core/bpf-firewall: replace bpf_firewall_supported() with bpf_program_supported()

Note, BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB is supported since kernel v4.10, and
BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI and program name is supported since kernel v4.15.
As our baseline on the kernel is v5.4, we can assume that the type,
flag, and naming is supported when bpf_program_supported() succeeds.
This commit is contained in:
Yu Watanabe
2025-05-10 00:17:52 +09:00
parent 22e2f06428
commit ec3c5cfac7
7 changed files with 71 additions and 265 deletions
+23 -169
View File
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ int bpf_firewall_compile(Unit *u) {
bool ip_allow_any = false, ip_deny_any = false;
CGroupContext *cc;
CGroupRuntime *crt;
int r, supported;
int r;
assert(u);
@@ -554,27 +554,12 @@ int bpf_firewall_compile(Unit *u) {
if (!crt)
return -ENOMEM;
supported = bpf_firewall_supported();
if (supported < 0)
return supported;
if (supported == BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED)
if (bpf_program_supported() <= 0)
return log_unit_debug_errno(u, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"bpf-firewall: BPF firewalling not supported, proceeding without.");
if (supported != BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED_WITH_MULTI && u->type == UNIT_SLICE)
/* If BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI is not supported we don't support any BPF magic on inner nodes (i.e. on slice
* units), since that would mean leaf nodes couldn't do any BPF anymore at all. Under the assumption
* that BPF is more interesting on leaf nodes we hence avoid it on inner nodes in that case. This is
* consistent with old systemd behaviour from before v238, where BPF wasn't supported in inner nodes at
* all, either. */
return log_unit_debug_errno(u, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"bpf-firewall: BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI is not supported, not doing BPF firewall on slice units.");
/* If BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI flag is supported program name is also supported (both were added to v4.15
* kernel). */
if (supported == BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED_WITH_MULTI) {
ingress_name = "sd_fw_ingress";
egress_name = "sd_fw_egress";
}
ingress_name = "sd_fw_ingress";
egress_name = "sd_fw_egress";
/* Note that when we compile a new firewall we first flush out the access maps and the BPF programs themselves,
* but we reuse the accounting maps. That way the firewall in effect always maps to the actual
@@ -646,7 +631,7 @@ static int load_bpf_progs_from_fs_to_set(Unit *u, char **filter_paths, Set **set
int bpf_firewall_load_custom(Unit *u) {
CGroupContext *cc;
CGroupRuntime *crt;
int r, supported;
int r;
assert(u);
@@ -660,13 +645,9 @@ int bpf_firewall_load_custom(Unit *u) {
if (!(cc->ip_filters_ingress || cc->ip_filters_egress))
return 0;
supported = bpf_firewall_supported();
if (supported < 0)
return supported;
if (supported != BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED_WITH_MULTI)
if (bpf_program_supported() <= 0)
return log_unit_debug_errno(u, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"bpf-firewall: BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI not supported, cannot attach custom BPF programs.");
"bpf-firewall: BPF firewalling not supported, cannot attach custom BPF programs.");
r = load_bpf_progs_from_fs_to_set(u, cc->ip_filters_ingress, &crt->ip_bpf_custom_ingress);
if (r < 0)
@@ -702,8 +683,7 @@ int bpf_firewall_install(Unit *u) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
CGroupContext *cc;
CGroupRuntime *crt;
int r, supported;
uint32_t flags;
int r;
assert(u);
@@ -718,43 +698,23 @@ int bpf_firewall_install(Unit *u) {
if (!crt->cgroup_realized)
return -EINVAL;
supported = bpf_firewall_supported();
if (supported < 0)
return supported;
if (supported == BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED)
if (bpf_program_supported() <= 0)
return log_unit_debug_errno(u, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"bpf-firewall: BPF firewalling not supported, proceeding without.");
if (supported != BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED_WITH_MULTI && u->type == UNIT_SLICE)
return log_unit_debug_errno(u, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"bpf-firewall: BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI not supported, not doing BPF firewall on slice units.");
if (supported != BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED_WITH_MULTI &&
(!set_isempty(crt->ip_bpf_custom_ingress) || !set_isempty(crt->ip_bpf_custom_egress)))
return log_unit_debug_errno(u, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"bpf-firewall: BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI not supported, cannot attach custom BPF programs.");
