Luca Boccassi
4a91ace5bc
This is intended to be used with VSOCK, to notify the hypervisor/VMM, eg on the host: qemu <...> -smbios type=11,value=io.systemd.credential:vmm.notify_socket=vsock:2:1234 -device vhost-vsock-pci,id=vhost-vsock-pci0,guest-cid=42 (vsock:2:1234 -> send to host on vsock port 1234, default is to send to 0 which is the hypervisor itself) Also on the host: $ socat - VSOCK-LISTEN:1234,socktype=5 READY=1 STATUS=Ready.
731 lines
29 KiB
C
731 lines
29 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
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#include <sys/mount.h>
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#include "copy.h"
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#include "creds-util.h"
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#include "escape.h"
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#include "fileio.h"
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#include "format-util.h"
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#include "fs-util.h"
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#include "hexdecoct.h"
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#include "initrd-util.h"
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#include "import-creds.h"
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#include "io-util.h"
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#include "mkdir-label.h"
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#include "mount-util.h"
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#include "mountpoint-util.h"
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#include "parse-util.h"
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#include "path-util.h"
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#include "proc-cmdline.h"
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#include "recurse-dir.h"
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#include "strv.h"
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#include "virt.h"
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/* This imports credentials passed in from environments higher up (VM manager, boot loader, …) and rearranges
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* them so that later code can access them using our regular credential protocol
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* (i.e. $CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY). It's supposed to be minimal glue to unify behaviour how PID 1 (and
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* generators invoked by it) can acquire credentials from outside, to mimic how we support it for containers,
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* but on VM/physical environments.
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*
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* This does four things:
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*
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* 1. It imports credentials picked up by sd-boot (and placed in the /.extra/credentials/ dir in the initrd)
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* and puts them in /run/credentials/@encrypted/. Note that during the initrd→host transition the initrd root
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* file system is cleaned out, thus it is essential we pick up these files before they are deleted. Note
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* that these credentials originate from an untrusted source, i.e. the ESP and are not
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* pre-authenticated. They still have to be authenticated before use.
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*
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* 2. It imports credentials from /proc/cmdline and puts them in /run/credentials/@system/. These come from a
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* trusted environment (i.e. the boot loader), and are typically authenticated (if authentication is done
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* at all). However, they are world-readable, which might be less than ideal. Hence only use this for data
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* that doesn't require trust.
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*
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* 3. It imports credentials passed in through qemu's fw_cfg logic. Specifically, credential data passed in
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* /sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_name/opt/io.systemd.credentials/ is picked up and also placed in
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* /run/credentials/@system/.
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*
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* 4. It imports credentials passed in via the DMI/SMBIOS OEM string tables, quite similar to fw_cfg. It
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* looks for strings starting with "io.systemd.credential:" and "io.systemd.credential.binary:". Both
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* expect a key=value assignment, but in the latter case the value is Base64 decoded, allowing binary
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* credentials to be passed in.
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*
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* If it picked up any credentials it will set the $CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY and
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* $ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY environment variables to point to these directories, so that processes
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* can find them there later on. If "ramfs" is available $CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY will be backed by it (but
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* $ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY is just a regular tmpfs).
