When shooting down a service with SIGABRT the user might want to have a
much longer stop timeout than on regular stops/shutdowns. Especially in
the face of short stop timeouts the time might not be sufficient to
write huge core dumps before the service is killed.
This commit adds a dedicated (Default)TimeoutAbortSec= timer that is
used when stopping a service via SIGABRT. In all other cases the
existing TimeoutStopSec= is used. The timer value is unset by default
to skip the special handling and use TimeoutStopSec= for state
'stop-watchdog' to keep the old behaviour.
If the service is in state 'stop-watchdog' and the service should be
stopped explicitly we still go to 'stop-sigterm' and re-apply the usual
TimeoutStopSec= timeout.
[zj: this is a subset of changes generated by clang-format, just the ones
I think improve readability or consistency.]
This is a part of https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/11811.
In cgroup v2 we have protection tunables -- currently MemoryLow and
MemoryMin (there will be more in future for other resources, too). The
design of these protection tunables requires not only intermediate
cgroups to propagate protections, but also the units at the leaf of that
resource's operation to accept it (by setting MemoryLow or MemoryMin).
This makes sense from an low-level API design perspective, but it's a
good idea to also have a higher-level abstraction that can, by default,
propagate these resources to children recursively. In this patch, this
happens by having descendants set memory.low to N if their ancestor has
DefaultMemoryLow=N -- assuming they don't set a separate MemoryLow
value.
Any affected unit can opt out of this propagation by manually setting
`MemoryLow` to some value in its unit configuration. A unit can also
stop further propagation by setting `DefaultMemoryLow=` with no
argument. This removes further propagation in the subtree, but has no
effect on the unit itself (for that, use `MemoryLow=0`).
Our use case in production is simplifying the configuration of machines
which heavily rely on memory protection tunables, but currently require
tweaking a huge number of unit files to make that a reality. This
directive makes that significantly less fragile, and decreases the risk
of misconfiguration.
After this patch is merged, I will implement DefaultMemoryMin= using the
same principles.
This was the last kind of accounting still not exposed on for each unit.
Let's fix that.
Note that this is a relatively simplistic approach: we don't expose
per-device stats, but sum them all up, much like cgtop does. This kind
of metric is probably the most interesting for most usecases, and covers
the "systemctl status" output best. If we want per-device stats one day
we can of course always add that eventually.
It's a simple wrapper for resetting both IP and CPU accounting in one
go.
This will become particularly useful when we also needs this to reset IO
accounting (to be added in a later commit).
Let's exit the loop early in case the variant is not actually an object
or array. This is safer since otherwise we might end up iterating
through these variants and access fields that aren't of the type we
expect them to be and then bad things happen.
Of course, this doesn't absolve uses of these macros to check the type
of the variant explicitly beforehand, but it makes it less bad if they
forget to do so.
There's no point in returning the "key" within each loop iteration as
JsonVariant object. Let's simplify things and return it as string. That
simplifies usage (since the caller doesn't have to convert the object to
the string anymore) and is safe since we already validate that keys are
strings when an object JsonVariant is allocated.
Unlocked operations are used in all three places. I don't see why just one was
special.
This also improves logging, since we don't just log the final component of the
path, but the full name.
This is partially a refactoring, but also makes many more places use
unlocked operations implicitly, i.e. all users of fopen_temporary().
AFAICT, the uses are always for short-lived files which are not shared
externally, and are just used within the same context. Locking is not
necessary.
We noticed in our tests that occasionally SystemCallFilter= would
fail to set and the service would run with no syscall filtering.
Most of the time the same tests would apply the filter and fail
the service as expected. While it's not totally clear why this happens,
we noticed seccomp_load() in the systemd code base would fail open for
all errors except EPERM and EACCES.
ENOMEM, EINVAL, and EFAULT seem like reasonable values to add to the
error set based on what I gather from libseccomp code and man pages:
-ENOMEM: out of memory, failed to allocate space for a libseccomp structure, or would exceed a defined constant
-EINVAL: kernel isn't configured to support the operations, args are invalid (to seccomp_load(), seccomp(), or prctl())
-EFAULT: addresses passed as args are invalid
The comment explains that $PATH might not be set in certain circumstances and
takes steps to handle this case. If we do that, let's assume that $PATH indeed
might be unset and not call setenv("PATH", NULL, 1). It is not clear from the
man page if that is allowed.
CID #1400497.
Coverity was unhappy, because it doesn't know that $PATH is pretty much always
set. But let's not assume that in the test. CID #1400496.
$ (unset PATH; build/test-env-util)
[1] 31658 segmentation fault (core dumped) ( unset PATH; build/test-env-util; )
We had all kinds of indentation: 2 sp, 3 sp, 4 sp, 8 sp, and mixed.
4 sp was the most common, in particular the majority of scripts under test/
used that. Let's standarize on 4 sp, because many commandlines are long and
there's a lot of nesting, and with 8sp indentation less stuff fits. 4 sp
also seems to be the default indentation, so this will make it less likely
that people will mess up if they don't load the editor config. (I think people
often use vi, and vi has no support to load project-wide configuration
automatically. We distribute a .vimrc file, but it is not loaded by default,
and even the instructions in it seem to discourage its use for security
reasons.)
Also remove the few vim config lines that were left. We should either have them
on all files, or none.
Also remove some strange stuff like '#!/bin/env bash', yikes.
Media Access Control Security (MACsec) is an 802.1AE IEEE
industry-standard security technology that provides secure
communication for all traffic on Ethernet links.
MACsec provides point-to-point security on Ethernet links between
directly connected nodes and is capable of identifying and preventing
most security threats, including denial of service, intrusion,
man-in-the-middle, masquerading, passive wiretapping, and playback attacks.
Closes#5754
Yu Watanabe
Jan Klötzke
Sebastian Jennen
Chris Down
Lennart Poettering
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Anita Zhang
Susant Sahani