r = cg_get_path(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, crt->cgroup_path, NULL, &path);
if (r < 0)
return log_unit_error_errno(u, r, "bpf-firewall: Failed to determine cgroup path: %m");
flags = supported == BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED_WITH_MULTI ? BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI : 0;
if (FLAGS_SET(flags, BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI)) {
/* If we have BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI, then let's clear the fields, but destroy the programs only
* after attaching the new programs, so that there's no time window where neither program is
* attached. (There will be a program where both are attached, but that's OK, since this is a
* security feature where we rather want to lock down too much than too little */
ip_bpf_egress_uninstall = TAKE_PTR(crt->ip_bpf_egress_installed);
ip_bpf_ingress_uninstall = TAKE_PTR(crt->ip_bpf_ingress_installed);
} else {
/* If we don't have BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI then unref the old BPF programs (which will implicitly
* detach them) right before attaching the new program, to minimize the time window when we
* don't account for IP traffic. */
crt->ip_bpf_egress_installed = bpf_program_free(crt->ip_bpf_egress_installed);
crt->ip_bpf_ingress_installed = bpf_program_free(crt->ip_bpf_ingress_installed);
}
/* Let's clear the fields, but destroy the programs only after attaching the new programs, so that
* there's no time window where neither program is attached. (There will be a program where both are
* attached, but that's OK, since this is a security feature where we rather want to lock down too
* much than too little. */
ip_bpf_egress_uninstall = TAKE_PTR(crt->ip_bpf_egress_installed);
ip_bpf_ingress_uninstall = TAKE_PTR(crt->ip_bpf_ingress_installed);
if (crt->ip_bpf_egress) {
r = bpf_program_cgroup_attach(crt->ip_bpf_egress, BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS, path, flags);
r = bpf_program_cgroup_attach(crt->ip_bpf_egress, BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS, path, BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI);
if (r < 0)
return log_unit_error_errno(u, r,
"bpf-firewall: Attaching egress BPF program to cgroup %s failed: %m", path);
@@ -764,7 +724,7 @@ int bpf_firewall_install(Unit *u) {
}
if (crt->ip_bpf_ingress) {
r = bpf_program_cgroup_attach(crt->ip_bpf_ingress, BPF_CGROUP_INET_INGRESS, path, flags);
r = bpf_program_cgroup_attach(crt->ip_bpf_ingress, BPF_CGROUP_INET_INGRESS, path, BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI);
if (r < 0)
return log_unit_error_errno(u, r,
"bpf-firewall: Attaching ingress BPF program to cgroup %s failed: %m", path);
@@ -830,118 +790,9 @@ int bpf_firewall_reset_accounting(int map_fd) {
return bpf_map_update_element(map_fd, &key, &value);
}
static int bpf_firewall_unsupported_reason = 0;
int bpf_firewall_supported(void) {
const struct bpf_insn trivial[] = {
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN()
};
_cleanup_(bpf_program_freep) BPFProgram *program = NULL;
static int supported = -1;
union bpf_attr attr;
int r;
/* Checks whether BPF firewalling is supported. For this, we check the following things:
*
* - the BPF implementation in the kernel supports BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB programs, which we require
* - the BPF implementation in the kernel supports the BPF_PROG_DETACH call, which we require
*/
if (supported >= 0)
return supported;
/* prog_name is NULL since it is supported only starting from v4.15 kernel. */
r = bpf_program_new(BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, NULL, &program);
if (r < 0) {
bpf_firewall_unsupported_reason =
log_debug_errno(r, "bpf-firewall: Can't allocate CGROUP SKB BPF program, BPF firewalling is not supported: %m");
return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED;
}
r = bpf_program_add_instructions(program, trivial, ELEMENTSOF(trivial));
if (r < 0) {
bpf_firewall_unsupported_reason =
log_debug_errno(r, "bpf-firewall: Can't add trivial instructions to CGROUP SKB BPF program, BPF firewalling is not supported: %m");
return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED;
}
r = bpf_program_load_kernel(program, NULL, 0);
if (r < 0) {
bpf_firewall_unsupported_reason =
log_debug_errno(r, "bpf-firewall: Can't load kernel CGROUP SKB BPF program, BPF firewalling is not supported: %m");
return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED;
}
/* Unfortunately the kernel allows us to create BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB programs even when CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF
* is turned off at kernel compilation time. This sucks of course: why does it allow us to create a cgroup BPF
* program if we can't do a thing with it later?
