LIST_CLEAR(name, head, free_func, elem) \
({ \
typeof(head) elem; \
+1 -1
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@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ only load them after `ExitBootServices()` has been called.
Another mechanism is supported by `systemd-boot` and `systemd-stub` to add additional payloads to the boot
process: `addons`. Addons are PE signed binaries that can carry kernel command line arguments or Devicetree
blobs (more might be added in the future). In constrast to the user-specified additions in the Type #1 case
blobs (more might be added in the future). In contrast to the user-specified additions in the Type #1 case
described above, these addons are loaded through the UEFI image loading protocol, and thus are subject to
signature validation, and will be rejected if not signed or if the signature is invalid, following the
standard SecureBoot model. They are also measured in the TPM.
+1 -1
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@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static uint64_t ticks_freq_arch(void) {
uint64_t freq = crystal_hz;
if (crystal_hz == 0) {
/* If the crystal frquency is not available, try to deduce it from
/* If the crystal frequency is not available, try to deduce it from
* the processor frequency leaf if available. */
if (max_leaf < 0x16)
return 0;
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static int luks2_pkcs11_callback(
/* Called for every token matching our URI */
r = pkcs11_token_login_by_pin(m, session, token_info, token_label, data->pin, data->pin_size);
if (r == -ENOLCK) {
/* Referesh the token info, so that we can prompt knowing the new flags if they changed. */
/* Refresh the token info, so that we can prompt knowing the new flags if they changed. */
rv = m->C_GetTokenInfo(slot_id, &updated_token_info);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
crypt_log_error(data->cd,
+1 -1
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@@ -3197,7 +3197,7 @@ int home_resize_luks(
old_image_size = st.st_size;
/* Note an asymetry here: when we operate on loopback files the specified disk size we get we
/* Note an asymmetry here: when we operate on loopback files the specified disk size we get we
* apply onto the loopback file as a whole. When we operate on block devices we instead apply
* to the partition itself only. */
+1 -1
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@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
if (FLAGS_SET(mount_table[k].mount_settings, MOUNT_PREFIX_ROOT)) {
/* Optionally prefix the mount source with the root dir. This is useful in bind
* mounts to be created within the container image before we transition into it. Note
* that MOUNT_IN_USERNS is run after we transitioned hence prefixing is not ncessary
* that MOUNT_IN_USERNS is run after we transitioned hence prefixing is not necessary
* for those. */
r = chase(mount_table[k].what, dest, CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT, &prefixed, NULL);
if (r < 0)
+2 -2
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@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int openssl_digest_many(
return log_openssl_errors("Failed to create new EVP_MD_CTX");
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL))
return log_openssl_errors("Failed to initializate EVP_MD_CTX");
return log_openssl_errors("Failed to initialize EVP_MD_CTX");
for (size_t i = 0; i < n_data; i++)
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data[i].iov_base, data[i].iov_len))
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ int openssl_hmac_many(
return log_openssl_errors("Failed to build HMAC OSSL_PARAM");
if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx, key, key_size, params))
return log_openssl_errors("Failed to initializate EVP_MAC_CTX");
return log_openssl_errors("Failed to initialize EVP_MAC_CTX");
#else
_cleanup_(HMAC_CTX_freep) HMAC_CTX *ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (!ctx)
+1 -1
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@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ int pkcs11_token_login(
if (r != -ENOLCK)
return r;
/* Referesh the token info, so that we can prompt knowing the new flags if they changed. */
/* Refresh the token info, so that we can prompt knowing the new flags if they changed. */
rv = m->C_GetTokenInfo(slotid, &updated_token_info);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+1 -1
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@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ int serialize_item_escaped(FILE *f, const char *key, const char *value) {
int serialize_item_format(FILE *f, const char *key, const char *format, ...) {
_cleanup_free_ char *allocated = NULL;
char buf[256]; /* Something resonably short that fits nicely on any stack (i.e. is considerably less
char buf[256]; /* Something reasonably short that fits nicely on any stack (i.e. is considerably less
* than LONG_LINE_MAX (1MiB!) */
const char *b;
va_list ap;
+3 -3
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@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ int tpm2_context_new(const char *device, Tpm2Context **ret_context) {
r = tpm2_cache_capabilities(context);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to cache TPM capbilities: %m");
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to cache TPM capabilities: %m");
/* We require AES and CFB support for session encryption. */
if (!tpm2_supports_alg(context, TPM2_ALG_AES))
@@ -862,7 +862,7 @@ int tpm2_index_from_handle(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *handle, TPM2_HANDLE
*
* Returns 1 if the object was successfully persisted, or 0 if there is already a key at the requested
* handle, or < 0 on error. Theoretically, this would also return 0 if no specific persistent handle is
* requiested but all persistent handles are used, but it is extremely unlikely the TPM has enough internal
* requested but all persistent handles are used, but it is extremely unlikely the TPM has enough internal
* memory to store the entire persistent range, in which case an error will be returned if the TPM is out of
* memory for persistent storage. The persistent handle is only provided when returning 1. */
static int tpm2_persist_handle(
@@ -4636,7 +4636,7 @@ int tpm2_extend_bytes(
values.count++;
}
/* Open + lock the log file *before* we start measuring, so that noone else can come between our log
/* Open + lock the log file *before* we start measuring, so that no one else can come between our log
* and our measurement and change either */
log_fd = tpm2_userspace_log_open();
+1 -1
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@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ static void test_path_is_encrypted_one(const char *p, int expect) {
/* This might fail, if btrfs is used and we run in a container. In that case we cannot
* resolve the device node paths that BTRFS_IOC_DEV_INFO returns, because the device nodes
* are unlikely to exist in the container. But if we can't stat() them we cannot determine
* the dev_t of them, and thus cannot figure out if they are enrypted. Hence let's just
* the dev_t of them, and thus cannot figure out if they are encrypted. Hence let's just
* ignore ENOENT here. Also skip the test if we lack privileges. */
return;
assert_se(r >= 0);
+1 -1
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@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
assert_se(unit_add_name(c, "c.service") >= 0);
assert_se(set_isempty(c->pids));
/* Fork off a child so thta we have a PID to watch */
/* Fork off a child so that we have a PID to watch */
_cleanup_(sigkill_waitp) pid_t pid = 0;
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
+1 -1
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@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ static int find_source_vc(char **ret_path, unsigned *ret_idx) {
r = verify_vc_allocation(i);
if (r < 0) {
log_debug_errno(r, "VC %u existance check failed, skipping: %m", i);
log_debug_errno(r, "VC %u existence check failed, skipping: %m", i);
RET_GATHER(err, r);
continue;
}