libgcrypt is used only by test-fsprg. We do not add dlopen notes for
unit tests, so the library may not be installed on the system. If systemd
is built with HAVE_GCRYPT but libgcrypt is not installed, the test fails.
There is no need to install libgcrypt solely for test-dlopen-so, so drop
the test case.
(cherry picked from commit 764b9a724925c4167e91fd36311e38aee8c6871a)
make_console_stdio() forces KD_TEXT while reopening /dev/console. When
systemd-shutdown enters the exitrd, this can expose the text console over
a retained graphical shutdown splash.
Let callers choose whether to switch to text mode, and preserve the mode
for the exitrd handoff. Keep the existing text-mode behavior for manager
reexecution and the crash shell. Restore text mode if executing /shutdown
fails and before reporting a fatal error and freezing.
Add an unsafe, nonparallel virtual-console regression test requiring
explicit opt-in and an already-owned inactive VT in a disposable VM.
Check graphics preservation and text restoration through a private
/dev/console bind mount, retain stderr diagnostics, and restore the saved
mode in the parent even if the child fails.
(cherry picked from commit ef3e0ff7bb)
This is useful to check if how fast the code is (painfully slow) and whether
worlds indeed are selected with a flat distribution probability (they are).
The code is slow because the hashing and because chaseat is exteremely
inefficient :(
Provides a Tokio-like #[tokio::main] entry point for binaries that want
to run their main function inside a fiber on a default sd_event loop.
DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION_FIBER(impl) mirrors DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION but routes
impl through a new run_main_fiber() helper, which:
- allocates the default sd_event,
- enables exit-on-idle so the loop terminates once all event sources
drain (structured concurrency: impl is expected to cancel and reap
whatever it spawned before returning),
- spawns impl as a fiber named after program_invocation_short_name,
- installs SIGINT/SIGTERM handlers that cancel the main fiber (and
disable themselves so the loop can go idle once the fiber unwinds),
- runs sd_event_loop and propagates impl's return value via
sd_future_result, normalising -ECANCELED to 0 since that just
represents an orderly signal-driven shutdown.
Provide a Tokio-like #[tokio::main] entry point for binaries that want to run
their main function inside a fiber on a default sd_event loop.
DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION_FIBER(impl) mirrors DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION but routes impl
through a new run_main_fiber() helper. impl keeps the run() convention while
the loop's exit code keeps the exit status convention: impl's result never
becomes an exit code, an explicit exit status wins over a successful impl, and
impl's own failure wins over the exit status unless it is the -ECANCELED of a
fiber that the exit request cancelled. Signal policy stays with impl so
existing handlers such as sd_event_set_signal_exit() keep working.
The fiber is created fire-and-forget: as long as the loop reaches
SD_EVENT_FINISHED it unwinds the fiber through its exit event source, so we
never hold a reference we cannot drop because the fiber is still suspended. A
loop that fails internally never dispatches its exit sources, so the fiber may
stay suspended with no working loop left to unwind it; we leak both for now and
leave a TODO to keep the broken loop out of the default slot. Since the fiber
also refers to run_main_fiber()'s stack frame, refuse to run on a loop we don't
own, or from a fiber, as sd_fiber_new() leaves the exit event source disabled
there and nothing would unwind the fiber.
Cover argument forwarding, result propagation, explicit event exits, nested
invocations, signal-source registration, event-loop errors, and fiber stack
unwinding, and check after every run that the default event loop was released
again. Also build and run a separate test executable that expands
DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION_FIBER itself and verifies that a positive implementation
result maps to a successful process exit.
The message, icon and id fields are written verbatim into single-line
assignments of the [Ask] section of the agent request file, so a newline in
them lets the caller append arbitrary further assignments. Agents let a later
assignment override an earlier one, so an injected Socket= line redirects the
password to a path of the injector's choosing. Validate the fields and refuse
the request instead.
Plymouth encodes the password prompt length in a single byte.
Reject prompts whose length cannot be represented instead of
wrapping the encoded length while sending the complete message.
tpm2-util.h includes crypto-util.h, which requires OpenSSL compiler
flags when HAVE_OPENSSL is defined. Add libopenssl_cflags to every
build target that uses tpm2_cflags but was missing the transitive
OpenSSL dependency.
