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exec-invoke: Rename various variables from has_ to have_

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All of these encode information of the current process, so have_ is
more approriate than has_, which refers to something else.
This commit is contained in:
Daan De Meyer
2025-03-19 10:00:45 +01:00
parent d2ce0db7a7
commit af6a8b6969
1 changed files with 12 additions and 12 deletions
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src/core/exec-invoke.c
+12 -12
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@@ -1473,7 +1473,7 @@ static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext *c) {
static bool seccomp_allows_drop_privileges(const ExecContext *c) {
void *id, *val;
bool has_capget = false, has_capset = false, has_prctl = false;
bool have_capget = false, have_capset = false, have_prctl = false;
assert(c);
@@ -1487,17 +1487,17 @@ static bool seccomp_allows_drop_privileges(const ExecContext *c) {
name = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1);
if (streq(name, "capget"))
has_capget = true;
have_capget = true;
else if (streq(name, "capset"))
has_capset = true;
have_capset = true;
else if (streq(name, "prctl"))
has_prctl = true;
have_prctl = true;
}
if (c->syscall_allow_list)
return has_capget && has_capset && has_prctl;
return have_capget && have_capset && have_prctl;
else
return !(has_capget || has_capset || has_prctl);
return !(have_capget || have_capset || have_prctl);
}
static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, const char *msg) {
@@ -4300,7 +4300,7 @@ static int setup_delegated_namespaces(
uid_t gid,
const ExecCommand *command,
bool needs_sandboxing,
bool has_cap_sys_admin,
bool have_cap_sys_admin,
int *reterr_exit_status) {
int r;
@@ -4391,7 +4391,7 @@ static int setup_delegated_namespaces(
* We need to check prior to entering the user namespace because if we're running unprivileged or in a
* system without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, then we can have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current user namespace but not
* once we unshare a mount namespace. */
if (!has_cap_sys_admin) {
if (!have_cap_sys_admin) {
r = can_mount_proc(context, params);
if (r < 0) {
*reterr_exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
@@ -4647,7 +4647,7 @@ int exec_invoke(
needs_setuid, /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */
needs_mount_namespace; /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */
bool keep_seccomp_privileges = false;
bool has_cap_sys_admin = false;
bool have_cap_sys_admin = false;
#if HAVE_SELINUX
_cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL;
bool use_selinux = false;
@@ -5308,7 +5308,7 @@ int exec_invoke(
uint64_t capability_ambient_set = context->capability_ambient_set;
/* Check CAP_SYS_ADMIN before we enter user namespace to see if we can mount /proc even though its masked. */
has_cap_sys_admin = have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) > 0;
have_cap_sys_admin = have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) > 0;
if (needs_sandboxing) {
/* MAC enablement checks need to be done before a new mount ns is created, as they rely on
@@ -5407,7 +5407,7 @@ int exec_invoke(
gid,
command,
needs_sandboxing,
has_cap_sys_admin,
have_cap_sys_admin,
exit_status);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -5468,7 +5468,7 @@ int exec_invoke(
gid,
command,
needs_sandboxing,
has_cap_sys_admin,
have_cap_sys_admin,
exit_status);
if (r < 0)
return r;