SR-IOV provides the ability to partition a single physical PCI
resource into virtual PCI functions which can then be injected in
to a VM. In the case of network VFs, SR-IOV improves north-south n
etwork performance (that is, traffic with endpoints outside the
host machine) by allowing traffic to bypass the host machine’s network stack.
All devices behind a SPI controller have the same udev ID_PATH property.
This is a problem for predicable network names for CAN controllers.
CAN controllers, in contrast to Ethernet controllers, don't have a MAC
Address, so there's no way to tell two CAN controllers on the same SPI
host controller apart:
$ udevadm info /sys/class/net/can0
P: /devices/platform/soc/fe204000.spi/spi_master/spi0/spi0.1/net/can0
L: 0
E: DEVPATH=/devices/platform/soc/fe204000.spi/spi_master/spi0/spi0.1/net/can0
E: INTERFACE=can0
E: IFINDEX=3
E: SUBSYSTEM=net
E: USEC_INITIALIZED=11187199
E: ID_PATH=platform-fe204000.spi
E: ID_PATH_TAG=platform-fe204000_spi
E: SYSTEMD_ALIAS=/sys/subsystem/net/devices/can0
E: TAGS=:systemd:
$ udevadm info /sys/class/net/can1
P: /devices/platform/soc/fe204000.spi/spi_master/spi0/spi0.0/net/can1
L: 0
E: DEVPATH=/devices/platform/soc/fe204000.spi/spi_master/spi0/spi0.0/net/can1
E: INTERFACE=can1
E: IFINDEX=4
E: SUBSYSTEM=net
E: USEC_INITIALIZED=11192211
E: ID_PATH=platform-fe204000.spi
E: ID_PATH_TAG=platform-fe204000_spi
E: SYSTEMD_ALIAS=/sys/subsystem/net/devices/can1
E: TAGS=:systemd:
With this the chip select number is added to the ID_PATH, to make
predictable network names possible.
$ sudo udevadm info /sys/class/net/can0
P: /devices/platform/soc/fe204000.spi/spi_master/spi0/spi0.1/net/can0
L: 0
E: DEVPATH=/devices/platform/soc/fe204000.spi/spi_master/spi0/spi0.1/net/can0
E: INTERFACE=can0
E: IFINDEX=3
E: SUBSYSTEM=net
E: USEC_INITIALIZED=11187199
E: ID_PATH=platform-fe204000.spi-cs-1
E: ID_PATH_TAG=platform-fe204000_spi-cs-1
E: SYSTEMD_ALIAS=/sys/subsystem/net/devices/can0
E: TAGS=:systemd:
$ sudo udevadm info /sys/class/net/can1
P: /devices/platform/soc/fe204000.spi/spi_master/spi0/spi0.0/net/can1
L: 0
E: DEVPATH=/devices/platform/soc/fe204000.spi/spi_master/spi0/spi0.0/net/can1
E: INTERFACE=can1
E: IFINDEX=4
E: SUBSYSTEM=net
E: USEC_INITIALIZED=11192211
E: ID_PATH=platform-fe204000.spi-cs-0
E: ID_PATH_TAG=platform-fe204000_spi-cs-0
E: SYSTEMD_ALIAS=/sys/subsystem/net/devices/can1
E: TAGS=:systemd:
When the system is under heavy load, it can happen that the unit cache
is refreshed for an unrelated reason (in the test I simulate this by
attempting to start a non-existing unit). The new unit is found and
accounted for in the cache, but it's ignored since we are loading
something else.
When we actually look for it, by attempting to start it, the cache is
up to date so no refresh happens, and starting fails although we have
it loaded in the cache.
When the unit state is set to UNIT_NOT_FOUND, mark the timestamp in
u->fragment_loadtime. Then when attempting to load again we can check
both if the cache itself needs a refresh, OR if it was refreshed AFTER
the last failed attempt that resulted in the state being
UNIT_NOT_FOUND.
Update the test so that this issue reproduces more often.
