UnsetEnvironment= was applied to the environment block before the
command line was expanded. Since the expansion looks the variables up
in that same block, any variable listed in UnsetEnvironment= was
already gone when $VAR in ExecStart= and friends was expanded, and a
whole-word $VAR reference was dropped from the command line.
Let the expansion see the full environment block, and apply the
unsetting only to the environment block passed to the executed
process. This way UnsetEnvironment= can hide variables from the
executed process without breaking command lines that reference them.
Extend the exec-unsetenvironment test accordingly: the whole-word
$VAR6 argument must be expanded into a positional parameter for the
shell, while ${VAR6-X} must evaluate to X in the executed process.
Also document in both the UnsetEnvironment= description and the
"Environment Variables in Spawned Processes" section that the
unsetting happens after command line variable expansion.
Fixes: #43343
This adds an initial TPM2 implementation of the io.systemd.Report.Signer
interface, which returns a set of signed TPM attestations that also
includes the supplied report digest.
The returned report consists of multiple components:
- A signed PCR quote generated with TPM2_Quote.
- Signed NvPCR attestations generated with TPM2_NV_Certify.
- A signed audit session attestation generated with
TPM2_GetSessionAuditDigest.
Each signed report component includes the JSON encoded TPMS_ATTEST
attestation structure and corresponding signature, in both PEM encoded
form and as a JSON encoded TPMT_SIGNATURE structure.
NvPCR report components also include the readable name of the NvPCR, the
NV index public area as the JSON encoded TPMS_NV_PUBLIC structure, and some
additional authenticated data that is digested and supplied as the
qualifying data to the TPM2_NV_Certify command. This authenticated data
includes the NvPCR name and priority.
The report digest that is supplied via varlink is supplied as the
qualifying data to the audit session attestation.
The returned report also includes the event log which is retrieved from
pcrlock's varlink interface, and the public area of the signing key in
both PEM encoded form and as a JSON encoded TPMT_PUBLIC structure.
The audit session attestation is always the last component. The
preceding components are all executed with the audit session, and the
signer requires the audit session to remain exclusive whilst generating
the report. What this does is provide evidence to a verifier that the
overall report is a single, consistent snapshot of the system (ie, no
other TPM commands executed whilst generating the report) because the
audit session attestation contains a field that indicates that the
session was exclusive at the time it was attested.
The set of attested PCRs and NvPCRs are currently hardcoded. It includes
all firmware PCRs with the exception of PCR6, and all other PCRs with
the exception of the IMA one (which isn't useful on its own without the
IMA log). All defined NvPCRs are included.
A verifier can verify the signed attestation components individually by
verifying their signatures against the supplied attestation data, using
the supplied public key.
For the PCR report component, a verifier can replay the measurements in
the log in order to reconstruct the PCR values, and then use this and
the PCR selection from the attestation in order to calculate the PCR
digest, and then check that this matches the one in the attestation.
For the NvPCR report components, a verifier checks that the NV index
name in the attestation matches one that is anchored in PCR9 to be sure
that the attestation is for a valid NvPCR. A verifier can then replay
the measurements in the log to ensure that the resulting NvPCR value
matches the one supplied in the attestation. The authenticated data is a
JSON blob containing the NvPCR name and priority. A verifier can digest
this and ensure it matches the qualifying data in the attestation.
The audit session attestation includes the audit session digest and
whether the audit session was still exclusive when the attestation was
generated. A verifier should confirm exclusivity. The digest includes a
record of all TPM commands executed with the audit session, as each
command results in it being extended with the command parameter hash and
the result parameter hash. A verifier should replay the preceding report
components to compute an expected audit digest and make sure that this
digest matches the one in the attestation in order to be sure that the
overall report represents a single, consistent snapshot. The other
report components provide sufficient information for a verifier to
reconstruct the cpHash and rpHash.
When reconstructing the cpHash for the PCR and NvPCR components, the
signing scheme is the NULL scheme (they use the attestation key's
signing scheme). The required signing key public area is supplied in
the report. The supplied qualifying data is in the extra data field of
the attestation.
