In all our daemons the primary entrypoint object is called "Manager".
But so far there was one exception: in journald it was called "Server".
Let's normalize that, and stick to the same nomenclature everywhere, to
make journald less special.
No real code change, just some search&replace.
When running with sanitizers:
```
26/95 systemd:integration-tests / TEST-21-DFUZZER OK 1517.75s
40/95 systemd:integration-tests / TEST-85-NETWORK-NetworkdDHCPClientTests OK 779.18s
42/95 systemd:integration-tests / TEST-04-JOURNAL OK 716.17s
```
and without sanitizers:
```
44/95 systemd:integration-tests / TEST-85-NETWORK-NetworkdDHCPClientTests OK 730.33s
29/95 systemd:integration-tests / TEST-64-UDEV-STORAGE-simultaneous_events OK 701.49s
40/95 systemd:integration-tests / TEST-04-JOURNAL OK 348.05s
```
So, let's set higher priorities only on these tests.
Previously, both udevd and logind modifies ACLs of a device node. Hence,
there exists a race something like the following:
1. udevd reads an old state file,
2. logind updates the state file, and apply new ACLs,
3. udevd applies ACLs based on the old state file.
This makes logind not update ACLs but trigger uevents for relevant
devices to make ACLs updated by udevd.
When udevd broadcasts an event for e.g. a graphics device with master-of-seat
tag, then previously manager_process_seat_device() was called twice for
the event.
With this commit, the function is called only once even for an event for
such device.
This returns to the original approach proposed in
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/17270. After review, the approach was
changed to use sd_pid_get_owner_uid() instead. Back then, when running in a
typical graphical session, sd_pid_get_owner_uid() would usually return the user
UID, and when running under sudo, geteuid() would return 0, so we'd trigger the
secure path.
sudo may allocate a new session if is invoked outside of a session (depending
on the PAM config). Since nowadays desktop environments usually start the user
shell through user units, the typical shell in a terminal emulator is not part
of a session, and when sudo is invoked, a new session is allocated, and
sd_pid_get_owner_uid() returns 0 too. Technically, the code still works as
documented in the man page, but in the common case, it doesn't do the expected
thing.
$ build/test-sd-login |& rg 'get_(owner_uid|cgroup|session)'
sd_pid_get_session(0) → No data available
sd_pid_get_owner_uid(0) → 1000
sd_pid_get_cgroup(0) → /user.slice/user-1000.slice/user@1000.service/app.slice/app-ghostty-transient-5088.scope/surfaces/556FAF50BA40.scope
$ sudo build/test-sd-login |& rg 'get_(owner_uid|cgroup|session)'
sd_pid_get_session(0) → c289
sd_pid_get_owner_uid(0) → 0
sd_pid_get_cgroup(0) → /user.slice/user-0.slice/session-c289.scope
I think it's worth checking for sudo because it is a common case used by users.
There obviously are other mechanims, so the man page is extended to say that
only some common mechanisms are supported, and to (again) recommend setting
SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE explicitly. The other option would be to set "secure mode"
by default. But this would create an inconvenience for users doing the right
thing, running systemctl and other tools directly, because then they can't run
privileged commands from the pager, e.g. to save the output to a file. (Or the
user would need to explicitly set SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE. One option would be to
set it always in the environment and to rely on sudo and other tools stripping
it from the environment before running privileged code. But that is also fairly
fragile and it obviously relies on the user doing a complicated setup to
support a fairly common use case. I think this decreases usability of the
system quite a bit. I don't think we should build solutions that work in
priniciple, but are painfully inconvenient in common cases.)
Fixes https://yeswehack.com/vulnerability-center/reports/346802.
Also see https://github.com/polkit-org/polkit/pull/562, which adds support for
$SUDO_UID/$SUDO_GID to pkexec.