When LOOP_CONFIGURE fail, then it is not necessary to call it on any
later call of loop_configure(). Let's save the flag in a static variable
in the function.
In a couple of recent CI runs I noticed TEST-36 failing due to a missed
service exit notification and a subsequent fail of the `grep` command:
```
[ 257.112153] H systemd[1]: Started numa-test.service.
[ 257.114343] H systemd[899]: numa-test.service: Failed to set NUMA memory policy: Invalid argument
[ 257.118270] H systemd[899]: numa-test.service: Failed at step NUMA_POLICY spawning /bin/sleep: Invalid argument
[ 257.126170] H systemd[1]: Bus private-bus-connection: changing state RUNNING → CLOSING
[ 257.130290] H systemd[1]: numa-test.service: Failed to send unit change signal for numa-test.service: Connection reset by peer
[ 257.131567] H systemd[1]: Received SIGCHLD from PID 899 ((sleep)).
[ 257.132870] H systemd[1]: Got disconnect on private connection.
[ 257.134299] H systemd[1]: systemd-journald.service: Got notification message from PID 498 (FDSTORE=1)
[ 257.135611] H systemd[1]: systemd-journald.service: Added fd 38 (n/a) to fd store.
[ 257.136999] H systemd[1]: systemd-journald.service: Received EPOLLHUP on stored fd 38 (stored), closing.
[ 257.366996] H testsuite-36.sh[536]: + stopJournalctl
[ 257.366996] H testsuite-36.sh[536]: + local unit=init.scope
[ 257.366996] H testsuite-36.sh[536]: + echo 'Force journald to write all queued messages'
[ 257.366996] H testsuite-36.sh[536]: Force journald to write all queued messages
[ 257.366996] H testsuite-36.sh[536]: + journalctl --sync
[ 257.488642] H systemd-journald[498]: Received client request to rotate journal.
[ 257.520821] H testsuite-36.sh[536]: + journalctl -u init.scope --cursor-file=jounalCursorFile
[ 257.981399] H testsuite-36.sh[536]: + pid1StopUnit numa-test.service
[ 257.984533] H testsuite-36.sh[536]: + systemctl stop numa-test.service
[ 258.173656] H systemd[1]: Bus private-bus-connection: changing state AUTHENTICATING → RUNNING
[ 258.180710] H systemd[1]: numa-test.service: Trying to enqueue job numa-test.service/stop/replace
[ 258.182424] H systemd[1]: Added job numa-test.service/stop to transaction.
[ 258.185234] H systemd[1]: numa-test.service: Installed new job numa-test.service/stop as 738
[ 258.187017] H systemd[1]: numa-test.service: Enqueued job numa-test.service/stop as 738
[ 258.239930] H testsuite-36.sh[536]: + grep 'numa-test.service: Main process exited, code=exited, status=242/NUMA' journal.log
```
Let's mitigate this by checking the test service exit status directly
instead of relying on the notification.
This splits out the JSON parser used by the systemd-cryptsetup code.
This is preparation for later work to reuse it in the tpm2 cryptsetup
token module, which currently uses a separate but very similar parser
for the same data.
No change in behaviour.
Traditionally, TPM2 PCR policies are bound against literal PCR values,
which makes them hard to work with when updating software that is
measured into PCRs: each update will change the PCR values, and thus
break TPM2 policies of existing objects.
Let's improve the situation: let's allow signed PCR policies. Secrets
and other TPM2 objects can be associated with a public key that signs a
PCR policy. Thus, if the signed policy and the public key is presented,
access to the TPM2 object can be granted. This allows a less brittle
handling of updates: for example, whenever a kernel image is updated a
new signed PCR policy can be shipped along with it, signed by a private
key owned by the kernel vendor (ideally: same private key that is used
to sign the kernel image itself). TPM2 objects can then be bound to the
associated public key, thus allowing objects that can only be unlocked
by kernels of the same vendor. This makes it very easy to update kernels
without affecting locked secrets.
This does not hook up any of the consuming code (just passes NULL/0
everywhere). This is for later commits.
Let's not output a title line given that we don't output multiple
different things here anyway, and the "bootctl list" command is about
listing boot entries anyway and it's documented that way.
Having titles for sections if we have mutliple sections of output
definitely makes sense, but if there's only one kind of information we
list it's redundant clutter.
Let's better be safe than sorry, and follow symlinks in ESP + XBOOTLDR
via chase_symlinks() relative to the root of these files systems. This is
not a big issue given that ESP/XBOOTLDR are supposed to be VFAT where
symlinks don't exist, but the specs don't strictly require this, and by
loading efifs drivers in uefi it would be possible to support symlinks,
but we'd rather not have that here.
No real change in behaviour, just stricter rules to make me sleep better
at night.
Currently, the tpm2 support will use encrypted sessions by creating a
primary key that is used to encrypt traffic. This creates a problem as
the key created for encrypting the traffic could be faked by an active
interposer on the bus. In cases when a pin is used, we can introduce the
bind key. The pin is used as the auth value for the seal key, aka the
disk encryption key, and that auth value can be used in the session
establishment. An attacker would need the pin value to create the secure
session and thus an active interposer without the pin could not
interpose on TPM traffic.
Related-to: #22637
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
This commit adds a new Verity= setting to repart definition files
with two possible values: "data" and "hash".
If Verity= is set to "data", repart works as before, and populates
the partition with the content from CopyBlocks= or CopyFiles=.
If Verity= is set to "hash", repart will try to find a matching
data partition with Verity=data and equal values for CopyBlocks=
or CopyFiles=, Format= and MakeDirectories=. If a matching data
partition is found, repart will generate verity hashes for that
data partition in the verity partition. The UUID of the data
partition is set to the first 128 bits of the verity root hash. The
UUID of the hashes partition is set to the final 128 bits of the
verity root hash.
Fixes#24559
Let's return ENOSYS if /proc/ is not mounted (as that's what we usually
return in that case in various helpers that operate on /proc/). Return
EOPNOTSUPP if the kernel simply doesn't support userns.
Currently, dissect_image() is only called through dissect_loop_device(),
and the LoopDevice object has device name. Hence, it is not necessary to
get device name in dissect_image().
Yu Watanabe
Frantisek Sumsal
Lennart Poettering
Guillaume W. Bres
Luca Boccassi
William Roberts
Daan De Meyer