Unexpected cleanup of live X11 socket files was reported in #35182,
suggesting an underlying issue with the `!` boot safety switch for
tmpfiles.
Regardless of that bug, time-based cleanup of X11 sockets is likely to
be unwanted behaviour as systems often stay up for extended periods of
time, and cleanup of these directories based on age alone is liable to
cause issues at runtime for user sessions.
This adds the following device to AV production hwdb:
- ID 17cc:2420 Native Instruments Traktor MX2
Support for this new HID-based DJ controller was also recently
merged to Mixxx.
In https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2479961 a user
reported that they are confused that 'init 6' and such commands
do not work anymore. We removed support for the whole interface,
but it's likely that such commands persist in various scripts
and finger memories. Let's give a helpful hint that this inteface
is gone and what to use instead.
We shouldn't say that that they boot into "a … legacy target", because
they boot into the standard targets. Those names are just aliases now.
(And also the user is not required to know what SysV even is, so it
shouldn't be used in the main explanation.)
The claude bot keeps getting this wrong again and again:
Claude: nit: systemd coding style requires braces on both branches of
an if/else when one branch uses them. Here the if branch
is a single statement without braces but the else branch
uses braces
Specifically mention this is not the case in the coding style doc
to hopefully make it stop hallucinating this rule
TEST-60-MOUNT-RATELIMIT sometimes fails as it cannot see the 'left rate limit'
message in the journal. Tests relying on specific log messages are often flaky,
as the journal is lossy.
Change the test case to check for the desired outcome instead, as that also
catches regressions, without being over reliant on the journal.
Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/32712
We need a removal rule for systems where /tmp is not on tmpfs,
so that if they crash, stale sockets will be removed during boot.
OTOH, at runtime, those lock files must never be removed.
But since the 'r!' rule uses '!', it only applies during boot. With
the rule inactive, the usual time-based cleanup for /tmp/ was also
applied to those files, causing them to be removed after 10 days.
Fixes#35182.
4a1f92c704 added '!' through confusion:
the goal was probably to exclude those directories from cleanup at
runtime. But as discussed below, that exclusion is not needed. In fact,
we want the rule to be active during runtime, so that if the directory
were removed or wasn't created earlier for whatever reason, it'd be
created during one of those later runs too. This just makes the system
more robust.
Those directories are used for sockets, and tmpfiles will not remove
live sockets. So it is fine to run the cleanup on those directories,
it doesn't have any effect in normal circumstances. The only case where
the cleanup would matter would be if the service was running, crashed
without removing the socket, and the system would remain up for more
than 10 days after that. This is not a particularly likely scenario, but
OTOH, we can imaging that somebody tried to run Xorg, it didn't work,
and they switched to Wayland. Or their DE crashes every once in a while,
leaving some state behind. Keeping the cleanup in place seems OK, it
makes the system slightly more robust in fringe scenarios.
In fact, this cleanup will work better if we reduce the delay from
10 days to something small. systemd-tmpfiles-clean.timer runs once
per day, so the cleanup will not be very fast anyway. So use '1h' as
an arbitrary small value. (I think '0' would be risky, because it's
possible for the socket to be set up through a script where it's
created first and the service is connected to it, so it is momentarily
"not live". I think people used to do this. Not sure if that happens
anymore, but let's be safe.)
Co-authored-by: Jarl Gullberg <jarl.gullberg@visar-systems.com>
Map the Power Boost key (top-right corner, scancode 0x64) to KEY_PROG1.
Map the Touchpad Toggle key (Fn+F8, scancode 0x76) to KEY_F21.
Verified working via evtest:
Event: type 4 (EV_MSC), code 4 (MSC_SCAN), value 64
Event: type 1 (EV_KEY), code 148 (KEY_PROG1), value 1
Event: type 4 (EV_MSC), code 4 (MSC_SCAN), value 76
Event: type 1 (EV_KEY), code 206 (KEY_F21), value 1
DMI: svnInfinix:*pnY3Max:*
AT keyboard scancodes: 0x64, 0x76 (set 2)
- This synchronize the state for existing stuff.
- Enable translations for Plymouth interaction strings.
- Translate them in French as an example.
Fixes#42384.
This changes some lines and add translations related to resolved
policies and sysupdate policies.