*
* We detect this case by issuing the BPF_PROG_DETACH bpf() call with invalid file descriptors: if
* CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF is turned off, then the call will fail early with EINVAL. If it is turned on the
* parameters are validated however, and that'll fail with EBADF then. */
// FIXME: Clang doesn't 0-pad with structured initialization, causing
// the kernel to reject the bpf_attr as invalid. See:
// https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/v5.9/kernel/bpf/syscall.c#L65
// Ideally it should behave like GCC, so that we can remove these workarounds.
zero(attr);
attr.attach_type = BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS;
attr.target_fd = -EBADF;
attr.attach_bpf_fd = -EBADF;
if (bpf(BPF_PROG_DETACH, &attr, sizeof(attr)) < 0) {
if (errno != EBADF) {
bpf_firewall_unsupported_reason =
log_debug_errno(errno, "bpf-firewall: Didn't get EBADF from BPF_PROG_DETACH, BPF firewalling is not supported: %m");
return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED;
}
/* YAY! */
} else {
bpf_firewall_unsupported_reason =
log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADE),
"bpf-firewall: Wut? Kernel accepted our invalid BPF_PROG_DETACH call? "
"Something is weird, assuming BPF firewalling is broken and hence not supported.");
return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED;
}
/* So now we know that the BPF program is generally available, let's see if BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI is also supported
* (which was added in kernel 4.15). We use a similar logic as before, but this time we use the BPF_PROG_ATTACH
* bpf() call and the BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI flags value. Since the flags are checked early in the system call we'll
* get EINVAL if it's not supported, and EBADF as before if it is available.
* Use probe result as the indicator that program name is also supported since they both were
* added in kernel 4.15. */
zero(attr);
attr.attach_type = BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS;
attr.target_fd = -EBADF;
attr.attach_bpf_fd = -EBADF;
attr.attach_flags = BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI;
if (bpf(BPF_PROG_ATTACH, &attr, sizeof(attr)) < 0) {
if (errno == EBADF) {
log_debug_errno(errno, "bpf-firewall: Got EBADF when using BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI, which indicates it is supported. Yay!");
return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED_WITH_MULTI;
}
if (errno == EINVAL)
log_debug_errno(errno, "bpf-firewall: Got EINVAL error when using BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI, which indicates it's not supported.");
else
log_debug_errno(errno, "bpf-firewall: Got unexpected error when using BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI, assuming it's not supported: %m");
return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED;
} else {
bpf_firewall_unsupported_reason =
log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADE),
"bpf-firewall: Wut? Kernel accepted our invalid BPF_PROG_ATTACH+BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI call? "
"Something is weird, assuming BPF firewalling is broken and hence not supported.");
return supported = BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED;
}
}
void emit_bpf_firewall_warning(Unit *u) {
static bool warned = false;
int r;
assert(u);
assert(u->manager);
@@ -949,9 +800,12 @@ void emit_bpf_firewall_warning(Unit *u) {
if (warned || MANAGER_IS_TEST_RUN(u->manager))
return;
bool quiet = ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(bpf_firewall_unsupported_reason) && detect_container() > 0;
r = bpf_program_supported();
assert(r < 0);
log_unit_full_errno(u, quiet ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, bpf_firewall_unsupported_reason,
bool quiet = ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r) && detect_container() > 0;
log_unit_full_errno(u, quiet ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, r,
"unit configures an IP firewall, but %s.\n"
"(This warning is only shown for the first unit using IP firewalling.)",
getuid() != 0 ? "not running as root" :
-8
View File
@@ -6,14 +6,6 @@
#include "cgroup.h"
#include "unit.h"
enum {
BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED = 0,
BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED = 1,
BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED_WITH_MULTI = 2,
};
int bpf_firewall_supported(void);
int bpf_firewall_compile(Unit *u);
int bpf_firewall_install(Unit *u);
