repart: add basic support for LUKS2 integrity verification (#39295)

Authenticated disk encryption is experimentally supported by cryptsetup
since v2.0.0 and allows for automatic dm-integrity setup for LUKS
devices. Add support for the mode to systemd-repart. The PR adds support
for `cryptsetup luksFormat --integrity` to systemd-repart and
"encryptedwithintegrity" dissection policy.

Limitations:
- No discard, online-only mode for repart.

Closes #39250
This commit is contained in:
Lennart Poettering
2025-12-18 21:19:39 +01:00
committed by GitHub
13 changed files with 431 additions and 59 deletions
+6
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@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ Deprecations and removals:
Features:
* systemd-repart: implement Integrity=data/meta and Integrity=inline for non-LUKS
case. Currently, only Integrity=inline combined with Encrypt= is implemented
and uses libcryptsetup features. Add support for plain dm-integrity setups when
integrity tags are stored by the device (inline), interleaved with data (data),
and on a separate device (meta).
* networkd/machined: implement reverse name lookups in the resolved hook
* networkd's resolved hook: optionally map all lease IP addresses handed out to
+21
View File
@@ -909,6 +909,27 @@
<xi:include href="version-info.xml" xpointer="v259"/></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>Integrity=</varname></term>
<listitem><para>Enable integrity checking for the partition. Currently, the only supported option
is <varname>Integrity=inline</varname> which enables authenticated disk encryption for LUKS2 devices.
The option requires <varname>Encrypt=</varname> setting and can only be used in online image build.
Defaults to <literal>off</literal>, i.e. integrity protection is disabled.</para>
<para>Note: authenticated disk encryption is considered EXPERIMENTAL by cryptsetup.</para>
<xi:include href="version-info.xml" xpointer="v260"/></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>IntegrityAlgorithm=</varname></term>
<listitem><para>Specify the integrity algorithm to be used for integrity verification. For
<varname>Integrity=inline</varname> the supported values are: <literal>hmac-sha1</literal>,
<literal>hmac-sha256</literal>(default), and <literal>hmac-sha512</literal>.</para>
<xi:include href="version-info.xml" xpointer="v260"/></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>Compression=</varname></term>
+2 -2
View File
@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ static int table_add_designator_line(Table *table, PartitionDesignator d, Partit
return log_oom();
color = (f & _PARTITION_POLICY_USE_MASK) == PARTITION_POLICY_IGNORE ? ansi_grey() :
((f & (PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT)) ==
(PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT)) ? ansi_highlight_yellow() :
((f & (PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT)) ==
(PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT)) ? ansi_highlight_yellow() :
(f & _PARTITION_POLICY_USE_MASK) == PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT ? ansi_highlight_red() :
!(f & PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED) ? ansi_highlight_green() : NULL;
+108 -6
View File
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
/* To do LUKS2 offline encryption, we need to keep some extra free space at the end of the partition. */
#define LUKS2_METADATA_KEEP_FREE (LUKS2_METADATA_SIZE*2ULL)
/* LUKS2 volume key size. */
/* LUKS2 default volume key size (no integrity). */
#define VOLUME_KEY_SIZE (512ULL/8ULL)
/* Use 4K as the default filesystem sector size because as long as the partitions are aligned to 4K, the
@@ -266,6 +266,21 @@ typedef enum EncryptMode {
_ENCRYPT_MODE_INVALID = -EINVAL,
} EncryptMode;
typedef enum IntegrityMode {
INTEGRITY_OFF,
INTEGRITY_INLINE,
_INTEGRITY_MODE_MAX,
_INTEGRITY_MODE_INVALID = -EINVAL,
} IntegrityMode;
typedef enum IntegrityAlg {
INTEGRITY_ALG_HMAC_SHA1,
INTEGRITY_ALG_HMAC_SHA256,
INTEGRITY_ALG_HMAC_SHA512,
_INTEGRITY_ALG_MAX,
_INTEGRITY_ALG_INVALID = -EINVAL,
} IntegrityAlg;
typedef enum VerityMode {
VERITY_OFF,
VERITY_DATA,
@@ -444,6 +459,8 @@ typedef struct Partition {
struct iovec key;
Tpm2PCRValue *tpm2_hash_pcr_values;
size_t tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values;
IntegrityMode integrity;
IntegrityAlg integrity_alg;
VerityMode verity;
char *verity_match_key;
MinimizeMode minimize;
@@ -552,6 +569,22 @@ static const char *encrypt_mode_table[_ENCRYPT_MODE_MAX] = {
[ENCRYPT_KEY_FILE_TPM2] = "key-file+tpm2",
};
/* Going forward, the plan is to add two more modes:
* [INTEGRITY_DATA] = "data" (interleave data and integrity tags on the same device),
* [INTEGRITY_META] = "meta" (use a separate device for storing integrity tags).