Extend the 'install' keyword for executable definitions to accept four
modes—'yes', 'no', 'both', and 'static'—to elegantly manage the creation
and installation of both shared and statically-linked (.standalone) binaries.
- 'yes' / 'no': Standard behavior (mapped to true/false).
- 'both': Installs both the shared and static variants.
- 'static': Installs the static variant under the original name, while
suffixing the uninstalled shared variant with '.shared'.
With this change, any arbitrary executable can now have its `.standalone`
variant built on demand simply by invoking `ninja <target>.standalone`.
For example, `varlinkctl` did not previously support a standalone variant,
but it can now be built explicitly via `ninja varlinkctl.standalone`.
These `.standalone` binaries are not built by default unless explicitly
specified as a ninja target or enabled via `-Dstandalone-binaries=true`.
Thus, the default build time should remain unaffected.
This centralisation eliminates a massive amount of boilerplate and duplicated
target declarations across almost all subdirectories (e.g., systemd-repart,
systemd-tmpfiles, systemd-shutdown, and systemd-report tools).
We have two concepts: a list of files that should be extracted from an
intermediate build artifact to be used in a later build artifact, and for a
given artifact, a list "donors". The first list was called "extract", because
it is passed to the .extract_objects() meson function, and the second was
called "objects", because that is the meson parameter to specify pre-built
objects files (6350d2dbd9). But this naming is
confusing: we don't care about the 'extract' step, this is something internal
to the build machinery. And 'objects' is a very generic term.
Let's use 'export' for the stuff that is "exported" for other binaries to use,
and 'import' to say where to import from. Those terms are symmetrical and the
association between them should be intuitive. (If you think the terms are
actually assymetrical, there are precedents for confusing the import with the
import sources. E.g. in modern English, turkeys are called so because they were
imported from the Americas and guineafowls were imported from Africa via
Türkiye and all that foreign stuff is alike.)
This makes each `foo_cflags` dependency define a `SYSTEMD_CFLAGS_MARKER_FOO`
macro, and checks if the macro is set when headers provided by external
libraries are included.
With this, we can fail fast at compile time if necessary `_cflags`
dependencies are omitted in meson.build. Missing dependencies found by this
mechanism have been added across the tree.
This adds a new systemd.firstboot=headless mode. It differs from the
existing systemd.firstboot=no mode in that it still performs the
non-interactive auto-configuration that requires no user input (such
as selecting the only installed locale, or applying settings provided
via credentials), and only skips the prompts that would otherwise
block waiting for user input. In contrast, =no disables that
auto-configuration along with the prompts.
The option is also honoured by homectls firstboot logic and
systemd-cryptenroll, where headless behaves the same as no
(because the is no auto-configuration).
With this change, gcrypt dependency is not mandatory. Hence, allow to build
systemd even when -D gcrypt=enabled but gcrypt devel package is not installed.
Add a small newc-format cpio encoder that builds an archive with each
credential as a file under .extra/system_credentials/<id>.cred and
writes it to a temp file. This mirrors what systemd-stub produces from
ESP credentials, so PID1's import_credentials_boot() picks them up
unchanged via the new /.extra/system_credentials/ initrd path.
Motivated by vmspawn under SEV-SNP, where SMBIOS credentials aren't
covered by the launch measurement and are discarded by PID1 in
confidential guests, so they must be delivered via the measured initrd
instead. The writer lives in src/shared/ so other host-side tooling
can reuse it.
Signed-off-by: Paul Meyer <katexochen0@gmail.com>
This PR fixes userdb lookups for NSS users that are resolved through an
alias but returned with a canonical user name.
Some NSS providers, such as SSSD, can successfully resolve a user by an
alias-like name, for example a Kerberos/AD UPN (for example
testuser@example.test) while returning a passwd record with the
canonical login name.
The original lookup name was not preserved. Later, the userdb worker
checked whether the returned record matched the requested name with
user_record_matches_user_name(). Since the requested name was
testuser@example.test, but the record only contained testuser, the
lookup was rejected as:
`io.systemd.UserDatabase.ConflictingRecordFound`
This also caused pam_systemd to fail opening sessions for such users
with:
`pam_systemd(...:session): Failed to get user record`
In my case, this broke graphical logins for Samba users logging in with
a UPN on systems where SSSD canonicalizes the NSS result.