The PCR selection is also required to reconstruct the cpHash for the
PCR component. The PCR selection is available in the attestation.
The name of the NV index is also required to reconstruct the cpHash for
the NvPCR components. The name is available in the attestation.
The rpHash for each component can be reconstructed from the supplied
attestation blob and signature.
In the future, we might want to add more report component types. Eg, we
could add report components for ordinary NV indexes. Using the audit
session means that we could also add additional components that the TPM
can't attest directly, such as the values of interesting TPM properties
(as the TPM2_GetCapability calls will appear in the audit session digest).
The attestation signing key is stored as a JSON file in the report
signer's state directory. Different types of keys are supported:
- Ordinary keys that are protected by an existing persistent TPM key
such as the SRK or EK.
- Persistent TPM keys.
- Primary keys, which are recreated using a template on use.
When an ordinary or primary key is used, the report signer saves the
object context in its runtime directory. This context is used on future
invocations. This has the benefit that where a primary key is used, it
doesn't need to be recreated on each use. When an ordinary key is used,
we don't need to run TPM2_Load, which requires authorization with the
parent key, on each This authorization currently requires a policy
session for low-range EKs.
Regardless of the key type, it must be a restricted signing key. If no
key exists, an ordinary key is generated automatically.
The attestation key can also have an associated credential which is
attached to the signed report. The credential can be issued by a CA or
some other party during onboarding, and is presented to a verifier as
proof that the attestation key is authentic. It is considered an opaque
blob in order to not require it to be a specific format, such as a X.509
certificate. I've called this a "voucher" though because "cred" or
"credential" has other meanings in systemd.
As a follow-up to this, I plan to add a varlink interface for creating
attestation keys that can be used for report signing.
Since run0 --help now goes through the pager, provide a way to turn that
off from the command line, like all other commands that page --help. The
option is documented the same way as for systemd-run.
parse_argv() requires at least one DEVICE unless --all is given, and
refuses DEVICE arguments when --all is given, so "[DEVICE…]" described
neither mode correctly. Spell out the three modes as separate synopsis
lines, like pcrextend and inhibit do, and update the man page to match.
The custom help() is replaced by a COMMAND() description, and
--introspect-cli is added. The positional argument is spelled MOUNTPOINT
in the synopsis, like the other metavars, instead of /path/to/mountpoint,
and the man page synopsis, which said "[DEVICE]", is fixed to match: the
argument is required and it is a mount point.
The custom help() is replaced by a COMMAND() description, and
--introspect-cli is added. The positional argument is spelled MOUNTPOINT
in the synopsis, like the other metavars, instead of /path/to/mountpoint.
The man page is adjusted to match.
The custom help() is replaced by a COMMAND() description, and
--introspect-cli is added. The synopsis is updated to be more truthful
and consistent between the prog and man page.
The custom help() is replaced by a COMMAND() description, and
--introspect-cli is added. --help now goes through the pager, like other
commands with --no-pager.
Synopses are adjusted. --user-unit/--unit without any unit names is
technically allowed, but not very meaningful, since it's the same as
the default mode. So [] is dropped. And the prog help string is then
adjusted to match the man page.
The securebits parsing code now recognizes 'no-cap-ambient-raise'
(added in Linux 4.3), 'exec-restrict-file', and 'exec-deny-interactive'
(both added in Linux 6.14). The '-locked' variants were added too.
The resolvconf compatibility parser ignored errors from
nameserver, domain, and search lines. If one of those lines was
malformed, resolvectl could still send the partially parsed
configuration to resolved and overwrite the previous link state.
Reproducer:
IF=enp1s0
TMP="$(mktemp -d)"
ln -s "$(command -v resolvectl)" "$TMP/resolvconf"
sudo resolvectl dns "$IF" 1.1.1.1
sudo resolvectl domain "$IF" keep.example
resolvectl domain "$IF"
printf 'nameserver 1.1.1.1\nsearch "unterminated\n' |
sudo "$TMP/resolvconf" -a "$IF" || true
resolvectl domain "$IF"
Before:
The malformed search line was ignored and the previous domain
was cleared:
Link 2 (enp1s0): keep.example
Link 2 (enp1s0):
After:
The malformed input fails before updating resolved, so
keep.example remains configured.