* Also, INTEGRITY_INLINE will be using hardware sector integrity fields when used
* without encryption. */
static const char *integrity_mode_table[_INTEGRITY_MODE_MAX] = {
[INTEGRITY_OFF] = "off", /* no integrity protection */
[INTEGRITY_INLINE] = "inline", /* luks2 storage when encrypted */
};
static const char *integrity_alg_table[_INTEGRITY_ALG_MAX] = {
[INTEGRITY_ALG_HMAC_SHA1] = "hmac-sha1",
[INTEGRITY_ALG_HMAC_SHA256] = "hmac-sha256",
[INTEGRITY_ALG_HMAC_SHA512] = "hmac-sha512",
};
static const char *verity_mode_table[_VERITY_MODE_MAX] = {
[VERITY_OFF] = "off",
[VERITY_DATA] = "data",
@@ -584,6 +617,8 @@ static const char *progress_phase_table[_PROGRESS_PHASE_MAX] = {
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(empty_mode, EmptyMode);
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(append_mode, AppendMode);
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_FROM_STRING_WITH_BOOLEAN(encrypt_mode, EncryptMode, ENCRYPT_KEY_FILE);
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_FROM_STRING_WITH_BOOLEAN(integrity_mode, IntegrityMode, INTEGRITY_INLINE);
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(integrity_alg, IntegrityAlg);
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(verity_mode, VerityMode);
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_FROM_STRING_WITH_BOOLEAN(minimize_mode, MinimizeMode, MINIMIZE_BEST);
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(progress_phase, ProgressPhase);
@@ -2633,6 +2668,9 @@ static int config_parse_key_file(
return parse_key_file(rvalue, &partition->key);
}
static DEFINE_CONFIG_PARSE_ENUM_WITH_DEFAULT(config_parse_integrity, integrity_mode, IntegrityMode, INTEGRITY_OFF);
static DEFINE_CONFIG_PARSE_ENUM_WITH_DEFAULT(config_parse_integrity_alg, integrity_alg, IntegrityAlg, INTEGRITY_ALG_HMAC_SHA256);
static DEFINE_CONFIG_PARSE_ENUM_WITH_DEFAULT(config_parse_verity, verity_mode, VerityMode, VERITY_OFF);
static DEFINE_CONFIG_PARSE_ENUM_WITH_DEFAULT(config_parse_minimize, minimize_mode, MinimizeMode, MINIMIZE_OFF);
@@ -2787,6 +2825,8 @@ static int partition_read_definition(
{ "Partition", "EncryptedVolume", config_parse_encrypted_volume, 0, p },
{ "Partition", "TPM2PCRs", config_parse_tpm2_pcrs, 0, p },
{ "Partition", "KeyFile", config_parse_key_file, 0, p },
{ "Partition", "Integrity", config_parse_integrity, 0, &p->integrity },
{ "Partition", "IntegrityAlgorithm", config_parse_integrity_alg, 0, &p->integrity_alg },
{ "Partition", "Compression", config_parse_string, CONFIG_PARSE_STRING_SAFE_AND_ASCII, &p->compression },
{ "Partition", "CompressionLevel", config_parse_string, CONFIG_PARSE_STRING_SAFE_AND_ASCII, &p->compression_level },
{ "Partition", "SupplementFor", config_parse_string, 0, &p->supplement_for_name },
@@ -2921,6 +2961,10 @@ static int partition_read_definition(
"SizeMinBytes=/SizeMaxBytes= cannot be used with Verity=%s.",
verity_mode_to_string(p->verity));
if (p->integrity == INTEGRITY_INLINE && p->encrypt == ENCRYPT_OFF)
return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, path, 1, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Integrity=inline requires Encrypt=.");
if (p->default_subvolume && !ordered_hashmap_contains(p->subvolumes, p->default_subvolume))
return log_syntax(NULL, LOG_ERR, path, 1, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"DefaultSubvolume= must be one of the paths in Subvolumes=.");
@@ -4989,6 +5033,39 @@ static int partition_target_sync(Context *context, Partition *p, PartitionTarget
return 0;
}
/* libcryptsetup uses its own names for integrity algorithms, e.g. 'hmac(sha1)' but systemd
* prefers more standardized 'hmac-sha1', do the conversion here. Default to hmac(sha256). */
static const char* dmcrypt_integrity_alg_name(Partition *p) {
if (p->integrity != INTEGRITY_INLINE)
return NULL;
switch (p->integrity_alg) {
case INTEGRITY_ALG_HMAC_SHA1:
return "hmac(sha1)";
case INTEGRITY_ALG_HMAC_SHA512:
return "hmac(sha512)";
case INTEGRITY_ALG_HMAC_SHA256:
default:
return "hmac(sha256)";
}
}
/* Integrity puts specific limitations on the key size depending on the algorithm */
static size_t dmcrypt_proper_key_size(Partition *p) {
if (p->integrity != INTEGRITY_INLINE)
return VOLUME_KEY_SIZE;
switch (p->integrity_alg) {
case INTEGRITY_ALG_HMAC_SHA1:
return 672/8;
case INTEGRITY_ALG_HMAC_SHA512:
return 1024/8;
case INTEGRITY_ALG_HMAC_SHA256:
default:
return 768/8;
}
}