My solution preserves the requested name as a UserRecord alias when an
NSS lookup by name succeeds but the returned pw_name differs from the
requested name.
This allows user_record_matches_user_name() to accept the canonicalized
NSS result instead of treating it as a conflicting record.
The patch does not invent new aliases. It only records the name that NSS
itself already accepted and resolved successfully.
I'm not an expert on working with systemd, so I'm asking for a review of
my PR.
Add separate NSS conversion tests for user and group records covering
canonicalized lookup aliases, invalid alias rejection, user-side alias
no-op cases, group alias@realm matching, and alias-aware fuzzy matching.
Fixes the following build error:
```
ninja: job failed: cc (snip) -o test-bpf-restrict-fsaccess.p/src_test_test-bpf-restrict-fsaccess.c.o -c ../src/test/test-bpf-restrict-fsaccess.c
In file included from ../src/test/test-bpf-restrict-fsaccess.c:96:
src/bpf/restrict-fsaccess-skel.h:19:10: fatal error: restrict-fsaccess.bpf.skel.h: No such file or directory
19 | #include "restrict-fsaccess.bpf.skel.h" /* IWYU pragma: export */
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
compilation terminated.
ninja: subcommand failed
```
Follow-up for e6fc73350f.
The quota test takes ~30 seconds on my poor laptop, and randomly fails
with timeout. Let's extend the timeout and skip the test case when slow
tests are disabled.
A hostile but structurally valid 382-byte PE32+ "EFI application" with a
single section whose VirtualSize is ~4 GiB and SizeOfRawData is 0 drives
uki_hash() into ~4.17 M iterations of SHA-256 over 1024 bytes of zeros
— wedging the parser for >10 s. Nine more slow-units share the same
shape. A separate MSAN finding from the new fuzzer (CIFuzz, memory
sanitizer) shows pe_load_headers() reading uninitialised heap memory
when SizeOfOptionalHeader is too small to actually contain
NumberOfRvaAndSizes.
Three tightenings in src/shared/pe-binary.c:
1. In pe_load_sections, reject sections whose PointerToRawData +
SizeOfRawData exceeds the actual file size. Raw section data must
fit inside the file; this is the parser-wide invariant
pe_hash / uki_hash / pe_read_section_data rely on.
2. In uki_hash, cap the (VirtualSize - SizeOfRawData) zero-padding
hash loop at 64 MiB. Real UKIs do not pad sections with tens of
MiB of zero-equivalent data; anything above this cap is a
malformed PE.
3. In pe_load_headers, reject a PE whose SizeOfOptionalHeader is too
small to cover up to NumberOfRvaAndSizes. Without this guard the
subsequent size-mismatch check reads uninitialised optional-header
bytes, caught by MSAN under CIFuzz.
Add the 382 B canonical reproducer (plus two structural siblings) and
the MSAN reproducer to test/fuzz/fuzz-pe-binary/. Also add a libFuzzer
harness in src/fuzz/fuzz-pe-binary.c and unit tests in
src/test/test-pe-binary.c that exercise each fix branch in isolation.
The 64 MiB hash boundary test is gated behind SYSTEMD_SLOW_TESTS so it
doesn't slow down emulated-arch CI.
This is a robustness fix, not a security fix: PE binaries consumed by
bootctl / systemd-stub / pcrlock / kernel-install / systemd-measure are
already trusted and signed at the consumer side, so the worst pre-fix
behaviour is wasted CPU on a UKI install / measure / inspect call.
Closes#42344.
Reported-by: AI-assisted libFuzzer campaign
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Varlink ListSessions method accepts optional Id and PID filters,
folding in the D-Bus GetSession(s) and GetSessionByPID(u) lookups.
Passing a unique-key filter (Id and/or PID) yields a single reply on
match, or NoSuchSession on miss. Passing no filter streams the full
list (requires the 'more' flag). Specifying both Id and PID acts as a
consistency check: both must refer to the same session, otherwise
NoSuchSession is returned.
The Id filter supports the special names "self" and "auto" which
resolve to the caller's session. The SessionInfo type in the
io.systemd.Login Varlink IDL carries all session properties matching
the D-Bus org.freedesktop.login1.Session interface.
