This is preparation for adding Varlink calls for these operations, as it
makes sense to unify log msg generation in one place (i.e. the callee)
rather than in two (the two callers, i.e. the D-Bus and the Varlink
interfaces).
We need a removal rule for systems where /tmp is not on tmpfs,
so that if they crash, stale sockets will be removed during boot.
OTOH, at runtime, those lock files must never be removed.
But since the 'r!' rule uses '!', it only applies during boot. With
the rule inactive, the usual time-based cleanup for /tmp/ was also
applied to those files, causing them to be removed after 10 days.
Fixes#35182.
4a1f92c704 added '!' through confusion:
the goal was probably to exclude those directories from cleanup at
runtime. But as discussed below, that exclusion is not needed. In fact,
we want the rule to be active during runtime, so that if the directory
were removed or wasn't created earlier for whatever reason, it'd be
created during one of those later runs too. This just makes the system
more robust.
Those directories are used for sockets, and tmpfiles will not remove
live sockets. So it is fine to run the cleanup on those directories,
it doesn't have any effect in normal circumstances. The only case where
the cleanup would matter would be if the service was running, crashed
without removing the socket, and the system would remain up for more
than 10 days after that. This is not a particularly likely scenario, but
OTOH, we can imaging that somebody tried to run Xorg, it didn't work,
and they switched to Wayland. Or their DE crashes every once in a while,
leaving some state behind. Keeping the cleanup in place seems OK, it
makes the system slightly more robust in fringe scenarios.
In fact, this cleanup will work better if we reduce the delay from
10 days to something small. systemd-tmpfiles-clean.timer runs once
per day, so the cleanup will not be very fast anyway. So use '1h' as
an arbitrary small value. (I think '0' would be risky, because it's
possible for the socket to be set up through a script where it's
created first and the service is connected to it, so it is momentarily
"not live". I think people used to do this. Not sure if that happens
anymore, but let's be safe.)
Co-authored-by: Jarl Gullberg <jarl.gullberg@visar-systems.com>
Map the Power Boost key (top-right corner, scancode 0x64) to KEY_PROG1.
Map the Touchpad Toggle key (Fn+F8, scancode 0x76) to KEY_F21.
Verified working via evtest:
Event: type 4 (EV_MSC), code 4 (MSC_SCAN), value 64
Event: type 1 (EV_KEY), code 148 (KEY_PROG1), value 1
Event: type 4 (EV_MSC), code 4 (MSC_SCAN), value 76
Event: type 1 (EV_KEY), code 206 (KEY_F21), value 1
DMI: svnInfinix:*pnY3Max:*
AT keyboard scancodes: 0x64, 0x76 (set 2)
- This synchronize the state for existing stuff.
- Enable translations for Plymouth interaction strings.
- Translate them in French as an example.
Fixes#42384.
This changes some lines and add translations related to resolved
policies and sysupdate policies.
Signed-off-by: Raito Bezarius <masterancpp@gmail.com>
arm64 hosts support running armv7 (armhf) binaries, so we can
cross compile and run the unit tests without performance issues.
armv7 (armhf) is a primary architecture on Ubuntu, so build
regressions block new version updates, and adding coverage
helps to avoid introducing regressions.
When the accumulated trie key exceeds the fixed-size line buffer,
linebuf_get() returns NULL. trie_fnmatch_f() passed that NULL straight
into fnmatch() as the pattern, causing a SIGSEGV on a crafted hwdb.bin
(reachable now that recursion is capped rather than overflowing the
stack first). Treat the NULL like the other corruption checks and
return -EBADMSG.
Follow-up for 73fea38cf1
Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/42376
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When ssh-ing into a VM, you generally do not want to log
in as your user from the host. Let's default to the root
user unless a user is explicitly specified.
sshd reads AuthorizedKeysFile after dropping to the authenticating user's UID, so the
0400 credential file under %d/ is unreadable for non-root users. Materialize a 0444
copy in a RuntimeDirectory so the ephemeral key works for any user. */
The log message is informational only, same as the count of killed
processes, so we can safely use cgroup.kill when available instead
of manually recursing through the cgroup tree.
Otherwise, it introduces cyclic dependencies:
```
systemd[1]: sockets.target: Found ordering cycle:
systemd-networkd-resolve-hook.socket/start after network-pre.target/start after
iptables.service/start after basic.target/start after sockets.target/start -
after systemd-networkd-resolve-hook.socket
systemd[1]: sockets.target: Job systemd-networkd-resolve-hook.socket/start deleted
to break ordering cycle starting with sockets.target/start
```
Follow-up for 37adb410a2.