static int partition_encrypt(Context *context, Partition *p, PartitionTarget *target, bool offline) {
#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP
#if HAVE_TPM2
@@ -4997,6 +5074,7 @@ static int partition_encrypt(Context *context, Partition *p, PartitionTarget *ta
_cleanup_fclose_ FILE *h = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *hp = NULL, *vol = NULL, *dm_name = NULL;
const char *passphrase = NULL;
const size_t volume_key_size = dmcrypt_proper_key_size(p);
size_t passphrase_size = 0;
const char *vt;
int r;
@@ -5021,6 +5099,7 @@ static int partition_encrypt(Context *context, Partition *p, PartitionTarget *ta
.label = vl,
.sector_size = partition_fs_sector_size(context, p),
.data_device = offline ? node : NULL,
.integrity = dmcrypt_integrity_alg_name(p),
};
struct crypt_params_reencrypt reencrypt_params = {
.mode = CRYPT_REENCRYPT_ENCRYPT,
@@ -5032,6 +5111,10 @@ static int partition_encrypt(Context *context, Partition *p, PartitionTarget *ta
};
if (offline) {
/* libcryptsetup does not currently support reencryption of devices with integrity profiles.*/
if (p->integrity == INTEGRITY_INLINE)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Integrity=inline cannot be enabled in offline mode.");
r = var_tmp_dir(&vt);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine temporary files directory: %m");
@@ -5084,7 +5167,7 @@ static int partition_encrypt(Context *context, Partition *p, PartitionTarget *ta
"xts-plain64",
SD_ID128_TO_UUID_STRING(p->luks_uuid),
NULL,
VOLUME_KEY_SIZE,
/* volume_key_size= */ volume_key_size,
&luks_params);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to LUKS2 format future partition: %m");
@@ -5097,7 +5180,7 @@ static int partition_encrypt(Context *context, Partition *p, PartitionTarget *ta
cd,
CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,
NULL,
VOLUME_KEY_SIZE,
/* volume_key_size= */ volume_key_size,
strempty(iovec_key->iov_base),
iovec_key->iov_len);
if (r < 0)
@@ -5272,7 +5355,7 @@ static int partition_encrypt(Context *context, Partition *p, PartitionTarget *ta
cd,
CRYPT_ANY_SLOT,
/* volume_key= */ NULL,
/* volume_key_size= */ VOLUME_KEY_SIZE,
/* volume_key_size= */ volume_key_size,
base64_encoded,
base64_encoded_size);
if (keyslot < 0)
@@ -5372,11 +5455,30 @@ static int partition_encrypt(Context *context, Partition *p, PartitionTarget *ta
cd,
dm_name,
NULL,
VOLUME_KEY_SIZE,
(arg_discard ? CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS : 0) | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE);
/* volume_key_size= */ volume_key_size,
(arg_discard && p->integrity != INTEGRITY_INLINE ? CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS : 0) | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate LUKS superblock: %m");
/* crypt_wipe() the whole device to avoid integrity errors upon mkfs */
if (p->integrity == INTEGRITY_INLINE) {
r = sym_crypt_wipe(
cd,
vol,
CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO,
/* offset= */ 0,
/* length= */ 0,
/* wipe_block_size= */ 1 * U64_MB,
/* flags= */ 0,
/* progress= */ NULL,
/* usrptr= */ NULL);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to wipe LUKS device: %m");
log_info("%s integrity protection for future partition %" PRIu64 " initialized.",
integrity_alg_to_string(p->integrity_alg), p->partno);
}
dev_fd = open(vol, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
if (dev_fd < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open LUKS volume '%s': %m", vol);
+5 -1
View File
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(crypt_token_set_external_path) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(crypt_token_status) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(crypt_volume_key_get) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(crypt_volume_key_keyring) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(crypt_wipe) = NULL;
DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(crypt_get_integrity_info) = NULL;
static void cryptsetup_log_glue(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr) {
@@ -274,7 +276,9 @@ int dlopen_cryptsetup(void) {
#endif
DLSYM_ARG(crypt_token_status),
DLSYM_ARG(crypt_volume_key_get),
DLSYM_ARG(crypt_volume_key_keyring));
DLSYM_ARG(crypt_volume_key_keyring),
DLSYM_ARG(crypt_wipe),
DLSYM_ARG(crypt_get_integrity_info));
if (r <= 0)
return r;
+2
View File
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(crypt_token_set_external_path);
extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(crypt_token_status);
extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(crypt_volume_key_get);
extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(crypt_volume_key_keyring);
extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(crypt_wipe);
extern DLSYM_PROTOTYPE(crypt_get_integrity_info);
DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC_FULL(struct crypt_device *, crypt_free, NULL);
DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC_FULL(struct crypt_device *, sym_crypt_free, NULL);
+127 -4
View File
@@ -397,6 +397,114 @@ static int image_policy_check_protection(
return 0;
}
/* internal LUKS2 header defines */
#define LUKS2_FIXED_HDR_SIZE UINT64_C(0x1000)
#define LUKS2_MAGIC "LUKS\xba\xbe"
/* Matches the beginning of 'struct luks2_hdr_disk' from cryptsetup */
struct luks_header_incomplete {
char luks_magic[sizeof(LUKS2_MAGIC) - 1];
be16_t version;
be64_t hdr_len;
};
/* 'integrity' information from LUKS JSON header. Currenly, only 'type' is extracted/checked. */
struct luks_integrity_data {
char *type;
};
static int integrity_information(const char *name, sd_json_variant *v, sd_json_dispatch_flags_t flags, void *userdata) {
static const sd_json_dispatch_field table[] = {
{ "type", SD_JSON_VARIANT_STRING, sd_json_dispatch_const_string, offsetof(struct luks_integrity_data, type), SD_JSON_MANDATORY },
{}
};
return sd_json_dispatch(v, table, flags, userdata);
}
/* cryptsetup needs a loop device to work with a partition which has offset/size but
* dissect may be running unpriviliged. Implement a minimal custom LUKS header parser
* checking integrity protection information. */
static int partition_is_luks2_integrity(int part_fd, uint64_t offset, uint64_t size) {
_cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *v = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *json = NULL;
sd_json_variant *w;
const char *key;
struct luks_header_incomplete header;
ssize_t sz, json_len;
int r;
assert(part_fd >= 0);
if (size < LUKS2_FIXED_HDR_SIZE) {
log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Partition is too small to contain a LUKS header.");
return 0;
}
sz = pread(part_fd, &header, sizeof(header), offset);
if (sz < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to read LUKS header.");
if (sz != sizeof(header))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "Failed to read LUKS header.");
if (memcmp(header.luks_magic, LUKS2_MAGIC, sizeof(header.luks_magic)) != 0)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Partition's magic is not LUKS.");
if (be16toh(header.version) != 2)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Unsupported LUKS header version: %" PRIu16 ".", be16toh(header.version));
if (be64toh(header.hdr_len) > size)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "LUKS header length exceeds partition size.");
if (be64toh(header.hdr_len) <= LUKS2_FIXED_HDR_SIZE || offset > UINT64_MAX - be64toh(header.hdr_len))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid LUKS header length: %" PRIu64 ".", be64toh(header.hdr_len));
json_len = be64toh(header.hdr_len) - LUKS2_FIXED_HDR_SIZE;
json = malloc(json_len + 1);
if (!json)
return -ENOMEM;
sz = pread(part_fd, json, json_len, offset + LUKS2_FIXED_HDR_SIZE);
if (sz < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to read LUKS JSON header.");
if (sz != json_len)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "Failed to read LUKS JSON header.");
json[sz] = '\0';
r = sd_json_parse(json, /* flags = */ 0, &v, /* reterr_line = */ NULL, /* reterr_column = */ NULL);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse LUKS JSON header.");
v = sd_json_variant_by_key(v, "segments");
if (!v || !sd_json_variant_is_object(v)) {
log_debug("LUKS JSON header lacks 'segments' information, assuming no integrity.");
return 0;
}
/* Verify that all segments have integrity protection */
JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT_FOREACH(key, w, v) {
struct luks_integrity_data data = {};
static const sd_json_dispatch_field dispatch_segment[] = {
{ "integrity", SD_JSON_VARIANT_OBJECT, integrity_information, 0, SD_JSON_MANDATORY },
{}
};
r = sd_json_dispatch(w, dispatch_segment, SD_JSON_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS, &data);
if (r < 0) {