- test-random-util is reworked to not use sqrt()
- pretty-print.c inlines ceil() so libm doesn't have
to be linked into libshared
- We add fno-math-errno to allow inlining of more math
functions by not requiring standard math functions to
set errno on invalid input.
Our baseline glibc is 2.34, which merged libdl, libpthread (the
dependency('threads') target), and librt into libc. Empty .so/.a stubs
remain for backward compatibility with old binaries, but new builds
resolve dl_*, pthread_*, mq_*, timer_*, etc. directly from libc.
On musl the same libraries are likewise empty stubs.
Drop the libdl, threads, and librt entries from every meson.build, and
remove the now-stale 'Libs.private: -lrt -pthread' from libudev.pc.in
since both flags resolve to empty link-time stubs on glibc 2.34+ and
musl.
Verified with readelf -d that libsystemd.so, libudev.so, and systemd no
longer carry DT_NEEDED entries for libdl/libpthread/librt.
Renames src/shared/bpf-dlopen.{c,h} to src/shared/bpf-util.{c,h} and
folds the former src/shared/bpf-compat.h (struct forward decl and
compat_bpf_map_create() helper) into the new header.
Aligns dlopen_bpf() with the standard wrapper pattern: drops the
manual dlopen_safe()/dlsym_many_or_warn()/TAKE_PTR(dl) plumbing and
the bespoke 'cached' int in favor of dlopen_many_sym_or_warn() inside
a FOREACH_STRING() soname-fallback loop.
Unifies declaration of the version-specific symbols (bpf_create_map,
bpf_map_create, bpf_object__next_map, bpf_token_create) into a single
DISABLE_WARNING_REDUNDANT_DECLS block in the header, and alphabetically
merges the DLSYM_PROTOTYPE list. DLSYM_OPTIONAL is used to load each
one — call sites already handle NULL (compat_bpf_map_create() and the
sym_bpf_object__next_map guard in userns-restrict.c). bpf_token_create
additionally defaults to a missing_bpf_token_create() stub returning
-ENOSYS, so callers can branch on the errno instead of NULL-checking
the pointer.
Updates test-bpf-token to match: drops the compile-time
LIBBPF_MAJOR_VERSION ≥ 1.5 gate and the direct <bpf/bpf.h> include in
favor of dlopen_bpf() + sym_bpf_token_create(), and treats -ENOSYS as
the test-skip path (covering both 'libbpf too old' and 'kernel lacks
BPF_TOKEN_CREATE support').
When there is a NOTIFY_SOCKET, and FDs are received from the
payload following the FD Store protocol, forward them up the
chain to the service manager that is managing nspawn.
This allows FD Store persistence across container restarts,
and can chain up for user managers as well to survive restarting
those, or reexecs, and in the future reboots too via LUO.
Add a new test case to exercise the PID1 -> user session -> nspawn -> payload
chain.
This series adds a new `RestrictFileSystemAccess=` setting in the
`[Manager]` section of `system.conf` that enforces a deny-default
execution policy: only binaries residing on signed dm-verity block
devices (and the initramfs during early boot) are permitted to execute.
Everything else — tmpfs, procfs, sysfs, anonymous executable mappings,
unsigned dm-verity devices — is denied.
The directive takes the values `no` (default), `exec` (lock down
execution), and accepts `yes` as an alias for `exec`. The name is
deliberately broader than what the initial values cover so the same
setting can grow to restrict other filesystem access categories in the
future (e.g. `any` to deny all access from untrusted filesystems, not
just execution).
### How it works
The BPF program is entirely self-contained; PID1 loads it and the kernel
does the rest. When dm-verity brings up a device, the kernel calls
`security_bdev_setintegrity()` twice during `verity_preresume()`: once
with the root hash and once with the signature validity status. Our
`lsm/bdev_setintegrity` hook captures the second call and records the
device number in a BPF hash map if the signature is valid. When a device
is torn down, `lsm/bdev_free_security` cleans up the map entry. No
userspace map population is needed at any point.
The enforcement side hooks `bprm_check_security` (execve), `mmap_file`
(PROT_EXEC mappings including shared libraries), and `file_mprotect`
(W→X transitions like JIT and libffi). Each hook resolves the file's
backing device via `file->f_inode->i_sb->s_dev` and looks it up in the
verity device map. For block-backed filesystems, `s_dev` equals
`s_bdev->bd_dev`, which avoids an extra pointer chase and NULL check on
`s_bdev` — non-block filesystems simply miss in the map and get denied
by the default policy.
