When running inside a container (during image builds or such),
`/proc/cmdline` belongs to the host and would leak the host's root= (or a
faked placeholder like root=/dev/osbuild) into the UKI.
Mirror the same guard that `90-loaderentry.install` has: check
`systemd-detect-virt --container` before falling back to `/proc/cmdline`,
and return an empty cmdline if we are in a container to ensure both
modes (`uki` and `bls`) work the same.
Signed-off-by: Simon de Vlieger <cmdr@supakeen.com>
Explicitly call label_ops_post() where necessary with specific
arguments. Previously, regardless if fopen_tmpfile_linkable_at()
success, label_ops_post() was called but its argument was heavily
conditionalized. Let's call it both on failure and success cases
with specific arguments. This should be easy to read.
This also
- moves variable declarations where used,
- drops unnecessary boolean flag call_label_ops_post.
No functional change. Just reafactoring.
Hopefully silence CID#1664328, though it is false-positive.
The erofs branch in make_filesystem() never passed the sector size to
mkfs.erofs, so FileSystemSectorSize= was silently ignored for erofs
partitions. mkfs.erofs defaults to the page size (e.g. 16K on aarch64),
which is too large for some use cases such as UFS with 4K blocks.
Pass -b <sector_size> to mkfs.erofs, but only when it is smaller than the
page size, since mkfs.erofs defaults to the page size and rejects larger
values. This matches how the other supported filesystems (xfs, ext4,
btrfs, f2fs, vfat) already handle sector_size.
Fixes#43238
systemd-repart implicitly excludes the contents of APIVFS and temporary
directories (/proc, /sys, /dev, /tmp, /run, /var/tmp) when copying files
via CopyFiles=. When populating a root partition, the contents below the
mount points of other partitions in the image (e.g. /boot, /efi for an
esp partition) are excluded as well, so that data belonging to a separate
partition is not duplicated into the root file system.
Neither of these implied denylists was documented, which surprised users
(see #32651). Document them, and explain how to work around the
mount-point exclusion by adding an explicit CopyFiles= entry for the
directory in question.
Fixes#32651
systemd-sysusers currently skips entries for groups that already exists.
However, if a group exists only in /etc/gshadow and not in /etc/group,
systemd-sysusers panics:
~# groupdel sgx
~# systemd-sysusers; echo $?
Creating group 'sgx' with GID 106.
0
~# systemd-sysusers; echo $?
0
~# sed -i '/sgx/d' /etc/group
~# systemd-sysusers; echo $?
Creating group 'sgx' with GID 106.
/etc/gshadow: Group "sgx" already exists.
1
To fix this, let's mirror the logic from the user path
(write_temporary_shadow()) where we simply drop the user from the "todo"
queue if it already exists in /etc/shadow instead of throwing an error.
The openpgp and tlsa verbs rejected --json= even though they
already determine the RR type they query. Allow JSON output for
these shortcut commands.
Accept matching explicit --type= values as well, but reject
mismatched types so openpgp only queries OPENPGPKEY records and
tlsa only queries TLSA records.
Refuse unauthenticated key records in JSON format so scripts do
not accidentally consume cryptographic DNS data that would only
produce a warning in human-readable output.
Fixes#43245
Introduce Slice.ActivatingConcurrencyMax to limit how many units
within a slice hierarchy may be in activating state concurrently.
Expose the setting over D-Bus, support transient/property parsing,
enforce it during unit start dispatch, and re-check queued starts when
units leave activating state.
Document the new slice option and add a PID1 concurrency test covering
queued startup behavior.
PNP devices may represent ACPI-enumerated hardware but do not have a
parent type supported by path_id. Consequently, importing path_id fails
even when the PNP device exposes a stable ACPI firmware_node. This also
prevents later assignments in rules such as the systemd-backlight
activation rule from taking effect.
Resolve the PNP device's firmware_node and use its ACPI sysname for the
path component. This gives PNP-backed devices the same stable identity
as their firmware representation.
