Fixes for yeswehack reports (#40840)

This commit is contained in:
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
2026-02-26 17:55:52 +01:00
committed by GitHub
5 changed files with 34 additions and 28 deletions
+13 -15
View File
@@ -2115,12 +2115,13 @@ static int unit_update_cgroup(
return 0;
}
static int unit_attach_pid_to_cgroup_via_bus(Unit *u, pid_t pid, const char *suffix_path) {
static int unit_attach_pid_to_cgroup_via_bus(Unit *u, const char *cgroup_path, pid_t pid) {
_cleanup_(sd_bus_error_free) sd_bus_error error = SD_BUS_ERROR_NULL;
char *pp;
int r;
assert(u);
assert(cgroup_path);
assert(pid_is_valid(pid));
if (MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(u->manager))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2128,18 +2129,13 @@ static int unit_attach_pid_to_cgroup_via_bus(Unit *u, pid_t pid, const char *suf
if (!u->manager->system_bus)
return -EIO;
CGroupRuntime *crt = unit_get_cgroup_runtime(u);
if (!crt || !crt->cgroup_path)
return -EOWNERDEAD;
/* Determine this unit's cgroup path relative to our cgroup root */
pp = path_startswith(crt->cgroup_path, u->manager->cgroup_root);
const char *pp = path_startswith_full(cgroup_path,
u->manager->cgroup_root,
PATH_STARTSWITH_RETURN_LEADING_SLASH|PATH_STARTSWITH_REFUSE_DOT_DOT);
if (!pp)
return -EINVAL;
pp = strjoina("/", pp, suffix_path);
path_simplify(pp);
r = bus_call_method(u->manager->system_bus,
bus_systemd_mgr,
"AttachProcessesToUnit",
@@ -2172,8 +2168,10 @@ int unit_attach_pids_to_cgroup(Unit *u, Set *pids, const char *suffix_path) {
CGroupRuntime *crt = ASSERT_PTR(unit_get_cgroup_runtime(u));
if (isempty(suffix_path))
p = crt->cgroup_path;
p = empty_to_root(crt->cgroup_path);
else {
assert(path_is_absolute(suffix_path));
joined = path_join(crt->cgroup_path, suffix_path);
if (!joined)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -2189,7 +2187,7 @@ int unit_attach_pids_to_cgroup(Unit *u, Set *pids, const char *suffix_path) {
* before we use it */
r = pidref_verify(pid);
if (r < 0) {
log_unit_info_errno(u, r, "PID " PID_FMT " vanished before we could move it to target cgroup '%s', skipping: %m", pid->pid, empty_to_root(p));
log_unit_info_errno(u, r, "PID " PID_FMT " vanished before we could move it to target cgroup '%s', skipping: %m", pid->pid, p);
continue;
}
@@ -2199,7 +2197,7 @@ int unit_attach_pids_to_cgroup(Unit *u, Set *pids, const char *suffix_path) {
log_unit_full_errno(u, again ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_INFO, r,
"Couldn't move process "PID_FMT" to%s requested cgroup '%s': %m",
pid->pid, again ? " directly" : "", empty_to_root(p));
pid->pid, again ? " directly" : "", p);
if (again) {
int z;
@@ -2209,11 +2207,11 @@ int unit_attach_pids_to_cgroup(Unit *u, Set *pids, const char *suffix_path) {
* Since it's more privileged it might be able to move the process across the
* leaves of a subtree whose top node is not owned by us. */
z = unit_attach_pid_to_cgroup_via_bus(u, pid->pid, suffix_path);
z = unit_attach_pid_to_cgroup_via_bus(u, p, pid->pid);
if (z >= 0)
goto success;
log_unit_info_errno(u, z, "Couldn't move process "PID_FMT" to requested cgroup '%s' (directly or via the system bus): %m", pid->pid, empty_to_root(p));
log_unit_info_errno(u, z, "Couldn't move process "PID_FMT" to requested cgroup '%s' (directly or via the system bus): %m", pid->pid, p);
}
RET_GATHER(ret, r);
+6
View File
@@ -652,6 +652,12 @@ static int method_get_unit_by_control_group(sd_bus_message *message, void *userd
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (!path_is_absolute(cgroup))
return sd_bus_error_setf(reterr_error, SD_BUS_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, "Control group path is not absolute: %s", cgroup);
if (!path_is_normalized(cgroup))
