get_user_creds would use getpwnam() and then returns strings pointing
into the static buffer. This seems very iffy. Let's duplicate the
strings properly
The param was input/output, which is unexpected and confusing and
actually made most callers much more complicated than they needed to be.
The function was playing fast and loose with the return value. In some
cases it was returning a static string, which would be completely fine.
But in other case it was returning a pointer into the getgrgid static
buffer, i.e. that return value could be overwritten. AFAICT, this didn't
matter in any of the callers, but we shouldn't do that anyway.
So use a separate output param with an allocated string that the caller
is responsible for.
It turns out that all callers pass NULL (outside of tests) and zero for
flags. So the function _could_ be simplified. But get_user_creds is
called with all the params actually used, and I think having the the
functions so different wouldn't be nice. I first wrote a commit to
drop the unused params, but then I discarded it.
The error message in exec-invoke.c is fixed.
The mount.storage helper open-codes the conventional 64K UID/GID
delegation block size as 0x10000 / 0x10000U in four places. Several
other places in the tree do the same (nspawn's arg_uid_range default,
homed's mount setup, …), but with no shared name.
Add USERNS_RANGE_SIZE in user-util.h alongside UID_NOBODY and friends,
and switch storagectl over to it. Other call sites can adopt it
incrementally.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
$ sudo build/systemd-run --uid=asdf whoami
$ journalctl -e
(whoami)[1007784]: run-p1007782-i5200512.service: Failed to determine user credentials: No such process
(whoami)[1007784]: run-p1007782-i5200512.service: Failed at step USER spawning /usr/sbin/whoami: No such process
systemd[1]: run-p1007782-i5200512.service: Main process exited, code=exited, status=217/USER
systemd[1]: run-p1007782-i5200512.service: Failed with result 'exit-code'.
Now:
(whoami)[1013204]: run-p1013202-i5205932.service: Failed to determine credentials for user 'asdf': Unknown user
(whoami)[1013204]: run-p1013202-i5205932.service: Failed at step USER spawning /usr/sbin/whoami: Invalid argument
systemd[1]: run-p1013202-i5205932.service: Main process exited, code=exited, status=217/USER
systemd[1]: run-p1013202-i5205932.service: Failed with result 'exit-code'.
We cannot just use %m, because strerror returns a confusing error message
for ESRCH or ENOEXEC. udev code was doing a good job, but the error handling
was very verbose. Let's encapsulate the customized error messages in a
helper.
No functional change, except that the error messages have a slightly different
form now. The old messages were a bit better, but we don't have as much
flexibility in the new scheme. "Failed to resolve user 'foo': Unknown user"
should be good enough.
Let's not leak details from src/shared and src/libsystemd into
src/basic, even though you can't actually do anything useful with
just forward declarations from src/shared.
The sd-forward.h header is put in src/libsystemd/sd-common as we
don't have a directory for shared internal headers for libsystemd
yet.
Let's also rename forward.h to basic-forward.h to keep things
self-explanatory.
These are wrappers around getpwuid_r() and friends, and will allocate the
right-sized buffer for this call.
We so far had multiple implementations of a buffer allocation loop
around getpwuid_r() and friends, and they all suck in some way. Let's
clean this up and add a common implementation, and use it everywhere.
Also, be more careful with error numbers, in particular systematically
turn ENOENT into ENOSRCH (the former is what is returned if /etc/passwd
is absent, which we want to consider identical to user not existing,
which is ENOSRCH). We so far did this at some invocations, but not all.
There are some invocations of getpwuid() left in the codebase. We really
should fix those too, and have a single unified implementation of the
logic, but those are not as trivial to convert, so left for another
time.
Let's rename return parameters to ret_xyz, and let's guarantee the usual
rule to initialize all return parameters on success, and not touch any
on failure.
