Merge pull request #21304 from poettering/chain-ssh-auth-keys

userdbctl: add support for chaining other ssh-authorized-keys commands from userdbctl
This commit is contained in:
Lennart Poettering
2021-11-11 14:35:48 +01:00
committed by GitHub
8 changed files with 114 additions and 42 deletions
+23 -2
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@@ -146,6 +146,14 @@
typically preferable, since it runs in a locked down sandbox.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--chain</option></term>
<listitem><para>When used with the <command>ssh-authorized-keys</command> command, this will allow
passing an additional command line after the user name that is chain executed after the lookup
completed. This allows chaining multiple tools that show SSH authorized keys.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<xi:include href="standard-options.xml" xpointer="no-pager" />
<xi:include href="standard-options.xml" xpointer="no-legend" />
<xi:include href="standard-options.xml" xpointer="help" />
@@ -201,8 +209,8 @@
<varlistentry>
<term><command>ssh-authorized-keys</command></term>
<listitem><para>This operation is not a public, user-facing interface. It is used to allow the SSH daemon to pick
up authorized keys from user records, see below.</para></listitem>
<listitem><para>Show SSH authorized keys for this account. This command is intended to be used to
allow the SSH daemon to pick up authorized keys from user records, see below.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
</refsect1>
@@ -301,6 +309,19 @@
AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/bin/userdbctl ssh-authorized-keys %u
AuthorizedKeysCommandUser root
…</programlisting>
<para>Sometimes it's useful to allow chain invocation of another program to list SSH authorized keys. By
using the <option>--chain</option> such a tool may be chain executed by <command>userdbctl
ssh-authorized-keys</command> once a lookup completes (regardless if an SSH key was found or
not). Example:</para>
<programlisting>…
AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/bin/userdbctl ssh-authorized-keys %u --chain /usr/bin/othertool %u
AuthorizedKeysCommandUser root
…</programlisting>
<para>The above will first query the userdb database for SSH keys, and then chain execute
<command>/usr/bin/othertool</command> to also be queried.</para>
</refsect1>
<refsect1>
+3 -3
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@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ char* shell_maybe_quote(const char *s, ShellEscapeFlags flags) {
return str_realloc(buf);
}
char* quote_command_line(char **argv) {
char* quote_command_line(char **argv, ShellEscapeFlags flags) {
_cleanup_free_ char *result = NULL;
assert(argv);
@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ char* quote_command_line(char **argv) {
STRV_FOREACH(a, argv) {
_cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
t = shell_maybe_quote(*a, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY);
t = shell_maybe_quote(*a, flags);
if (!t)
return NULL;
@@ -561,5 +561,5 @@ char* quote_command_line(char **argv) {
return NULL;
}
return TAKE_PTR(result);
return str_realloc(TAKE_PTR(result));
}
+1 -1
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@@ -69,4 +69,4 @@ char* escape_non_printable_full(const char *str, size_t console_width, XEscapeFl
char* shell_escape(const char *s, const char *bad);
char* shell_maybe_quote(const char *s, ShellEscapeFlags flags);
char* quote_command_line(char **argv);
char* quote_command_line(char **argv, ShellEscapeFlags flags);
+1 -12
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@@ -219,20 +219,9 @@ int get_process_cmdline(pid_t pid, size_t max_columns, ProcessCmdlineFlags flags
if (!args)
return -ENOMEM;
for (size_t i = 0; args[i]; i++) {
char *e;
e = shell_maybe_quote(args[i], shflags);
if (!e)
return -ENOMEM;
free_and_replace(args[i], e);
}
ans = strv_join(args, " ");
ans = quote_command_line(args, shflags);
if (!ans)
return -ENOMEM;
} else {
/* Arguments are separated by NULs. Let's replace those with spaces. */
for (size_t i = 0; i < k - 1; i++)
+5 -6
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@@ -3999,16 +3999,15 @@ static int exec_child(
exec_context_tty_reset(context, params);
if (unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit)) {
const char *vc = params->confirm_spawn;
_cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = NULL;
cmdline = quote_command_line(command->argv);
cmdline = quote_command_line(command->argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY);
if (!cmdline) {
*exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
return log_oom();
}
r = ask_for_confirmation(context, vc, unit, cmdline);
r = ask_for_confirmation(context, params->confirm_spawn, unit, cmdline);
if (r != CONFIRM_EXECUTE) {
if (r == CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS) {
*exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS;
@@ -4884,7 +4883,7 @@ static int exec_child(
if (DEBUG_LOGGING) {
_cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
line = quote_command_line(final_argv);
line = quote_command_line(final_argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY);
if (!line) {
*exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
return log_oom();
@@ -4976,7 +4975,7 @@ int exec_spawn(Unit *unit,
if (r < 0)
return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
line = quote_command_line(command->argv);
line = quote_command_line(command->argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY);
if (!line)
return log_oom();
@@ -6230,7 +6229,7 @@ static void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) {
prefix = strempty(prefix);
prefix2 = strjoina(prefix, "\t");
cmd = quote_command_line(c->argv);
cmd = quote_command_line(c->argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY);
fprintf(f,
"%sCommand Line: %s\n",
prefix, cmd ? cmd : strerror_safe(ENOMEM));
+1 -1
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@@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ int bus_socket_exec(sd_bus *b) {
_cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
if (b->exec_argv)
line = quote_command_line(b->exec_argv);
line = quote_command_line(b->exec_argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY);
log_debug("sd-bus: starting bus%s%s with %s%s",
b->description ? " " : "", strempty(b->description),
+1 -1
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@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ static void test_shell_maybe_quote(void) {