During early boot the initramfs needs to be trusted as well, since it
runs before any dm-verity volume is mounted. PID1 writes the initramfs
superblock's device number into a BPF global before attaching the
programs, and clears it after `switch_root` to close the trust window.
As a prerequisite, PID1 also verifies that
`dm_verity.require_signatures=1` is active — without it, unsigned
dm-verity devices could be created, which would weaken the security
model even though the BPF program would correctly deny execution from
them.
### Surviving daemon-reexec
The BPF programs and their verity device map must survive PID1
re-execution (daemon-reexec, switch_root, soft-reboot). Without
preservation, `manager_free()` would destroy the skeleton, the link FDs
would close, programs would detach, and the map would be freed. After
exec, a fresh skeleton would have an empty map — but existing dm-verity
devices have already signaled their integrity and won't do so again. A
deny-default policy plus an empty map means all execution denied and the
system is bricked.
We solve this by serializing the raw BPF link FDs and the `.bss` map FD
across exec using systemd's existing `serialize_fd` / `fdset_cloexec` /
`deserialize_fd` infrastructure. The kernel reference chain (link FD →
`struct bpf_link` → `struct bpf_prog` → `struct bpf_map`) keeps programs
attached and map data intact as long as the dup'd FDs survive. After
exec, PID1 detects the deserialized FDs and skips skeleton re-creation
entirely. If switching root, it uses the deserialized `.bss` map FD to
clear `initramfs_s_dev` via a targeted `mmap()` write, preserving the
other guard globals in `.bss`.
We intentionally avoid bpffs pinning. Pinned objects are discoverable
and manipulable by any process with sufficient privileges
(`BPF_OBJ_GET`, unlink). FD serialization keeps everything private to
PID1 with no external attack surface.
### Self-protection
BPF LSM programs attached via the tracing trampoline (`BPF_LSM_MAC`) are
inherently tamper-resistant — `bpf_tracing_link_lops` has no
`.update_prog` and no `.detach` callbacks, so the kernel rejects
`BPF_LINK_UPDATE` with `-EINVAL` and `BPF_LINK_DETACH` with
`-EOPNOTSUPP`. Once attached, our programs cannot be modified or
detached through the `bpf()` syscall.
The remaining attack vector is map injection: `BPF_MAP_GET_FD_BY_ID` to
obtain an FD to `verity_devices`, then `BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM` to insert a
fake trusted device. The self-protection guard blocks this with three
hooks. `lsm/bpf_map` fires inside `bpf_map_new_fd()`, the chokepoint for
all code paths that produce a map FD, and denies access to our map IDs
from any process other than PID1 (identified via `tgid == 1`, which is
unspoofable — `bpf_get_current_pid_tgid()` reads `current->tgid` from
`pid->numbers[0].nr`, the init-namespace PID). `lsm/bpf_prog` provides
analogous protection for program FDs as defense-in-depth. `lsm/bpf`
handles `BPF_LINK_GET_FD_BY_ID` at the command level since there is no
`security_bpf_link()` hook in the kernel.
The guard starts inactive — all protected IDs default to 0 in `.bss`,
and no real BPF object has ID 0 — so there is no window where it
interferes with PID1's own setup. After attaching all programs, PID1
queries the kernel-assigned IDs via `bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd()` and
writes them into the guard's globals. From that point on, the guard is
active. The guard has zero collateral damage: it only denies access to
our specific object IDs, leaving bpftrace, bpftool,
`RestrictFileSystems=`, and all other BPF usage completely unaffected.
Additionally, a ptrace guard (`lsm/ptrace_access_check`) blocks
`PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH` to PID1 from other processes, preventing extraction
of sensitive state from PID1's address space via ptrace, `/proc/1/mem`,
`process_vm_readv()`, or `pidfd_getfd()`. `PTRACE_MODE_READ` is allowed
so that monitoring tools and `systemctl` continue to work normally.
