This wraps a few common steps. It is defined as inline function instead of in a
.c file to avoid having a .c file. With a .c file, we would have three choices:
- either link it into libshared, but then then libshared would have to be
linked to libmount.
- or compile the .c file into each target separately. This has the disdvantage
that configuration of every target has to be updated and stuff will be compiled
multiple times anyway, which is not too different from keeping this in the
header file.
- or create a new convenience library just for this. This also has the disadvantage
that the every target would have to be updated, and a separate library for a
10 line function seems overkill.
By keeping everything in a header file, we compile this a few times, but
otherwise it's the least painful option. The compiler can optimize most of the
function away, because it knows if 'source' is set or not.
It seems better to use just a single parsing algorithm for /proc/self/mountinfo.
Also, unify the naming of variables in all places that use mnt_table_next_fs().
It makes it easier to compare the different call sites.
When shooting down a service with SIGABRT the user might want to have a
much longer stop timeout than on regular stops/shutdowns. Especially in
the face of short stop timeouts the time might not be sufficient to
write huge core dumps before the service is killed.
This commit adds a dedicated (Default)TimeoutAbortSec= timer that is
used when stopping a service via SIGABRT. In all other cases the
existing TimeoutStopSec= is used. The timer value is unset by default
to skip the special handling and use TimeoutStopSec= for state
'stop-watchdog' to keep the old behaviour.
If the service is in state 'stop-watchdog' and the service should be
stopped explicitly we still go to 'stop-sigterm' and re-apply the usual
TimeoutStopSec= timeout.
In cgroup v2 we have protection tunables -- currently MemoryLow and
MemoryMin (there will be more in future for other resources, too). The
design of these protection tunables requires not only intermediate
cgroups to propagate protections, but also the units at the leaf of that
resource's operation to accept it (by setting MemoryLow or MemoryMin).
This makes sense from an low-level API design perspective, but it's a
good idea to also have a higher-level abstraction that can, by default,
propagate these resources to children recursively. In this patch, this
happens by having descendants set memory.low to N if their ancestor has
DefaultMemoryLow=N -- assuming they don't set a separate MemoryLow
value.
Any affected unit can opt out of this propagation by manually setting
`MemoryLow` to some value in its unit configuration. A unit can also
stop further propagation by setting `DefaultMemoryLow=` with no
argument. This removes further propagation in the subtree, but has no
effect on the unit itself (for that, use `MemoryLow=0`).
Our use case in production is simplifying the configuration of machines
which heavily rely on memory protection tunables, but currently require
tweaking a huge number of unit files to make that a reality. This
directive makes that significantly less fragile, and decreases the risk
of misconfiguration.
After this patch is merged, I will implement DefaultMemoryMin= using the
same principles.
Let's exit the loop early in case the variant is not actually an object
or array. This is safer since otherwise we might end up iterating
through these variants and access fields that aren't of the type we
expect them to be and then bad things happen.
Of course, this doesn't absolve uses of these macros to check the type
of the variant explicitly beforehand, but it makes it less bad if they
forget to do so.
There's no point in returning the "key" within each loop iteration as
JsonVariant object. Let's simplify things and return it as string. That
simplifies usage (since the caller doesn't have to convert the object to
the string anymore) and is safe since we already validate that keys are
strings when an object JsonVariant is allocated.
This is partially a refactoring, but also makes many more places use
unlocked operations implicitly, i.e. all users of fopen_temporary().
AFAICT, the uses are always for short-lived files which are not shared
externally, and are just used within the same context. Locking is not
necessary.
We noticed in our tests that occasionally SystemCallFilter= would
fail to set and the service would run with no syscall filtering.
Most of the time the same tests would apply the filter and fail
the service as expected. While it's not totally clear why this happens,
we noticed seccomp_load() in the systemd code base would fail open for
all errors except EPERM and EACCES.
