coredump: when %F/pidfd is used, again allow forwarding to containers

This commit is contained in:
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
2025-05-29 00:10:55 +02:00
parent 868d95577e
commit e6a8687b93
+8 -7
View File
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ typedef struct Context {
uint64_t rlimit;
bool is_pid1;
bool is_journald;
bool got_pidfd;
int mount_tree_fd;
/* These point into external memory, are not owned by this object */
@@ -1407,6 +1408,8 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata_from_argv(
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to initialize pidref from pidfd %d: %m", kernel_fd);
context->got_pidfd = 1;
/* If there are containers involved with different versions of the code they might
* not be using pidfds, so it would be wrong to set the metadata, skip it. */
r = pidref_in_same_namespace(/* pid1 = */ NULL, &context->pidref, NAMESPACE_PID);
@@ -1627,13 +1630,11 @@ static int can_forward_coredump(Context *context, const PidRef *pid) {
assert(pidref_is_set(pid));
assert(!pidref_is_remote(pid));
/* We don't use %F/pidfd to pin down the crashed process yet. We need to avoid a situation where the
* attacker crashes a SUID process or a root daemon and quickly replaces it with a namespaced process
* and we forward the initial part of the coredump to the attacker, inside the namespace.
*
* TODO: relax this check when %F is implemented and used.
*/
if (context->dumpable != 1)
/* We need to avoid a situation where the attacker crashes a SUID process or a root daemon and
* quickly replaces it with a namespaced process and we forward the coredump to the attacker, into
* the namespace. With %F/pidfd we can reliably check the namespace of the original process, hence we
* can allow forwarding. */
if (!context->got_pidfd && context->dumpable != 1)
return false;
r = cg_pidref_get_path(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, pid, &cgroup);