### Limitations
- The enforcement hooks resolve trust by looking at
`file->f_inode->i_sb->s_dev` — the device number of the superblock that
owns the file's inode. This works correctly for files directly on a
dm-verity block device, but it does not see through overlayfs. When a
file is accessed on an overlay mount, `f_inode` points to the overlay
inode, and `i_sb->s_dev` is the overlay superblock's anonymous device
number — not the underlying dm-verity device. The overlay superblock has
no backing block device, so the lookup misses in the verity map and
execution is denied by the default policy.
This means that overlayfs mounts whose lower layers are on
dm-verity-protected volumes will currently have execution blocked, even
though the actual data is integrity-protected. The correct fix requires
a kernel extension that allows the BPF program to call something like
`d_real_inode()` to resolve through the overlay to the real inode on the
underlying filesystem, and then check that inode's superblock device
number against the verity map. I plan to add a BPF kfunc exposing this
functionality in a follow-up kernel series.
- Multi-device filesystems such as btrfs use entirely synthetic device
numbers and there is no way to reach the actual device backing the inode
from the inode itself. So `RestrictFileSystemAccess=` only works
reliably with a subset of filesystems. In practice this isn't a problem
because the feature is tailored to erofs; using it on arbitrary
filesystems requires careful vetting of the actual filesystem behaviour.
- The initial implementation also blocks JIT-style execution that relies
on memory mapped executable. This is part of `exec` semantics today and
can be loosened later by introducing finer-grained values (a common
pattern in systemd — following the precedent of `ProtectSystem=`, which
started as a boolean and later grew `auto`/`yes`/`full`/`strict`
semantics).
- The configuration is a system-wide setting with no per-unit opt-out.
This is intentional for the initial implementation: a global invariant
is easier to reason about and harder to accidentally weaken. Per-unit
relaxation can be added later if a concrete need arises.
### Testing
The series includes unit tests and integration tests covering both the
core enforcement logic and the self-protection guard. The unit test
loads the skeleton, attaches programs, populates guard globals, and
verifies that protected IDs are set correctly. The integration tests
exercise the guard by attempting `BPF_MAP_GET_FD_BY_ID` and
`BPF_PROG_GET_FD_BY_ID` from a non-PID1 process and verifying that
access is denied.
What we cannot currently test end-to-end is actual execution enforcement
against a dm-verity-signed root filesystem. The systemd test suite does
not yet have infrastructure for booting a VM with a signed dm-verity
rootfs image — the existing mkosi-based test framework lacks the ability
to produce and boot such images. This will hopefully change soon when
Daan integrates barrage into the test suite.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert test-btrfs to use the test framework and
assertions, merge the physical offset test into it
and beef it up to include what TEST-83-BTRFS does and
finally get rid of TEST-83-BTRFS as it is unneeded now.
Add TEST-90-RESTRICT-FSACCESS with two subtests:
config subtest — Tests PID1's RestrictFileSystemAccess= configuration parsing and
failure modes via system.conf drop-ins and daemon-reexec:
- Default RestrictFileSystemAccess=no produces no log messages
- RestrictFileSystemAccess=yes without BPF LSM logs appropriate warning
- RestrictFileSystemAccess=yes without require_signatures is correctly rejected
by the test helper binary's precondition check
enforce subtest — Tests actual BPF LSM enforcement using a test helper
binary (test-bpf-restrict-fsaccess) that loads the BPF skeleton with
initramfs_s_dev set to the rootfs s_dev, pins BPF links, and exits:
- Execution from rootfs continues to work (trusted via initramfs_s_dev)
- Execution from tmpfs is blocked with EPERM
- Execution from a signed dm-verity device is allowed, driven via
systemd-run -p RootImage= against the pre-built signed minimal_0
images that mkosi ships and signs at image build time (no on-the-fly
squashfs / verity hash tree / signature build required)
- After BPF detach, enforcement is lifted
All tests skip gracefully when prerequisites are not met (BPF LSM, BPF
framework, dm-verity tools, signing keys).
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
PR #41583 (io.systemd.Unit.StartTransient) introduced several new varlink IDL enum types without corresponding enum consistency tests:
- JobType, JobState, JobResult in the new io.systemd.Job interface
- ServiceType in the Unit interface's ServiceContext
Add a new test-varlink-idl-job test file covering all three Job enums, and add ServiceType coverage to the existing test-varlink-idl-unit test. Export vl_type_ServiceType (was static) so it can be referenced from the test.
