Ensure bogus inputs are cleanly rejected. These are privileged
interfaces so in practice it's not a problem.
Reported on yeswehack.com as YWH-PGM9780-168
Follow-up for bf2c741fd7
The default coreutils in Ubuntu 26.04 moved to uutils, which is broken
in many subtle and annoying ways, breaking various tests. It's also
a giant monolithic megabinary which makes the minimal image size
go up and break other tests.
Force the gnu coreutils to be pulled in all images.
Ubuntu is doing shenanigans with their coreutils so they are now
symlinks instead of binaries, so the grep fails. Check bash instead
to fix test failure on 26.04.
'kexec -e' is just a small wrapper that does the xen hypercall
on xen, or otherwise just calls reboot(). Drop the dependency,
and reuse the existing xen hypercall helper.
This is a followup for https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/41096
that makes more subsystems pass the new `check-pointer-deref` coccinelle
checks. See the individual commits.
My plan is to do a few more of these PRs until we have it all covered. I
could also do it in a single very big PR but I'm worried about a)
conflicts b) that its just too big/annoying to review. Only 7 dirs left
but some (like src/basic) are quite big (~50k loc) so those PRs will be
a bit bigger.
Align find_ovmf_config() with mkosi's find_ovmf_firmware() by adding
checks that were previously missing:
- Filter on interface-types, only selecting UEFI firmware definitions.
Previously non-UEFI (e.g. BIOS-only) firmware could be selected.
- Check machine type compatibility using substring matching against the
target machine patterns in firmware descriptions (e.g. "q35" matches
"pc-q35-*"), following the same approach as mkosi.
- Make nvram-template optional in the firmware JSON mapping. Firmware
definitions without an nvram-template are now parsed successfully
(with vars remaining NULL) rather than failing entirely.
Also rework the firmware target parsing to store both architecture and
machine arrays per target (instead of just a flat architecture list),
and extract the machine matching into firmware_data_matches_machine().
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
It's useful to be able to check what firmware description vmspawn
will select. In particular, this will allow me to figure out the
nvram template file that will be picked up so I can pick it up in
mkosi and operate on it to pass a modified version of it to vmspawn
with --efi-nvram-template=.
Add --efi-nvram-template=PATH to specify a custom firmware variables
file to copy and use as the initial EFI NVRAM state instead of the
default template from the firmware definition.
Add --firmware-features=FEATURE[,FEATURE...] to require or exclude
specific firmware features during automatic firmware discovery.
Features prefixed with "!" are excluded. If a feature appears in both
the included and excluded lists, inclusion takes priority. Firmware
with the "enrolled-keys" feature is excluded by default.
Refactor --secure-boot= to operate on the firmware features sets
instead of maintaining a separate tristate. --secure-boot=yes adds
"secure-boot" to the include set, --secure-boot=no adds it to the
exclude set, and --secure-boot=auto removes it from both.
Generalize find_ovmf_config() to accept include/exclude feature sets
instead of a secure boot tristate, removing the special-cased
enrolled-keys and secure-boot filtering logic.
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
It's a very common case (vfat...), and it's just too much noise. After
all the whole function exists primarily to deal with O_TMPFILE not being
availeble everywhere...
* 23ef56be00 Install new files for upstream build
* 98645a89ba Install new files for upstream build
* dc2dd78cc0 Install new files for upstream build
* aad316ec34 Drop wildcards, dh_exec does not suppor them for manpages
* 3bf8703dab Install new files for upstream build
* d1e92a6493 Update changelog for 260.1-1 release
* e7a80fe2b8 Install basic.conf in sd-standalone-sysusers package
* 48f796240e Add lpadmin group to basic.conf sysusers.d as requested by CUPS maintainer
* c15703b8aa Update changelog for 260-1 release
* f26cc52a43 Drop version from libselinux-dev dependency
* 7f3701ae2f Do not run "systemctl enable getty@.service" unconditionally
* ec59ddd832 Switch from libselinux1-dev to libselinux-dev
* 35258cd599 Update changelog for 260~rc4-1 release
* eb194c22ff Update changelog for 260~rc3-1 release
* a6878815d6 Really enable getty@ via packaging scriptlets
A malformed image can cause a division by zero, check that
the parameters are not zero.
Reported on yeswehackl.com as YWH-PGM9780-173
Follow-up for 0fa2cac4f0
For some of the directories it makes more sense to keep them
excluded from the coccinelle check. Specifically:
- libc: compatibility, no asserts or systemd headers yet
- test: uses NUL internally to test crashes etc
Our coccinelle/check-pointer-deref.cocci checker has a special
case for `assert(pidref_is_set(param))`. It turns out we can
generalize this and catch the following:
- iovec_is_set
- sd_dhcp_duid_is_set
- sd_dhcp_client_id_is_set
This corrects sorting of menu entries regarding profile numbers:
1. If the profile number is unset, let's treat this identical to profile
0, when ordering stuff, because an item with no profile is
conceptually the same as an item with only a profile 0.
2. Let's take the profile number into account also if sort keys are
used. This was makes profiles work sensibly in type 1 entries, via
the recently added "profile" stanza.
Follow-up for: 5fb90fa319
When showing the list of menu entries via "p", the "internal call:"
field was showing nonsense, since
fb6cf4bbb7.
Fix that by adding a proper entry type for "internal" menu items such as
reboot/firmware/poweroff, and then check for that.
With this in place all entries now have a loader type that makes sense
and describes precisely what an entry is about.
Inspired by the discussion in #41161.
Also change the order of flags to be more logical. First the option
to specify at what fields we look, then the option to specify how we
return their name, the the value, and finally what to do if the value
is missing.
The fix in 8f1751a111 made me wonder if we could automatically detect
when pointers are accessed but when this might not be safe. Systemd
is already using a lot of `assert(dst)` and this change now forces
us to use them.