Follow-up for: 097f130731
--raw only affects ResolveRecord output. Without --type= or an
RFC4501 dns: URI, query takes the ResolveHostname/ResolveAddress
paths, where --raw was silently ignored.
Reproducer:
build/resolvectl --raw query localhost
Before:
The command exited successfully and printed regular text output,
such as:
localhost: 127.0.0.1
After:
The command fails before issuing a lookup:
--raw may only be combined with --type= or dns: URIs.
Follow-up for: 05ea7e87b6
Replace the paragraph that claims overlayfs is always blocked. Mention
that only the file data is checked, keep the btrfs note and mention the
new behavior in NEWS.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
When --json is requested, resolution errors returned by resolved still went
through text logging. That made scripts parse stderr even though the
varlink error already carried structured fields such as rcode and EDE.
Add a small JSON error dumper for resolvectl query errors. It outputs the
queried name and varlink error id alongside the original varlink parameters
so DNSError and DNSSECValidationFailed expose rcode, extendedDNSErrorCode,
extendedDNSErrorMessage, queryString, and result without duplicating the
schema in resolvectl.
Keep non-JSON text output and silent warn_missing NXDOMAIN handling
unchanged. Document the JSON resolution error object in resolvectl(1),
including the distinction between resolved errors and local invocation or
connection errors.
Closes#42904
For some of us building image based operating systems with
`systemd-sysupdate` it's useful to have UKI filenames that encode
`IMAGE_VERSION` (and architecture). For example
`SimonOS_45.20260805.0_x86-64.efi`.
Currently to do this I have to manually post-process around the `.efi`
produced by `60-ukify` because it is named
`$ENTRY_TOKEN-$KERNEL_VERSION.efi`. It'd be very useful if I could skip
that step and instead have the image built directly without this
post-processing step; then extract the UKI and /usr partitions and plop
them onto my update server. It makes the build much more "install RPMs
into a tree and you're done" (barring other things `60-ukify` currently
can't do but I have follow-ups for those in mind).
This PR adds a knob to `install.conf` to let users specify a custom
format for the output filename for both UKI's and BLS entries produced
by `kernel-install`.
It accepts the following specifiers:
- `%e`: entry token
- `%v`: kernel version being installed
- Several common specifiers
The default is %e-%v, which is the current behavior. With
`entry_name_format=%M_%A_%a`, an OS with `IMAGE_ID=SimonOS` and
`IMAGE_VERSION=1.0` would get moved to `SimonOS_1.0_x86-64.efi`.
The resolved name is exported as `$KERNEL_INSTALL_ENTRY_NAME` for shell
plugins. Both `90-uki-copy.install` and `90-loaderentry.install` are
updated to use it, with a fallback to `$ENTRY_TOKEN-$KERNEL_VERSION` for
compatibility with older kernel-install versions.
RestrictSUIDSGID uses seccomp to block setting SUID/SGID bits.
openat2() passes these mode bits indirectly via struct open_how.
Document that such calls are blocked regardless of requested mode.
Closes#43314
We currently blindly send the configured reload signal (e.g. SIGHUP or
SIGUSR1) to the main service PID for Type=notify-reload units, even if
the service hasn't installed a userspace handler. This can lead to
invoking unintended default behavior (typically process termination) in
daemons which later deprecate and remove their reload handler.
This is a real problem we have seen in production on multiple occasions.
In one particularly egregious instance, a production distributed storage
service had a large percentage of its nodes all terminate at once when
sent a reload signal. In this case a signal handler had been removed,
but another place still sending the signal was missed.
To mitigate this, introduce two new checks for Type=notify-reload
services:
1. On READY=1: When the service first sends READY=1 during initial
startup, we check for the handler. If it's missing, the service startup
is failed with SERVICE_FAILURE_PROTOCOL. This enforces the contract that
services *must* install their handler before signalling readiness.