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Refactor curl-util to use the same per-request, refcounted, cancellable
slot model as sd-bus, sd-varlink and qmp-client.
CurlGlue becomes opaque and refcounted, and dispatches per-slot
completion callbacks through CURLOPT_PRIVATE instead of a single
g->on_finished demux that every caller had to switch on. The new
curl_glue_perform_async(g, easy, cb, userdata, &slot) replaces
curl_glue_add + the on_finished/userdata wiring.
CurlSlot is the per-request handle: it owns the easy handle,
curl_slot_unref does curl_multi_remove_handle + curl_easy_cleanup
(which doubles as cancel since remove aborts in-flight transfers
without queuing CURLMSG_DONE), and floating slots (ret_slot=NULL) are
kept alive in the glue's slot set until the callback fires. Drop the
userdata parameter from curl_glue_make: CURLOPT_PRIVATE is now used
internally to route completions to the slot.
Migrate pull-job and the pull-{oci,raw,tar} drivers, and imdsd, to the
new shape. PullJob.curl becomes PullJob.slot; pull_job_curl_on_finished
becomes a per-slot callback. imdsd routes its token-vs-data branch off
slot identity rather than easy-handle pointer comparison. Both daemons
drop the global on_finished/userdata wiring on the glue. pull_job_finish
and context_fail{,_full} now return int (always 0) so the callbacks
stay in the `return finish(...);` style.
Add test-curl-util covering glue lifecycle, easy-handle defaults,
floating and non-floating perform paths, cancel-via-slot-unref (verified
by a sentinel request that drives the loop to completion), and three
concurrent requests on a single glue. Tests fetch local files via
file:// URLs so no network is needed; libcurl availability is probed
once via dlopen_curl in intro().
Add a universal parser for the colon-separated grammar
'PROVIDER:VOLUME[:CONFIG][:K=V,K=V,…]' that backs --bind-volume on
systemd-vmspawn (next), machinectl bind-volume, and the future nspawn
+ service-manager BindVolume= integrations.
The 'config' field is opaque to shared code and interpreted per
backend (vmspawn: a DiskType name, future nspawn: a mount path). The
trailing key=value list is parsed into the io.systemd.StorageProvider
.Acquire() parameters (template, create, read-only/ro, size/create-size
and request-as), with values validated against the existing
storage-util enums and validators. Provider/volume names are checked
with storage_provider_name_is_valid() and storage_volume_name_is_valid();
the combined "<provider>:<volume>" string is also validated as
string_is_safe so it is safe to use as a QEMU device id.
Add a test-machine-util unit test covering the happy paths plus a
handful of malformed inputs.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Merge the two blocks adding tests, since there seems to be
no obvious reason to have two separate blocks, as they both
contain tests from the same libraries.
Until now OpenSSL was linked into every binary and library that needed
cryptography, pulling libcrypto (and, for resolved, libssl) into the
address space of services that never touch them at runtime. This commit
moves all OpenSSL usage behind the same dlopen helper pattern that we
already use for other optional libraries (libpam, libseccomp, libxz, …)
so libcrypto/libssl are only loaded on demand.
The bulk of the work lives in src/shared/crypto-util.{c,h} (libcrypto)
and src/shared/ssl-util.{c,h} (libssl), which replace the previous
src/shared/openssl-util.{c,h}:
- crypto-util.{c,h} declares every libcrypto function we call via
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE() and resolves them inside dlopen_libcrypto().
- ssl-util.{c,h} holds the libssl-specific DLSYM_PROTOTYPEs,
dlopen_libssl(), and the SSL_freep cleanup helper, so translation
units that only need libcrypto do not pull in libssl declarations.
- Callers refer to the symbols through sym_* aliases rather than the
original names.
- Convenience macros that used to be provided by the OpenSSL headers
(OPENSSL_free, BN_num_bytes, the sk_TYPE_* helpers, …) are
reimplemented as sym_* wrappers so no code path needs to fall back
to the linker-resolved symbols.
- All _cleanup_ helpers are redefined in terms of the sym_* variants
(EVP_PKEY_freep, X509_freep, BIO_freep, …) so cleanup attributes
keep working without pulling in libcrypto symbols at link time.