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*
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* Net result: the service manager can pick up trusted credentials from $CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY afterwards,
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* and untrusted ones from $ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY. */
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typedef struct ImportCredentialContext {
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int target_dir_fd;
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size_t size_sum;
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unsigned n_credentials;
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} ImportCredentialContext;
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static void import_credentials_context_free(ImportCredentialContext *c) {
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assert(c);
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c->target_dir_fd = safe_close(c->target_dir_fd);
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}
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static int acquire_encrypted_credential_directory(ImportCredentialContext *c) {
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int r;
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assert(c);
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if (c->target_dir_fd >= 0)
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return c->target_dir_fd;
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r = mkdir_safe_label(ENCRYPTED_SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create " ENCRYPTED_SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY ": %m");
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c->target_dir_fd = open(ENCRYPTED_SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
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if (c->target_dir_fd < 0)
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return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open " ENCRYPTED_SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY ": %m");
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return c->target_dir_fd;
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}
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static int open_credential_file_for_write(int target_dir_fd, const char *dir_name, const char *n) {
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int fd;
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assert(target_dir_fd >= 0);
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assert(dir_name);
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assert(n);
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fd = openat(target_dir_fd, n, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW, 0400);
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if (fd < 0) {
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if (errno == EEXIST) /* In case of EEXIST we'll only debug log! */
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return log_debug_errno(errno, "Credential '%s' set twice, ignoring.", n);
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return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to create %s/%s: %m", dir_name, n);
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}
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return fd;
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}
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static bool credential_size_ok(ImportCredentialContext *c, const char *name, uint64_t size) {
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assert(c);
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assert(name);
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if (size > CREDENTIAL_SIZE_MAX) {
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log_warning("Credential '%s' is larger than allowed limit (%s > %s), skipping.", name, FORMAT_BYTES(size), FORMAT_BYTES(CREDENTIAL_SIZE_MAX));
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return false;
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}
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if (size > CREDENTIALS_TOTAL_SIZE_MAX - c->size_sum) {
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log_warning("Accumulated credential size would be above allowed limit (%s+%s > %s), skipping '%s'.",
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FORMAT_BYTES(c->size_sum), FORMAT_BYTES(size), FORMAT_BYTES(CREDENTIALS_TOTAL_SIZE_MAX), name);
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static int finalize_credentials_dir(const char *dir, const char *envvar) {
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int r;
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assert(dir);
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assert(envvar);
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/* Try to make the credentials directory read-only now */
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r = make_mount_point(dir);
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if (r < 0)
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log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to make '%s' a mount point, ignoring: %m", dir);
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else
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(void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_WARNING, NULL, dir, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID|MS_RDONLY|MS_REMOUNT, NULL);
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if (setenv(envvar, dir, /* overwrite= */ true) < 0)
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return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to set $%s environment variable: %m", envvar);
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return 0;
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}
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static int import_credentials_boot(void) {
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_cleanup_(import_credentials_context_free) ImportCredentialContext context = {
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.target_dir_fd = -EBADF,
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};
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int r;
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/* systemd-stub will wrap sidecar *.cred files from the UEFI kernel image directory into initrd
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* cpios, so that they unpack into /.extra/. We'll pick them up from there and copy them into /run/
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* so that we can access them during the entire runtime (note that the initrd file system is erased
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* during the initrd → host transition). Note that these credentials originate from an untrusted
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* source (i.e. the ESP typically) and thus need to be authenticated later. We thus put them in a
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* directory separate from the usual credentials which are from a trusted source. */
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if (!in_initrd())
