exec-invoke: add missing assertions and drop unnecessary conditions

Fixes CID#1534358.
This commit is contained in:
Yu Watanabe
2025-03-04 05:18:15 +09:00
parent 34b58da114
commit 059d23c966
+48 -23
View File
@@ -646,6 +646,7 @@ static int setup_confirm_stdio(
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF, saved_stdin = -EBADF, saved_stdout = -EBADF;
int r;
assert(context);
assert(ret_saved_stdin);
assert(ret_saved_stdout);
@@ -1006,9 +1007,11 @@ static int enforce_user(
const ExecContext *context,
uid_t uid,
uint64_t capability_ambient_set) {
assert(context);
int r;
assert(context);
if (!uid_is_valid(uid))
return 0;
@@ -1434,6 +1437,8 @@ static bool context_has_syscall_logs(const ExecContext *c) {
}
static bool context_has_seccomp(const ExecContext *c) {
assert(c);
/* We need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */
return c->lock_personality ||
c->memory_deny_write_execute ||
@@ -1495,7 +1500,10 @@ static bool seccomp_allows_drop_privileges(const ExecContext *c) {
return !(has_capget || has_capset || has_prctl);
}
static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, const char* msg) {
static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, const char *msg) {
assert(c);
assert(p);
assert(msg);
if (is_seccomp_available())
return false;
@@ -1794,6 +1802,7 @@ static int apply_protect_hostname(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p,
assert(c);
assert(p);
assert(ret_exit_status);
if (c->protect_hostname == PROTECT_HOSTNAME_NO)
return 0;
@@ -1900,6 +1909,7 @@ static int build_environment(
assert(c);
assert(p);
assert(cgroup_context);
assert(ret);
#define N_ENV_VARS 20
@@ -2118,7 +2128,7 @@ static int build_environment(
our_env[n_env++] = x;
if (cgroup_context && !path_equal(memory_pressure_path, "/dev/null")) {
if (!path_equal(memory_pressure_path, "/dev/null")) {
_cleanup_free_ char *b = NULL, *e = NULL;
if (asprintf(&b, "%s " USEC_FMT " " USEC_FMT,
@@ -2159,6 +2169,9 @@ static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) {
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **pass_env = NULL;
size_t n_env = 0;
assert(c);
assert(ret);
STRV_FOREACH(i, c->pass_environment) {
_cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL;
char *v;
@@ -2178,7 +2191,6 @@ static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) {
}
*ret = TAKE_PTR(pass_env);
return 0;
}
@@ -2383,7 +2395,7 @@ static int setup_private_users(PrivateUsers private_users, uid_t ouid, gid_t ogi
return 1;
}
static int can_mount_proc(const ExecContext *c, ExecParameters *p) {
static int can_mount_proc(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p) {
_cleanup_close_pair_ int errno_pipe[2] = EBADF_PAIR;
_cleanup_(sigkill_waitp) pid_t pid = 0;
ssize_t n;
@@ -2886,11 +2898,12 @@ fail:
#if ENABLE_SMACK
static int setup_smack(
const ExecParameters *params,
const ExecContext *context,
const ExecParameters *params,
int executable_fd) {
int r;
assert(context);
assert(params);
assert(executable_fd >= 0);
@@ -3158,13 +3171,14 @@ static int setup_ephemeral(
int r;
assert(context);
assert(runtime);
assert(root_image);
assert(root_directory);
if (!*root_image && !*root_directory)
return 0;
if (!runtime || !runtime->ephemeral_copy)
if (!runtime->ephemeral_copy)
return 0;
assert(runtime->ephemeral_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
@@ -3376,6 +3390,8 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace(
int r;
assert(context);
assert(params);
assert(runtime);
CLEANUP_ARRAY(bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, bind_mount_free_many);
@@ -3423,7 +3439,7 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace(
* to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp that is sticky, and that's the one we want to
* use here. This does not apply when we are using /run/systemd/empty as fallback. */
if (context->private_tmp == PRIVATE_TMP_CONNECTED && runtime && runtime->shared) {
if (context->private_tmp == PRIVATE_TMP_CONNECTED && runtime->shared) {
if (streq_ptr(runtime->shared->tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY))
tmp_dir = runtime->shared->tmp_dir;
else if (runtime->shared->tmp_dir)
@@ -3615,6 +3631,8 @@ static int apply_working_directory(
int r;
assert(context);
assert(params);
assert(runtime);
if (context->working_directory_home) {
/* Preferably use the data from $HOME, in case it was updated by a PAM module */
@@ -3635,7 +3653,7 @@ static int apply_working_directory(
_cleanup_close_ int dfd = -EBADF;
r = chase(wd,
(runtime ? runtime->ephemeral_copy : NULL) ?: context->root_directory,
runtime->ephemeral_copy ?: context->root_directory,
CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT|CHASE_AT_RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
/* ret_path= */ NULL,
&dfd);
@@ -3653,11 +3671,13 @@ static int apply_root_directory(
int *exit_status) {
assert(context);
assert(params);
assert(runtime);
assert(exit_status);
if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT)
