Commit Graph
9 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Jeremy Linton 2572bf6a39 confidential-virt: add detection for aarch64 CCA
The arm confidential compute architecture (CCA) provides a platform design for
confidential VMs running in a new realm context.

This can be detected by the existence of a platform device exported for the
arm-cca-guest driver, which provides attestation services via the realm
services interface (RSI) to the Realm Management Monitor (RMM).

Like the other methods systemd uses to detect Confidential VM's, checking
the sysfs entry suggests that this is a confidential VM and should only be
used for informative purposes, or to trigger further attestation.

Like the s390 detection logic, the sysfs path being checked is not labeled
as ABI, and may change in the future. It was chosen because its
directly tied to the kernel's detection of the realm service interface rather
to the Trusted Security Module (TSM) which is what is being triggered by the
device entry. The TSM module has a provider string of 'arm-cca-guest' which
could also be used, but that (IMHO) doesn't currently provide any additional
benefit except that it can fail of the module isn't loaded.

More information can be found here:
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0125/0300

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
2025-01-15 13:51:12 +09:00
Yu Watanabe f769518c9a tree-wide: drop doubled empty lines 2024-10-07 09:51:37 +02:00
Daniel P. Berrangé 6c35e0a51c confidential-virt: add detection for s390x target
The s390x platform provides confidential VMs using the "Secure Execution"
technology, which is also referred to as "Protected Virtualization" or
just "prot virt" in Linux / QEMU.

This can be detected through a simple sysfs attribute.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2024-08-02 16:53:20 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrangé 1c4bd7adcc confidential-virt: split caching of CVM detection into separate method
We have different impls of detect_confidential_virtualization per
architecture. The detection is cached in the x86_64 impl, and as we
add support for more targets, we want to use caching for all. It thus
makes sense to split caching out into an architecture independent
method.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2024-08-02 16:26:00 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrangé 9d7be044ca Fix detection of TDX confidential VM on Azure platform
The original CVM detection logic for TDX assumes that the guest can see
the standard TDX CPUID leaf. This was true in Azure when this code was
originally written, however, current Azure now blocks that leaf in the
paravisor. Instead it is required to use the same Azure specific CPUID
leaf that is used for SEV-SNP detection, which reports the VM isolation
type.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2024-07-30 22:39:20 +02:00
Luca Boccassi d3634ac46b Merge pull request #28301 from berrange/cvm-lockdown
Avoid using SMBIOS for kernel cmdline injection in sd-stub in confidential VMs
2023-07-14 22:47:37 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrangé 129b9e3f42 fundamental: share constants for confidential virt detection
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2023-07-14 14:06:51 +01:00
Luca Boccassi f692c4a6cf Print ssize_t as %zd
On some architectures (x32) ssize_t is int, not long int.

../src/basic/confidential-virt.c: In function ‘msr’:
../src/basic/confidential-virt.c:133:27: error: format ‘%ld’ expects argument of type ‘long int’, but argument 7 has type ‘ssize_t’ {aka ‘int’} [-Werror=format=]
  133 |                 log_debug("Short read %ld bytes from MSR device %s (index %" PRIu64 "), ignoring",
      |                           ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  134 |                           rv,
      |                           ~~
      |                           |
      |                           ssize_t {aka int}
../src/basic/log.h:214:86: note: in definition of macro ‘log_full_errno_zerook’
  214 |                         ? log_internal(_level, _e, PROJECT_FILE, __LINE__, __func__, __VA_ARGS__) \
      |                                                                                      ^~~~~~~~~~~
../src/basic/log.h:242:28: note: in expansion of macro ‘log_full’
  242 | #define log_debug(...)     log_full(LOG_DEBUG,   __VA_ARGS__)
      |                            ^~~~~~~~
../src/basic/confidential-virt.c:133:17: note: in expansion of macro ‘log_debug’
  133 |                 log_debug("Short read %ld bytes from MSR device %s (index %" PRIu64 "), ignoring",
      |                 ^~~~~~~~~
../src/basic/confidential-virt.c:133:41: note: format string is defined here
  133 |                 log_debug("Short read %ld bytes from MSR device %s (index %" PRIu64 "), ignoring",
      |                                       ~~^
      |                                         |
      |                                         long int
      |                                       %d
2023-07-10 10:57:16 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrangé a577a61625 add APIs for detecting confidential virtualization
This code uses various CPUID checks to be able to identify

 * AMD SEV
 * AMD SEV-ES
 * AMD SEV-SNP
 * Intel TDX

On HyperV/Azure, it has special checks for detecting SEV-SNP
since the normal CPUID is blocked.

Related: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/27604
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2023-07-06 12:20:04 +01:00