Let's check both the per user machined and the system machined instead
of only the system machined. We give preference to the per user machined
and fall back to the system machined.
This is also preparation for the installer later, split out of #38764.
It makes the experience a lot nicer if our nice little tools aren't
constantly interrupted by log spew from the kernel.
Fixes: #34448
This allows Type 1 entries to take advantage of multiprofile efi files
by allowing the configuration of the profile associated with that entry.
It will now parse the profile key in a Type 1 config to select that
profile when booting that efi file instead of relaying in the cmdline
Signed-off-by: Itxaka <itxaka@kairos.io>
For "wizard" style interactive tools it's very annoying if they are
interrupted by kernel log output or PID1's status output. let's add some
infra to disable this temporarily. I decided to implement this as an IPC
service so that we can make this robust: if the client request the
muting dies we can automatically unmute again.
This is hence a tiny varlink service, but it can also be started
directly from the cmdline.
In integration tests (for example TEST-85-NETWORK-NetworkctlTests)
LINK_OPERSTATE_RANGE_INVALID and required_for_online == -1 are serialized as
```
"RequiredForOnline": "true",
"RequiredOperationalStateForOnline": [null, null]
```
Such link should be reported as required_for_online=False and not
serialize nulls.
Except for the test, bpf_firewall_compile() is only called by the following:
cgroup_context_apply() -> cgroup_apply_firewall() -> bpf_firewall_compile()
and in the early stage of cgroup_context_apply(), it checks if the cgroup
runtime exists. Hence, it is not necessary to try to allocate the
runtime in bpf_firewall_compile().
All other resource control features work as 'best-effort', and failures
in applying them are handled gracefully. However, unlike the other features,
we tested if the BPF programs can be loaded and refuse execution on failure.
Moreover, the previous behavior of testing loading BPF programs had
inconsistency: the test was silently skipped if the cgroup for the unit does
not exist yet, but tested when the cgroup already exists.
Let's not handle failures in loading custom BPF programs as critical, but
gracefully ignore them, like we do for the other resource control features.
Follow-up for fab347489f.
Before 23ac08115a, even if we failed to
create the cgroup for a unit, a cgroup runtime object for the cgroup is
created with the cgroup path. Hence, the creation of cgroup is failed,
execution of the unit will fail in posix_spawn_wrapper() and logged
something like the following:
```
systemd[1]: testservice.service: Failed to create cgroup /testslice.slice/testservice.service: Cannot allocate memory
systemd[1]: testservice.service: Failed to spawn executor: No such file or directory
systemd[1]: testservice.service: Failed to spawn 'start' task: No such file or directory
systemd[1]: testservice.service: Failed with result 'resources'.
systemd[1]: Failed to start testservice.service.
```
However, after the commit, when we failed to create the cgroup, a cgroup
runtime object is not created, hence NULL will be assigned to
ExecParameters.cgroup_path in unit_set_exec_params().
Hence, the unit process will be invoked in the init.scope.
```
systemd[1]: testservice.service: Failed to create cgroup /testslice.slice/testservice.service: Cannot allocate memory
systemd[1]: Starting testservice.service...
cat[1094]: 0::/init.scope
systemd[1]: testservice.service: Deactivated successfully.
systemd[1]: Finished testservice.service.
```
where the test service calls 'cat /proc/self/cgroup'.
To fix the issue, let's fail earlier when we failed to create cgroup.
Follow-up for 23ac08115a (v258).
This is the first part of #38728, just the machined stuff, no the
importd stuff.
This definitely makes sense of its own, hence let's get this in first.
The original PR contains a tescase that tests machined + importd in
combination. This PR here hence is without a testcase, but it's there,
just in the other PR.
This looks large and is large, but do note that much of the machined
changes are very repetitive: they conditionalize PK checks to the system
version, as PK doesn't make sense in the use rversion.
When HAVE_SECCOMP is not set, a build error happens:
../src/analyze/analyze-security.c: In function ‘get_security_info’:
../src/analyze/analyze-security.c:2449:13: error: unused variable ‘r’ [-Werror=unused-variable]
2449 | int r;
| ^
cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
Fix it by removing the sometimes unused variable.
Currently, cgroup_path is (de-)serialized after all the cached
accounting data. This is bogus though, since unit_set_cgroup_path()
destroys the CGroupRuntime object and starts afresh, discarding
all deserialized values. This matters especially for IP accounting,
whose BPF maps get recreated on reload/reexec and the previous values
are exclusively retrievable from deserialization. Let's hence swap things
around and serialize cgroup_path first, accounting data only afterwards.
discover-image.[ch] largely already supports per-scope operations, let's
extend this however to also cover finding .nspawn settings files and
managing the pool dir.
We intend to make self-registering machines an unprivileged operation,
but currently that would allow an unprivileged user to register a
process they own in the root namespace, and then login as any
user they like, including root, which is not ideal.
Forbid non-root from shelling into a machine that is running in
the root user namespace.
This caused resolved to only consider the 1st search domain of every
interface and ignore the rest.
Fixes a regression caused by 81ae2237c1 (v258).
Fixes#39118.
Currently it's next to impossible to find out why dissect_image()
has failed with EADDRNOTAVAIL, so let's add debug logging and use
EREMOTE for the different architectures error to help out with
debugging a bit.
When establishing a idmapped mount for a directory with foreign mapping
we so far insisted in the dir being properly opened (i.e. via a
non-O_PATH fd) being passed to mountfsd. This is problematic however,
since the client might not actually be able to open the dir (which after
all is owned by the foreign UID, not by the user). Hence, let's relax
the rules, and accept an O_PATH fd too (which the client can get even
without privs). This should be safe, since the load-bearing security
check is whether the dir has a parent owned by the client's UID, and
for that check O_PATH or not O_PATH is not relevant.
This is split out of #38764.
It mostly introduces the "chrome" stuff that puts a blue at the top of
bottom of the terminal screen when going through interactive tools such
as firstboot, homed-firstboot, and (in future) systemd-sysinstall).
it also introduces a generic "prompt_loop()" helper thatn queries the
user for some option in a loop until the rsponse matches certain
requirements. It's a generalization of a function of the same name that
so far only existed in firstboot.c. The more generic version will be
reused in a later PR by homed-firstboot and by sysinstall.
Daan De Meyer
Lennart Poettering
Itxaka
Anton Tiurin
Anton Tiurin
Luca Boccassi
Yu Watanabe
Matteo Croce
Mike Yuan
Luca Boccassi
Mantas Mikulėnas
Lukas Nykryn
Antonio Alvarez Feijoo