We updated this table manually, but the kernel adds new modes periodically
and we forget to do that. So let that happen automatically whenever we import
new kernel headers.
C.f. 72dda93acb.
Effectively, this adds:
[ETHTOOL_LINK_MODE_10baseT1L_Full_BIT] = "10baset1l-full",
[ETHTOOL_LINK_MODE_800000baseCR8_Full_BIT] = "800000basecr8-full",
[ETHTOOL_LINK_MODE_800000baseKR8_Full_BIT] = "800000basekr8-full",
[ETHTOOL_LINK_MODE_800000baseDR8_Full_BIT] = "800000basedr8-full",
[ETHTOOL_LINK_MODE_800000baseDR8_2_Full_BIT] = "800000basedr8-2-full",
[ETHTOOL_LINK_MODE_800000baseSR8_Full_BIT] = "800000basesr8-full",
[ETHTOOL_LINK_MODE_800000baseVR8_Full_BIT] = "800000basevr8-full",
N_ADVERTISE needed to be increased because we need more bits.
gpt-auto-generator does three checks: 1. whether the directory doesn't have
files, 2. whether it's not in fstab, and 3. whether it is not a mount point.
For dissect logic, 3. is not relevant, and it ignores 2.
But the check whether files exists was done only partially: it was done
for /efi, but not for /boot.
Two changes are made:
- the check whether /boot is empty is now done.
- for ESP, /boot is used in preference to /efi, if not used for XBOOTLDR.
With those changes, the logic in dissect matches what gpt-auto-generator does.
There are the two intentional differences described in the first paragraph,
In mkosi we set the default architecture to platform.machine() which
is again slightly incompatible for a few architectures, so add more
aliases, so that repart works by default with these names.
The DSP and our implementation mixes Debian terminology with CPU
terminology. It uses arm64 which is a Debian thing instead of
aarch64, but x86-64 which is a CPU thing instead of amd64.
Add some convenience and transparent aliasing, so that we don't
need to maintain architecture-specific and tool-specific translation
layers in mkosi among other places, while at the same time the DDIs
still look the same (ie: the partlabel does not change depending on
which alias is used, the canonical label is used on disk).
This adds a function to fully calculate the authPolicy needed to seal a secret,
and updates tpm2_seal() to use the new function instead of a trial policy.
This updates the function to build the sealing policy to use the dedicated
function to perform PolicyAuthorize.
This is separate from the previous commit to make each commit easier to read.
This adds functions to get the digest for a PolicyAuthorize operation. For
building a policy hash, this provides a function to calculate the hash; and for
building a policy hash to satisfy the authPolicy for an existing object, this
provides a function to perform PolicyAuthorize with an existing session.
This adds functions to get the digest for a PolicyAuthValue operation. For
building a policy hash, this provides a function to calculate the hash; and for
building a policy hash to satisfy the authPolicy for an existing object, this
provides a function to perform PolicyAuthValue with an existing session.
This adds functions to get the digest for a PolicyPCR operation. For building
a policy hash, this provides a function to calculate the hash; and for building
a policy hash to satisfy the authPolicy for an existing object, this provides a
function to perform PolicyPCR with an existing session.
This adds functions to get the "name" of a key. The key "name", as defined
by the TPM2 spec, includes its entire public area (with attribute fields),
not only its key fingerprint.
A function is added to calculate the name of a provided key public area,
as well as a function to get the name of a key which is present in the TPM.
These functions allow extending (or initializing) a TPM2B_DIGEST with additional
data, using a specified hash operation. This is needed to perform hash
calculations instead of relying on the TPM to perform the calculations in
trial sessions.
When closing the FILE handle attached to a memstream, it may attempt to
do a realloc() that may fail during OOM situations, in which case we are
left with the buffer pointer pointing to NULL and buffer size > 0. For
example:
```
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
void *realloc(void *ptr, size_t size) {
return NULL;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
FILE *f;
char *buf;
size_t sz = 0;
f = open_memstream(&buf, &sz);
if (!f)
return -ENOMEM;
fputs("Hello", f);
fflush(f);
printf("buf: 0x%lx, sz: %lu, errno: %d\n",
(unsigned long) buf, sz, errno);
fclose(f);
printf("buf: 0x%lx, sz: %lu, errno: %d\n",
(unsigned long) buf, sz, errno);
return 0;
}
```
```
$ gcc -o main main.c
$ ./main
buf: 0x74d4a0, sz: 5, errno: 0
buf: 0x0, sz: 5, errno: 0
```
This might do unexpected things if the underlying code expects a valid
pointer to the memstream buffer after closing the handle.
Found by Nallocfuzz.
We can't dereference the variant object directly, as it might be
a magic object (which has an address on a faulting page); use
json_variant_is_sensitive() instead that handles this case.