int bpf_firewall_load_custom(Unit *u);
+4 -10
View File
@@ -3259,12 +3259,10 @@ static int cg_bpf_mask_supported(CGroupMask *ret) {
CGroupMask mask = 0;
int r;
/* BPF-based firewall */
r = bpf_firewall_supported();
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
mask |= CGROUP_MASK_BPF_FIREWALL;
/* BPF-based firewall and pinned foreign prog */
if (bpf_program_supported() > 0)
mask |= CGROUP_MASK_BPF_FIREWALL |
CGROUP_MASK_BPF_FOREIGN;
/* BPF-based device access control */
r = bpf_devices_supported();
@@ -3273,10 +3271,6 @@ static int cg_bpf_mask_supported(CGroupMask *ret) {
if (r > 0)
mask |= CGROUP_MASK_BPF_DEVICES;
/* BPF pinned prog */
if (bpf_program_supported() > 0)
mask |= CGROUP_MASK_BPF_FOREIGN;
/* BPF-based bind{4|6} hooks */
r = bpf_socket_bind_supported();
if (r < 0)
+6 -11
View File
@@ -635,18 +635,13 @@ static int bus_cgroup_set_transient_property(
unit_write_setting(u, flags, name, buf);
if (*filters) {
r = bpf_firewall_supported();
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r != BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED_WITH_MULTI) {
static bool warned = false;
if (*filters && bpf_program_supported() <= 0) {
static bool warned = false;
log_full(warned ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING,
"Transient unit %s configures an IP firewall with BPF, but the local system does not support BPF/cgroup firewalling with multiple filters.\n"
"Starting this unit will fail! (This warning is only shown for the first started transient unit using IP firewalling.)", u->id);
warned = true;
}
log_full(warned ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING,
"Transient unit %s configures an IP firewall with BPF, but the local system does not support BPF/cgroup firewalling with multiple filters.\n"
"Starting this unit will fail! (This warning is only shown for the first started transient unit using IP firewalling.)", u->id);
warned = true;
}
}
+4 -7
View File
@@ -5712,15 +5712,12 @@ int config_parse_ip_filter_bpf_progs(
if (r < 0)
return log_oom();
r = bpf_firewall_supported();
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r != BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED_WITH_MULTI) {
if (bpf_program_supported() <= 0) {
static bool warned = false;
log_full(warned ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING,
"File %s:%u configures an IP firewall with BPF programs (%s=%s), but the local system does not support BPF/cgroup based firewalling with multiple filters.\n"
"Starting this unit will fail! (This warning is only shown for the first loaded unit using IP firewalling.)", filename, line, lvalue, rvalue);
log_syntax(unit, warned ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, filename, line, 0,
"Configures an IP firewall with BPF programs (%s=%s), but the local system does not support BPF/cgroup based firewalling with multiple filters. "
"Starting this unit will fail! (This warning is only shown for the first loaded unit using IP firewalling.)", lvalue, rvalue);
warned = true;
}
+6 -18
View File
@@ -1477,9 +1477,7 @@ static int socket_address_listen_do(
log_unit_error_errno(u, error, fmt, strna(_t)); \
})
static int fork_needed(const SocketAddress *address, Socket *s) {
int r;
static bool fork_needed(const SocketAddress *address, Socket *s) {
assert(address);
assert(s);
@@ -1493,13 +1491,9 @@ static int fork_needed(const SocketAddress *address, Socket *s) {
if (nft_set->source == NFT_SET_SOURCE_CGROUP)
return true;
if (IN_SET(address->sockaddr.sa.sa_family, AF_INET, AF_INET6)) {
r = bpf_firewall_supported();
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r != BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED) /* If BPF firewalling isn't supported anyway — there's no point in this forking complexity */
return true;
}
if (IN_SET(address->sockaddr.sa.sa_family, AF_INET, AF_INET6) &&
bpf_program_supported() > 0) /* If BPF firewalling isn't supported anyway — there's no point in this forking complexity */
return true;
return exec_needs_network_namespace(&s->exec_context);
}
@@ -1521,10 +1515,7 @@ static int socket_address_listen_in_cgroup(
* the socket is actually properly attached to the unit's cgroup for the purpose of BPF filtering and
* such. */
r = fork_needed(address, s);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0) {
if (!fork_needed(address, s)) {
/* Shortcut things... */
fd = socket_address_listen_do(s, address, label);
if (fd < 0)
@@ -3030,10 +3021,7 @@ static int socket_accept_in_cgroup(Socket *s, SocketPort *p, int fd) {
if (!IN_SET(p->address.sockaddr.sa.sa_family, AF_INET, AF_INET6))