../src/shared/efi-loader.c:738:5: error: redefinition of 'efi_loader_get_config_timeout_one_shot'
int efi_loader_get_config_timeout_one_shot(usec_t *ret) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from ../src/shared/efi-loader.c:9:
../src/shared/efi-loader.h:85:19: note: previous definition of 'efi_loader_get_config_timeout_one_shot' was here
static inline int efi_loader_get_config_timeout_one_shot(usec_t *ret) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../src/shared/efi-loader.c:776:5: error: redefinition of 'efi_loader_update_entry_one_shot_cache'
int efi_loader_update_entry_one_shot_cache(char **cache, struct stat *cache_stat) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from ../src/shared/efi-loader.c:9:
../src/shared/efi-loader.h:89:19: note: previous definition of 'efi_loader_update_entry_one_shot_cache' was here
static inline int efi_loader_update_entry_one_shot_cache(char **cache, struct stat *cache_stat) {
To set up a verity/cryptsetup RootImage the forked child needs to
ioctl /dev/mapper/control and create a new mapper.
If PrivateDevices=yes and/or DevicePolicy=closed are used, this is
blocked by the cgroup setting, so add an exception like it's done
for loop devices (and also add a dependency on the kernel modules
implementing them).
With this we are now caching all EFI variables that we expose as
property in logind. Thus a client invoking GetAllProperties() should
only trgger a single read of each variable, but never repeated ones.
Obsoletes: #16190Fixes: #14828
The data from this EFI variable is exposed as dbus property, and gdbus
clients are happy to issue GetAllProperties() as if it was free. Hence
make sure it's actually free and cache LoaderConfigTimeoutOneShot, since
it's easy.
This allows copying in arbitrary file systems on the block level into
newly created partitions.
Usecase: simple replicating OS installers or OS image builders.
open_tmpfile_linkable is used to create a temporary file in the same
directory as the target, but portabled uses the name of the parent
directory instead of the file it intends to create.
In other words, it creats a tmp for /etc/systemd/system.attached instead
of /etc/systemd/system.attached/foo.service.
It still works because it's later moved in the right place.
But as a side effect, it tries the create the file in the parent directory
which is /etc/systemd, and it case of read-only filesystems it fails.
Since bc8d57f290 mac_selinux_init() is checked and considered fatal
tree-wide.
Coverity complains about it not being checked in the test code.
Follow-up of: #16223
Fixes: CID 1429975
Even with the new keyed hash table journal feature: if an attacker
manages to get access to the journal file id it could synthesize records
that result in hash collisions. Let's rotate automatically when we
notice that, so that a new journal file ID is generated, our performance
is restored and the attacker has to guess a new file ID before being
able to trigger the issue again.
That said, untrusted peers should never get access to journal files in
the first case...
This adds a new (incompatible) feature to journal files: if enabled the
hash function used for the hash tables is no longer jenkins hash with a
zero key, but siphash keyed by the file uuid that is included in the
file header anyway. This should make our hash tables more robust against
collision attacks, as long as the attacker has no read access to the
journal files. We switch from jenkins to siphash simply because it's
more well-known and we standardize for the rest of our codebase onto it.
This is hardening in order to make collision attacks harder for clients
that can forge log messages but have no read access to the logs. It has
no effect on clients that have read access.
Let's prefix this with "jenkins_" since it wraps the jenkins hash. We
want to add support for other hash functions to journald soon, hence
better be clear with what this is. In particular as all other symbols
defined by lookup3.h actually are prefixed "jenkins_".
Let's clean this up a bit, following our usual nomenclature to name
return parameters ret-xyz.
This is mostly a bit of renaming, but there's also some minor other
changes: if we return a pointer to a mmap'ed object plus its offset, in
almost all cases we are happy if either parameter is NULL in case the
caller is not interested in it. Let's fix the remaining case to do this
too, to minimize surprises.
The object flags field is a bitmask, hence don't sloppily define
_OBJECT_COMPRESSED_MAX as one mor than the previous flag. That worked OK
as long as we only had two flags, but will fall apart as soon as we have
three. Let's fix this.
(It's kinda sloppy how the string table is built here, as it will be
quite sparse as soon as we have more enum entries, but let's keep it for
now.)
Yu Watanabe
Susant Sahani
Marc Kleine-Budde
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Luca Boccassi
Lennart Poettering
Frantisek Sumsal
Christian Göttsche