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return 0;
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FOREACH_STRING(p,
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"/.extra/credentials/", /* specific to this boot menu */
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"/.extra/global_credentials/") { /* boot partition wide */
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_cleanup_free_ DirectoryEntries *de = NULL;
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_cleanup_close_ int source_dir_fd = -EBADF;
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source_dir_fd = open(p, O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW);
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if (source_dir_fd < 0) {
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if (errno == ENOENT) {
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log_debug("No credentials passed via %s.", p);
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continue;
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}
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log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to open '%s', ignoring: %m", p);
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continue;
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}
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r = readdir_all(source_dir_fd, RECURSE_DIR_SORT|RECURSE_DIR_IGNORE_DOT, &de);
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if (r < 0) {
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log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to read '%s' contents, ignoring: %m", p);
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continue;
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}
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for (size_t i = 0; i < de->n_entries; i++) {
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const struct dirent *d = de->entries[i];
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_cleanup_close_ int cfd = -EBADF, nfd = -EBADF;
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_cleanup_free_ char *n = NULL;
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const char *e;
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struct stat st;
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e = endswith(d->d_name, ".cred");
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if (!e)
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continue;
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/* drop .cred suffix (which we want in the ESP sidecar dir, but not for our internal
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* processing) */
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n = strndup(d->d_name, e - d->d_name);
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if (!n)
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return log_oom();
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if (!credential_name_valid(n)) {
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log_warning("Credential '%s' has invalid name, ignoring.", d->d_name);
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continue;
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}
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cfd = openat(source_dir_fd, d->d_name, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
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if (cfd < 0) {
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log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to open %s, ignoring: %m", d->d_name);
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continue;
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}
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if (fstat(cfd, &st) < 0) {
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log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to stat %s, ignoring: %m", d->d_name);
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continue;
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}
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r = stat_verify_regular(&st);
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if (r < 0) {
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log_warning_errno(r, "Credential file %s is not a regular file, ignoring: %m", d->d_name);
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continue;
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}
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if (!credential_size_ok(&context, n, st.st_size))
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continue;
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r = acquire_encrypted_credential_directory(&context);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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nfd = open_credential_file_for_write(context.target_dir_fd, ENCRYPTED_SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, n);
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if (nfd == -EEXIST)
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continue;
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if (nfd < 0)
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return nfd;
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r = copy_bytes(cfd, nfd, st.st_size, 0);
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if (r < 0) {
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(void) unlinkat(context.target_dir_fd, n, 0);
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return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create credential '%s': %m", n);
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}
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context.size_sum += st.st_size;
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context.n_credentials++;
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log_debug("Successfully copied boot credential '%s'.", n);
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}
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}
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if (context.n_credentials > 0) {
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log_debug("Imported %u credentials from boot loader.", context.n_credentials);
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r = finalize_credentials_dir(ENCRYPTED_SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, "ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY");
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int acquire_credential_directory(ImportCredentialContext *c) {
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int r;
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assert(c);
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if (c->target_dir_fd >= 0)
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return c->target_dir_fd;
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r = path_is_mount_point(SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, NULL, 0);
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if (r < 0) {
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if (r != -ENOENT)
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return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine if " SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY " is a mount point: %m");