2. On reload: Immediately before sending the reload signal, we check
again. If the handler is now missing, we log a warning but still send
the signal. This preserves the requested operator action while making
the missing handler visible.
The startup check catches definite static misconfiguration before the
service is accepted as ready. The reload check is advisory because the
service has already started successfully, but warns if its handler later
disappears. Together these provide a best-effort safety net while
preserving the agreed reload semantics.
Document the new entry_name_format= setting in install.conf and the
KERNEL_INSTALL_ENTRY_NAME / KERNEL_INSTALL_ENTRY_NAME_FORMAT environment
variables set for plugins.
List the available specifiers: %e (entry token), %v (kernel version),
%a (architecture), %A (IMAGE_VERSION), %M (IMAGE_ID), and all common
system specifiers.
Each of these citerefentry targets exists, but is referenced with a
section it is not installed in, so the generated link does not resolve
and 'man <page>' sends the reader to the wrong section.
systemd-confext 1 -> 8
systemd-cryptsetup@.service 5 -> 8
systemd-firstboot.service 8 -> 1 (three places)
systemd-nspawn 8 -> 1
systemd-userdbd.service 7 -> 8
The section for each was taken from the refmeta of the page that
defines it. In systemd.special.xml the neighbouring reference to
systemd-veritysetup@.service already uses 8, which is what the
cryptsetup one should have been.
Document that needs-restart/needs-reload markers follow try-restart /
try-reload behavior for enqueue-marked, and drop the duplicated note
from the deprecated --marked alias entry.
Reword the note for --fido2-with-user-presence= to make it clear that the
setting has no effect if the token does not support the up feature, or does
not allow the user presence requirement to be enabled or disabled for the
requested operation. Drop the surrounding parentheses and the spurious
"in other contexts" qualifier.
Apply the same rewording to the sibling --fido2-with-client-pin= and
--fido2-with-user-verification= options so the three parallel FIDO2
entries stay consistent.
Fixes#23632.
- --strict=/--full moved to the OPTION_LONG() parser framework that
replaced getopt in the meantime
- the is-supported commit is dropped, main grew that verb independently.
That also gets rid of the early tpm2_support() gate that broke CI back
then, and TEST-70-TPM2 runs with a software TPM these days anyway
- special_glyph() → glyph() renames
- the log table PCR filter needs an EVENT_LOG_RECORD_IS_PCR() guard now
that the event log has NV-index records
We currently blindly send the configured reload signal (e.g. SIGHUP or
SIGUSR1) to the main service PID for Type=notify-reload units, even if
the service hasn't installed a userspace handler. This can lead to
invoking unintended default behavior (typically process termination) in
daemons which later deprecate and remove their reload handler.
This is a real problem we have seen in production on multiple occasions.
In one particularly egregious instance, a production distributed storage
service had a large percentage of its nodes all terminate at once when
sent a reload signal. In this case a signal handler had been removed, but
another place still sending the signal was missed.
To mitigate this, introduce signal handler validation for
Type=notify-reload services. We check both SigCgt (traditional handlers
via sigaction) and SigBlk (blocked signals for signalfd) to detect valid
handler configurations:
1. On first READY=1: When the service first sends READY=1 during initial
startup, we check for the handler. If it's missing, the service
startup is aborted with Result=protocol.
2. On reload: Immediately before sending the reload signal, we check
again. If the handler is missing, we log a warning but still send
the signal.
The rationale is that a missing handler at first startup represents a
definite misconfiguration that should be caught early. A missing handler
at reload time is warned about, but we defer to the operator's judgement
since the service already started successfully.
These checks are a best-effort, pragmatic safety net. They are naturally
racy, but in practice they prevent the common class of bugs from static
misconfiguration or software updates.
Add a --strict option that makes sure all PCRs for which components were
found are indeed included in the set of predicted PCRs. Instead throw an
error. Avoids creating a policy less secure than requested.
