Fix miscalculated buffer size and uses of size-unlimited sprintf()

function.

Not sure if this results in an exploitable buffer overflow, probably not
since the the int value is likely sanitized somewhere earlier and it's
being put through a bit mask shortly before being used.
This commit is contained in:
Aleksander Adamowski
2016-01-11 15:26:41 -08:00
parent a41a7181c9
commit 13f5402c6b
+3 -3
View File
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ void server_process_syslog_message(
size_t label_len) {
char syslog_priority[sizeof("PRIORITY=") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)],
syslog_facility[sizeof("SYSLOG_FACILITY") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
syslog_facility[sizeof("SYSLOG_FACILITY=") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
const char *message = NULL, *syslog_identifier = NULL, *syslog_pid = NULL;
struct iovec iovec[N_IOVEC_META_FIELDS + 6];
unsigned n = 0;
@@ -357,11 +357,11 @@ void server_process_syslog_message(
IOVEC_SET_STRING(iovec[n++], "_TRANSPORT=syslog");
sprintf(syslog_priority, "PRIORITY=%i", priority & LOG_PRIMASK);
snprintf(syslog_priority, sizeof(syslog_priority), "PRIORITY=%i", priority & LOG_PRIMASK);
IOVEC_SET_STRING(iovec[n++], syslog_priority);
if (priority & LOG_FACMASK) {
sprintf(syslog_facility, "SYSLOG_FACILITY=%i", LOG_FAC(priority));
snprintf(syslog_facility, sizeof(syslog_facility), "SYSLOG_FACILITY=%i", LOG_FAC(priority));
IOVEC_SET_STRING(iovec[n++], syslog_facility);
}