Add a regression test using an RTC device below a PNP parent with an
ACPI firmware node.
sd_bus_message carries an array of header field offsets and a counter,
but their only reader was part of the D-Bus v2/GVariant sealing path
removed in 0dd4876815 ("sd-bus: drop D-Bus version 2 format support").
There are three remaining callers of message_extend_fields(), for
SD_BUS_MESSAGE_HEADER_DESTINATION, _PATH, and _INTERFACE, and all of
them pass false for add_offset. The receive path does not populate the
array either, so nothing reads or writes it any more.
Let's drop the two fields and the now unused add_offset argument and
branch.
This reduces sizeof(sd_bus_message) from 792...
$ gdb -batch build-baseline/test-bus-benchmark \
-ex 'ptype /o struct sd_bus_message'
...
/* 688 | 8 */ usec_t timeout;
/* 696 | 80 */ size_t header_offsets[10];
/* 776 | 4 */ unsigned int n_header_offsets;
/* XXX 4-byte hole */
/* 784 | 8 */ uint64_t read_counter;
/* total size (bytes): 792 */
to 704 bytes:
$ gdb -batch build-patched/test-bus-benchmark \
-ex 'ptype /o struct sd_bus_message'
...
/* 688 | 8 */ usec_t timeout;
/* 696 | 8 */ uint64_t read_counter;
/* total size (bytes): 704 */
On Fedora 43 aarch64 with glibc 2.42, the usable allocation for a
method-call message falls from 808 to 728 bytes, a reduction of 9.9%.
In my tests, retaining 400,000 method-call messages reduces in median
peak RSS from 363M to 332M.
Using `test-bus-benchmark chart direct 500ms` across message sizes from
1 byte to 2 MiB one can also see things are around 1% faster, which is
another nice incidental boost.
The Lenovo B570e touchpad (ETPS/2 Elantech) reports ABS ranges that
are too wide by default, which makes edge scrolling trigger across
roughly the right half of the touchpad instead of only at the right
edge. Add an evdev hwdb entry in `60-evdev.hwdb` that overrides the
ABS_X/ABS_Y (and the matching MT position) ranges with the calibrated
values, following the same pattern already used for the Lenovo B590
and L430 entries.
Fixes#29666
The Adesso wireless keyboard with an integrated trackball (MosArt
062a:4101) is identified as a regular mouse, so trackball-style
scrolling does not work out of the box. Add a hwdb entry in
`70-mouse.hwdb` setting `ID_INPUT_TRACKBALL=1` so libinput and other
clients treat the device as a trackball.
Fixes#29609
The Microsoft Surface Type Cover touchpad (USB 045E:09C0) is attached
through a USB port that firmware reports as removable. Because of that,
`65-integration.rules` sets `ID_INPUT_TOUCHPAD_INTEGRATION=external`,
and libinput skips disable-while-typing (DWT) for the device.
The touchpad is physically integrated into the Type Cover, so add a hwdb
entry in `70-touchpad.hwdb` that overrides
`ID_INPUT_TOUCHPAD_INTEGRATION=internal`, restoring DWT.
Fixes#43256
Allow MessageQueueMessageSize= to accept IEC size suffixes in socket unit files.
Support the same syntax for transient property assignments.
Keep MessageQueueMaxMessages= as a plain message count.
Accept RFC4122 UUID URN strings with the `urn:uuid:` prefix in
sd_id128_from_string(), while keeping plain 128-bit IDs and regular
UUID strings working as before.
Implement the TODO item for `udevadm info -q symlink`: keep the
default space-separated output pager-free, and make `--value` print
one symlink per line with an empty separator line between devices.
Weblate got itself into a conflict and while resolving it it forced a
resynchronization of all translations, which in combination with a new
version of Weblate triggered a lot of rather pointless
multiline-to-singleline (and vice versa) changes. Let's squash all this
noise into a single commit to make both Weblate and us happy.
C.f. https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/43248.
Turn --sign=BOOL into --sign=no|best-effort|require-one|require-all,
making the multi-signer aggregation policy explicit: best-effort never
fails on signing, require-one requires at least one signature, and
require-all requires every signer to succeed (an empty reply, i.e. a
signer opting out, counts as failure). Signed reports are always emitted
as a JSON-SEQ stream. The mode is also exposed as an input to the
io.systemd.Report.GenerateSigned Varlink method.