goto shortcut;
r = bpf_firewall_supported();
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED)
if (bpf_program_supported() <= 0)
goto shortcut;
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, pair) < 0)
+28 -42
View File
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
struct rlimit rl;
int r;
union bpf_attr attr;
bool test_custom_filter = false;
const char *test_prog = "/sys/fs/bpf/test-dropper";
test_setup_logging(LOG_DEBUG);
@@ -39,6 +38,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (detect_container() > 0)
return log_tests_skipped("test-bpf-firewall fails inside LXC and Docker containers: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/9666");
r = bpf_program_supported();
if (r < 0)
return log_tests_skipped_errno(r, "BPF firewalling not supported");
ASSERT_TRUE(r);
ASSERT_OK(getrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &rl));
rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max = MAX(rl.rlim_max, CAN_MEMLOCK_SIZE);
(void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &rl);
@@ -65,34 +69,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
r = bpf_program_add_instructions(p, exit_insn, ELEMENTSOF(exit_insn));
ASSERT_EQ(r, 0);
r = bpf_firewall_supported();
if (r == BPF_FIREWALL_UNSUPPORTED)
return log_tests_skipped("BPF firewalling not supported");
ASSERT_GT(r, 0);
if (r == BPF_FIREWALL_SUPPORTED_WITH_MULTI) {
log_notice("BPF firewalling with BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI supported. Yay!");
test_custom_filter = true;
} else
log_notice("BPF firewalling (though without BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI) supported. Good.");
r = bpf_program_load_kernel(p, log_buf, ELEMENTSOF(log_buf));
ASSERT_OK(r);
if (test_custom_filter) {
zero(attr);
attr.pathname = PTR_TO_UINT64(test_prog);
attr.bpf_fd = p->kernel_fd;
attr.file_flags = 0;
zero(attr);
attr.pathname = PTR_TO_UINT64(test_prog);
attr.bpf_fd = p->kernel_fd;
attr.file_flags = 0;
(void) unlink(test_prog);
(void) unlink(test_prog);
r = bpf(BPF_OBJ_PIN, &attr, sizeof(attr));
if (r < 0) {
log_warning_errno(errno, "BPF object pinning failed, will not run custom filter test: %m");
test_custom_filter = false;
}
}
ASSERT_OK(bpf(BPF_OBJ_PIN, &attr, sizeof(attr)));
p = bpf_program_free(p);
@@ -192,31 +179,30 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
assert_se(SERVICE(u)->exec_command[SERVICE_EXEC_START]->command_next->exec_status.code != CLD_EXITED ||
SERVICE(u)->exec_command[SERVICE_EXEC_START]->command_next->exec_status.status != EXIT_SUCCESS);
if (test_custom_filter) {
assert_se(u = unit_new(m, sizeof(Service)));
assert_se(unit_add_name(u, "custom-filter.service") == 0);
assert_se(cc = unit_get_cgroup_context(u));
u->perpetual = true;
/* testing custom filter */
assert_se(u = unit_new(m, sizeof(Service)));
assert_se(unit_add_name(u, "custom-filter.service") == 0);
assert_se(cc = unit_get_cgroup_context(u));
u->perpetual = true;
cc->ip_accounting = true;
cc->ip_accounting = true;
assert_se(config_parse_ip_filter_bpf_progs(u->id, "filename", 1, "Service", 1, "IPIngressFilterPath", 0, test_prog, &cc->ip_filters_ingress, u) == 0);
assert_se(config_parse_exec(u->id, "filename", 1, "Service", 1, "ExecStart", SERVICE_EXEC_START, "-/bin/ping -c 1 127.0.0.1 -W 5", SERVICE(u)->exec_command, u) == 0);
assert_se(config_parse_ip_filter_bpf_progs(u->id, "filename", 1, "Service", 1, "IPIngressFilterPath", 0, test_prog, &cc->ip_filters_ingress, u) == 0);
assert_se(config_parse_exec(u->id, "filename", 1, "Service", 1, "ExecStart", SERVICE_EXEC_START, "-/bin/ping -c 1 127.0.0.1 -W 5", SERVICE(u)->exec_command, u) == 0);
SERVICE(u)->type = SERVICE_ONESHOT;
u->load_state = UNIT_LOADED;
SERVICE(u)->type = SERVICE_ONESHOT;
u->load_state = UNIT_LOADED;
ASSERT_OK(unit_start(u, NULL));
ASSERT_OK(unit_start(u, NULL));
while (!IN_SET(SERVICE(u)->state, SERVICE_DEAD, SERVICE_FAILED))
assert_se(sd_event_run(m->event, UINT64_MAX) >= 0);
while (!IN_SET(SERVICE(u)->state, SERVICE_DEAD, SERVICE_FAILED))
assert_se(sd_event_run(m->event, UINT64_MAX) >= 0);
assert_se(SERVICE(u)->exec_command[SERVICE_EXEC_START]->exec_status.code != CLD_EXITED ||
SERVICE(u)->exec_command[SERVICE_EXEC_START]->exec_status.status != EXIT_SUCCESS);
assert_se(SERVICE(u)->exec_command[SERVICE_EXEC_START]->exec_status.code != CLD_EXITED ||
SERVICE(u)->exec_command[SERVICE_EXEC_START]->exec_status.status != EXIT_SUCCESS);
(void) unlink(test_prog);
assert_se(SERVICE(u)->state == SERVICE_DEAD);
}
(void) unlink(test_prog);
assert_se(SERVICE(u)->state == SERVICE_DEAD);
return 0;
}