PTRACE_POKETEXT and PTRACE_POKEDATA use FOLL_FORCE to forcibly write into a tracee's memory. That includes executable read-only pages. If we restrict execution to trusted binaries PID 1 must enforce that it's impossible to abuse this to get untrusted code execution. Note, that usermodehelpers are not subject to PID 1's seccomp filters. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
187 lines
6.4 KiB
C
187 lines
6.4 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
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#pragma once
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#include "dlopen-note.h"
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#include "errno-util.h"
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#include "forward.h"
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#if HAVE_SECCOMP
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#ifndef SYSTEMD_CFLAGS_MARKER_LIBSECCOMP
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# error "missing libseccomp_cflags in meson dependency."
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#endif
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#include <seccomp.h> /* IWYU pragma: export */
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#include "dlfcn-util.h"
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extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(seccomp_api_get);
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extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(seccomp_arch_add);
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extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(seccomp_arch_exist);
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extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(seccomp_arch_native);
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extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(seccomp_arch_remove);
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extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(seccomp_attr_set);
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extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(seccomp_init);
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extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(seccomp_load);
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extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(seccomp_release);
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extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(seccomp_rule_add_array);
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extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(seccomp_rule_add_exact);
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extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(seccomp_syscall_resolve_name);
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extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch);
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DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(seccomp_arch, uint32_t);
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int seccomp_arch_from_string(const char *n, uint32_t *ret);
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int seccomp_init_for_arch(scmp_filter_ctx *ret, uint32_t arch, uint32_t default_action);
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bool is_seccomp_available(void);
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typedef struct SyscallFilterSet {
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const char *name;
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const char *help;
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const char *value;
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} SyscallFilterSet;
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enum {
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/* Please leave DEFAULT first and KNOWN last, but sort the rest alphabetically */
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_AIO,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_BASIC_IO,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CHOWN,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CPU_EMULATION,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEBUG,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_FILE_SYSTEM,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IO_EVENT,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IPC,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_KEYRING,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MEMLOCK,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MOUNT,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_NETWORK_IO,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_OBSOLETE,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PKEY,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PRIVILEGED,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PROCESS,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_REBOOT,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RESOURCES,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SANDBOX,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SIGNAL,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SWAP,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SYNC,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SYSTEM_SERVICE,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_TIMER,
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SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_KNOWN,
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_SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX,
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};
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assert_cc(SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT == 0);
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assert_cc(SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_KNOWN == _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX-1);
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extern const SyscallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[];
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const SyscallFilterSet *syscall_filter_set_find(const char *name);
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int seccomp_filter_set_add_by_name(Hashmap *filter, bool add, const char *name);
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int seccomp_filter_set_add(Hashmap *filter, bool add, const SyscallFilterSet *set);
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int seccomp_add_syscall_filter_item(
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scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp,
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const char *name,
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uint32_t action,
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char **exclude,
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bool log_missing,
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char ***added);
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int seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(uint32_t default_action, const SyscallFilterSet *set, uint32_t action, bool log_missing);
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int seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(uint32_t default_action, Hashmap *filter, uint32_t action, bool log_missing);
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typedef enum SeccompParseFlags {
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SECCOMP_PARSE_INVERT = 1 << 0,
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SECCOMP_PARSE_ALLOW_LIST = 1 << 1,
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SECCOMP_PARSE_LOG = 1 << 2,
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SECCOMP_PARSE_PERMISSIVE = 1 << 3,
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} SeccompParseFlags;
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int seccomp_parse_syscall_filter(
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const char *name,
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int errno_num,
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Hashmap *filter,
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SeccompParseFlags flags,
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const char *unit,
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const char *filename, unsigned line);
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int seccomp_restrict_archs(Set *archs);
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int seccomp_restrict_namespaces(unsigned long retain);
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int seccomp_protect_sysctl(void);
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int seccomp_protect_syslog(void);
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int seccomp_restrict_address_families(Set *address_families, bool allow_list);
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int seccomp_restrict_realtime_full(int error_code); /* This is mostly for testing code. */
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static inline int seccomp_restrict_realtime(void) {
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return seccomp_restrict_realtime_full(EPERM);
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}
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int seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute(void);
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int seccomp_restrict_ptrace(void);
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int seccomp_lock_personality(unsigned long personality);
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int seccomp_protect_hostname(void);
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int seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid(void);
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extern uint32_t seccomp_local_archs[];
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#define SECCOMP_LOCAL_ARCH_END UINT32_MAX
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/* Note: 0 is safe to use here because although SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE is 0, it would
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* never be in the seccomp_local_archs array anyway so we can use it as a
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* marker. */
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#define SECCOMP_LOCAL_ARCH_BLOCKED 0
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#define SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) \
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for (unsigned _i = ({ (arch) = seccomp_local_archs[0]; 0; }); \
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(arch) != SECCOMP_LOCAL_ARCH_END; \
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(arch) = seccomp_local_archs[++_i]) \
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if ((arch) != SECCOMP_LOCAL_ARCH_BLOCKED)
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/* EACCES: does not have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN or no_new_privs == 1
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* ENOMEM: out of memory, failed to allocate space for a libseccomp structure, or would exceed a defined constant
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* EFAULT: addresses passed as args (by libseccomp) are invalid */
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static inline bool ERRNO_IS_NEG_SECCOMP_FATAL(intmax_t r) {
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return IN_SET(r,
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-EPERM,
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-EACCES,
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-ENOMEM,
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-EFAULT);
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}
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_DEFINE_ABS_WRAPPER(SECCOMP_FATAL);
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DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC_FULL_RENAME(scmp_filter_ctx, sym_seccomp_release, seccomp_releasep, NULL);
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int parse_syscall_archs(char **l, Set **ret_archs);
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int parse_syscall_and_errno(const char *in, char **name, int *error);
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int seccomp_suppress_sync(void);
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#else
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static inline bool is_seccomp_available(void) {
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return false;
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}
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static inline int seccomp_restrict_ptrace(void) {
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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}
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#endif
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int dlopen_libseccomp(int log_level) _dlopen_loader_;
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/* This is a special value to be used where syscall filters otherwise expect errno numbers, will be
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replaced with real seccomp action. */
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enum {
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SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL = INT_MAX - 1,
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};
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bool seccomp_errno_or_action_is_valid(int n) _const_;
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int seccomp_parse_errno_or_action(const char *p) _pure_;
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DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(seccomp_errno_or_action, int);
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