Fixes#42353.
A hostile but structurally valid 382-byte PE32+ "EFI application" with a
single section whose VirtualSize is ~4 GiB and SizeOfRawData is 0 drives
uki_hash() into ~4.17 M iterations of SHA-256 over 1024 bytes of zeros
— wedging the parser for >10 s. Nine more slow-units share the same
shape. A separate MSAN finding from the new fuzzer (CIFuzz, memory
sanitizer) shows pe_load_headers() reading uninitialised heap memory
when SizeOfOptionalHeader is too small to actually contain
NumberOfRvaAndSizes.
Three tightenings in src/shared/pe-binary.c:
1. In pe_load_sections, reject sections whose PointerToRawData +
SizeOfRawData exceeds the actual file size. Raw section data must
fit inside the file; this is the parser-wide invariant
pe_hash / uki_hash / pe_read_section_data rely on.
2. In uki_hash, cap the (VirtualSize - SizeOfRawData) zero-padding
hash loop at 64 MiB. Real UKIs do not pad sections with tens of
MiB of zero-equivalent data; anything above this cap is a
malformed PE.
3. In pe_load_headers, reject a PE whose SizeOfOptionalHeader is too
small to cover up to NumberOfRvaAndSizes. Without this guard the
subsequent size-mismatch check reads uninitialised optional-header
bytes, caught by MSAN under CIFuzz.
Add the 382 B canonical reproducer (plus two structural siblings) and
the MSAN reproducer to test/fuzz/fuzz-pe-binary/. Also add a libFuzzer
harness in src/fuzz/fuzz-pe-binary.c and unit tests in
src/test/test-pe-binary.c that exercise each fix branch in isolation.
The 64 MiB hash boundary test is gated behind SYSTEMD_SLOW_TESTS so it
doesn't slow down emulated-arch CI.
This is a robustness fix, not a security fix: PE binaries consumed by
bootctl / systemd-stub / pcrlock / kernel-install / systemd-measure are
already trusted and signed at the consumer side, so the worst pre-fix
behaviour is wasted CPU on a UKI install / measure / inspect call.
Closes#42344.
Reported-by: AI-assisted libFuzzer campaign
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
We currently log at warning level:
/usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-udevd.service:56: System call bpf cannot be
resolved as libseccomp is not available, ignoring: Operation not supported
In the initrd, or in minimal installations, not installing libseccomp is
reasonable, depending on various other choices. We shouldn't make fuss
about this.
C.f. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2463540.
This was requested in https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/42333.
Indeed, this integration is using three levels of systemd magick, so
doing this correctly is not obvious. Let's include specific instructions
to help people for whom this integration is causing problems.
Many *at()-style helpers accept a directory fd that may be either a
regular, valid fd (>= 0) or one of the special AT_FDCWD/XAT_FDROOT
wildcard values, and open-code that check in their assertions. Add a
wildcard_fd_is_valid() helper for it and use it tree-wide.
When both --private-users and --network-namespace-path are
specified, systemd-nspawn fails to start with "Operation not
permitted" during the setns() call.
This occurs because of the following execution sequence:
1. The outer child calls raw_clone() with CLONE_NEWUSER to create
the new user namespace.
2. The inner child is spawned inside this new user namespace.
3. The inner child then attempts to call setns() to join the
external network namespace.
Because the inner child is already running inside
the restricted user namespace, the kernel rejects
the setns() call to join a network namespace owned by
a different (host/more privileged) user namespace.
Fix this by moving the setns() call to the outer child, executing it
just before the raw_clone() call. This ensures the network namespace
is joined while the process still has the necessary privileges, which
also aligns with the inner child's expectation that the network
namespace is already set up upon entry.
The file name of the reproducer is used for test name, and the test name
is messed when the file name is too long.
Also, the mentioned issues are not regressions, but long standing bugs.
Follow-up for 73fea38cf1.
Fixes a family of OOB reads in the trie walker where attacker-controlled
offsets are loaded from a (possibly hostile) hwdb.bin and added to
hwdb->map without first checking that the resulting pointer stays inside
the mapping. Crash sites:
- trie_fnmatch_f sd-hwdb.c:187 (#42340)
- trie_search_f sd-hwdb.c:233 (#42341)
- trie_children_cmp_f /bsearch sd-hwdb.c:94 (#42342)
- hwdb_add_property sd-hwdb.c:121 (#42343)
- trie_node_from_off (UBSAN) sd-hwdb.c:83
- trie_fnmatch_f stack overflow on cyclic children (CIFuzz finding)
Commit b45a897edc ("hwdb: reject out-of-bounds fnmatch prefixes")
plugged the first site only at the prefix_off-content level, but the
crash on the read of node->prefix_off itself still happens when node is
already OOB. This is the structural fix: a single hwdb_at() helper
validates that [off, off + size) lies inside the mapping, and
trie_node_from_off() / trie_string() return NULL on OOB; every caller
treats the result as nullable and surfaces -EBADMSG.