if (!needs_mount_ns && context->root_directory)
if (chroot((runtime ? runtime->ephemeral_copy : NULL) ?: context->root_directory) < 0) {
if (chroot(runtime->ephemeral_copy ?: context->root_directory) < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_CHROOT;
return -errno;
}
@@ -3668,7 +3688,8 @@ static int apply_root_directory(
static int setup_keyring(
const ExecContext *context,
const ExecParameters *p,
uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
uid_t uid,
gid_t gid) {
key_serial_t keyring;
int r = 0;
@@ -3825,12 +3846,14 @@ static int close_remaining_fds(
const ExecParameters *params,
const ExecRuntime *runtime,
int socket_fd,
const int *fds, size_t n_fds) {
const int *fds,
size_t n_fds) {
size_t n_dont_close = 0;
int dont_close[n_fds + 17];
assert(params);
assert(runtime);
if (params->stdin_fd >= 0)
dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdin_fd;
@@ -3846,15 +3869,14 @@ static int close_remaining_fds(
n_dont_close += n_fds;
}
if (runtime)
append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->ephemeral_storage_socket);
append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->ephemeral_storage_socket);
if (runtime && runtime->shared) {
if (runtime->shared) {
append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket);
append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket);
}
if (runtime && runtime->dynamic_creds) {
if (runtime->dynamic_creds) {
if (runtime->dynamic_creds->user)
append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->dynamic_creds->user->storage_socket);
if (runtime->dynamic_creds->group)
@@ -4272,11 +4294,12 @@ static int setup_delegated_namespaces(
assert(context);
assert(params);
assert(runtime);
assert(reterr_exit_status);
if (exec_needs_network_namespace(context) &&
exec_namespace_is_delegated(context, params, CLONE_NEWNET) == delegate &&
runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
runtime->shared && runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
/* Try to enable network namespacing if network namespacing is available and we have
* CAP_NET_ADMIN in the current user namespace (either the system manager one or the unit's
@@ -4303,7 +4326,7 @@ static int setup_delegated_namespaces(
if (exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context) &&
exec_namespace_is_delegated(context, params, CLONE_NEWIPC) == delegate &&
runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
runtime->shared && runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_IPC)) {
r = setup_shareable_ns(runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket, CLONE_NEWIPC);
@@ -4633,6 +4656,8 @@ int exec_invoke(
assert(command);
assert(context);
assert(params);
assert(runtime);
assert(cgroup_context);
assert(exit_status);
/* This should be mostly redundant, as the log level is also passed as an argument of the executor,
@@ -4793,7 +4818,7 @@ int exec_invoke(
return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m");
}
if (context->dynamic_user && runtime && runtime->dynamic_creds) {
if (context->dynamic_user && runtime->dynamic_creds) {
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **suggested_paths = NULL;
/* On top of that, make sure we bypass our own NSS module nss-systemd comprehensively for any NSS
@@ -4914,7 +4939,7 @@ int exec_invoke(
}
}
if (context->network_namespace_path && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
if (context->network_namespace_path && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
r = open_shareable_ns_path(runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket, context->network_namespace_path, CLONE_NEWNET);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK;
@@ -4922,7 +4947,7 @@ int exec_invoke(
}
}
if (context->ipc_namespace_path && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
if (context->ipc_namespace_path && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
r = open_shareable_ns_path(runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket, context->ipc_namespace_path, CLONE_NEWIPC);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
@@ -5143,7 +5168,7 @@ int exec_invoke(
}
}
if (cgroup_context && cg_unified() > 0 && is_pressure_supported() > 0) {
if (cg_unified() > 0 && is_pressure_supported() > 0) {
if (cgroup_context_want_memory_pressure(cgroup_context)) {
r = cg_get_path("memory", params->cgroup_path, "memory.pressure", &memory_pressure_path);
if (r < 0) {
@@ -5526,7 +5551,7 @@ int exec_invoke(
/* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the
* process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */
if (use_smack) {
r = setup_smack(params, context, executable_fd);
r = setup_smack(context, params, executable_fd);
if (r < 0 && !context->smack_process_label_ignore) {
*exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
return log_exec_error_errno(context, params, r, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m");