Co-authored-by: Akarithos <277667353+Akarithos@users.noreply.github.com>
Shorten number of bytes show of sha256 hashes. Similar to git, makes
output less wide and more readable.
Co-authored-by: Akarithos <277667353+Akarithos@users.noreply.github.com>
Combining --ephemeral with --grow-image= truncated the file passed to
--image= to the requested size before the VM was started, so a mode whose
entire purpose is to leave the original image untouched modified it on
disk.
Skip growing the original image when running ephemeral, and instead create
the qcow2 overlay with the requested virtual size, so the guest sees the
larger disk while the base image stays read-only. As only the overlay is
sized in that case, the base image format no longer matters, so allow
--grow-image= together with qcow2 images when running ephemeral. The round
up to a multiple of 4096 moves to option parsing so both paths apply the
same value.
The vmspawn drive test grows an ephemeral VM and checks that the image
passed to --image= keeps its size, and that the overlay QEMU runs off is
created at the requested one.
systemd-repart implicitly excludes the contents of APIVFS and temporary
directories (/proc, /sys, /dev, /tmp, /run, /var/tmp) when copying files
via CopyFiles=. When populating a root partition, the contents below the
mount points of other partitions in the image (e.g. /boot, /efi for an
esp partition) are excluded as well, so that data belonging to a separate
partition is not duplicated into the root file system.
Neither of these implied denylists was documented, which surprised users
(see #32651). Document them, and explain how to work around the
mount-point exclusion by adding an explicit CopyFiles= entry for the
directory in question.
Fixes#32651
The openpgp and tlsa verbs rejected --json= even though they
already determine the RR type they query. Allow JSON output for
these shortcut commands.
Accept matching explicit --type= values as well, but reject
mismatched types so openpgp only queries OPENPGPKEY records and
tlsa only queries TLSA records.
Refuse unauthenticated key records in JSON format so scripts do
not accidentally consume cryptographic DNS data that would only
produce a warning in human-readable output.
Fixes#43245
Introduce Slice.ActivatingConcurrencyMax to limit how many units
within a slice hierarchy may be in activating state concurrently.
Expose the setting over D-Bus, support transient/property parsing,
enforce it during unit start dispatch, and re-check queued starts when
units leave activating state.
Document the new slice option and add a PID1 concurrency test covering
queued startup behavior.
Allow MessageQueueMessageSize= to accept IEC size suffixes in socket unit files.
Support the same syntax for transient property assignments.
Keep MessageQueueMaxMessages= as a plain message count.
Accept RFC4122 UUID URN strings with the `urn:uuid:` prefix in
sd_id128_from_string(), while keeping plain 128-bit IDs and regular
UUID strings working as before.
Implement the TODO item for `udevadm info -q symlink`: keep the
default space-separated output pager-free, and make `--value` print
one symlink per line with an empty separator line between devices.
Turn --sign=BOOL into --sign=no|best-effort|require-one|require-all,
making the multi-signer aggregation policy explicit: best-effort never
fails on signing, require-one requires at least one signature, and
require-all requires every signer to succeed (an empty reply, i.e. a
signer opting out, counts as failure). Signed reports are always emitted
as a JSON-SEQ stream. The mode is also exposed as an input to the
io.systemd.Report.GenerateSigned Varlink method.
Signed-off-by: Paul Meyer <katexochen0@gmail.com>
This updates systemd-tmpfiles in two small areas:
- Reject non-empty argument fields for tmpfiles.d line types that do not
consume the argument field, instead of warning and silently ignoring
them.
- Let `r` and `R` tmpfiles.d entries honor the `Age` field when
`systemd-tmpfiles --clean` is used. The existing `--remove` behavior
remains unconditional.
The completed TODO entries are removed, and NEWS/man page documentation
is updated for the visible behavior changes.
Let r and R lines participate in --clean when they specify an age. The
target itself is removed only after its selected file or directory
timestamps have aged enough; --remove remains unconditional.