trie_fnmatch_f() additionally caps its recursion depth at 2048; without
the cap a corrupt trie whose child offsets form a cycle (or just a deep
linear chain) drives the parser into stack-overflow rather than
returning -EBADMSG (caught by CIFuzz address sanitizer on this branch).
Additions:
- A fuzz-hwdb libFuzzer harness that drives sd_hwdb_new_from_path,
sd_hwdb_get, sd_hwdb_seek, and sd_hwdb_enumerate on attacker bytes.
- Five hand-crafted unit tests in test-sd-hwdb.c (one per crash
bucket, plus the cyclic-trie recursion case) that build a malformed
in-memory hwdb.bin and assert -EBADMSG rather than SIGSEGV /
stack-overflow.
- Regression corpus files under test/fuzz/fuzz-hwdb/ pinning each
fixed bucket, including the CIFuzz stack-overflow reproducer.
Closes#42340.
Closes#42341.
Closes#42342.
Closes#42343.
Reported-by: AI-assisted libFuzzer campaign
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
test_oomd_cgroup_context_acquire_and_insert sets c1->pgscan = UINT64_MAX
and c1->last_had_mem_reclaim = 888 before re-inserting via
oomd_insert_cgroup_context(h1, h2, cgroup), then asserts that c2 carries
over last_had_mem_reclaim == 888.
The assumption was that, because c1->pgscan (which becomes c2->last_pgscan)
is UINT64_MAX and is therefore strictly greater than the freshly-acquired
c2->pgscan, oomd_pgscan_rate() in oomd_insert_cgroup_context() would
return 0 and leave last_had_mem_reclaim untouched. But the function
treats last_pgscan > pgscan as "cgroup was recreated", resets last_pgscan
to 0, and returns pgscan - 0 == pgscan. So when the kernel records any
non-zero pgscan on the live cgroup of the test unit, the rate is > 0 and
last_had_mem_reclaim is overwritten with now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC).
From src/oom/oomd-util.c:
uint64_t oomd_pgscan_rate(const OomdCGroupContext *c) {
[...]
last_pgscan = c->last_pgscan;
if (c->last_pgscan > c->pgscan) {
log_debug("Last pgscan %"PRIu64" greater than current pgscan %"PRIu64" for %s. Using last pgscan of zero.",
c->last_pgscan, c->pgscan, c->path);
last_pgscan = 0;
}
return c->pgscan - last_pgscan;
}
int oomd_insert_cgroup_context(Hashmap *old_h, Hashmap *new_h, const char *path) {
[...]
if (oomd_pgscan_rate(curr_ctx) > 0)
curr_ctx->last_had_mem_reclaim = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
Under sanitizers the test can be slow enough that the kernel scans the
test service cgroup at least once between the two acquisitions, which
triggers the failure:
[ 1898.159455] test-oomd-util[2606]: /* test_oomd_cgroup_context_acquire_and_insert */
[ 1898.161247] test-oomd-util[2606]: Last pgscan 18446744073709551615 greater than current pgscan 2 for /system.slice/test-oomd-util.service. Using last pgscan of zero.
[ 1898.161330] test-oomd-util[2606]: src/oom/test-oomd-util.c:322: Assertion failed: Expected "c2->last_had_mem_reclaim == 888u", but 1898161250 != 888
(1898161250 matches the monotonic timestamp of the log line, confirming
that last_had_mem_reclaim was overwritten with now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC).)
The propagation of last_had_mem_reclaim is already covered
deterministically by TEST(oomd_update_cgroup_contexts_between_hashmaps),
which builds OomdCGroupContext structs directly with matching pgscan
values so that oomd_pgscan_rate() returns exactly 0. So just drop the
racy setup and assertion here.
Follow-up for df637ede7b
Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/38543
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lennart Poettering
Luca Boccassi
Fco. Javier F. Serrador
joo es
Rafael Fontenelle
Anders Jonsson
Luna Jernberg
Ettore Atalan
Marek Adamski
김인수
Yuri Chornoivan
Américo Monteiro
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
sykikxo
Hosted Weblate
Raito Bezarius
Daan De Meyer
Yu Watanabe
jeffhuang
Malformed C
