Add function to create openssl pkey from ECC curve and point, and function to
get curve id and x/y point from existing ECC pkey. Also add function to create
new ECC key for specified curve.
Also add DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC_FULL_MACRO() to handle case when func() is
a macro, not a function symbol; specifically in this case it is used for
OPENSSL_free() which is a macro.
Fixes
| ../git/src/basic/user-util.c:708:30: error: use of undeclared identifier 'LOCK_EX'; did you mean 'LOCK_BSD'?
| 708 | r = unposix_lock(fd, LOCK_EX);
| | ^~~~~~~
| | LOCK_BSD
Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Private mappings are required when F_SEAL_WRITE is set on a memfd,
because otherwise you could end up with writable mappings through
mprotect() and other calls. This is a limitation of the kernel
implementation, and might be lifted by future extensions.
Regardless, the current code tests for the full `is_sealed()` before
using MAP_PRIVATE. This might end up using MAP_SHARED for write-sealed
memfds, which will be refused by the kernel.
Fix this and make memfd_map() check for exactly `F_SEAL_WRITE`.
Rather than always setting all seals, make `memfd_set_seals()` employ
the original set of seals, that is: SEAL+GROW+SHRINK+WRITE
Historically, the memfd code was used with the out-of-tree memfd
patches, which merely supported a single seal ("SEALED", which
effectively was GROW+SHRINK+WRITE). When the code was adapted to the
upstream memfd seals, it was extended to the full seal set. With more
and more seals being added upstream, this because more problematic. In
particular, it is unclear what the function really is meant to achieve.
Instead of just adding all seals, the function is returned to its
original purpose: seal the memfd so futher modifications to its content
are prevented.
With `F_SEAL_SEAL` a memfd can disable further sealing operations,
effectively sealing the set of seals. Testing for it ensures that no
further seals can be added, it never prevents seals from being dropped,
since seals cannot be dropped, ever.
Now testing for `F_SEAL_SEAL` makes sense if you want to ensure that
some seals are *not* set. That is, you either test for the entire set of
seals to match a local set, or you verify that a specific seal is not
set. Neither is what we are doing, so it feels wrong requiring it to be
set.
By dropping the requirement for `F_SEAL_SEAL`, the same FD can be shared
with other entities while retaining the ability to further restrict the
set of seals later on (e.g., being able to mark a region as executable
later on, and then adding `F_SEAL_EXEC`).
In chaseat() we call dir_fd_is_root() several places, and the final
result depends on it. If the root path specified to `chase()` is not
normalized but points to "/", e.g. "/../", assertions in `chaseat()` or
`chase()` may be triggered.
Previously, in path_is_root_at(), if statx() does not provide mount ID,
path_get_mnt_id_at() was called, but it also calls statx(). Let's avoid
the second trial.
When newer glibc is used, but kernel does not support statx(), then
glibc try to fallback with fstatat(). That's quite similar to our
implementation, but the supported flags are different, and if
unsupported flags are specified, it returns EINVAL.
Let's handle the case more gracefully.
The previous definition was not quite appropriate for the library code
because it relied on the message domain set by textdomain() invocation
which is not necessarily the same message domain defined in
GETTEXT_PACKAGE macro.
The only code that uses _() so far is located in pam_systemd_home.c.
Fixes: 20f56fddcd ("Add gettext support")
This commits adds version_is_valid_versionspec and uses it in
analyze-compare-version.c.
version_is_valid_versionspec differs from version_is_valid in that it acepts
empty strings and since valid characters in a version spec version are all
ASCII letters and digits as well as "-.~^", but ",_+" allowed by
version_is_valid are not.
Also give a more specific warning message on invalid characters.
If getopt_long() is called for a list of arguments and it is freed, then
calling getopt_long() for another list will trigger use-after-free.
The function proc_cmdline_filter_pid1_args() may be called before or during
parsing program arguments (typically named as parse_argv()), hence we cannot
use getopt_long() in proc_cmdline_filter_pid1_args().
Fixes#28366.
Dan Streetman
OMOJOLA JOSHUA
Khem Raj
Luca Boccassi
David Rheinsberg
Daan De Meyer
Yu Watanabe
Dmitry V. Levin
Joerg Behrmann
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Frantisek Sumsal
Maanya Goenka
Daniel P. Berrangé