For example, with an empty array:
==1547789==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000023 (pc 0x7fd616ca9a18 bp 0x7ffcba1dc7c0 sp 0x7ffcba1dc6d0 T0)
==1547789==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==1547789==Hint: address points to the zero page.
SCARINESS: 10 (null-deref)
#0 0x7fd616ca9a18 in json_variant_strv ../src/shared/json.c:2190
#1 0x408332 in oci_args ../src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.c:173
#2 0x7fd616cc09ce in json_dispatch ../src/shared/json.c:4400
#3 0x40addf in oci_process ../src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.c:428
#4 0x7fd616cc09ce in json_dispatch ../src/shared/json.c:4400
#5 0x41fef5 in oci_load ../src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.c:2187
#6 0x4061e4 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput ../src/nspawn/fuzz-nspawn-oci.c:23
#7 0x40691c in main ../src/fuzz/fuzz-main.c:50
#8 0x7fd61564a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)
#9 0x7fd61564a5c8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x275c8)
#10 0x405da4 in _start (/home/fsumsal/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-san/fuzz-nspawn-oci+0x405da4)
DEDUP_TOKEN: json_variant_strv--oci_args--json_dispatch
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV ../src/shared/json.c:2190 in json_variant_strv
==1547789==ABORTING
Or with an empty string in an array:
../src/shared/json.c:2202:39: runtime error: member access within misaligned address 0x000000000007 for type 'struct JsonVariant', which requires 8 byte alignment
0x000000000007: note: pointer points here
<memory cannot be printed>
#0 0x7f35f4ca9bcf in json_variant_strv ../src/shared/json.c:2202
#1 0x408332 in oci_args ../src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.c:173
#2 0x7f35f4cc09ce in json_dispatch ../src/shared/json.c:4400
#3 0x40addf in oci_process ../src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.c:428
#4 0x7f35f4cc09ce in json_dispatch ../src/shared/json.c:4400
#5 0x41fef5 in oci_load ../src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.c:2187
#6 0x4061e4 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput ../src/nspawn/fuzz-nspawn-oci.c:23
#7 0x40691c in main ../src/fuzz/fuzz-main.c:50
#8 0x7f35f364a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f)
#9 0x7f35f364a5c8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x275c8)
#10 0x405da4 in _start (/home/fsumsal/repos/@systemd/systemd/build-san/fuzz-nspawn-oci+0x405da4)
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior ../src/shared/json.c:2202:39 in
Note: this happens only if json_variant_copy() in json_variant_set_source() fails.
Found by Nallocfuzz.
So here's the thing. One library we use (libselinux) is opening fds
behind our back when we initialize it and keeps it open. On the other
hand we want to automatically pick up all fds passed in to us, so that
we can distribute them to our services and close the rest. We pick them
up very early in our code, to ensure that we don't get confused by open
fds at that point. Except that libselinux insists on being initialized
even earlier. So suddenly we might take possession of libselinux' fds,
and then close them later when we decide no service wants them. Then
during shutdown we close down selinux and selinux closes its fds, but
since already closed long ago this ight close our fds instead. Hilarity
ensues.
I wish low-level software wouldn't do such things behind our back, but
well, let's make the best of it.
This changes the fd pick-up logic to only pick up fds that have
O_CLOEXEC unset. O_CLOEXEC must be unset for any fds passed in to us
over execve() after all. And for all our own fds we should set O_CLOEXEC
since we generally don't want to litter fd tables for execve(). Also,
libselinux thankfully appears to set O_CLOEXEC correctly on its fds,
hence the filter works.
Fixes: #27491
Before 7cd43e34c5, it was possible to use
SYSTEMD_PROC_CMDLINE=systemd.condition-first-boot to override autodetection.
But now this doesn't work anymore, and it's useful to be able to do that for
testing.
Let's be more accurate about what this function does: it checks whether
the underlying reported inode is the same. Internally, this already uses
a better named stat_inode_same() call, hence let's similarly name the
wrapping function following the same logic.
Similar for files_same_at() and path_equal_or_same_files().
No code changes, just some renaming.
Let's try to unmount anything left, since if we don't they will remain
as "shadow" mounts, hidden underneath our new root.
This is only necessary when we transition into a new root via MS_MOVE.
If we do so via pivot_root() this is not necessary as the kernel will
get rid of the mounts anyway for us.
That way, if we end up unmounting /proc/ in our loop we can still
operate correctly, since we don't have to go through /proc/ again to
open the mount table again.
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Luca Boccassi
Daan De Meyer
Yu Watanabe
Mike Yuan
Dan Streetman
Frantisek Sumsal
David Tardon
Lennart Poettering