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vmspawn: bring external and internal enum value names back in sync

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We generally want that the exposed strings for enum values and the
internal names for them stay in sync. Let's make sure this is the case
for the ConfidentialComputing enum.

This just changes the internal names, so that they match the external
ones. No user visible change, just some search and replace.
This commit is contained in:
Lennart Poettering
2026-09-21 12:37:25 +02:00
committed by Luca Boccassi
parent 5d414df040
commit ada6409d6a
3 changed files with 17 additions and 17 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
src/vmspawn/vmspawn-settings.c
+3 -3
View File
@@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ static const char *const firmware_table[_FIRMWARE_MAX] = {
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(firmware, Firmware);
static const char *const confidential_computing_table[_COCO_MAX] = {
[COCO_NO] = "no",
[COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP] = "sev-snp",
[COCO_INTEL_TDX] = "tdx",
[COCO_NO] = "no",
[COCO_SEV_SNP] = "sev-snp",
[COCO_TDX] = "tdx",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(confidential_computing, ConfidentialComputing);
src/vmspawn/vmspawn-settings.h
+2 -2
View File
@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ typedef enum Firmware {
typedef enum ConfidentialComputing {
COCO_NO,
COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP,
COCO_INTEL_TDX,
COCO_SEV_SNP,
COCO_TDX,
_COCO_MAX,
_COCO_INVALID = -EINVAL,
} ConfidentialComputing;
src/vmspawn/vmspawn.c
+12 -12
View File
@@ -2513,8 +2513,8 @@ static int prepare_device_info(const char *runtime_dir, MachineConfig *c) {
* deviate slightly from our own names for the same modes (cf. confidential_computing_to_string()):
* "sev-snp" vs. "amd-sev-snp", and "tdx" vs. "intel-tdx". */
static const char* const coco_firmware_feature_table[_COCO_MAX] = {
[COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP] = "amd-sev-snp",
[COCO_INTEL_TDX] = "intel-tdx",
[COCO_SEV_SNP] = "amd-sev-snp",
[COCO_TDX] = "intel-tdx",
};
DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(coco_firmware_feature, ConfidentialComputing);
@@ -2760,11 +2760,11 @@ static int run_virtual_machine(int kvm_device_fd, int vhost_device_fd) {
return r;
}
if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP) {
if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_SEV_SNP) {
r = qemu_config_key(config_file, "confidential-guest-support", "snp0");
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_INTEL_TDX) {
} else if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_TDX) {
r = qemu_config_key(config_file, "confidential-guest-support", "tdx0");
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -2962,7 +2962,7 @@ static int run_virtual_machine(int kvm_device_fd, int vhost_device_fd) {
return r;
}
if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP) {
if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_SEV_SNP) {
/* SNP marks encrypted guest pages via the "C-bit" in the page table entry. On all
* SNP-capable processors (Milan and later) the C-bit lives at bit 51, which reduces
* the usable guest physical address space by one bit.
@@ -2976,7 +2976,7 @@ static int run_virtual_machine(int kvm_device_fd, int vhost_device_fd) {
"kernel-hashes", "on");
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_INTEL_TDX) {
} else if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_TDX) {
r = qemu_config_section(config_file, "object", "tdx0",
"qom-type", "tdx-guest");
if (r < 0)
@@ -3036,9 +3036,9 @@ static int run_virtual_machine(int kvm_device_fd, int vhost_device_fd) {
* CPU model. */
const char *cpu_model =
#ifdef __x86_64__
arg_confidential_computing == COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP ? "EPYC-v4" :
arg_confidential_computing == COCO_INTEL_TDX ? "host" :
"max,hv_relaxed,hv-vapic,hv-time";
arg_confidential_computing == COCO_SEV_SNP ? "EPYC-v4" :
arg_confidential_computing == COCO_TDX ? "host" :
"max,hv_relaxed,hv-vapic,hv-time";
#else
"max";
#endif
@@ -3616,7 +3616,7 @@ static int run_virtual_machine(int kvm_device_fd, int vhost_device_fd) {
* /.extra/system_credentials/, so we keep this scoped to SNP for now. Non-SNP guests
* continue to use the SMBIOS path below, which works with older systemd versions too.
* Must run after all credential-mutating calls above so the cpio captures the complete set. */
bool use_initrd_cpio = arg_confidential_computing == COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP &&
bool use_initrd_cpio = arg_confidential_computing == COCO_SEV_SNP &&
arg_credentials.n_credentials > 0;
_cleanup_(unlink_and_freep) char *credentials_cpio_path = NULL;
@@ -4225,7 +4225,7 @@ static int verify_arguments(void) {
"confidential computing firmware is stateless. Use 'off' or 'auto'.");
}
if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_AMD_SEV_SNP) {
if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_SEV_SNP) {
if (native_architecture() != ARCHITECTURE_X86_64)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"--coco=sev-snp is only supported on x86_64.");
@@ -4248,7 +4248,7 @@ static int verify_arguments(void) {
"so kernel, initrd and cmdline are covered by the launch measurement.");
}
if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_INTEL_TDX) {
if (arg_confidential_computing == COCO_TDX) {
if (native_architecture() != ARCHITECTURE_X86_64)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"--coco=tdx is only supported on x86_64.");