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r = mkdir_safe_label(SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create " SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY " mount point: %m");
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r = 0; /* Now it exists and is not a mount point */
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}
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if (r == 0)
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/* If not a mountpoint yet, try to mount a ramfs there (so that this stuff isn't swapped
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* out), but if that doesn't work, let's just use the regular tmpfs it already is. */
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(void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_WARNING, "ramfs", SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, "ramfs", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, "mode=0700");
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c->target_dir_fd = open(SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
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if (c->target_dir_fd < 0)
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return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open " SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY ": %m");
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return c->target_dir_fd;
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}
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static int proc_cmdline_callback(const char *key, const char *value, void *data) {
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ImportCredentialContext *c = ASSERT_PTR(data);
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_cleanup_free_ char *n = NULL;
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_cleanup_close_ int nfd = -EBADF;
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const char *colon;
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size_t l;
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int r;
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assert(key);
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if (!proc_cmdline_key_streq(key, "systemd.set_credential"))
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return 0;
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colon = value ? strchr(value, ':') : NULL;
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if (!colon) {
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log_warning("Credential assignment through kernel command line lacks ':' character, ignoring: %s", value);
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return 0;
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}
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n = strndup(value, colon - value);
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if (!n)
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return log_oom();
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if (!credential_name_valid(n)) {
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log_warning("Credential name '%s' is invalid, ignoring.", n);
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return 0;
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}
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colon++;
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l = strlen(colon);
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if (!credential_size_ok(c, n, l))
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return 0;
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r = acquire_credential_directory(c);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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nfd = open_credential_file_for_write(c->target_dir_fd, SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, n);
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if (nfd == -EEXIST)
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return 0;
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if (nfd < 0)
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return nfd;
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r = loop_write(nfd, colon, l, /* do_poll= */ false);
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if (r < 0) {
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(void) unlinkat(c->target_dir_fd, n, 0);
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return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write credential: %m");
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}
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c->size_sum += l;
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c->n_credentials++;
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log_debug("Successfully processed kernel command line credential '%s'.", n);
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return 0;
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}
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static int import_credentials_proc_cmdline(ImportCredentialContext *c) {
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int r;
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assert(c);
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r = proc_cmdline_parse(proc_cmdline_callback, c, 0);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse /proc/cmdline: %m");
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return 0;
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}
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#define QEMU_FWCFG_PATH "/sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_name/opt/io.systemd.credentials"
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static int import_credentials_qemu(ImportCredentialContext *c) {
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_cleanup_free_ DirectoryEntries *de = NULL;
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_cleanup_close_ int source_dir_fd = -EBADF;
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int r;
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assert(c);
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if (detect_container() > 0) /* don't access /sys/ in a container */
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return 0;
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source_dir_fd = open(QEMU_FWCFG_PATH, O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
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if (source_dir_fd < 0) {
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if (errno == ENOENT) {
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log_debug("No credentials passed via fw_cfg.");
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return 0;
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}
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log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to open '" QEMU_FWCFG_PATH "', ignoring: %m");
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return 0;
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}
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r = readdir_all(source_dir_fd, RECURSE_DIR_SORT|RECURSE_DIR_IGNORE_DOT, &de);