We would create root account from sysusers or from firstboot, depending on
which one ran earlier. Since firstboot offers more options, in particular can
set the root password, we needed to order it earlier. This created an ugly
ordering requirement:
systemd-sysusers.service > systemd-firstboot.service > ... >
systemd-remount-fs.service > systemd-tmpfiles-setup-dev.service >
systemd-sysusers.service
We want sysusers.service to create basic users, so we can create nodes in dev,
so we can operate on block devices and such, so that we can resize and remount
things. But at the same time, systemd-firstboot.service can only work if it is
run early, before systemd-sysusers.service has created /etc/passwd. We can't
have it both ways: the units that want to have a fully writable root file
system cannot be ordered before units which are required to do file system
preparation.
Instead of trying to order firstboot very early, let's let it do its thing even
if it is started later. Instead of refusing to create to the root account if
/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow exist, actually check if the account is configured.
Now sysusers writes root account with password PASSWORD_UNPROVISIONED
("!unprovisioned"), and then firstboot checks for this, and will configure root
in this case.
This allows sysusers to be executed earlier (or accounts to be set up earlier
in another way).
This effectively reverts b825ab1a99.
This enum should be used to define various idmapping modes for bind
mounts which might be incompatible. Changing its name and the values
name to reflect that.
/bin/sh as a shell is punishing. There is no good reason to make
the occasional root login unpleasant.
Since /bin/sh is usually /bin/bash in compat mode, i.e. if one is
available, the other will be too, /bin/bash is almost as good as a default.
But to avoid a regression in the situation where /bin/bash (or
DEFAULT_USER_SHELL) is not installed, we check with access() and fall back
to /bin/sh. This should make this change in behaviour less risky.
(FWIW, e.g. Fedora/RHEL use /bin/bash as default for root.)
This is a follow-up of sorts for 53350c7bba,
which added the default-user-shell option, but most likely with the idea
of using /bin/bash less ;)
Fixes#24369.
When using user namespaces in conjunction with uidmapped mounts, nspawn
so far set up two uidmappings:
1. One that is used for the uidmapped mount and that maps the UID range
0…65535 on the backing fs to some high UID range X…X+65535 on the
uidmapped fs. (Let's call this mapping the "mount mapping")
2. One that is used for the userns namespace the container payload
processes run in, that maps X…X+65535 back to 0…65535. (Let's call
this one the "process mapping").
These mappings hence are pretty much identical, one just moves things up
and one back down. (Reminder: we do all this so that the processes can
run under high UIDs while running off file systems that require no
recursive chown()ing, i.e. we want processes with high UID range but
files with low UID range.)
This creates one problem, i.e. issue #20989: if nspawn (which runs as
host root, i.e. host UID 0) wants to add inodes to the uidmapped mount
it can't do that, since host UID 0 is not defined in the mount mapping
(only the X…X+65536 range is, after all, and X > 0), and processes whose
UID is not mapped in a uidmapped fs cannot create inodes in it since
those would be owned by an unmapped UID, which then triggers
the famous EOVERFLOW error.
Let's fix this, by explicitly including an entry for the host UID 0 in
the mount mapping. Specifically, we'll extend the mount mapping to map
UID 2147483646 (which is INT32_MAX-1, see code for an explanation why I
picked this one) of the backing fs to UID 0 on the uidmapped fs. This
way nspawn can creates inode on the uidmapped as it likes (which will
then actually be owned by UID 2147483646 on the backing fs), and as it
always did. Note that we do *not* create a similar entry in the process
mapping. Thus any files created by nspawn that way (and not chown()ed to
something better) will appear as unmapped (i.e. as overflowuid/"nobody")
in the container payload. And that's good. Of course, the latter is
mostly theoretic, as nspawn should generally chown() the inodes it
creates to UID ranges that actually make sense for the container (and we
generally already do this correctly), but it#s good to know that we are
safe here, given we might accidentally forget to chown() some inodes we
create.
Net effect: the two mappings will not be identical anymore. The mount
mapping has one entry more, and the only reason it exists is so that
nspawn can access the uidmapped fs reasonably independently from any
process mapping.
Fixes: #20989
This is a debugging feature. It's sometimes incredibly useful to be able
to run a second instance of homed that operates on another dir than
/home/.
