We always should use size_t for sizes of arrays (and any size of memory,
in fact), unless there's a strong reason to use something else. Hence,
let's fix these cases where we sloppily used "unsigned" or "int"
instead.
No change in behaviour, this is just to make things less surprising for
the random reader.
systemd-sysctl currently fails silently under any of these conditions:
- Missing permission to write a sysctl.
- Invalid sysctl (path doesn't exists).
- Ignore failure flag ('-' in front of the sysctl name).
Because of this behaviour, configuration issues can go unnoticed as
there is no way to detect those unless going through the logs.
--strict option forces systemd-sysctl to fail if a sysctl is invalid or
if permission are insufficient. Errors on sysctl marked as "ignore
failure" will still be ignored.
This makes use of the option switch that was added in the previous commit.
We used a pretty big hammer on a relatively small nail: we would do daemon-reload
and (in principle) allow any configuration to be changed. But in fact we only
made use of this in systemd-fstab-generator. systemd-fstab-generator filters
out all mountpoints except /usr and those marked with x-initrd.mount, i.e. on
a big majority of systems it wouldn't do anything.
Also, since systemd-fstab-generator first parses /proc/cmdline, and then
initrd's /etc/fstab, and only then /sysroot/etc/fstab, configuration in the
host would only matter if it the same mountpoint wasn't configured "earlier".
So the config in the host could be used for new mountpoints, but it couldn't
be used to amend configuration for existing mountpoints. And we wouldn't actually
remount anything, so mountpoints that were already mounted wouldn't be affected,
even if did change some config.
In the new scheme, we will parse /sysroot/etc/fstab and explicitly start
sysroot-usr.mount and other units that we just wrote. In most cases (as written
above), this will actually result in no units being created or started.
If the generator is invoked on a system with /sysroot/etc/fstab present,
behaviour is not changed and we'll create units as before. This is needed so
that if daemon-reload is later at some points, we don't "lose" those units.
There's a minor bugfix here: we honour x-initrd.mount for swaps, but we
wouldn't restart swap.target, i.e. the new swaps wouldn't necessarilly be
pulled in immediately.
The idea is that we can peek into /sysroot/etc/fstab and figure out if there's
anything interesting there. We could use a separate binary for this, but we'd
need to duplicate most of the logic that in systemd-fstab-generator. Thus I
think it's nicer to make systemd-fstab-generator work as a multi-call binary.
If called as systemd-sysroot-fstab-check, we look for units that we'd mount and
call daemon-reload and initrd-fs.target/restart, similarly to what we did
before, but in the process itself.
And this makes the new merged function `sd_nfnl_nft_message_new_setelems()`
not open container, as containers should be opened and closed in the
same function in general. Otherwise, it is hard to understand which
level we are in the nested attribute tree.
- rename family -> nfproto, and other arguments,
- check specified nfproto,
- change type of several function arguments that specify data length,
- add several assertions,
- drop unnecessary headers.
This makes udevd reload rules only when the timestamp is updated,
even on SIGHUP or `udevadm control --reload`.
So, we can call `udevadm control --reload` without huge performance
penalty when no rules, .link files, and so on are changed.
Previously, if activation failed, link did not enter the failed state,
but still Link.activated flag not set. Hence, nothing processed even if
the interface is manually brought up later.
Partially fixes#23649.
For the system manager, /run/systemd/private is publicly accessible, because
/run/systemd is 0755, and /run/systemd/private is 0777. For the user manager,
/run/user/<uid> is 0700, and /run/user/<uid>/systemd/private is 0777. This
does not directly cause any security issue because we check the sender in
bus_check_peercred (ucred.uid != 0 && ucred.uid != geteuid()).
But it makes sense to limit access to the socket to avoid wasting time in PID1.
Somebody could send messages there that'd we'd reject anyway. It also makes
things more explicit.
This can be easily used to show that the issue described in
ceedbf8185 is still reproduced:
$ strace -e execveat build/test-execve /bin/grep Name /proc/self/status
execveat(3, "", ["/bin/grep", "Name", "/proc/self/status"], NULL, AT_EMPTY_PATH) = 0
Name: 3
docbook already indents diagrams, so there is no need to leave whitespace on
the left. Also, make the charts a bit narrower to fit better on a terminal.
Frantisek Sumsal
Lennart Poettering
Quentin Deslandes
Rudi Heitbaum
Yu Watanabe
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
codefiles