Signed-off-by: Raito Bezarius <masterancpp@gmail.com>
When the accumulated trie key exceeds the fixed-size line buffer,
linebuf_get() returns NULL. trie_fnmatch_f() passed that NULL straight
into fnmatch() as the pattern, causing a SIGSEGV on a crafted hwdb.bin
(reachable now that recursion is capped rather than overflowing the
stack first). Treat the NULL like the other corruption checks and
return -EBADMSG.
Follow-up for 73fea38cf1
Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/42376
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When ssh-ing into a VM, you generally do not want to log
in as your user from the host. Let's default to the root
user unless a user is explicitly specified.
sshd reads AuthorizedKeysFile after dropping to the authenticating user's UID, so the
0400 credential file under %d/ is unreadable for non-root users. Materialize a 0444
copy in a RuntimeDirectory so the ephemeral key works for any user. */
Otherwise, it introduces cyclic dependencies:
```
systemd[1]: sockets.target: Found ordering cycle:
systemd-networkd-resolve-hook.socket/start after network-pre.target/start after
iptables.service/start after basic.target/start after sockets.target/start -
after systemd-networkd-resolve-hook.socket
systemd[1]: sockets.target: Job systemd-networkd-resolve-hook.socket/start deleted
to break ordering cycle starting with sockets.target/start
```
Follow-up for 37adb410a2.
Fixes#42353.
A hostile but structurally valid 382-byte PE32+ "EFI application" with a
single section whose VirtualSize is ~4 GiB and SizeOfRawData is 0 drives
uki_hash() into ~4.17 M iterations of SHA-256 over 1024 bytes of zeros
— wedging the parser for >10 s. Nine more slow-units share the same
shape. A separate MSAN finding from the new fuzzer (CIFuzz, memory
sanitizer) shows pe_load_headers() reading uninitialised heap memory
when SizeOfOptionalHeader is too small to actually contain
NumberOfRvaAndSizes.
Three tightenings in src/shared/pe-binary.c:
1. In pe_load_sections, reject sections whose PointerToRawData +
SizeOfRawData exceeds the actual file size. Raw section data must
fit inside the file; this is the parser-wide invariant
pe_hash / uki_hash / pe_read_section_data rely on.
2. In uki_hash, cap the (VirtualSize - SizeOfRawData) zero-padding
hash loop at 64 MiB. Real UKIs do not pad sections with tens of
MiB of zero-equivalent data; anything above this cap is a
malformed PE.
3. In pe_load_headers, reject a PE whose SizeOfOptionalHeader is too
small to cover up to NumberOfRvaAndSizes. Without this guard the
subsequent size-mismatch check reads uninitialised optional-header
bytes, caught by MSAN under CIFuzz.
Add the 382 B canonical reproducer (plus two structural siblings) and
the MSAN reproducer to test/fuzz/fuzz-pe-binary/. Also add a libFuzzer
harness in src/fuzz/fuzz-pe-binary.c and unit tests in
src/test/test-pe-binary.c that exercise each fix branch in isolation.
The 64 MiB hash boundary test is gated behind SYSTEMD_SLOW_TESTS so it
doesn't slow down emulated-arch CI.
This is a robustness fix, not a security fix: PE binaries consumed by
bootctl / systemd-stub / pcrlock / kernel-install / systemd-measure are
already trusted and signed at the consumer side, so the worst pre-fix
behaviour is wasted CPU on a UKI install / measure / inspect call.
Closes#42344.
Reported-by: AI-assisted libFuzzer campaign
Co-developed-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
We currently log at warning level:
/usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-udevd.service:56: System call bpf cannot be
resolved as libseccomp is not available, ignoring: Operation not supported
In the initrd, or in minimal installations, not installing libseccomp is
reasonable, depending on various other choices. We shouldn't make fuss
about this.
C.f. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2463540.
dependabot[bot]
Yu Watanabe
Luca Boccassi
George Tsiamasiotis
Petru Rebeja
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
Lennart Poettering
djantti
Oğuz Ersen
Temuri Doghonadze
Andrei Stepanov
Yuri Chornoivan
Poesty Li
Fco. Javier F. Serrador
joo es
Rafael Fontenelle
Anders Jonsson
Luna Jernberg
Ettore Atalan
Marek Adamski
김인수
Américo Monteiro
sykikxo
Hosted Weblate
Raito Bezarius
Daan De Meyer
jeffhuang
