Comes with tests.
Also add direct test for $SYSTEMD_PROC_CMDLINE.
In test-proc-cmdline, "true" was masquerading as PROC_CMDLINE_STRIP_RD_PREFIX,
fix that. Also, reorder functions to match call order.
Previously, together with kill_dots true, patch like
".", "./.", ".//.//" would all return an empty string.
That is wrong. There must be one "." left to reference
the current directory.
Also, the comment with examples was wrong.
Apparently FAT on some recent kernels can't do RENAME_NOREPLACE, and of
course cannot do linkat()/unlinkat() either (as the hard link concept
does not exist on FAT). Add a fallback using an explicit beforehand
faccessat() check. This sucks, but what we can do if the safe operations
are not available?
Fixes: #10063
LGTM was complaining:
> Multiplication result may overflow 'int' before it is converted to 'long'.
Fix this by changing all types to ssize_t and add a check for overflow
while at it.
v2: fix error in free_and_strndup()
When the orignal and copied message were the same, but shorter than specified
length l, memory read past the end of the buffer would be performed. A test
case is included: a string that had an embedded NUL ("q\0") is used to replace
"q".
v3: Fix one more bug in free_and_strndup and add tests.
v4: Some style fixed based on review, one more use of free_and_replace, and
make the tests more comprehensive.
Allows configuring the watchdog signal (with a default of SIGABRT).
This allows an alternative to SIGABRT when coredumps are not desirable.
Appropriate references to SIGABRT or aborting were renamed to reflect
more liberal watchdog signals.
Closes#8658
Let's change utf16_to_utf8() prototype to refer to utf16 chars with char16_t rather than void
Let's not cast away a "const" needlessly.
Let's add a few comments.
Let's fix the calculations of the buffer size to allocate, and how long
to run the loop in case of uneven byte numbers
Let's fix an indentation issue.
Let's avoid yoda comparisons.
Let's drop unnecessary ().
Let's make sure we convert 16bit values to 32bit before shifting them by
10bit to the left, to avoid overflows.
Let's avoid comparisons between signed literals and unsigned variables,
in particular if the literals are outside of the minimum range C
requires for "int".
Let's avoid a few casts in the function. Also, let's drop the "const"
when returning the string, for similar reasons as strchr() and friends
drop it: so that we don't add a const if the user passes in a non-const
string.
"because blacklisted" is not grammatical, it should be something like
"becuase it is blacklisted", which in turn in too verbose. Let's use
a shorter form.
Quoting https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/10074:
> detect_vm_uml() reads /proc/cpuinfo with read_full_file()
> read_full_file() has a file max limit size of READ_FULL_BYTES_MAX=(4U*1024U*1024U)
> Unfortunately, the size of my /proc/cpuinfo is bigger, approximately:
> echo $(( 4* $(cat /proc/cpuinfo | wc -c)))
> 9918072
> This causes read_full_file() to fail and the Condition test fallout.
Let's just read line by line until we find an intersting line. This also
helps if not running under UML, because we avoid reading as much data.
optind may be used in each verb, e.g., udevadm. So, let's initialize
optind before calling verbs.
Without this, e.g., udevadm -d hwdb --update causes error in parsing arguments.
Both SO_SNDBUFFORCE and SO_RCVBUFFORCE requires capability 'net_admin'.
If this capability is not granted to the service the first attempt to increase
the recv/snd buffers (via sd_notify()) with SO_RCVBUFFORCE/SO_SNDBUFFORCE will
fail, even if the requested size is lower than the limit enforced by the
kernel.
If apparmor is used, the DENIED logs for net_admin will show up. These log
entries are seen as red warning light, because they could indicate that a
program has been hacked and tries to compromise the system.
It would be nicer if they can be avoided without giving services (relying on
sd_notify) net_admin capability or dropping DENIED logs for all such services
via their apparmor profile.
I'm not sure if sd_notify really needs to forcibly increase the buffer sizes,
but at least if the requested size is below the kernel limit, the capability
(hence the log entries) should be avoided.
Hence let's first ask politely for increasing the buffers and only if it fails
then ignore the kernel limit if we have sufficient privileges.
Lennart Poettering
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Thomas Haller
Yu Watanabe
Frank Schaefer
Anita Zhang
Dimitri John Ledkov
Franck Bui