- The public crypto-util.c entry points (openssl_pubkey_from_pem,
openssl_digest_many, openssl_hmac_many, openssl_cipher_many,
kdf_ss_derive, kdf_kb_hmac_derive, rsa_* / ecc_* helpers,
pubkey_fingerprint, digest_and_sign, pkcs7_new, x509_fingerprint,
openssl_extract_public_key, pkey_generate_volume_keys, the load_*
helpers, …) now call dlopen_libcrypto() at entry before touching any
sym_* pointer.
The call sites across the tree have been converted to call
dlopen_libcrypto()/dlopen_libssl() at the appropriate entry point
before their first sym_* use, and to use sym_* variants throughout:
- bootctl, sbsign, measure, pcrlock, pcrextend, tpm2-setup, repart,
cryptsetup, cryptenroll, homectl, homed, homework, keyutil,
sysupdate, creds, import, dissect-image, pe-binary, pkcs11-util,
pkcs7-util, tpm2-util, creds-util. resolved additionally dlopens
libssl for DoT.
The meson build files are updated to depend on libopenssl_cflags (a
new partial dependency that exposes include paths and compile flags
only, not the linker flags) instead of libopenssl for every target that
previously linked against OpenSSL. Nothing links against libcrypto or
libssl directly anymore.
A new src/sbsign/authenticode.c hosts the Authenticode ASN.1 type
definitions that used to live inline in sbsign.c. The OpenSSL
ASN1_SEQUENCE / ASN1_CHOICE / IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS macros expand to
code that references libcrypto symbols directly, so to keep this
translation unit unlinked from libcrypto we redirect ASN1_item_* to
the sym_* variants via #define and wrap the ASN1_*_it() getters (which
appear as constant function pointers in static initializers) in small
trampoline functions that forward to the sym_* pointers at runtime.
test-dlopen-so gains assertions for dlopen_libcrypto and dlopen_libssl
so the dlopen contract is exercised in CI, and the openssl-specific
test was renamed from test-openssl.c to test-crypto-util.c to match
the new header naming.
Convert the GnuTLS and libmicrohttpd usage in journal-remote to the
dlopen pattern used by other optional shared libraries. A new
src/shared/gnutls-util.{h,c} declares the GnuTLS entry points via
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE and resolves them in dlopen_gnutls(); microhttpd-util
is moved from src/journal-remote to src/shared and gains analogous
DLSYM_PROTOTYPEs plus dlopen_microhttpd(). Callers in journal-gatewayd,
journal-remote-main and microhttpd-util itself call the sym_* wrappers
and invoke dlopen_gnutls()/dlopen_microhttpd() at their entry points.
setup_gnutls_logger() no longer fails when libgnutls is missing at
runtime; it logs a notice and returns 0 so journal-gatewayd starts up
without TLS dependencies installed.
The meson files gain libgnutls_cflags and libmicrohttpd_cflags partial
dependencies that expose include paths and compile flags only. Every
systemd-journal-{gatewayd,remote,upload} target switches to the cflags
variant, dropping the direct libgnutls/libmicrohttpd link. The
gatewayd->remote object-sharing dance for microhttpd-util.o goes away
since the code now lives in libshared.
test-dlopen-so gains assertions for dlopen_gnutls and dlopen_microhttpd.
Convert fdisk-util to the dlopen pattern used by other optional shared
libraries in libshared. Declare the libfdisk API entry points with
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE, resolve them in a dlopen_fdisk() helper, and call the
sym_* wrappers from the homework, sysupdate and repart binaries that
use them.
With this in place fdisk-util can live in libshared itself, linked only
against libfdisk's headers (via libfdisk_cflags). The libshared_fdisk
convenience library and the libfdisk link dependency on systemd-homework,
systemd-sysupdate, systemd-repart and systemd-repart.standalone go away.
Also add a dlopen_fdisk() check to test-dlopen-so.
Yu Watanabe
Birk Skyum
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Chris Down
Daan De Meyer
Armaan Sandhu
Armaan Sandhu
fuldeka
Michael Vogt
Paul Meyer
Lennart Poettering
Arseniy Kostevich
Luca Boccassi
jeffhuang
nikstur
Yaping Li
Christian Brauner
Christian Brauner
Ivan Kruglov