On systems lacking EFI or the SecureBoot efi var the caching of this
info didn#t work, since we'd see ENOENT when reading the var, and cache
that, which we then use as reason to retry next time.
Let's fix that and convert ENOENT to "secure boot", because that's what
it really means. All other errors are left as is (and reason to retry).
But let's add some debug logging for that case.
Same idea as 03677889f0.
No functional change intended. The type of the iterator is generally changed to
be 'const char*' instead of 'char*'. Despite the type commonly used, modifying
the string was not allowed.
I adjusted the naming of some short variables for clarity and reduced the scope
of some variable declarations in code that was being touched anyway.
The actual minimum size of the pool across supported kernel versions is
32 bytes. So adjust this minimum.
I've audited every single usage of random_pool_size(), and cannot see
anywhere that this would have any impact at all on anything. We could
actually just not change the constant and everything would be fine, or
we could change it here and that's fine too. From both a functionality
and crypto perspective, it doesn't really seem to make a substantive
difference any which way, so long as the value is ≥32. However, it's
better to be correct and have the function do what it says, so clamp it
to the right minimum.
This is a wrapper around openat(). It works mostly the same, except for
one thing: it race-freely reports whether we just created the indicated
file in case O_CREAT is passed without O_EXCL.
"""
Given an array a[N] of N elements of type T:
- Forming a pointer &a[i] (or a + i) with 0 ≤ i ≤ N is safe.
- Forming a pointer &a[i] with i < 0 or i > N causes undefined behavior.
- Dereferencing a pointer &a[i] with 0 ≤ i < N is safe.
- Dereferencing a pointer &a[i] with i < 0 or i ≥ N causes undefined behavior.
"""
As pointed by by @medhefgo, here we were forming a pointer to a[-1]. a itself
wasn't NULL, so a > 0, and a-1 was also >= 0, and this didn't seem to cause any
problems. But it's better to be formally correct, especially if we move the
code to src/fundamental/ later on and compile it differently.
Compilation shows no size change (with -O0 -g) on build/systemd, so this should
have no effect whatsoever.
When using user namespaces in conjunction with uidmapped mounts, nspawn
so far set up two uidmappings:
1. One that is used for the uidmapped mount and that maps the UID range
0…65535 on the backing fs to some high UID range X…X+65535 on the
uidmapped fs. (Let's call this mapping the "mount mapping")
2. One that is used for the userns namespace the container payload
processes run in, that maps X…X+65535 back to 0…65535. (Let's call
this one the "process mapping").
These mappings hence are pretty much identical, one just moves things up
and one back down. (Reminder: we do all this so that the processes can
run under high UIDs while running off file systems that require no
recursive chown()ing, i.e. we want processes with high UID range but
files with low UID range.)
This creates one problem, i.e. issue #20989: if nspawn (which runs as
host root, i.e. host UID 0) wants to add inodes to the uidmapped mount
it can't do that, since host UID 0 is not defined in the mount mapping
(only the X…X+65536 range is, after all, and X > 0), and processes whose
UID is not mapped in a uidmapped fs cannot create inodes in it since
those would be owned by an unmapped UID, which then triggers
the famous EOVERFLOW error.
Let's fix this, by explicitly including an entry for the host UID 0 in
the mount mapping. Specifically, we'll extend the mount mapping to map
UID 2147483646 (which is INT32_MAX-1, see code for an explanation why I
picked this one) of the backing fs to UID 0 on the uidmapped fs. This
way nspawn can creates inode on the uidmapped as it likes (which will
then actually be owned by UID 2147483646 on the backing fs), and as it
always did. Note that we do *not* create a similar entry in the process
mapping. Thus any files created by nspawn that way (and not chown()ed to
something better) will appear as unmapped (i.e. as overflowuid/"nobody")
in the container payload. And that's good. Of course, the latter is
mostly theoretic, as nspawn should generally chown() the inodes it
creates to UID ranges that actually make sense for the container (and we
generally already do this correctly), but it#s good to know that we are
safe here, given we might accidentally forget to chown() some inodes we
create.
Net effect: the two mappings will not be identical anymore. The mount
mapping has one entry more, and the only reason it exists is so that
nspawn can access the uidmapped fs reasonably independently from any
process mapping.
Fixes: #20989
/dev/urandom is seeded with RDRAND. Calling genuine_random_bytes(...,
..., 0) will use /dev/urandom as a last resort. Hence, we gain nothing
here by having our own RDRAND wrapper, because /dev/urandom already is
based on RDRAND output, even before /dev/urandom has fully initialized.
Furthermore, RDRAND is not actually fast! And on each successive
generation of new x86 CPUs, from both AMD and Intel, it just gets
slower.
This commit simplifies things by just using /dev/urandom in cases where
we before might use RDRAND, since /dev/urandom will always have RDRAND
mixed in as part of it.