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if (r < 0) {
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log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to read '" QEMU_FWCFG_PATH "' contents, ignoring: %m");
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return 0;
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}
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for (size_t i = 0; i < de->n_entries; i++) {
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const struct dirent *d = de->entries[i];
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_cleanup_close_ int vfd = -EBADF, rfd = -EBADF, nfd = -EBADF;
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_cleanup_free_ char *szs = NULL;
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uint64_t sz;
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if (!credential_name_valid(d->d_name)) {
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log_warning("Credential '%s' has invalid name, ignoring.", d->d_name);
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continue;
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}
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vfd = openat(source_dir_fd, d->d_name, O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
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if (vfd < 0) {
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log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to open '" QEMU_FWCFG_PATH "'/%s/, ignoring: %m", d->d_name);
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continue;
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}
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r = read_virtual_file_at(vfd, "size", LINE_MAX, &szs, NULL);
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if (r < 0) {
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log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to read '" QEMU_FWCFG_PATH "'/%s/size, ignoring: %m", d->d_name);
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continue;
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}
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r = safe_atou64(strstrip(szs), &sz);
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if (r < 0) {
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log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse size of credential '%s', ignoring: %s", d->d_name, szs);
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continue;
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}
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if (!credential_size_ok(c, d->d_name, sz))
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continue;
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/* Ideally we'd just symlink the data here. Alas the kernel driver exports the raw file as
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* having size zero, and we'd rather not have applications support such credential
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* files. Let's hence copy the files to make them regular. */
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rfd = openat(vfd, "raw", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
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if (rfd < 0) {
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log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to open '" QEMU_FWCFG_PATH "'/%s/raw, ignoring: %m", d->d_name);
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continue;
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}
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r = acquire_credential_directory(c);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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nfd = open_credential_file_for_write(c->target_dir_fd, SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, d->d_name);
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if (nfd == -EEXIST)
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continue;
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if (nfd < 0)
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return nfd;
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r = copy_bytes(rfd, nfd, sz, 0);
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if (r < 0) {
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(void) unlinkat(c->target_dir_fd, d->d_name, 0);
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return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create credential '%s': %m", d->d_name);
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}
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c->size_sum += sz;
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c->n_credentials++;
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|
|
log_debug("Successfully copied qemu fw_cfg credential '%s'.", d->d_name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int parse_smbios_strings(ImportCredentialContext *c, const char *data, size_t size) {
|
|
size_t left, skip;
|
|
const char *p;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
assert(c);
|
|
assert(data || size == 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Unpacks a packed series of SMBIOS OEM vendor strings. These are a series of NUL terminated
|
|
* strings, one after the other. */
|
|
|
|
for (p = data, left = size; left > 0; p += skip, left -= skip) {
|
|
_cleanup_free_ void *buf = NULL;
|
|
_cleanup_free_ char *cn = NULL;
|
|
_cleanup_close_ int nfd = -EBADF;
|
|
const char *nul, *n, *eq;
|
|
const void *cdata;
|
|
size_t buflen, cdata_len;
|
|
bool unbase64;
|
|
|
|
nul = memchr(p, 0, left);
|
|
if (nul)
|
|
skip = (nul - p) + 1;
|
|
else {
|
|
nul = p + left;
|
|
skip = left;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (nul - p == 0) /* Skip empty strings */
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* Only care about strings starting with either of these two prefixes */
|
|
if ((n = memory_startswith(p, nul - p, "io.systemd.credential:")))
|
|
unbase64 = false;
|
|
else if ((n = memory_startswith(p, nul - p, "io.systemd.credential.binary:")))
|
|
unbase64 = true;
|
|
else {
|
|
_cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL;
|
|
|
|
escaped = cescape_length(p, nul - p);
|
|
log_debug("Ignoring OEM string: %s", strnull(escaped));
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
eq = memchr(n, '=', nul - n);
|
|
if (!eq) {
|
|
log_warning("SMBIOS OEM string lacks '=' character, ignoring.");
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cn = memdup_suffix0(n, eq - n);
|
|
if (!cn)
|
|
return log_oom();
|
|
|
|
if (!credential_name_valid(cn)) {
|
|
log_warning("SMBIOS credential name '%s' is not valid, ignoring: %m", cn);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Optionally base64 decode the data, if requested, to allow binary credentials */
|
|
if (unbase64) {
|
|
r = unbase64mem(eq + 1, nul - (eq + 1), &buf, &buflen);
|
|
if (r < 0) {
|
|
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to base64 decode credential '%s', ignoring: %m", cn);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cdata = buf;
|
|
cdata_len = buflen;
|
|
} else {
|
|
cdata = eq + 1;
|
|
cdata_len = nul - (eq + 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!credential_size_ok(c, cn, cdata_len))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