So this commit (ab)uses coccinelle to flag any pointer parameter
dereference not preceded by assert(param), ASSERT_PTR(param), or an
explicit NULL check. It adds integration into meson as a new "coccinelle"
test suite (just like clang-tidy) and is run in CI. The check is not
perfect but seems a reasonable heuristic.
For this RFC commit it is scoped to a subset, it excludes 25 dirs right
now and includes around 100. About 300 warnings left. Busywork that I am
happy to do if there is agreement that it is worth it.
With this in place we would have caught the bug from 8f1751a111 in CI:
```
FAIL: check-pointer-deref.cocci found issues in systemd/src/boot:
diff -u -p systemd/src/boot/measure.c /tmp/nothing/measure.c
--- systemd/src/boot/measure.c
+++ /tmp/nothing/measure.c
@@ -312,7 +312,6 @@ EFI_STATUS tpm_log_tagged_event(
if (err != EFI_SUCCESS)
return err;
- *ret_measured = true;
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
```
This also adds a new POINTER_MAY_BE_NULL() for the cases when the
called function will do the NULL check (like `iovec_is_set()`).
Enabling locking by default would constitute a major footgun and
compatibility break on upgrades. This functionality is useful, but it
requires the rest of the system to be "ported" to use systemd-imds
first. The user or distro should opt in to "locked" mode only after
doing the integration work.
When doing large refactors or large changes the bot spams
labels left and right, making the PR unreadable. Use the
new option to limit the bot to a max of 5 file-based
labels. If more than 5 would be set, all file-based labels
are skipped.
In various scenarios it's useful to be able to run a software TPM as
fallback on a machine if it doesn't natively have a hardware for it, in
order to provide somewhat systematic interfacing for legacy machines.
This adds the infrastructure for it.
Relevant parts:
1. On EFI systems sd-stub will now generate a random secret on first
boot and store it in a persistent NV variable, which is marked
inaccessible to the OS. It then derives a per-OS secret from that which
is passed to the OS via the initrd logic. This is generally useful, but
in particular is intended to secure the software TPM at least a bit: it
provides better security than nothing (i.e. the only protection in place
is that the firmwrae protections work, but this is also what shim relies
on, hence maybe not too bad), and allows swtpm to encrypt its storage
with something.
2. systemd-tpm2-generator is extended to optionally start an swtpm if no
tpm hw is detected. Because this is of course a major downgrade in
security, this has to be requested explicitly at boot via a kernel
cmdline switch.
3. This optionally mounts the ESP from the initrd. This is general
infrastructure, and has been requested before, but is particularly
interesting in the context of software TPMs: the state needs to be
stored somewhere, and that before the rootfs can be unlocked.
4. This introduces a special new separator measurement for PCRs 0-7 that
isolates all measurements from pre-os/uefi world from those done by the
OS. I added this for three reasons:
- in the swtpm case we'll not have any pre-os/uefi measurements, and we
need to be able to determine cleanly that this is the case. this hence
is supposed to play a similar role as the usual firmware separator
measurement, that however cleanly fixates to the PCRs even the case
where the firmware measurements don't exist at all
- this is a very comprehensive fix for #40567
- not all firmwares generate the firmware separator at all, but it is
essential to seal off firmware variables from OS generated ones. This
can fill the void to some degree.
6. This introduces a new kernel cmdline switch
systemd.tpm2-measured-os=1, which allows force enabling all our
measurement logic, even if UKI TPM measurements are not done. This is
supposed to be used for the swtpm case so that one gets all the
measurements even without having the early boot verified boot chain in
place.
Benefits of all this: systems that care about TPMs have a (lower
security) compat glue in place that allows supporting legacy hw the same
way as modern hw in many ways, so that remote attestation and other uses
can reasonably work with the same codepaths.
Also see: https://github.com/lxc/incus-os/pull/667 regarding prior
similar work.
Fixes: #40567
This makes sure we don't use the "hardware" or "verity" nvpcrs before
the NV anchor measurement is done.
This is mostly to avoid confusing output, and to indirectly ensure the
nvpcr allocation in tpm2-setup is the load bearing one, but it should
not be load bearing for security afaics.
This has been requested previously for PCR 7 (#40567), but let's do that
for all firmware owned PCRs, since some firmwares forget to measure
their own separator. Let's hence measure our own guranteed one.
Fixes: #40567
The UKI public key PCR stuff only works if we get PCR measurements from
the pre-boot environment, hence automatically disable the logic by
default if we don't have that.
This is a potentially common case in VMs: firmwares might know the
concept of TPMs, but the hardware is not enabled in the specific VM.
Let's handle this case nicely.
So far we always conditioned our TPM magic on the UKI having detected
TPM support in the firmware. This is a bit limiting when we want to
support a software TPM that is not visible to the firmware. Hence let's
split this up, and add a separate control that can be set via the kernel
command line. However, as before, let's by default inherit the firmare
TPM discovery state into it, to retain the current behaviour unless
overriden.
With this in place, boot with "systemd.tpm2_measured_os=1
systemd.tpm2_software_fallback=1" on the kernel cmdline to get the swtpm
fallback and then a measured OS based on it.
In many cases it's essential to know if the firmware supports a TPM, but
in others we should accept it if the firmware doesn't have TPM support,
in particular if we want to run the OS with a software TPM.
Hence, add tpm2_is_mostly_supported() as function similar to
tpm2_is_fully_supported(), with the only difference that the former
doesn't insist on a firmware supported TPM. Then, change a number of
users over to this (but not all).
Luca Boccassi
RiskoZS
Duncan Overbruck
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Daan De Meyer
Pavel Borecki
Lennart Poettering
Mike Yuan
Michael Vogt