And above where I say "/dev/urandom", what I actually mean is
GRND_INSECURE, which is the same thing but won't generate warnings in
dmesg.
So far DECIMAL_STR_MAX() overestimated the types in two ways: it would
also adds space for a "-" for unsigned types.
And it would always return the same size for 64bit values regardless of
signedness, even though the longest maximum numbers for signed and
unsigned differ in length by one digit. i.e. 2^64-1 (i.e. UINT64_MAX) is
one decimal digit longer than -2^63 (INT64_MIN) - for the other integer
widths the number of digits in the "longest" decimal value is always the
same, regardless of signedness. by example: strlen("65535") ==
strlen("32768") (i.e. the relevant 16 bit limits) holds — and similar
for 8bit and 32bit integer width limits — but
strlen("18446744073709551615") > strlen("9223372036854775808") (i.e. the
relevant 64 bit limits).
Let's fix both misestimations.
With negative numbers we wouldn't account for the minus sign, thus
returning a string with one character too short, triggering buffer
overflows in certain situations.
get_pretty_hostname() so far had semantics not in line with our usual
ones: the return parameter was actually freed before the return string
written into it, because that's what parse_env_file() does. Moreover,
when the value was not set it would return NULL but succeed.
Let's normalize this, and only fill in the return value if there's
something set, and never read from it, like we usually do with return
parameter, and in particular those named "ret_xyz".
The existing callers don't really care about the differences, but it's
nicer to normalize behaviour to minimize surprises.
This mirrors a similar check in Linux kernel 5.16
(9dcc38e2813e0cd3b195940c98b181ce6ede8f20) that raised the
RLIMIT_MEMLOCK to 8M.
This change does two things: raise the default limit for nspawn
containers (where we try to mimic closely what the kernel does), and
bump it when running on old kernels which still have the lower setting.
Fixes: #16300
See: https://lwn.net/Articles/876288/
RANDOM_BLOCK has existed for a long time, but RANDOM_ALLOW_INSECURE was
added more recently, leading to an awkward relationship between the two.
It turns out that only one, RANDOM_BLOCK, is needed.
RANDOM_BLOCK means return cryptographically secure numbers no matter
what. If it's not set, it means try to do that, but if it fails, fall
back to using unseeded randomness.
This part of falling back to unseeded randomness is the intent of
GRND_INSECURE, which is what RANDOM_ALLOW_INSECURE previously aliased.
Rather than having an additional flag for that, it makes more sense to
just use it whenever RANDOM_BLOCK is not set. This saves us the overhead
of having to open up /dev/urandom.
Additionally, when getrandom returns too little data, but not zero data,
we currently fall back to using /dev/urandom if RANDOM_BLOCK is not set.
This doesn't quite make sense, because if getrandom returned seeded data
once, then it will forever after return the same thing as whatever
/dev/urandom does. So in that case, we should just loop again.
Since there's never really a time where /dev/urandom is able to return
some easily but more with difficulty, we can also get rid of
RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO. Once the RNG is initialized, bytes
should just flow normally.
This also makes RANDOM_MAY_FAIL obsolete, because the only case this ran
was where we'd fall back to /dev/urandom on old kernels and return
GRND_INSECURE bytes on new kernels. So also get rid of that flag.
Finally, since we're always able to use GRND_INSECURE on newer kernels,
and we only fall back to /dev/urandom on older kernels, also only fall
back to using RDRAND on those older kernels. There, the only reason to
have RDRAND is to avoid a kmsg entry about unseeded randomness.
The result of this commit is that we now cascade like this:
- Use getrandom(0) if RANDOM_BLOCK.
- Use getrandom(GRND_INSECURE) if !RANDOM_BLOCK.
- Use /dev/urandom if !RANDOM_BLOCK and no GRND_INSECURE support.
- Use /dev/urandom if no getrandom() support.
- Use RDRAND if we would use /dev/urandom for any of the above reasons
and RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND is set.
The data type off_t can be 64 on 32 bit systems if they have large
file support. Since mmap expects a size_t with 32 bits as second
argument truncation could occur. At worst these huge files could
lead to mmaps smaller than the previous check for small files.
This in turn shouldn't have a lot of impact because mmap allocates
at page size boundaries. This also made the PAGE_ALIGN call in
open_mmap unneeded. In fact it was neither in sync with other mmap
calls nor with its own munmap counterpart in error path.
If such large files are encountered, which is very unlikely in these
code paths, treat them with the same error as if they are too small.
The approach to use '''…'''.split() instead of a list of strings was initially
used when converting from automake because it allowed identical blocks of lines
to be used for both, making the conversion easier.
But over the years we have been using normal lists more and more, especially
when there were just a few filenames listed. This converts the rest.
No functional change.
Lennart Poettering
Yu Watanabe
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Jason A. Donenfeld
Grigori Goronzy
Frantisek Sumsal
Luca Boccassi
Tobias Stoeckmann