r = acquire_credential_directory(c);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
nfd = open_credential_file_for_write(c->target_dir_fd, SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, cn);
|
|
if (nfd == -EEXIST)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (nfd < 0)
|
|
return nfd;
|
|
|
|
r = loop_write(nfd, cdata, cdata_len, /* do_poll= */ false);
|
|
if (r < 0) {
|
|
(void) unlinkat(c->target_dir_fd, cn, 0);
|
|
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write credential: %m");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c->size_sum += cdata_len;
|
|
c->n_credentials++;
|
|
|
|
log_debug("Successfully processed SMBIOS credential '%s'.", cn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int import_credentials_smbios(ImportCredentialContext *c) {
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
/* Parses DMI OEM strings fields (SMBIOS type 11), as settable with qemu's -smbios type=11,value=… switch. */
|
|
|
|
if (detect_container() > 0) /* don't access /sys/ in a container */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
for (unsigned i = 0;; i++) {
|
|
struct dmi_field_header {
|
|
uint8_t type;
|
|
uint8_t length;
|
|
uint16_t handle;
|
|
uint8_t count;
|
|
char contents[];
|
|
} _packed_ *dmi_field_header;
|
|
_cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
|
|
_cleanup_free_ void *data = NULL;
|
|
size_t size;
|
|
|
|
assert_cc(offsetof(struct dmi_field_header, contents) == 5);
|
|
|
|
if (asprintf(&p, "/sys/firmware/dmi/entries/11-%u/raw", i) < 0)
|
|
return log_oom();
|
|
|
|
r = read_virtual_file(p, sizeof(dmi_field_header) + CREDENTIALS_TOTAL_SIZE_MAX, (char**) &data, &size);
|
|
if (r < 0) {
|
|
/* Once we reach ENOENT there are no more DMI Type 11 fields around. */
|
|
log_full_errno(r == -ENOENT ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, r, "Failed to open '%s', ignoring: %m", p);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (size < offsetof(struct dmi_field_header, contents))
|
|
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "DMI field header of '%s' too short.", p);
|
|
|
|
dmi_field_header = data;
|
|
if (dmi_field_header->type != 11 ||
|
|
dmi_field_header->length != offsetof(struct dmi_field_header, contents))
|
|
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Invalid DMI field header.");
|
|
|
|
r = parse_smbios_strings(c, dmi_field_header->contents, size - offsetof(struct dmi_field_header, contents));
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
if (i == UINT_MAX) /* Prevent overflow */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int import_credentials_trusted(void) {
|
|
_cleanup_(import_credentials_context_free) ImportCredentialContext c = {
|
|
.target_dir_fd = -EBADF,
|
|
};
|
|
int q, w, r;
|
|
|
|
r = import_credentials_qemu(&c);
|
|
w = import_credentials_smbios(&c);
|
|
q = import_credentials_proc_cmdline(&c);
|
|
|
|
if (c.n_credentials > 0) {
|
|
int z;
|
|
|
|
log_debug("Imported %u credentials from kernel command line/smbios/fw_cfg.", c.n_credentials);
|
|
|
|
z = finalize_credentials_dir(SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, "CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY");
|
|
if (z < 0)
|
|
return z;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return r < 0 ? r : w < 0 ? w : q;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int symlink_credential_dir(const char *envvar, const char *path, const char *where) {
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
assert(envvar);
|
|
assert(path);
|
|
assert(where);
|
|
|
|
if (!path_is_valid(path) || !path_is_absolute(path))
|
|
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "String specified via $%s is not a valid absolute path, refusing: %s", envvar, path);
|
|
|
|
/* If the env var already points to where we intend to create the symlink, then most likely we
|
|
* already imported some creds earlier, and thus set the env var, and hence don't need to do
|
|
* anything. */
|
|
if (path_equal(path, where))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
r = symlink_idempotent(path, where, /* make_relative= */ true);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to link $%s to %s: %m", envvar, where);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int import_credentials(void) {
|
|
const char *received_creds_dir = NULL, *received_encrypted_creds_dir = NULL;
|
|
bool envvar_set = false;
|
|
int r, q;
|
|
|
|
r = get_credentials_dir(&received_creds_dir);
|
|
if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) /* ENXIO → env var not set yet */
|
|
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to determine credentials directory, ignoring: %m");
|
|
|
|
envvar_set = r >= 0;
|
|
|
|
r = get_encrypted_credentials_dir(&received_encrypted_creds_dir);
|
|
if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) /* ENXIO → env var not set yet */
|
|
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to determine encrypted credentials directory, ignoring: %m");
|
|
|
|
envvar_set = envvar_set || r >= 0;
|
|
|
|
if (envvar_set) {
|
|
/* Maybe an earlier stage initrd already set this up? If so, don't try to import anything again. */
|
|
log_debug("Not importing credentials, $CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY or $ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY already set.");
|
|
|
|
/* But, let's make sure the creds are available from our regular paths. */
|
|
if (received_creds_dir)
|
|
r = symlink_credential_dir("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", received_creds_dir, SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY);
|
|
else
|
|
r = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (received_encrypted_creds_dir) {
|
|
q = symlink_credential_dir("ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", received_encrypted_creds_dir, ENCRYPTED_SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY);
|
|
if (r >= 0)
|
|
r = q;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
_cleanup_free_ char *v = NULL;
|
|
|
|
r = proc_cmdline_get_key("systemd.import_credentials", PROC_CMDLINE_STRIP_RD_PREFIX, &v);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to check if 'systemd.import_credentials=' kernel command line option is set, ignoring: %m");
|
|
else if (r > 0) {
|
|
r = parse_boolean(v);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse 'systemd.import_credentials=' parameter, ignoring: %m");
|
|
else if (r == 0) {
|
|
log_notice("systemd.import_credentials=no is set, skipping importing of credentials.");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = import_credentials_boot();
|
|
|
|
q = import_credentials_trusted();
|
|
if (r >= 0)
|
|
r = q;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (r >= 0) {
|
|
_cleanup_free_ char *address = NULL;
|
|
|
|
r = read_credential("vmm.notify_socket", (void **)&address, /* ret_size= */ NULL);
|
|
if (r < 0 && !IN_SET(r, -ENOENT, -ENXIO))
|
|
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to read 'vmm.notify_socket' credential, ignoring: %m");
|
|
else if (r >= 0 && !isempty(address)) {
|
|
r = setenv("NOTIFY_SOCKET", address, /* replace= */ 1);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to set $NOTIFY_SOCKET environment variable, ignoring: %m");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|