Follow-up for: beca6b6e6b
Line types which do not use the argument field used to warn and ignore
a non-empty field. Treat that as invalid configuration instead, so typos
are not silently accepted.
Follow-up for: 614cc34f3a
Motivated by
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/43041#discussion_r3595022610.
Switch systemd-cryptsetup's volume-key and keyslot measurements from
driving the TPM directly (tpm2-util) to the io.systemd.PCRExtend Varlink
service, aligning it with how the verity and imds measurements already
work.
Some notes on decisions taken:
- The volume key is sent over the wire. systemd-pcrextend will do the
hmac. The socket is root only. Otherwise we would need to do bank
negotiation via varlink and pollute the interface with it.
- `tpm2-measure-bank=` deprecated/dropped. Same reason as above.
- `tpm2-device=` now only affects unlocking. The device for measurements
is selected by pcrextend.
- Measuring requires the presence of `systemd-pcrextend.socket` in the
initrd, should be already given as systemd-veritysetup relies on it,
too.
- Logs are done on the pcrextend side.
Accept -n as a short option for --dry-run in bootctl,
systemd-oomd, systemd-sysusers, and systemd-tmpfiles.
For systemd-repart, make -n equivalent to --dry-run=yes,
while keeping --dry-run=BOOL available.
Follow-up for: 2479f0bb09
Measure the volume key and unlock keyslot through io.systemd.PCRExtend
instead of driving the TPM directly via tpm2-util, matching how the
verity and imds measurements already work.
Bank selection and the TPM context now live entirely in
systemd-pcrextend. As a result the tpm2-measure-bank= crypttab option
can no longer be honored per volume and is now a deprecated no-op.
Signed-off-by: Paul Meyer <katexochen0@gmail.com>
The `Domains=` option in the `[Network]` section did not document its
behaviour when specified repeatedly. In practice the option is additive
(each occurrence accumulates search/routing domains) and assigning an
empty string resets the list, matching the closely related `DNS=`
option. This is implemented by `config_parse_domains()` in
`src/network/networkd-dns.c`, which frees both the search and route
domain sets on an empty `rvalue` and otherwise inserts each
whitespace-separated entry into the corresponding set.
Document this explicitly, using the same wording already used for
`DNS=` in the same man page, so users know repeated assignments are
combined and that an empty value clears them.
Fixes#38740.
- sysupdate: In the auto-enable service, don't enable all features
The auto-enable service should activate suggested components and
features but enabled all features which includes the default components
unsuggested features and any unsuggested features of the suggested
components. This is unexpected behavior and we rather want this service
to be limited to suggested features.
Switch the service flag to suggested and make the wording more explicit
in the man page. Also fix the wrong statement that it operates on
enabled components, it operates on all components, also explicitly
disabled ones.
- sysupdate: Change disabling with
--component-suggested/--feature-suggested
The disabling of features or components with the flag
--component-suggested/--feature-suggested didn't disable the suggested
ones but instead disabled all other ones. This is rather unintuitive due
to how the flags are named and also not really needed because the
intended reconciliation outcome can instead be done by first disabling
everything and then enabling the suggested ones again which is easier to
reason about. For components the tricky part is that they default to
enabled and thus it's better to have the disable/enable commands with
--component-suggested operate only on suggested ones instead of touching
others like "legacy" components that don't explicity say whether they
are enabled and suggested or not.
Make running disablement of components/features with
--component-suggested/--feature-suggested undo a previous enablement
with the same flags. Document how one can align the system to only use
suggested components/features and not anything else by doing it in two
steps, first disabling everything and then enabling suggested ones. This
also makes it clearer now that all components that are not explicitly
enabled nor suggested will be disabled then.
tunaichao
Yu Watanabe
Chris Coulson
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Skye Soss
dongshengyuan
Christian Brauner
gpenz
Simon de Vlieger
Hüseyin Kutsi Balcı
Hashim Khan
lzwind
Chris Down
Ludwig NusselandAkarithos
Daan De Meyer
Liu Zheng
Shivank Sharma
Morteza Pourkazemi
Paul Meyer