Specifically, if you build homed from the source tree you can now run an
instance of it pretty reasonably directly from the build tree via:
sudo SYSTEMD_HOME_DEBUG_SUFFIX=foo SYSTEMD_HOMEWORK_PATH=$(pwd)/build/systemd-homework SYSTEMD_HOME_ROOT=/home/foo ./build/systemd-homed
And then talk to it via
sudo SYSTEMD_HOME_DEBUG_SUFFIX=foo homectl …
(you might need to tweak your dbus policy for this to work fully though)
Let's add three defines for the 3 special cases of passwords.
Some of our tools used different values for the "locked"/"invalid" case,
let's settle on using "!*" which means the password is both locked *and*
invalid.
Other tools like to use "!!" for this case, which however is less than
ideal I think, since the this could also be a considered an entry with
an empty password, that can be enabled again by unlocking it twice.
This reworks the user validation infrastructure. There are now two
modes. In regular mode we are strict and test against a strict set of
valid chars. And in "relaxed" mode we just filter out some really
obvious, dangerous stuff. i.e. strict is whitelisting what is OK, but
"relaxed" is blacklisting what is really not OK.
The idea is that we use strict mode whenver we allocate a new user
(i.e. in sysusers.d or homed), while "relaxed" mode is when we process
users registered elsewhere, (i.e. userdb, logind, …)
The requirements on user name validity vary wildly. SSSD thinks its fine
to embedd "@" for example, while the suggested NAME_REGEX field on
Debian does not even allow uppercase chars…
This effectively liberaralizes a lot what we expect from usernames.
The code that warns about questionnable user names is now optional and
only used at places such as unit file parsing, so that it doesn't show
up on every userdb query, but only when processing configuration files
that know better.
Fixes: #15149#15090
This way we can use libxcrypt specific functionality such as
crypt_gensalt() and thus take benefit of the newer algorithms libxcrypt
implements. (Also adds support for a new env var $SYSTEMD_CRYPT_PREFIX
which may be used to select the hash algorithm to use for libxcrypt.)
Also, let's move the weird crypt.h inclusion into libcrypt.h so that
there's a single place for it.
New functions are called valid_user_group_name_compat() and
valid_user_group_name_or_id_compat() and accept dots in the user
or group name. No functional change except the tests.
Commit 100d5f6ee6 (user-util: add new wrappers for [...] database
files), ammended by commit 4f07ffa8f5 (Use #if instead of #ifdef for
ENABLE_GSHADOW) moved code from sysuser to basic/user-util.
In doing so, the combination of both commits properly propagated the
ENABLE_GSHADOW conditions around the function manipulating gshadow, but
they forgot to protect the inclusion of the gshadow.h header.
Fix that to be able to build on C libraries that do not provide gshadow
(e.g. uClibc-ng, where it does not exist.)
Let's fold get_user_creds_clean() into get_user_creds(), and introduce a
flags argument for it to select "clean" behaviour. This flags parameter
also learns to other new flags:
- USER_CREDS_SYNTHESIZE_FALLBACK: in this mode the user records for
root/nobody are only synthesized as fallback. Normally, the synthesized
records take precedence over what is in the user database. With this
flag set this is reversed, and the user database takes precedence, and
the synthesized records are only used if they are missing there. This
flag should be set in cases where doing NSS is deemed safe, and where
there's interest in knowing the correct shell, for example if the
admin changed root's shell to zsh or suchlike.
- USER_CREDS_ALLOW_MISSING: if set, and a UID/GID is specified by
numeric value, and there's no user/group record for it accept it
anyway. This allows us to fix#9767
This then also ports all users to set the most appropriate flags.
Fixes: #9767
[zj: remove one isempty() call]
These lines are generally out-of-date, incomplete and unnecessary. With
SPDX and git repository much more accurate and fine grained information
about licensing and authorship is available, hence let's drop the
per-file copyright notice. Of course, removing copyright lines of others
is problematic, hence this commit only removes my own lines and leaves
all others untouched. It might be nicer if sooner or later those could
go away too, making git the only and accurate source of authorship
information.
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Christian Brauner
Daan De Meyer
Yu Watanabe
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Mike Yuan
Lennart Poettering
Quentin Deslandes
Jan Janssen
Pigmy-penguin
Dariusz Gadomski
Yann E. MORIN
ChenQi1989