fd-util: cover some corner cases with fd_reopen() on symlinks
The /proc/self/fd/ interface cannot be used to follow symlinks pinned via O_PATH. Add a comment + test for that. Moreover, using fd_reopen() with O_NOFOLLOW cannot work. Add an explicit check and test for that, to make behaviour uniform.
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-1
@@ -753,7 +753,20 @@ int fd_reopen(int fd, int flags) {
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*
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* This implicitly resets the file read index to 0.
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*
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* If AT_FDCWD is specified as file descriptor gets an fd to the current cwd */
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* If AT_FDCWD is specified as file descriptor gets an fd to the current cwd.
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*
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* If the specified file descriptor refers to a symlink via O_PATH, then this function cannot be used
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* to follow that symlink. Because we cannot have non-O_PATH fds to symlinks reopening it without
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* O_PATH will always result in -ELOOP. Or in other words: if you have an O_PATH fd to a symlink you
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* can reopen it only if you pass O_PATH again. */
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if (FLAGS_SET(flags, O_NOFOLLOW))
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/* O_NOFOLLOW is not allowed in fd_reopen(), because after all this is primarily implemented
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* via a symlink-based interface in /proc/self/fd. Let's refuse this here early. Note that
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* the kernel would generate ELOOP here too, hence this manual check is mostly redundant –
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* the only reason we add it here is so that the O_DIRECTORY special case (see below) behaves
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* the same way as the non-O_DIRECTORY case. */
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return -ELOOP;
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if (FLAGS_SET(flags, O_DIRECTORY) || fd == AT_FDCWD) {
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/* If we shall reopen the fd as directory we can just go via "." and thus bypass the whole
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@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
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#include "rm-rf.h"
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#include "seccomp-util.h"
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#include "serialize.h"
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#include "stat-util.h"
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#include "string-util.h"
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#include "tests.h"
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#include "tmpfile-util.h"
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@@ -410,6 +411,10 @@ TEST(fd_reopen) {
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assert_se(FLAGS_SET(fl, O_DIRECTORY));
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assert_se(FLAGS_SET(fl, O_PATH));
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/* fd_reopen() with O_NOFOLLOW will systematically fail, since it is implemented via a symlink in /proc/self/fd/ */
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assert_se(fd_reopen(fd1, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW) == -ELOOP);
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assert_se(fd_reopen(fd1, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW) == -ELOOP);
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fd2 = fd_reopen(fd1, O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC); /* drop the O_PATH */
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assert_se(fd2 >= 0);
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@@ -486,6 +491,23 @@ TEST(fd_reopen) {
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safe_close(fd1);
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assert_se(fd_reopen(fd1, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) == -EBADF);
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fd1 = -EBADF;
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/* Validate what happens if we reopen a symlink */
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fd1 = open("/proc/self", O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW);
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assert_se(fd1 >= 0);
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assert_se(fstat(fd1, &st1) >= 0);
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assert_se(S_ISLNK(st1.st_mode));
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fd2 = fd_reopen(fd1, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC);
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assert_se(fd2 >= 0);
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assert_se(fstat(fd2, &st2) >= 0);
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assert_se(S_ISLNK(st2.st_mode));
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assert_se(stat_inode_same(&st1, &st2));
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fd2 = safe_close(fd2);
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/* So here's the thing: if we have an O_PATH fd to a symlink, we *cannot* convert it to a regular fd
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* with that. i.e. you cannot have the VFS follow a symlink pinned via an O_PATH fd. */
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assert_se(fd_reopen(fd1, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) == -ELOOP);
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}
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TEST(fd_reopen_condition) {
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