Merge pull request #14369 from poettering/pkcs11-cryptsetup-followup
PKCS#11 cryptsetup support followup
This commit is contained in:
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-5
@@ -425,10 +425,10 @@
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line. This is useful for unlocking encrypted volumes through security tokens or smartcards. See below
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for an example how to set up this mechanism for unlocking a LUKS volume with a YubiKey security
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token. The specified URI can refer directly to a private RSA key stored on a token or alternatively
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just to a slot or token in which case a suitable private RSA key object is automatically searched on
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it. In this case if multiple suitable objects are found the token is refused. The key configured in
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the third column is passed as is to RSA decryption. The resulting decrypted key is then base64
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encoded before it is used to unlock the LUKS volume.</para></listitem>
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just to a slot or token, in which case a search for a suitable private RSA key will be performed. In
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this case if multiple suitable objects are found the token is refused. The key configured in the
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third column is passed as is to RSA decryption. The resulting decrypted key is then base64 encoded
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before it is used to unlock the LUKS volume.</para></listitem>
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</varlistentry>
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<varlistentry>
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@@ -489,7 +489,8 @@ external /dev/sda3 keyfile:LABEL=keydev keyfile-timeout=10s</programlist
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<title>Yubikey-based Volume Unlocking Example</title>
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<para>The PKCS#11 logic allows hooking up any compatible security token that is capable of storing RSA
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decryption keys. Here's an example how to set up a Yubikey security token for this purpose:</para>
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decryption keys. Here's an example how to set up a Yubikey security token for this purpose, using
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<command>ykman</command> from the yubikey-manager project:</para>
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<programlisting><xi:include href="yubikey-crypttab.sh" parse="text" /></programlisting>
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@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ ykman piv reset
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# Generate a new private/public key pair on the device, store the public key in 'pubkey.pem'.
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ykman piv generate-key -a RSA2048 9d pubkey.pem
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# Create a self-signed certificate from this public key, and store it on the device.
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# Create a self-signed certificate from this public key, and store it on the
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# device. The "subject" should be an arbitrary string to identify the token in
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# the p11tool output below.
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ykman piv generate-certificate --subject "Knobelei" 9d pubkey.pem
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# Check if the newly create key on the Yubikey shows up as token in PKCS#11. Have a look at the output, and
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@@ -18,16 +20,16 @@ p11tool --list-tokens
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dd if=/dev/urandom of=plaintext.bin bs=128 count=1
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# Encode the secret key also as base64 text (with all whitespace removed)
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base64 < plaintext.bin | tr -d '\n\r\t ' > plaintext.base64
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base64 < plaintext.bin | tr -d '\n\r\t ' > plaintext.base64
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# Encrypt this newly generated (binary) LUKS decryption key using the public key whose private key is on the
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# Yubikey, store the result in /etc/encrypted-luks-key.bin, where we'll look for it during boot.
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openssl rsautl -encrypt -pubin -inkey pubkey.pem -in plaintext.bin -out /etc/encrypted-luks-key.bin
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sudo openssl rsautl -encrypt -pubin -inkey pubkey.pem -in plaintext.bin -out /etc/encrypted-luks-key.bin
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# Configure the LUKS decryption key on the LUKS device. We use very low pbkdf settings since the key already
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# has quite a high quality (it comes directly from /dev/urandom after all), and thus we don't need to do much
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# key derivation.
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cryptsetup luksAddKey /dev/sda1 plaintext.base64 --pbkdf=pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations=1000
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# key derivation. Replace /dev/sdXn by the partition to use (e.g. sda1)
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sudo cryptsetup luksAddKey /dev/sdXn plaintext.base64 --pbkdf=pbkdf2 --pbkdf-force-iterations=1000
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# Now securely delete the plain text LUKS key, we don't need it anymore, and since it contains secret key
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# material it should be removed from disk thoroughly.
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@@ -39,7 +41,7 @@ rm pubkey.pem
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# Test: Let's run systemd-cryptsetup to test if this all worked. The option string should contain the full
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# PKCS#11 URI we have in the clipboard, it tells the tool how to decypher the encrypted LUKS key.
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systemd-cryptsetup attach mytest /dev/sda1 /etc/encrypted-luks-key.bin 'pkcs11-uri=pkcs11:…'
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sudo systemd-cryptsetup attach mytest /dev/sdXn /etc/encrypted-luks-key.bin 'pkcs11-uri=pkcs11:…'
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# If that worked, let's now add the same line persistently to /etc/crypttab, for the future.
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echo "mytest /dev/sda1 /etc/encrypted-luks-key 'pkcs11-uri=pkcs11:…' >> /etc/crypttab
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sudo bash -c 'echo "mytest /dev/sdXn /etc/encrypted-luks-key \'pkcs11-uri=pkcs11:…\'" >> /etc/crypttab'
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@@ -12,12 +12,15 @@
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#include "cryptsetup-pkcs11.h"
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#include "escape.h"
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#include "fd-util.h"
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#include "format-util.h"
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#include "macro.h"
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#include "memory-util.h"
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#include "pkcs11-util.h"
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#include "stat-util.h"
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#include "strv.h"
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#define KEY_FILE_SIZE_MAX (16U*1024U*1024U) /* 16 MiB */
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static int load_key_file(
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const char *key_file,
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size_t key_file_size,
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@@ -50,8 +53,13 @@ static int load_key_file(
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if (st.st_size == 0)
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return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Key file is empty, refusing.");
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if ((uint64_t) st.st_size > SIZE_MAX)
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return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ERANGE), "Key file too large, refusing.");
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if ((uint64_t) st.st_size > KEY_FILE_SIZE_MAX) {
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char buf1[FORMAT_BYTES_MAX], buf2[FORMAT_BYTES_MAX];
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return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ERANGE),
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"Key file larger (%s) than allowed maximum size (%s), refusing.",
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format_bytes(buf1, sizeof(buf1), st.st_size),
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format_bytes(buf2, sizeof(buf2), KEY_FILE_SIZE_MAX));
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}
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if (key_file_offset >= (uint64_t) st.st_size)
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return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Key file offset too large for file, refusing.");
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@@ -113,7 +121,16 @@ static int pkcs11_callback(
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/* Called for every token matching our URI */
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r = pkcs11_token_login(m, session, slot_id, token_info, data->friendly_name, "drive-harddisk", "pkcs11-pin", data->until, NULL);
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r = pkcs11_token_login(
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m,
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session,
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slot_id,
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token_info,
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data->friendly_name,
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"drive-harddisk",
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"pkcs11-pin",
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data->until,
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NULL);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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@@ -126,11 +143,18 @@ static int pkcs11_callback(
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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r = pkcs11_token_decrypt_data(m, session, object, data->encrypted_key, data->encrypted_key_size, &data->decrypted_key, &data->decrypted_key_size);
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r = pkcs11_token_decrypt_data(
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m,
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session,
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object,
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data->encrypted_key,
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data->encrypted_key_size,
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&data->decrypted_key,
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&data->decrypted_key_size);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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int decrypt_pkcs11_key(
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