log_debug("Failed to get integrity information from LUKS JSON for segment %s, assuming no integrity.", key);
return 0;
}
/* We don't require a particular integrity algorithm, everything but 'none' (which shouldn't
* be there in the first place but is theoretically possible) works. */
if (streq(data.type, "none"))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int image_policy_check_partition_flags(
const ImagePolicy *policy,
PartitionDesignator designator,
@@ -457,7 +565,16 @@ static int dissected_image_probe_filesystems(
if (streq_ptr(p->fstype, "crypto_LUKS")) {
m->encrypted = true;
found_flags = PARTITION_POLICY_UNUSED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED; /* found this one, and its definitely encrypted */
if (p->mount_node_fd >= 0)
r = partition_is_luks2_integrity(p->mount_node_fd, /* offset = */ 0, /* size = */ UINT64_MAX);
else
r = partition_is_luks2_integrity(fd, p->offset, p->size);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* found this one, it's definitely encrypted + with or without integrity checking */
found_flags = PARTITION_POLICY_UNUSED|(r > 0 ? PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY : PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED);
} else
/* found it, but it's definitely not encrypted, hence mask the encrypted flag, but
* set all other ways that indicate "present". */
@@ -948,8 +1065,14 @@ static int dissect_image(
if (verity_settings_data_covers(verity, PARTITION_ROOT))
found_flags = iovec_is_set(&verity->root_hash_sig) ? PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED : PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY;
else
found_flags = encrypted ? PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED : PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED;
else if (encrypted) {
r = partition_is_luks2_integrity(fd, /* offset = */ 0, /* size = */ UINT64_MAX);
if (r < 0)
return r;
found_flags = r > 0 ? PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY : PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED;
} else
found_flags = PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED;
r = image_policy_check_protection(policy, PARTITION_ROOT, found_flags);
if (r < 0)
@@ -1732,7 +1855,7 @@ static int dissect_image(
/* Determine the verity protection level for this partition. */
PartitionPolicyFlags found_flags;
if (m->partitions[di].found) {
found_flags = PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNUSED;
found_flags = PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNUSED;
PartitionDesignator vi = partition_verity_hash_of(di);
if (vi >= 0 && m->partitions[vi].found) {
+27 -23
View File
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static PartitionPolicyFlags partition_policy_normalized_flags(const PartitionPol
* all needs no protection, because it *is* the protection */
if (partition_verity_hash_to_data(policy->designator) >= 0 ||
partition_verity_sig_to_data(policy->designator) >= 0)
flags &= ~(PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED);
flags &= ~(PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY);
/* if this designator has no verity concept, then mask off verity protection flags */
if (partition_verity_hash_of(policy->designator) < 0)
@@ -187,6 +187,8 @@ static PartitionPolicyFlags policy_flag_from_string_one(const char *s) {
return PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED;
if (streq(s, "encrypted"))
return PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED;
if (streq(s, "encryptedwithintegrity"))
return PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY;
if (streq(s, "unprotected"))
return PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED;
if (streq(s, "unused"))
@@ -423,6 +425,8 @@ int partition_policy_flags_to_string(PartitionPolicyFlags flags, bool simplify,
l[m++] = "signed";
if (flags & PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED)
l[m++] = "encrypted";
if (flags & PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY)
l[m++] = "encryptedwithintegrity";
if (flags & PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED)
l[m++] = "unprotected";
if (flags & PARTITION_POLICY_UNUSED)
@@ -863,8 +867,8 @@ const ImagePolicy image_policy_sysext = {
* be. */
.n_policies = 2,
.policies = {
{ PARTITION_ROOT, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_USR, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_ROOT, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_USR, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