Signed-off-by: Paul Meyer <katexochen0@gmail.com>
This PR changes some SELinux bits related to working with alternate
roots (specifically when using `--root` or `--image` on a bunch of
executables).
It addresses bug #42643 and it's hopefully the more whole approach than
the naive approach I PR'ed in #42644.
Before this PR the 'wrong' labels get applied because the path lookups
in the SELinux label database are prefixed with whatever the location of
the alternate root is (explained in more detail below).
Initially I had taken a very naive approach that did fix the issue by
stripping the alternate root from the path; however this still looks up
that path in the hosts' label database, which might differ from the one
contained in the alternate root.
So this expanded approach actually reads the label database from the
alternate root, strips the prefix *if* an alternate root is used
directly in `selinux-util.c` and then uses that to assign labels
instead.
See under the line for the behavior pre/post.
I've tried builds of this PR on both enforcing/non-enforcing/non-enabled
hosts *and* on enabled/non-enabled disk images and things seem to work
or at least fall back to ignoring MAC when required bits aren't present.
One thing is *if* an `/etc/selinux/config` is present that defines a
`SELINUXTYPE=` we *do* require the policy given to be present in the
image. This is the only new actual error in this code path that doesn't
get ignored.
We *could* verify that the path exists and also ignore it but I
personally don't think that's the right approach since the actual system
itself would likely also be broken anyhow. Let me know thoughts on that.
There's a tight coupling here still with the *hosts* SELinux policy in
that to set (potentially) unknown labels to the policy loaded in the
host kernel these executables would need to execute in a domain that
allows transitioning to `mac_admin`. I'd say that `install_t` is the
most likely candidate for that. See the first comment on this PR for
more explanation on it/request for input.
---
When mounting `a.raw` before running any tooling against it and showing
the `/etc/shadow` file labels we have:
```
€ sudo systemd-dissect --mount test/a.raw test/mnt/a
€ ls -Zlart test/mnt/a/etc/shadow
----------. 1 root root system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0 520 Jun 27 07:55 test/mnt/a/etc/shadow
€ sudo systemd-dissect ---umount test/mnt/a
```
After running `systemd-firstboot` against the image, then remounting,
note the labels that have been changed to incorrect values:
```
€ sudo systemd-firstboot --image test/a.raw --root-password test
/home/user/src/github.com/teamsbc/artifacts/test/a.raw: /etc/passwd written.
/home/user/src/github.com/teamsbc/artifacts/test/a.raw: /etc/shadow written.
€ sudo systemd-dissect --mount test/a.raw test/mnt/a
€ ls -Zlart test/mnt/a/etc/shadow
----------. 1 root root system_u:object_r:init_var_run_t:s0 579 Jun 27 08:01 test/mnt/a/etc/shadow
```
The behavior before this PR looks up the labels in the label database of
the host, but the path that gets looked up is the path where the image
is temporarily mounted, or in the case of `--root` where the root is on
the host. Since that path doesn't define any labels we get the labels of
the location where the file was created on the host. In this case since
`--image` was used, which mounted things in a temporary location we end
up with `var_run_t`.
If this image is booted things that want to read `/etc/shadow` might not
be allowed to read files labeled this way; thus services fail to start,
and root can't login when SELinux is in enforcing mode.
After this PR is applied there are two main differences in how things
are handled. The first being that instead of reading the label database
from the host (which might have none, or have a different one from the
one contained inside an image or root) we read the label database from
inside the alternate root. This tries to make sure we get the correct
labels for given paths.
Second, and most importantly, if we did init SELinux with an alternate
root then any paths passed to the relevant label lookup functions strip
that alternate root from the path. While previously we'd look up a path
like `/run/dissect-XXXX/etc/shadow` we now look up a path like
`/etc/shadow` *and* this path gets looked up in the label database in
the alternate root.