return sd_bus_error_setf(reterr_error, SD_BUS_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, "Control group path is not normalized: %s", cgroup);
u = manager_get_unit_by_cgroup(m, cgroup);
if (!u)
return sd_bus_error_setf(reterr_error, BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_UNIT,
+13 -11
View File
@@ -1559,9 +1559,9 @@ static int property_get_effective_limit(
}
int bus_unit_method_attach_processes(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_error *reterr_error) {
Unit *u = ASSERT_PTR(userdata);
_cleanup_(sd_bus_creds_unrefp) sd_bus_creds *creds = NULL;
_cleanup_set_free_ Set *pids = NULL;
Unit *u = userdata;
const char *path;
int r;
@@ -1599,12 +1599,22 @@ int bus_unit_method_attach_processes(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Let's query the sender's UID, so that we can make our security decisions */
uid_t sender_uid;
r = sd_bus_creds_get_euid(creds, &sender_uid);
if (r < 0)
return r;
bool validate_ownership = sender_uid != 0 && sender_uid != getuid();
if (validate_ownership && !uid_is_valid(u->ref_uid)) /* process_is_owned_by_uid() requires a valid uid */
return sd_bus_error_setf(reterr_error, SD_BUS_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED,
"Refusing to attach processes to unit with unknown user credentials.");
r = sd_bus_message_enter_container(message, 'a', "u");
if (r < 0)
return r;
for (;;) {
_cleanup_(pidref_freep) PidRef *pidref = NULL;
uid_t sender_uid;
uint32_t upid;
r = sd_bus_message_read(message, "u", &upid);
@@ -1634,25 +1644,17 @@ int bus_unit_method_attach_processes(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Let's query the sender's UID, so that we can make our security decisions */
r = sd_bus_creds_get_euid(creds, &sender_uid);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Let's validate security: if the sender is root or the owner of the service manager, then
* all is OK. If the sender is any other user, then the process in question must be owned by
* both the sender and the target unit's UID. Note that ownership here means either direct
* ownership, or indirect via a userns that is owned by the right UID. */
if (sender_uid != 0 && sender_uid != getuid()) {
if (validate_ownership) {
r = process_is_owned_by_uid(pidref, sender_uid);
if (r < 0)
return sd_bus_error_set_errnof(reterr_error, r, "Failed to check if process " PID_FMT " is owned by client's UID: %m", pidref->pid);
if (r == 0)
return sd_bus_error_setf(reterr_error, SD_BUS_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED, "Process " PID_FMT " not owned by client's UID. Refusing.", pidref->pid);
if (!uid_is_valid(u->ref_uid)) /* process_is_owned_by_uid() requires a valid uid */
return sd_bus_error_setf(reterr_error, SD_BUS_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED, "Unit does not have a valid ref_uid, refusing to attach process " PID_FMT ".", pidref->pid);
r = process_is_owned_by_uid(pidref, u->ref_uid);
if (r < 0)
return sd_bus_error_set_errnof(reterr_error, r, "Failed to check if process " PID_FMT " is owned by target unit's UID: %m", pidref->pid);
+1 -1
View File
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ static int lookup_unit_by_parameters(
}
if (p->cgroup) {
if (!path_is_safe(p->cgroup))
if (!path_is_absolute(p->cgroup) || !path_is_normalized(p->cgroup))
return sd_varlink_error_invalid_parameter_name(link, "cgroup");
Unit *cgroup_unit = manager_get_unit_by_cgroup(manager, p->cgroup);
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2235,7 +2235,7 @@ _public_ int sd_json_variant_append_array(sd_json_variant **v, sd_json_variant *
if (old != *v)
/* Readjust the parent pointers to the new address */
for (size_t i = 1; i < size; i++)
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++)
(*v)[1 + i].parent = *v;
return json_variant_array_put_element(*v, element);