},
.default_flags = PARTITION_POLICY_IGNORE,
};
@@ -884,7 +888,7 @@ const ImagePolicy image_policy_confext = {
* are only interested in the /etc/ tree anyway, and that's really the only place it can be. */
.n_policies = 1,
.policies = {
{ PARTITION_ROOT, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_ROOT, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
},
.default_flags = PARTITION_POLICY_IGNORE,
};
@@ -901,14 +905,14 @@ const ImagePolicy image_policy_container = {
/* For systemd-nspawn containers we use all partitions, with the exception of swap */
.n_policies = 8,
.policies = {
{ PARTITION_ROOT, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_USR, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_HOME, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_SRV, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_ROOT, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_USR, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_HOME, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_SRV, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_ESP, PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_XBOOTLDR, PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_TMP, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_VAR, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_TMP, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_VAR, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
},
.default_flags = PARTITION_POLICY_IGNORE,
};
@@ -917,15 +921,15 @@ const ImagePolicy image_policy_host = {
/* For the host policy we basically use everything */
.n_policies = 9,
.policies = {
{ PARTITION_ROOT, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_USR, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_HOME, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_SRV, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_ROOT, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_USR, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_HOME, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_SRV, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_ESP, PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_XBOOTLDR, PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_SWAP, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_TMP, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_VAR, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_SWAP, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_TMP, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_VAR, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
},
.default_flags = PARTITION_POLICY_IGNORE,
};
@@ -934,12 +938,12 @@ const ImagePolicy image_policy_service = {
/* For RootImage= in services we skip ESP/XBOOTLDR and swap */
.n_policies = 6,
.policies = {
{ PARTITION_ROOT, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_USR, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_HOME, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_SRV, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_TMP, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_VAR, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_ROOT, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_USR, PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_HOME, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_SRV, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_TMP, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
{ PARTITION_VAR, PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT },
},
.default_flags = PARTITION_POLICY_IGNORE,
};
+21 -20
View File
@@ -14,29 +14,30 @@ typedef enum PartitionPolicyFlags {
* on. Example: a default policy of "verity+encrypted" certainly makes sense, but for /home/
* partitions this gracefully degrades to "encrypted" (as we do not have a concept of verity for
* /home/), and so on. */
PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY = 1 << 0, /* must exist, activate with verity (only applies to root/usr partitions) */
PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED = 1 << 1, /* must exist, activate with signed verity (only applies to root/usr partitions) */
PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED = 1 << 2, /* must exist, activate with LUKS encryption (applies to any data partition, but not to verity/signature partitions */
PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED = 1 << 3, /* must exist, activate without encryption/verity */
PARTITION_POLICY_UNUSED = 1 << 4, /* must exist, don't use */
PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT = 1 << 5, /* must not exist */
PARTITION_POLICY_OPEN = PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|
PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNUSED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT,
PARTITION_POLICY_IGNORE = PARTITION_POLICY_UNUSED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT,
_PARTITION_POLICY_USE_MASK = PARTITION_POLICY_OPEN,
PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY = 1 << 0, /* must exist, activate with verity (only applies to root/usr partitions) */
PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED = 1 << 1, /* must exist, activate with signed verity (only applies to root/usr partitions) */
PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED = 1 << 2, /* must exist, activate with LUKS encryption (applies to any data partition, but not to verity/signature partitions */
PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY = 1 << 3, /* same as PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED but also requires integrity checking */
PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED = 1 << 4, /* must exist, activate without encryption/verity */
PARTITION_POLICY_UNUSED = 1 << 5, /* must exist, don't use */
PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT = 1 << 6, /* must not exist */
PARTITION_POLICY_OPEN = PARTITION_POLICY_VERITY|PARTITION_POLICY_SIGNED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTED|PARTITION_POLICY_ENCRYPTEDWITHINTEGRITY|
PARTITION_POLICY_UNPROTECTED|PARTITION_POLICY_UNUSED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT,
PARTITION_POLICY_IGNORE = PARTITION_POLICY_UNUSED|PARTITION_POLICY_ABSENT,
_PARTITION_POLICY_USE_MASK = PARTITION_POLICY_OPEN,
PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_OFF = 1 << 6, /* State of GPT partition flag "read-only" must be on */
PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_ON = 1 << 7,
_PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_MASK = PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_OFF|PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_ON,
PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_OFF = 1 << 8, /* State of GPT partition flag "growfs" must be on */
PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_ON = 1 << 9,
_PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_MASK = PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_OFF|PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_ON,
_PARTITION_POLICY_PFLAGS_MASK = _PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_MASK|_PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_MASK,
PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_OFF = 1 << 7, /* State of GPT partition flag "read-only" must be on */
PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_ON = 1 << 8,
_PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_MASK = PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_OFF|PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_ON,
PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_OFF = 1 << 9, /* State of GPT partition flag "growfs" must be on */
PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_ON = 1 << 10,
_PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_MASK = PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_OFF|PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_ON,
_PARTITION_POLICY_PFLAGS_MASK = _PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_MASK|_PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_MASK,
_PARTITION_POLICY_MASK = _PARTITION_POLICY_USE_MASK|_PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_MASK|_PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_MASK,
_PARTITION_POLICY_MASK = _PARTITION_POLICY_USE_MASK|_PARTITION_POLICY_READ_ONLY_MASK|_PARTITION_POLICY_GROWFS_MASK,
_PARTITION_POLICY_FLAGS_INVALID = -EINVAL,
_PARTITION_POLICY_FLAGS_ERRNO_MAX = -ERRNO_MAX, /* Ensure the whole errno range fits into this enum */
_PARTITION_POLICY_FLAGS_INVALID = -EINVAL,
_PARTITION_POLICY_FLAGS_ERRNO_MAX = -ERRNO_MAX, /* Ensure the whole errno range fits into this enum */