Together these things give in my opinion better handling of SELinux in
alternate roots. To confirm things work here's the same operations on
the second copy of our image:
```
€ sudo systemd-dissect --mount test/b.raw test/mnt/b
artifacts € ls -Zlart test/mnt/b/etc/shadow
----------. 1 root root system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0 520 Jun 27 07:55 test/mnt/b/etc/shadow
€ sudo ~/src/github.com/systemd/systemd/build/systemd-firstboot --image test/b.raw --root-password test
/home/user/src/github.com/teamsbc/artifacts/test/b.raw: /etc/passwd written.
/home/user/src/github.com/teamsbc/artifacts/test/b.raw: /etc/shadow written.
€ sudo systemd-dissect --mount test/b.raw test/mnt/b
€ ls -Zlart test/mnt/b/etc/shadow
----------. 1 root root system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0 579 Jun 27 08:44 test/mnt/b/etc/shadow
```
Showing that we now have the correct labels applied.
bus_message_print_all_properties() builds a PROP= string for every
property in the reply so that -p PROP=value filters can be matched
against it, but most queries never need this.
Take the normal `systemctl show` or `systemctl show UNIT` case. In that
case there is no filter. Even with `-p PROP` there is no value filter
since there is no value.
Avoid constructing the string entirely by comparing property names
directly against filter entries.
In my tests with a `systemctl show` over 160 units this brings the
instructions retired from 992.6M down to 960.5M, a reduction of 3.2%.
The same goes for property filters with units. When running:
systemctl show -p UnitFileState -p ActiveState UNIT
...the instructions retired drops from 9.52M to 9.22M, a reduction of
3.2%. The output in each case is unchanged.
bus_message_print_all_properties() peeks the variant type, but then the
print callback and the default bus_print_property() each peek the value
type again, so there can be up to two redundant calls per property. Peek
it once up front and pass it through.
With this, in my tests `systemctl show` over 160 units decreases in
instructions retired from 1167.6M to 1155.7M, so about 1%.
bus_message_print_all_properties() peeks the variant type, but then the
print callback and the default bus_print_property() each peek the value
type again, so there can be up to two redundant calls per property. Peek
it once up front and pass it through.
With this, in my tests `systemctl show` over 160 units decreases in
instructions retired from 1167.6M to 1155.7M, so about 1%.
bus_message_print_all_properties() inserts every name it walks into the
found-properties set, but the set is only used to report missing requested
properties at debug level.
Request the set from systemctl only when properties were specified and debug
logging is enabled, avoiding the unnecessary work in normal operation.
In my tests with `systemctl show` over 160 units this brings the
instructions retired from 1167.8M down to 992.6M, a reduction of 15.0%.
The output is unchanged.
The RETURN traps in the browse helpers only stopped the transient
varlinkctl unit; the mktemp'd output/error/scratch files were never
removed and leaked on every invocation. Remove them from the same trap,
after the unit has been stopped so that nothing is still writing to
them, and make that stop best-effort like in
testcase_browse_ifindex_zero_no_flap: if varlinkctl exited on its own,
the transient unit is already gone, and a failing stop would otherwise
abort the testcase under errexit and skip the removal.
testcase_browse_ifindex_zero_no_flap cleans up its output file from the
trap it already arms for the dummy link, which is an EXIT trap since
run_testcases runs each testcase in its own subshell.
While at it, tidy up the helpers' variable scoping: error_file was
accidentally a global, and i/svc were declared in the wrong functions
(they are used by check_both/check_first, via dynamic scoping).
Previously, bpf_restrict_fsaccess_prepare() is called twice in
bpf_restrict_fsaccess_setup(). One by through
bpf_restrict_fsaccess_supported() and one by itself directly.
In PID1, bpf_restrict_fsaccess_prepare() was only called by
bpf_restrict_fsaccess_setup(), hence it is not necessary to exist as a
separated function.
bpf_restrict_fsaccess_prepare() loads BPF program(s), hence it is
slightly slow operation.
Let's avoid redundant loading of BPF programs by merging
bpf_restrict_fsaccess_supported() into bpf_restrict_fsaccess_setup().
