Let's move some more implementation logic into functions. We keep
the logic that requires the macro in the macro and move the rest into
functions.
While we're at it, let's also make the parameter declarations of
all the string table macros less clausthrophobic.
Now that the necessary functions from log.h have been moved to macro.h,
we can stop including log.h in macro.h. This requires modifying source
files all over the tree to include log.h instead.
The arm confidential compute architecture (CCA) provides a platform design for
confidential VMs running in a new realm context.
This can be detected by the existence of a platform device exported for the
arm-cca-guest driver, which provides attestation services via the realm
services interface (RSI) to the Realm Management Monitor (RMM).
Like the other methods systemd uses to detect Confidential VM's, checking
the sysfs entry suggests that this is a confidential VM and should only be
used for informative purposes, or to trigger further attestation.
Like the s390 detection logic, the sysfs path being checked is not labeled
as ABI, and may change in the future. It was chosen because its
directly tied to the kernel's detection of the realm service interface rather
to the Trusted Security Module (TSM) which is what is being triggered by the
device entry. The TSM module has a provider string of 'arm-cca-guest' which
could also be used, but that (IMHO) doesn't currently provide any additional
benefit except that it can fail of the module isn't loaded.
More information can be found here:
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0125/0300
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
The s390x platform provides confidential VMs using the "Secure Execution"
technology, which is also referred to as "Protected Virtualization" or
just "prot virt" in Linux / QEMU.
This can be detected through a simple sysfs attribute.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
We have different impls of detect_confidential_virtualization per
architecture. The detection is cached in the x86_64 impl, and as we
add support for more targets, we want to use caching for all. It thus
makes sense to split caching out into an architecture independent
method.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The original CVM detection logic for TDX assumes that the guest can see
the standard TDX CPUID leaf. This was true in Azure when this code was
originally written, however, current Azure now blocks that leaf in the
paravisor. Instead it is required to use the same Azure specific CPUID
leaf that is used for SEV-SNP detection, which reports the VM isolation
type.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
This code uses various CPUID checks to be able to identify
* AMD SEV
* AMD SEV-ES
* AMD SEV-SNP
* Intel TDX
On HyperV/Azure, it has special checks for detecting SEV-SNP
since the normal CPUID is blocked.
Related: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/27604
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Daan De Meyer
Yu Watanabe
Jeremy Linton
Daniel P. Berrangé
Luca Boccassi