static void test_quote_command_line_one(char **argv, const char *expected) {
_cleanup_free_ char *s;
assert_se(s = quote_command_line(argv));
assert_se(s = quote_command_line(argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY));
log_info("%s", s);
assert_se(streq(s, expected));
}
+79 -16
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@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include "dirent-util.h"
#include "errno-list.h"
#include "escape.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "format-table.h"
#include "format-util.h"
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ static bool arg_legend = true;
static char** arg_services = NULL;
static UserDBFlags arg_userdb_flags = 0;
static JsonFormatFlags arg_json_format_flags = JSON_FORMAT_OFF;
static bool arg_chain = false;
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_services, strv_freep);
@@ -586,33 +588,84 @@ static int display_services(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
static int ssh_authorized_keys(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
_cleanup_(user_record_unrefp) UserRecord *ur = NULL;
char **chain_invocation;
int r;
assert(argc >= 2);
if (arg_chain) {
/* If --chain is specified, the rest of the command line is the chain command */
if (argc < 3)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"No chain command line specified, refusing.");
/* Make similar restrictions on the chain command as OpenSSH itself makes on the primary command. */
if (!path_is_absolute(argv[2]))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Chain invocation of ssh-authorized-keys commands requires an absolute binary path argument.");
if (!path_is_normalized(argv[2]))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Chain invocation of ssh-authorized-keys commands requires an normalized binary path argument.");
chain_invocation = argv + 2;
} else {
/* If --chain is not specified, then refuse any further arguments */
if (argc > 2)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Too many arguments.");
chain_invocation = NULL;
}
r = userdb_by_name(argv[1], arg_userdb_flags, &ur);
if (r == -ESRCH)
return log_error_errno(r, "User %s does not exist.", argv[1]);
log_error_errno(r, "User %s does not exist.", argv[1]);
else if (r == -EHOSTDOWN)
return log_error_errno(r, "Selected user database service is not available for this request.");
log_error_errno(r, "Selected user database service is not available for this request.");
else if (r == -EINVAL)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to find user %s: %m (Invalid user name?)", argv[1]);
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to find user %s: %m (Invalid user name?)", argv[1]);
else if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to find user %s: %m", argv[1]);
if (strv_isempty(ur->ssh_authorized_keys))
log_debug("User record for %s has no public SSH keys.", argv[1]);
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to find user %s: %m", argv[1]);
else {
char **i;
if (strv_isempty(ur->ssh_authorized_keys))
log_debug("User record for %s has no public SSH keys.", argv[1]);
else {
char **i;
STRV_FOREACH(i, ur->ssh_authorized_keys)
printf("%s\n", *i);
STRV_FOREACH(i, ur->ssh_authorized_keys)
printf("%s\n", *i);
}
if (ur->incomplete) {
fflush(stdout);
log_warning("Warning: lacking rights to acquire privileged fields of user record of '%s', output incomplete.", ur->user_name);
}
}
if (ur->incomplete) {
fflush(stdout);
log_warning("Warning: lacking rights to acquire privileged fields of user record of '%s', output incomplete.", ur->user_name);
if (chain_invocation) {
if (DEBUG_LOGGING) {
_cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL;
s = quote_command_line(chain_invocation, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY);
if (!s)
return log_oom();
log_debug("Chain invoking: %s", s);
}
execv(chain_invocation[0], chain_invocation);
if (errno == ENOENT) /* Let's handle ENOENT gracefully */
log_warning_errno(errno, "Chain executable '%s' does not exist, ignoring chain invocation.", chain_invocation[0]);
else {
log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to invoke chain executable '%s': %m", chain_invocation[0]);
if (r >= 0)
r = -errno;
}
}
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
return r;
}
static int help(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
@@ -633,6 +686,7 @@ static int help(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
" users-in-group [GROUP…] Show users that are members of specified group(s)\n"
" groups-of-user [USER…] Show groups the specified user(s) is a member of\n"
" services Show enabled database services\n"
" ssh-authorized-keys USER Show SSH authorized keys for user\n"
"\nOptions:\n"
" -h --help Show this help\n"
" --version Show package version\n"
@@ -650,6 +704,7 @@ static int help(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
" --with-varlink=BOOL Control whether to talk to services at all\n"
" --multiplexer=BOOL Control whether to use the multiplexer\n"
" --json=pretty|short JSON output mode\n"
" --chain Chain another command\n"
"\nSee the %s for details.\n",
program_invocation_short_name,
ansi_highlight(),
@@ -672,6 +727,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
ARG_SYNTHESIZE,
ARG_MULTIPLEXER,
ARG_JSON,
ARG_CHAIN,
};
static const struct option options[] = {
@@ -687,6 +743,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
{ "synthesize", required_argument, NULL, ARG_SYNTHESIZE },
{ "multiplexer", required_argument, NULL, ARG_MULTIPLEXER },
{ "json", required_argument, NULL, ARG_JSON },
{ "chain", no_argument, NULL, ARG_CHAIN },
{}
};
@@ -712,7 +769,9 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
for (;;) {
int c;
c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "hjs:N", options, NULL);
c = getopt_long(argc, argv,
arg_chain ? "+hjs:N" : "hjs:N", /* When --chain was used disable parsing of further switches */
options, NULL);
if (c < 0)
break;
@@ -829,6 +888,10 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
SET_FLAG(arg_userdb_flags, USERDB_AVOID_MULTIPLEXER, !r);
break;
case ARG_CHAIN:
arg_chain = true;
break;
case '?':
return -EINVAL;
@@ -851,7 +914,7 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
/* This one is a helper for sshd_config's AuthorizedKeysCommand= setting, it's not a
* user-facing verb and thus should not appear in man pages or --help texts. */
{ "ssh-authorized-keys", 2, 2, 0, ssh_authorized_keys },
{ "ssh-authorized-keys", 2, VERB_ANY, 0, ssh_authorized_keys },
{}
};