} PartitionPolicyFlags;
assert_cc((_PARTITION_POLICY_USE_MASK | _PARTITION_POLICY_PFLAGS_MASK) >= 0); /* ensure flags don't collide with errno range */
+2 -2
View File
@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ TEST_RET(test_image_policy_to_string) {
test_policy_equiv("~", image_policy_equiv_deny);
test_policy_equiv("=absent", image_policy_equiv_deny);
test_policy_equiv("=open", image_policy_equiv_allow);
test_policy_equiv("=verity+signed+encrypted+unprotected+unused+absent", image_policy_equiv_allow);
test_policy_equiv("=signed+verity+encrypted+unused+unprotected+absent", image_policy_equiv_allow);
test_policy_equiv("=verity+signed+encrypted+encryptedwithintegrity+unprotected+unused+absent", image_policy_equiv_allow);
test_policy_equiv("=signed+verity+encrypted+encryptedwithintegrity+unused+unprotected+absent", image_policy_equiv_allow);
test_policy_equiv("=ignore", image_policy_equiv_ignore);
test_policy_equiv("=absent+unused", image_policy_equiv_ignore);
test_policy_equiv("=unused+absent", image_policy_equiv_ignore);
+48
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
set -eux
set -o pipefail
defs="$(mktemp --directory "/tmp/test-repart.defs.XXXXXXXXXX")"
imgs="$(mktemp --directory "/var/tmp/test-repart.imgs.XXXXXXXXXX")"
# shellcheck disable=SC2064
trap "rm -rf '$defs' '$imgs'" RETURN
chmod 0755 "$defs"
echo "*** testcase for systemd-dissect and encrypted partitions ***"
tee "$defs/root.conf" <<EOF
[Partition]
Type=root
Format=ext4
Encrypt=key-file
Integrity=off
EOF
systemd-repart --pretty=yes \
--definitions "$defs" \
--empty=create \
--size=100M \
--dry-run=no \
--offline=no \
"$imgs/encint.img"
systemd-dissect --validate --image-policy "root=encrypted" "$imgs/encint.img"
tee "$defs/root.conf" <<EOF
[Partition]
Type=root
Format=ext4
Encrypt=key-file
Integrity=inline
EOF
systemd-repart --pretty=yes \
--definitions "$defs" \
--empty=create \
--size=100M \
--dry-run=no \
--offline=no \
"$imgs/encint_int.img"
systemd-dissect --validate --image-policy "root=encryptedwithintegrity" "$imgs/encint_int.img"
+61
View File
@@ -1838,6 +1838,67 @@ EOF
cmp "$imgs/disk1.img" "$imgs/disk3.img"
}
_test_luks2_integrity() {
local defs imgs output root
if [[ "$OFFLINE" != "no" ]]; then
return 0
fi
defs="$(mktemp --directory "/tmp/test-repart.defs.XXXXXXXXXX")"
imgs="$(mktemp --directory "/var/tmp/test-repart.imgs.XXXXXXXXXX")"
root="$(mktemp --directory "/var/test-repart.root.XXXXXXXXXX")"
# shellcheck disable=SC2064
trap "rm -rf '$defs' '$imgs' '$root'" RETURN
chmod 0755 "$defs"
echo "*** testcase for LUKS2 integrity ***"
tee "$defs/root.conf" <<EOF
[Partition]
Type=root
Format=ext4
Encrypt=key-file
Integrity=inline
EOF
[ -n "$1" ] && echo "IntegrityAlgorithm=$1" >> "$defs/root.conf"
systemd-repart --pretty=yes \
--definitions "$defs" \
--empty=create \
--size=100M \
--seed="$seed" \
--dry-run=no \
--offline=no \
"$imgs/encint.img"
loop="$(losetup -P --show --find "$imgs/encint.img")"
udevadm wait --timeout=60 --settle "${loop:?}p1"
volume="test-repart-luksint-$RANDOM"
dmstatus="$imgs/dmsetup-$RANDOM"
touch "$imgs/empty-password"
# the expectation for hmac-sha256 is 'integrity: hmac(sha256)'
cryptsetup luksDump "${loop}p1" | grep -q "integrity: $(echo "$1" | sed -r 's/^hmac-(.*)$/hmac(\1)/')"
cryptsetup open --type=luks2 --key-file="$imgs/empty-password" "${loop}p1" "$volume"
dmsetup status > "$dmstatus"
cryptsetup close "$volume"
losetup -d "$loop"
# Check that there's a dm-integrity entry
grep -q "$volume""_dif.* integrity " "$dmstatus"
}
testcase_luks2_integrity() {
_test_luks2_integrity ""
_test_luks2_integrity "hmac-sha1"
_test_luks2_integrity "hmac-sha256"
_test_luks2_integrity "hmac-sha512"
}
OFFLINE="yes"
run_testcases
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ check deny no "$name"
# Let's also test the "image-policy" verb
systemd-analyze image-policy '*' 2>&1 | grep -F "Long form: =verity+signed+encrypted+unprotected+unused+absent" >/dev/null
systemd-analyze image-policy '*' 2>&1 | grep -F "Long form: =verity+signed+encrypted+encryptedwithintegrity+unprotected+unused+absent" >/dev/null
systemd-analyze image-policy '-' 2>&1 | grep -F "Long form: =unused+absent" >/dev/null
systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -F "Long form: usr=verity:home=encrypted:=unused+absent" >/dev/null
systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -e '^home \+encrypted \+' >/dev/null