mkosi switch to the newer -blockdev qemu option in systemd/mkosi#3557 [1], but
cache=unsafe is an option only -drive supports.
Since the qemu-system_x86-64 man page [2] says this, cache.writeback=on is the
default and mkosi setting the other two options to the values corresponding to
unsafe, it should be fine to drop the cache=unsafe option.
┌─────────────┬─────────────────┬──────────────┬────────────────┐
│ │ cache.writeback │ cache.direct │ cache.no-flush │
├─────────────┼─────────────────┼──────────────┼────────────────┤
│writeback │ on │ off │ off │
├─────────────┼─────────────────┼──────────────┼────────────────┤
│none │ on │ on │ off │
├─────────────┼─────────────────┼──────────────┼────────────────┤
│writethrough │ off │ off │ off │
├─────────────┼─────────────────┼──────────────┼────────────────┤
│directsync │ off │ on │ off │
├─────────────┼─────────────────┼──────────────┼────────────────┤
│unsafe │ on │ off │ on │
└─────────────┴─────────────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘
[1] https://github.com/systemd/mkosi/pull/3557
[2] https://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/noble/en/man1/qemu-system-x86_64.1.html
In various scenarios we invoke containers with access to the kernel
keyring blocked. Let's make sure we can handle this properly: when the
invocation ID is stored in in the kernel keyring and we try to read it
and get EPERM we should handle it gracefully, like EOPNOTSUPP.
This reverts commit b6a2df6307.
The functionality is entirely redundant, we already have
sd_json_variant_filter() which does the same, and is in fact even more
powerful, since it takes a list instead of a single field to remove.
When we're building ParticleOS images, we don't want the package
manager (or mkosi) to run systemd-sysusers, systemd-tmpfiles or
systemctl preset so let's add a few more bypass environment
variables that we can set to have execution of these skipped like
we already have $SYSTEMD_HWDB_UPDATE_BYPASS and $KERNEL_INSTALL_BYPASS.
This delegates one or more namespaces to the service. Concretely,
this setting influences in which order we unshare namespaces. Delegated
namespaces are unshared *after* the user namespace is unshared. Other
namespaces are unshared *before* the user namespace is unshared.
Fixes#35369
Two error conditions are unreachable, as now both glibc and kernel
support statx(). In other many places, failure in statx() are handled as
critical, even if it is filtered by seccomp or so. Let's follow the same
way here.
struct statx in glibc header was introduced in glibc-2.28
(fd70af45528d59a00eb3190ef6706cb299488fcd), but at that time,
sys/stat.h conflicts with linux/stat.h. Since glibc-2.30
(5dad6ffbb2b76215cfcd38c3001778536ada8e8a), sys/stat.h includes
linux/stat.h if exists.
Since now our baseline of glibc is 2.31. Hence, we can drop workarounds
for struct statx by importing linux/stat.h from newer kernel (v6.14-rc4).
The current glibc versions used by major distributions:
CentOS 9: 2.34
CentOS 10: 2.39
Fedora 40: 2.39
Fedora 41: 2.40
Fedora 42: 2.41
Ubuntu 20.04 LTS (focal): 2.31
Ubuntu 22.04 LTS (jammy): 2.35
Ubuntu 24.04 LTS (noble): 2.39
Ubuntu 24.10 (oracular): 2.40
Debian 11 (Bullseye, oldstable): 2.31
Debian 12 (Bookworm, stable): 2.36
openSUSE SLE-15-SP6: 2.38
openSUSE Tumbleweed: 2.40
Hence, based on our supporting policy, we can bump the base line to 2.31.
This commit does not change anything on our source code. But, will drop
many workarounds for supporting older glibc in later commits.
- split out verifications into two functions,
- also check the following scenarios:
* unmanaging an existing interface,
* re-managing an unmanaged interface,
* adding a new unmanaged interface,
* removing an unmanaged interface.
This is mostly a strawman to get a discussion going regarding how to
communicate to terminal emulators such as ptyxis about run0 (and nspawn,
and vmspawn, and moe) and what it does.
It's hierarchical and I think still relatively simple.
/cc @chergert
fido2_generate_hmac_hash() sets req->keyring to "fido2-pin" when
calling ask_password_auto(), suggesting that a key by this name
can be read from the kernel keyring. But the keyring is never
opened because the ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED flag is not set.
Set ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED to allow automated / scripted
setup of encrypted volumes with FIDO2. If the PIN turns out to
be invalid, clear ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED to avoid retrying
and possible lockout.
Let's "spoil" access to TPM secrets when we boot into these two modes.
This matters in particular for storagetm: if the host gets exploited
while booted into storage target mode any secrets kept by the TPM might
remain accessible otherwise. By measuring a new "phase" word into PCR 11
we "blow the fuse" however on this boot.
(Note: we also change TEST-13-NSPAWN.machined.sh minimally here, because
it checks for byte precise output of a pty allocated for a service
invocation - which it's not going to get if it claims that the pty is an
all-powerful one. After all this PR ensures that we'll generate the new
OSC sequence on non-dumb terminals associated with services. Hence, set
TERM=dumb explicitly to ensure no ANSI sequences are generated, ever.
Which is a nice test btw that TERM=dumb really does its thing here.)
So far we conditioned the logic that issues ansi sequences for resetting
the TTY based on whether something is a pty is not (under the assumption
we need no reset on ptys, since they are shortlived).
This is simply wrong though. The pty that a container getty is invoked
on is generally long-lived: as long as the container is up, and it will
be reused between getty instances/sessions all the time. In such a case
we really should reset properly.
Let's instead make the logic dependent on whether TERM is set to
anything other than "dumb". The previous commit made sure we always set
TERM in a sensible way in systemd-run, hence this
*explicit* logic sounds like a much better choice now, as it mea