Co-authored-by: Eric Curtin <eric.curtin@docker.com>
This merges prepare_restrict_fs_bpf() and bpf_restrict_fs_supported()
into bpf_restrict_fs_setup().
Previously, bpf_restrict_fs_supported() was only called in
manager_new() and bpf_restrict_fs_cleanup(). However, it is not
necessary to call it in bpf_restrict_fs_cleanup(), as if the feature is
not supporetd, manager->restrict_fs is always NULL. In manager_new()
the function was always called with bpf_restrict_fs_setup(). Hence,
it is not necessary to keep bpf_restrict_fs_supported() and
bpf_restrict_fs_setup() as separated functions.
This also drops unnecessary '#if HAVE_LIBBPF' condition in
manager_new(), as bpf_restrict_fs_setup() is well defined also when
libbpf support is disabled.
Follow-up for c99678eeda.
This updates systemd-tmpfiles in two small areas:
- Reject non-empty argument fields for tmpfiles.d line types that do not
consume the argument field, instead of warning and silently ignoring
them.
- Let `r` and `R` tmpfiles.d entries honor the `Age` field when
`systemd-tmpfiles --clean` is used. The existing `--remove` behavior
remains unconditional.
The completed TODO entries are removed, and NEWS/man page documentation
is updated for the visible behavior changes.
When a calendar timer with RandomizedOffsetSec and Persistent=true fires a
catch-up activation, last_trigger is set to the current wall-clock time.
This inherently already includes any randomized offset, because the
trigger was that the activation time including the offset had passed.
When computing the next elapse, calendar_spec_next_usec() finds the next
calendar boundary after the base time, and then random_offset is added to the
result. If the base time already includes the offset, the next calendar
boundary is one period too far in the future, causing a scheduled activation
to be skipped.
Fix this by always subtracting random_offset from the base time before passing
it to calendar_spec_next_usec(), matching what the fallback branches (using
inactive_exit_timestamp or current time) already do. This puts the base into
"pre-offset calendar space" so that the next calendar match and subsequent
offset addition yield the correct next activation time.
Fixes#42337.
The backwards scan started at offset length-3, so the last position at which a
sequence can begin, length-2, was never examined. CSI sequences are at least
three bytes long and were thus unaffected, but two byte Fe sequences (ESC
followed by 0x40…0x5F) terminating the examined slice were missed.
ellipsize_mem() calls this to figure out whether a sequence ends exactly at the
current position, so that it can be skipped over, which is precisely the case
that was broken: such a sequence was instead counted as two visible cells and
copied through as text, and the string was ellipsized more aggressively than
requested. For example ellipsize("🐱🐱\x1bM🐱🐱\x1bM", 5, 0) returned a three
cell wide string rather than the five cells asked for.
destroy_bus() flushes unwritten data for unprivileged managers so that
queued messages are not lost when a connection is torn down. However,
sd_bus_flush() first drives the connection to completion via
bus_ensure_running(): for a connection still in OPENING or
AUTHENTICATING this blocks the manager synchronously - a single-fd
ppoll, the event loop is not running - until the peer answers or
BUS_AUTH_TIMEOUT (= DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_USEC, 90 s by default) expires; a
connection in HELLO blocks the same way on the Hello call's own
method timeout. destroy_bus() is reached from four places: the
disconnect handler, manager_recheck_dbus(), the failed-setup path in
api_bus_instance_id_reply(), and bus_done() during normal shutdown or
reexec (via manager_free()).
Such a peer legitimately never answers: during session teardown,
dbus.socket can be (or re-enter) listening while the D-Bus service
behind it is hung or already gone, so connect() succeeds against the
socket backlog and the authentication request is never read. The user
manager then freezes mid-shutdown - or mid-reexec - for 90 s, with
every remaining unit stop (or the reexec itself) gated behind it.