ENOMEM, EINVAL, and EFAULT seem like reasonable values to add to the
error set based on what I gather from libseccomp code and man pages:
-ENOMEM: out of memory, failed to allocate space for a libseccomp structure, or would exceed a defined constant
-EINVAL: kernel isn't configured to support the operations, args are invalid (to seccomp_load(), seccomp(), or prctl())
-EFAULT: addresses passed as args are invalid
We had all kinds of indentation: 2 sp, 3 sp, 4 sp, 8 sp, and mixed.
4 sp was the most common, in particular the majority of scripts under test/
used that. Let's standarize on 4 sp, because many commandlines are long and
there's a lot of nesting, and with 8sp indentation less stuff fits. 4 sp
also seems to be the default indentation, so this will make it less likely
that people will mess up if they don't load the editor config. (I think people
often use vi, and vi has no support to load project-wide configuration
automatically. We distribute a .vimrc file, but it is not loaded by default,
and even the instructions in it seem to discourage its use for security
reasons.)
Also remove the few vim config lines that were left. We should either have them
on all files, or none.
Also remove some strange stuff like '#!/bin/env bash', yikes.
This adds a new per-service OOMPolicy= (along with a global
DefaultOOMPolicy=) that controls what to do if a process of the service
is killed by the kernel's OOM killer. It has three different values:
"continue" (old behaviour), "stop" (terminate the service), "kill" (let
the kernel kill all the service's processes).
On top of that, track OOM killer events per unit: generate a per-unit
structured, recognizable log message when we see an OOM killer event,
and put the service in a failure state if an OOM killer event was seen
and the selected policy was not "continue". A new "result" is defined
for this case: "oom-kill".
All of this relies on new cgroupv2 kernel functionality: the
"memory.events" notification interface and the "memory.oom.group"
attribute (which makes the kernel kill all cgroup processes
automatically).
I think this is more useful (because it's easy to stick the path into an editor command
when one wants to change the options or inspect the files), and more self-explanatory.
Example output:
title: Fedora 30 (Workstation Edition) (4.20.16-200.fc29.x86_64)
id: 08a5690a2eed47cf92ac0a5d2e3cf6b0-4.20.16-200.fc29.x86_64
source: /boot/efi/loader/entries/08a5690a2eed47cf92ac0a5d2e3cf6b0-4.20.16-200.fc29.x86_64.conf
version: 4.20.16-200.fc29.x86_64
...
title: Fedora 30 (Workstation Edition)
id: fedora-30
source: /boot/efi/EFI/Linux/linux-5.0.5-300.fc30.x86_64-08a5690a2eed47cf92ac0a5d2e3cf6b0.efi
linux: EFI/Linux/linux-5.0.5-300.fc30.x86_64-08a5690a2eed47cf92ac0a5d2e3cf6b0.efi
...
title: Reboot Into Firmware Interface
id: auto-reboot-to-firmware-setup
source: /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/LoaderEntries-4a67b082-0a4c-41cf-b6c7-440b29bb8c4f
Use a trivial header file to share mnt_free_tablep and mnt_free_iterp.
It would be nicer put this in mount-util.h, but libmount.h is not in the
default include path, and the build system would have to be adjusted to pass
pkg-config include path in various places, and it's just not worth the trouble.
A separate header file works nicely.
We can't use the per-thread default one here, as it might already be
running (for example, that's the case in portabled), and our event loops
are not recursive, hence running them a second time is not OK.
There are environments where /lib might not be necessary (think:
statically compiled portable service binary), hence don't insist on it
if the image is read-only.
If we know that a syscall is undefined on the given architecture, don't
even try to add it.
Try to install the filter even if some syscalls fail. Also use a helper
function to make the whole a bit less magic.
This allows the S[UG]ID test to pass on arm64.
Lennart Poettering
Frantisek Sumsal
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Chris Down
Anita Zhang
Yu Watanabe
Jan Klötzke