This is the block traced in #16471 (2020, v245): the reporter's
strace shows the manager hanging in a single-fd ppoll with an ~89 s
timeout right after SIGTERM - bus_ensure_running() driving an
AUTHENTICATING reconnection - and their summary attributes it to the
flush. Their tested sd-bus-level patch (breaking the wait via a
SIGTERM-set flag) was met with "a work-around once things are already
bad, but we shouldn't even get in that state"; the same reply stated
the expectation this commit implements - the manager "should normally
protect itself ... and not issue dbus messages when the dbus service
isn't fully up". bus_foreach_bus() already applies that principle in
the other direction, skipping enqueue for connections that "haven't
started yet" via the same sd_bus_is_ready() check. 1166f4472d
("core/dbus: do not block the manager on GetId during bus
(re-)connection") removed the connect-time instance of the same class
of block, in code added in 2025. The flush here is twelve years
older: it dates back to the libsystemd-bus conversion (718db96199,
2013).
Only flush when the connection is currently RUNNING. This does not
change what gets delivered in the failure case this fixes: whatever a
non-RUNNING connection's write queue holds (auth/Hello traffic, and
any subscriber signal a per-unit or per-job bus_track attached without
a readiness check) was never actually sent by the old code either -
sd_bus_flush() calls bus_ensure_running() before it ever looks at the
write queue, so a connection that times out without reaching RUNNING
had its queued data silently discarded on close exactly as before,
just after blocking for up to 90 s first rather than immediately. The
one narrowing is a connection that would have completed authentication
within the timeout window: previously such traffic could still reach
the peer after the block; now it will not. Every destroy_bus() call
site is reached only once the manager has already decided the
connection is being torn down (disconnected, recognized as down, or
the process itself exiting/reexecuting), so this narrowing does not
trade a working delivery for a broken one.
Fixes#16471
These three one-shot tools operate on alternate roots via --root/--image
but until now created files with host SELinux labels, producing images
that fail to boot or run with enforcing mode because every file carries
the wrong security context.
Create a LabelContext from arg_root at startup and thread it through all
labeling call sites so the target image gets labeled according to its own
policy.
Signed-off-by: Simon de Vlieger <cmdr@supakeen.com>
With the plumbing and context type in place, make the SELinux pre/post
callbacks use the alternate context when label_context is non-NULL, so
files get labeled according to the target image's policy rather than the
host's.
Errors from the host kernel not recognising image-specific contexts
(EINVAL from setfscreatecon_raw) are logged at debug level and skipped
gracefully, since this is expected when the image carries labels the host
policy doesn't define.
Signed-off-by: Simon de Vlieger <cmdr@supakeen.com>
When operating on an alternate root (--root/--image), SELinux labels must
come from that root's policy, not the host's. This requires opening a
separate selabel_handle against the target's policy database and
remembering the root path for prefix stripping.
Introduce LabelContext to carry both, and mac_label_context_new() to
set it up: it reads the target's SELinux config, validates SELINUXTYPE to
prevent path traversal, sets the policy root, and opens a label database
scoped to the target image.
Signed-off-by: Simon de Vlieger <cmdr@supakeen.com>
SELinux labeling with --root/--image needs per-call context to carry an
alternate policy database and root prefix. The current LabelOps interface
has no way to pass this, forcing any solution to rely on global state.
Add a LabelContext *label_context to the label_ops callbacks and all
intermediate layers. Generic filesystem functions that most callers use
(xopenat_full, write_string_file_full, etc.) get a _label variant
carrying the extra parameter, with inline wrappers preserving the
original signatures so the vast majority of call sites remain untouched.
Signed-off-by: Simon de Vlieger <cmdr@supakeen.com>
Error returned from security_compute_create_raw() means that kernel
couldn't compute target context. Very likely because file context is not
known to the policy, i.e. security.selinux xattr contains some garbage
value and we are running in permissive mode, otherwise returned context
would be "unlabeled_t" instead of getting an error.
mac_selinux_get_create_label_from_exe() is used to figure out create
label for socket units and we fail to start the socket if we can't
figure out that label.
However, it may be necessary to start some sockets in order to get to
the point when we launch the service that relabels (in permissive mode)
the entire filesystem and reboots.
Return -ENODATA instead of the raw error when SELinux is permissive, so
the caller falls back to the default label. This is needed to allow
relabeling service to start on systems where file contexts maybe
invalid.